Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 23 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Actions Austin
 
Books on Amazon
III 36f
Action / Austin: actions are very different - szneezing, to, win wars: life is not simply a sequence of actions - excuse does not match every verb - a way to characterize actions - e.g. "voluntarily" / AustinVsRyle: this is not a characteristic of actions such as "truth," not of assertions - rather a name of a dimension
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Behaviorism Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 115f
Behaviorism/VsRyle/Rorty: 1) It is impossible to give a description of behavioral dispositions which does not consist in an infinitely long list. 2) "Necessity", of whatever kind, does not depend on "meaning" here, but simply reflects the fact that we usually characterize behavior in a certain way. Necessity as little a "linguistic" or "conceptual" one as the necessary link between the redness of the stove and the fire in the stove. ((s) behavior depends on description.)
3) It is merely a philosophical paradox that only comes to the mind of someone who is chased by instrumentalist or verificationist dogmas, and is constantly eager to reduce any non-observable to the observable to avoid any risk to believe in something unreal.
I 115
Rorty: all three are justified, yet you get the feeling that the behaviorism is on to something right. But you will not say one day, "Okay, no feelings, i.e. no mental states, i.e. no people"
I 116
Behaviorism: Point: he makes it clear that the question of the harder philosophers: "Are there mental states or are there no mental states?" are thus more pointless the more often they are asked. RortyVsRyle: he should have said that incorrigibility is simply a function of the practice of justification. It was wrong to speak of a necessary and sufficient condition for the attribution of feelings.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Behaviorism Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 118
SellarsVsRyle: 1) the parallel statement about macro/micro-phenomena does not compel into the operationalist thesis that there can be no micro-entities (f.o.th.). 2) Similarly, the fact that behavior is evidence for sensations ( "built into the logic" of sensation concepts) does not mean that there can be no sensations. Privileged status: is not logically, but merely empirically privileged. (Prerequisite for Sellars, however, was Quine's attack on the distinction between logical and empirical.) Ryle's error was: the evidence of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that in reality there were no internal states. Just as wrong as the instrument's cunning approach: "There are no positrons, there are merely dispositions of electrons to...", "there are no physical objects, there are merely dispositions of sense data to...".
---
Rorty VI 182
Behavior/Sellars: a difference which is not apparent in behavior is not a difference that makes a difference ---
Sellars I XXIXf
Methodological Behaviorism (Sellars): VsLogical behaviorism. Logical behaviorism: is essentially a thesis on the meaning of mental terms. (Carnap, Hempel) mainly concentrated on 'pain' as a psychological predicate.
PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: E.g. "Super Spartans" who never expressed their pain in any way.
Methodological Behaviorism: (Sellars) introduces mental terms with view to observable behavior, but does not maintain that these terms should be defined in terms of behavior.
---
I 91
Behaviorism: also requires theoretical terms (to assume thoughts).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Consciousness Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Rorty I 60
Consciousness: Antiquity had no name for it.
III 37/38
RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: their doubts about whether there is something like ’mind’ or ’consciousness’ have to do with the idea of ​​a medium between the self and reality, a medium that realists consider to be transparent and skeptics to be opaque. Rorty: there is no medium.
VI 176
Consciousness/Rorty: What outcome do we want to see as a result of our research? Why would we want to change our intuitive conceptions? Neither intuition nor ambitious pursuit yield an Archimedean point.
Frank I 584
Consciousness/Rorty: does not really exist in the sense of a separate area of ​​the mental - mental events are conventions, a contingent language play - thesis: it can be abolished without loss.
Rorty I 132
Mental/Ryle/Rorty: thesis: mental states like opinions, desires, etc. are properties not of the consciousness but of the person.
III 37
Consciousness/mind/RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: mind or consciousness are not a medium between oneself and reality.
III 67
Consciousness/Kant/Rorty: two parts: a) reasonable: same in everyone b) empirically contingent. - In contrast: Freud: treats rationality as a mechanism that adjusts contingencies to other contingencies. - Plato: (State) conscience = internalized parents and society. - Reason/Kant: general principles - FreudVsKant: return to the special. - Kant: honest people are paradigmatic. - Freud: nothing human is paradigmatic.
VI 147
Consciousness/behavior/Wittgenstein/Rorty: wrong question: Is the behavior a different fact than consciousness? - Wittgenstein: we should not try to come between language and object.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Dispositions Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Frank I 594
Disposition/realism/RortyVsArmstrong: the realistic conception of dispositions implies that physicalism must be true - then physicalism would be no empirical scientific truth (or theory) anymore.
Frank I 595
Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: the phenomenalist, unlike the realist, cannot explain dispositions ((s) otherwise circular, because dispositions can also only be described) - He cannot explain why counterfactual conditionals are true.
Rorty I 115
Disposition/RortyVsRyle: 1) no necessary (conceptual, linguistic) connection between sensation and disposition as between heat and redness - Rorty: nevertheless, behaviorism is on the track of something right - it makes clear that the question "mental or not mental" becomes pointless.
I 119
Dosposition/SellarsVsRyle/RortyVsRyle: his mistake was: proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that there are no internal states in reality - (f.o.th.) - Wittgenstein: (PU § 308) the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things and leave their nature open.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Everyday Language Cavell
 
Books on Amazon
I 39
Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: one usually assumes that the reference to the everyday language refutes skepticism. Vs: this can be refuted itself.
We have to deal with the everyday language, when it is interpreted as the source of independent data, independently of certain philosophical positions or theories.
---
I 40
Otherwise the skeptic would be accused, in a biased way, that the obvious conflict between words and the world would be unclear to him or that he would not be able to address this conflict. Skepticism/Cavell: a serious refutation must show that the person who is as capable of understanding English as we are and knows everything we know has no real use for the words of the everyday language.
How can you show that? A decisive step would be to be able to show the skeptic (also the one who one has inside oneself) that you know what his words say in his opinion. (Not necessarily what they mean according to his opinion, as if they had a special or technical meaning).
So we need to understand his position from within.
---
I 41
Skepticism/everyday language/Cavell: the reference to the ordinary language does not refute the skeptic: 1. will not surprise him; 2. one is obviously misunderstanding him. Regarding the use of the language, we agree anyway.
---
Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

II 170
Everyday language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them:
Type I statement: "We say ...... but we do not say ...."
Type II statement: The addition of type I statement by explanations.
Type III statement: Generalizations.

Ryle: Thesis: when we use the word "voluntarily", it is with an action that we would not normally do.
---
II 172
Cavell thesis: Native speakers generally do not need to know what they can say in their language. They, themselves, are the source of such statements.
MatesVs intuition and memory in terms of correct speech.

CavellVsMates: Intuition is also not necessary at all. I do not need to remember the hour I learned something and not a perfect memory for my speaking. One does not remember the language; it is spoken.
---
II 173
CavellVsRyle: requires an explicit explanation (type II statement): for this he is generally also authorized, but precisely in relation to his example "voluntarily", the generalization fails: ---
II 174
(> e.g. Austin: voluntary gift).

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Forms of Thinking Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 118
SellarsVsRyle: the parallel indication of macro/micro-phenomena does not force upon us the operationalist hypothesis that there cannot be micro-entities. ---
Rorty I 261
Sellars: each model has its comment.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Knowledge Hare
 
Books on Amazon
II R. M. Hare Philosophische Entdeckungen in Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

Grewendorf II 142
Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: It may be that we know something without being able to say what we know. E.g. How a particular word is used, or a particular dance is danced. HenleVsRyle: but this should not be extended to speech situations.
---
II 143
It is by no means clear that one can always know how a word is used, even if one cannot say how it is used.
Knowledge/Saying/HareVsHenle: in language, however, this is perhaps clearer than anywhere else.
E.g. If we explain the use of an expression, we do not have to use it ourselves. Consequently, we can fully know its use in all contexts, even without being able to say how it is needed.
For example, a child may have learned the use of the word "father", and use it correctly, but perhaps cannot tell how it is used because it has not yet learned the use of "to mean"!

Henle confuses the ability
"to decide for logical reasons" whether a statement is true to use the term with the ability
"the statement is logically true".
Confusion/mentioning/use: (Doing without knowledge).
Hare: anyone who does not know how to use the term "logical true" could do the former, but not the latter.
---
Grewendorf II
Menon/Socrates: Question: What is the good? Menon: how can you look for something if you do not know what you are looking for, and when you have found it, how do you know it is what you were looking for? (Knowledge/saying). ---
II 151
Socrates: if we already knew, we would not have asked the first question. So philosophizing can never begin, or it can never lead to a conclusion. Solution/Hare: the solution lies in the distinction between knowing how a dance goes and the ability to also tell how it goes. Before beginning the investigation, we can do the former but not the latter. We could start because we could do the former all the time.
VsMenon: you already know what the good is, i.e. you can pick it out.


Meg II
G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle
Linguistik und Philosophie Frankfurt 1995
Memory Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 224
Memory/tacit knowledge/HintikkaVsRyle: one can also use his own memory as a source of knowledge. This is what Sherlock Holmes does with his conversation partners ("deductions").

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Mental States Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Wittgenstein, Strawson: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes
I 28
Non-spatiality is not a clear criterion for a mental state, because the concept of the state is so unclear, neither spatial nor non-spatial. I 77f Ryle: opinions, wishes and feelings (traits of reason and character) can be thought of as something that requires the human itself as a substrate, and not a non-material medium. This is more difficult with sensations, mental images and thoughts. (> Animal). I 76ff
State: this above argument makes it so easy to consider sensations, etc. not as states of things, but rather as things themselves. (RortyVs).
This allows some contemporary philosophers to afford mental things without a soul. I 80
Def neutral monism: considers the mental and the material as two "aspects" of an underlying reality. - reality accessible with intuition (Bergson) - Reality also to be identified with the material and the perception (Russell, Ayer) - The only way to escape skepticism. (Dewey, James)
I 106f
RortyVs: you cannot find a "neutral material" which is neither mental nor physical, and has its own powers and dispositions. Therefore, you simply postulate it. But that does not help.
Frank I 581
Mental/Rorty: a) Events: sensations, thoughts, etc. - b) states that are no events: opinions, moods, intentions, etc.
Rorty I 60
Idea/mind/Antiquity/Rorty: antiquity had no concept of the mental and no concept of a mind separated from the body - no concept of idea - no concept of consciousness - idea: new with Locke - only makes epistemology possible.
I 117
Mind/mental/RortyVsRyle: Ryle believed to have avoided the image of the mirror, but he failed in the attempt to prove that there are no uncorrectable reports.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Mind Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 11
Mind/Chalmers: conscious experience is not all there is to the mind. Cognitive sciences has had almost nothing to say about consciousness, but about mind in general as the internal basis of behaviour. Mind/Chalmers: a) phenomenal concept of mind: the conscious experience of mental states. That is what I will concentrate on.
b) The psychological concept as a causal or explanatory basis of behaviour.
ChalmersVsDescartes: Descartes may have been partly responsible for a conflation of the two concepts.
I 14
Mind/Psychology/Ryle/Chalmers: in philosophy, the shift in emphasis form the phenomenal to the psychological was codified by Gilbert Ryle (1949) who argued that all our mental concepts can be analysed in terms of certain kinds of associated behaviour, or in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways (E. g. Lycan 1987). ChalmersVsRyle: Ryle intended all mental concepts to fall within the grasp of his analysis. It seems to me that this view is a nonstarter as an analysis of our phenomenal concepts such as sensation and consciousness itself.
But Ryle’s analysis provided a suggestive approach to many other mental notions, such as believing, enjoying, wanting, pretending and remembering.
ChalmersVsRyle: technical problems: 1. It is natural to suppose that mental states cause behaviour, but if mental states are themselves behavioural then it is hard to see how they could do the job.
2. it was argued (Chisholm, 1957, Geach, 1957) that no mental state could be defined by a single range of behavioural dispositions, independent of any other mental states. E.g. if one believes that it is raining, one’s behavioural dispositions will vary depending on whether one has the desire to get wet. It is therefore necessary to invoke other mental states in characterizing the behavioural dispositions. (GeachVsRyle, ChisholmVsRyle).

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Motives Ryle
 
Books on Amazon
Danto II 323
Motive / Ryle / Danto: motives are not causes. - Motivational explanations are law-like sentences. - AnscombeVsRyle: this is only possible for generalizations - a design for a one time lie would dispose one to constant lies.
Ryle I 110 ff
Motive / Ryle: not accompanied by feeling! - dispostional, not causal - to recognize by regularity - lawlike - alien motives are recognizable as well as own motives.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Non-Existence Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 37
Non-existent objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects in the actual world. (> Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka. Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: test: is the paraphrase valid?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction ".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
---
I 38
Ontology/Language/Linguistically/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability decide on ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: it's about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels.
N.B.: even if they have some, they would be just fictional!
Model theory/Hintikka: the model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) "true in the model", means it is true in the story that the bullets are there).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: ask for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions are syntactic.
Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a referent. That is, it is a commitment to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.
---
I 39
Non-existent objects/substance/world/Tractatus/Hintikka: the reason why Wittgenstein postulated his "objects" as the substance of the world, ((s) which cannot be increased or diminished), is that their existence cannot be expressed. ---
I 103
Non-existence/not well-defined/HintikkaVsMontague: the Montague semantics does not allow the question of existence or non-existence to be meaningless because an individual is not well-defined in a world. ((s) Because in Montague the domain of individuals is assumed to be constant). Individual domain/solution/Hintikka: we have to allow that the individual domain is not constant. But Problem:
Quantification/belief context/existence/truth/Hintikka: in the following example we must presuppose existence so that the proposition can be true:
(11) John is looking for a unicorn and Mary is looking for it too. ((a) the same unicorn).
((s) numbering sic, then continue with (8)
Range/Quantifier/Hintikka: in the only natural reading of (11) one has to assume that the range of the implicit quantifier is such that "a unicorn" has a wider range than "searches/looks for".
((s) that is, that both are looking for the same unicorn.) Problem: how can one know whether both subjects believe in the same individual?)

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Non-Existence Parsons
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 37
Non-Existential Objects/Unrealized Possibilities/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: Thesis: there are non-existent objects, namely in the actual world. (> Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: the philosophers who reject them have thought too strongly in syntactic paths.
Hintikka: Thesis: one has to answer the question rather semantically (model-theoretically).
Fiction/Ryle: test: Does the paraphrase apply?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryle's test fails in cases like e.g. "Mr. Pickwick is a fiction".
HintikkaVsParsons: the relevance of the criterion is questionable at all.
---
I 38
Ontology/Language/Linguistic/HintikkaVsRyle: how should linguistic questions such as paraphrasability make decisions about ontological status? Solution/Hintikka: for the question whether there are non-existent objects: model theory.
E.g. Puccini's Tosca: here, it is about whether the soldiers have bullets in their rifle barrels.
N.B.: even if they had some, these would be just fictional ones!
Model theory/Hintikka: model theory provides a serious answer. ((s) is "true in the model", means, it is true in the story that the bullets are there).
HintikkaVsParsons: one should not argue too strongly syntactically, i.e. not merely ask what conclusions can be drawn and which cannot.
Acceptance/Acceptability/Inferences/Hintikka: asking for the acceptability of inferences and of language and intuitions is syntactic.
Singular terms/ontological obligation/existence/Parsons: Parsons argues that the use of singular terms obliges us to an existential generalization. And so on a speaker. That is, it is a commitment to an inference.
HintikkaVsParsons.

ParCh I
Ch. Parsons
Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014

ParTa I
T. Parsons
The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967

ParTe I
Ter. Parsons
Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Perception Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 255
FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectancy system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent of the physical uniformities of stimuli among one another.
Rorty I 255
RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe be so abstract at all? Presumably, we must be able to identify similarities. But then we do not need the idea of ​​a "non-abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this. E.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the contents of a package of chocolate cookies are also potentially infinite.
Rorty: so if we talk about "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract.
Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires the postulation of other control systems or they are not learned at all.
Either 1) infinite regress, because what is true for recognition would also need to apply for learning.
Or 2) we end up back at Ryle: people have an ability that they have not learned.
Rorty I 269
Fodor: rehabilitates the traditional British theories of perception: "it is an empirical question whether psychological processes are computer processes! If they are, our perception must work in a way that a description of the environment that is not done in a vocabulary whose terms represent values ​​of physical variables, is calculated on the basis of a description made in such a vocabulary.
I Rorty 269
Fodor: why shouldn t there be stimuli for the whole organism? Then you could discover a stimulus variant "bottle". Perception: requires the choice of an independent vocabulary for the representation of the inputs. Fodor s thesis: all perceptual knowledge is transferred by the activity of sensory transducers.
Rorty I 269
Fodor: if we do not want to realize the talk of the information processing, we need to use something that our subject need not necessarily know as its input. Rorty question (see above): could it turn out that the input is not completed on the retina but half way or elsewhere? Fodor presumes: yes, it jsut depends on which design of the black box the organism can best be considered to be split into converter and processor, so that the best theory comes out.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Privileged Access Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 119f
Dosposition / SellarsVsRyle / RortyVsRyle: his error was: to assume that a proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states showed that there were no internal states in reality. - (DF) - Wittgenstein (PI § 308), the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things, and leave open what their nature is.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Privileged Access Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 118
SearleVsRyle: Vs privileged access: spatial metaphor - for it, I would have to differ from my interior, but I do not.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Rylean Ancestors Pauen
 
Books on Amazon
V 91
Sellars/Pauen: thesis: our seemingly direct experience of mental states is the product of theoretical generalizations. - Question: how could such a theory arise, if one does not know the (everyday psychological postulated) mental states from their own experience? - Solution: Rylean ancestors: Step 1: Language and ideas are exclusively linked to behavioral dispositions and verbal expressions - Step 2: attribution of internal states, so thoughts. ---
V 91
Rylean ancestors/Sellars/Pauen: thesis: we do not know our mental states from own experience. - Solution: 1. Language and ideas relate only to behavior - 2. after that attribution of "thoughts"- one knows mental states (e.g. thoughts) not from the first-person perspective. - We do not have direct access to our inner states - only mediated through everyday psychology. ---
V 105
VsSellars/VsRylean ancestors/Pauen: implausible, how should one has ever come up with the idea to explain behavior with the attribution of mental states if one had not known them before from own experience. ---
V 106
Sellars disregards that an explanation is conceivable even without such attributions.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Seeing Ryle
 
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I 336 f
Seeing / Vision / Ryle: we can only see lifelike something that we do not really see - RyleVsHume: he confuses: presentation (falsely) perception of ghosts - or echo of perception (shadowy).
I 366
Seeing and hearing is no activity - neither observable nor unobservable. - ((s) LuhmannVsRyle: observation of observation).

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Sensations Sellars
 
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I XIIf
Sensation/Sellars: is not passive. ---
I 9
Sensation/Sellars: can be acquired through learning (symbols) - also factual knowledge - Conclusion (RyleVs) is irrelevant - neither epistemically nor physically - not to be equated with thoughts. ---
I 46
Sensation/Sellars: No idea - Learning: is activity - Experience: object. ---
I 77
Inner episodes: Ryle: Category error - SellarsVsRyle: sensations as inner episodes are not an error but with other inner episodes (thoughts) intersubjectively explainable.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Terminology Ryle
 
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Geach I 94
Namely rider/Ryle/GeachVsRyle: does not help if a sentence does not designate: E.g [The only one who has ever stolen a book of Snead] (namely Robinson) made a lot of money by selling it - we memorize from that: Robinson made a lot of money by selling it. ---
Geach I 255
Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code-style": misleading that p does not have to be alleged. - E.g. "if p then q, but p, therefore q" - conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are not statements - statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals - Ryle: here the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p" , as the "code style" suggests, but rather a "final ticket", a "license for the conclusion": "p, therefore q - solution/Geach: propositions, not allegations. ---
Ryle I 58
E.g. semi disopsitional/semi episodicall:"careful", "unswerving", etc. - nothing extra - manner. ---
I 93ff
Voluntary/Ryle: use too extended - laughter cannot be intentional - not "responsible" for punctual schoolwork. ---
I 97
Wrong: to define voluntariness as the child of voluntary acts. - But being fully committed in the matter with the mind. ---
I 174 f
Success words: Healing, proving, recognizing, knowledge, observation, can, win, solve, find - cannot be performed incorrectly.
Tendency to disease is different than habit - preference is unlike investment: (you would leave it if you would get the money like this).
---
I 195
Mix- categorical/Ryle: E.g. act obediently, E.g. bird moves south. ---
I 199ff
Power words/task words: difference: travel/arrive - treat/heal - grab/hold - search/find - see/catch sight of - listen/hear - aim/meet - performance may be accidental. ---
I 245ff
Thoughtless speech/Ryle: not frankness - but that which we are most interested in - no self-explanation - does not contribute to our knowledge. ---
I 248
One cannot answer "How do you know?". ---
I 297
Mix-categorical: usually partly general, partly hypothetical: E.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry. ---
II 261
Definition Mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states. ---
II 267
Defintion theme-neutral/Flor: are statements in which words such as "anything" or "anyone", "someone", or "something" are used. ---
Sellars I 53
Defintion mixed-categorical-hypothetical/mix-categorical/Ryle :: manifestations of associative connections of the word object- and of the word-word type.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Thinking Dennett
 
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II 58
Thinking/Animal/Dennett: can dogs think? Problem: An idea must be composed of certain concepts. Question of the description or formulation: E.g. bowl with meat, bucket with feed, "the delicious stuff that tastes so and so" ...
Translation: Could we, for example, just express the exact thought the dog thinks in German? If not, dogs can either not think at all or their thoughts cannot be expressed, and thus lie beyond our horizon.
II 157
Thinking/Speech/Dennett: All in all, these considerations suggest that our way of thinking had to wait for speech to develop. Speech, in turn, had to wait for keeping of secrets to develop, and that in turn required the development of a certain complexity of the environment.
II 202
DennettVsRyle: notorious are his assertions that thinking could only take place in the public world and would not need to occur in a personal place.
II 190
Speech/Thinking/Dennett: no thinking without speech - (Thinking is not the same as consciousness (see above) E.g. dog has no concept of cat as an animal).

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Thinking Ryle
 
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Dennett II 201
DennettVsRyle: his assertions are notorious, thinking could only take place in the public world and should not take place at personal place. ---
ad Ryle I 29
Language/thinking/Ryle/(s): monologue requires dialogue. ---
Ryle I 317
Thinking/Ryle: how to derive something from already established facts, we learn in reality like we play chess, cycle, or learn to recognize goalposts, namely by practice, perhaps supported by some instruction. ---
I 386
Thinking/Ryle: no self-talk - no symbolic operation (at least not consciously) - Dealing with symbols must be no application. - Also thoughtless speech makes sense.
---
I 390
Thinking/Ryle: a) work - b) disposition to opinions, results of work - nothing hidden.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969


Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

The author or concept searched is found in the following 33 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Rorty Vs Armstrong, D.
 
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Richard Rorty
Frank I 583
Incorrigibility/RortyVsArmstrong: no epistemic notion of truth: that not to say "implies its own truth". Instead: conventional standards of the respective culture!Later: RortyVsRorty: should science produce a disagreement Ex retinal images with the reports of a person: as in hallucination the representation may then indeed be false, without rendering the report of the hallucinating subject wrong!
Rorty: "There are no recognized methods to resolve doubts about p if p fits into a pattern of sincere reports of the subject S, even if p does not fit into a general theory".
I 584
Rorty adjusts to the "ontology of the man on the street", who would have a hard time without mental entities in the foreseeable future. Rorty thesis: before we give up incorrigibility, we may one day abandon the mentalist speech.
I 589
mental state/Armstrong: This term refers to what is being caused by certain stimuli and causes certain reactions - whatever that may be.
I 590
RortyVsArmstrong: if that were true, we could never understand the contrast between a) materialism and dualism or b) the mental and the physical or c) materialism and behaviorism.
I 591
mental state/Armstrong: Ex a specific condition of the liver can cause ill-tempered behavior. Problem: What characterizes mental states compared to others? Complexity?
I 592
Problem: if the complexity of the cause to achieve complex effects is missing. Sufficiently complex processes occur only when the causal chain has reached the brain.
Solution/Armstrong: our notion of a mental state is the notion of a "cause, the complexity which reflects the complexity of the behavior that it is capable of producing".
RortyVs: confuses the degree of complexity of physical and mental states.
RortyVsArmstrong: presupposes already, it were part of our concept of the mental state that it must be identified with one or another physiological process.
I 595
Identity theory/Rorty: its significance lies in the statement that the entities of which one has always thought that they could not be physical, now turn out to be physical. If materialism is made a truth a priori this pointe is missing.
VsArmstrong: when in his "ontologically neutral" analysis the mental is a mere deputy (and nothing in itself), then one side of the distinction is missing. There is nothing that could turn out to be identical to physical particles!
RortyVsArmstrong/RortyVsRyle: mental entities that yby their nature can not be physical must be maintained, because otherwise no identity could be adopted.
Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: unlike the realist, the phenomenalist cannot explain dispositions. ((s) otherwise circular because dispositions can also only be described).
He can not explain why counterfactual conditionals are true.
I 607
The Mental/RortyVsArmstrong: whether an entity is mental does not determine whether it explains behavior, and whether a property is mental, can not determine whether it is the property of a physical entity or not. Only feature: incorrigibility.
Incorrigibility/Armstrong: A believes that p logically implies (p).
Fra I 608
RortyVsArmstrong: I want to avoid necessities. 1. because of Quine's doubts about "natural" necessities).
2. Otherwise we would conclude that the meaning of the terms "thinking" and "thought" made it impossible to have false opinions, what one believes.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Behaviorism Identity Theory Vs Behaviorism
 
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Lanz I 279
Identity theory: the attempt to defend the status of mental phenomena as inner episodes in light of the weaknesses of behaviorism (RyleVs), without falling back into dualism. Elements of conscious experience are identical to processes and states in the brain.
Lanz I 281
Identity theory VsBehaviorism (Place / SmartVsRyle: sensations = physical states) - later: Lewis / Armstrong: even thoughts).
Behaviorism Sellars Vs Behaviorism
 
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I 89
Behaviorism/Sellars: does not analyze existing psychological concepts but constructs new concepts. Also does not deny the privileged access. Also does not deny that these mental states can be adequately described with everyday words such as "Belief", "Doubt", "Desires" and so on. It also does not deny that there is such a thing as introspection, nor that it is at least halfway reliable. (However, not according to the image of perception). It works on the basis of everyday mental concepts.
I 90
Besides that behaviorism recommends to start all over again with the conceptualization. The scientific behaviorism does not defend the thesis that folk psychological concepts can be attributed to behavioral concepts ("Philosophical" behaviorism). It rather says: maybe not mentalistic concepts, but the concepts used by me can be attributed to behavior.
SellarsVsBehaviorism: e.g. just as little as chemistry was calculated on the basis of concepts that can be explicitly defined by recourse to the observable properties and behavior of chemical substances.
I 91
That concludes that some behaviorist concepts must be introduced as theoretical concepts! Theoretical Termini/Sellars: are not only not defined in behaviorist psychology in terms of open behavior but also just as little in terms of nerves, synapses, neurons irritation, etc.! A behaviorist theory of behavior is not already as such a physiological explanation of behavior.
So that a structure of theoretical concepts is suitable to provide explanations for behavior, the theoretical concepts do not have to be identified with the concepts of neurophysiology. However, it operates under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system.
The behavioral theory is not fixed from the start to a physiological identification of all their concepts.
- - -
I XXIX
Methodological Behaviorism/Sellars: VsLogical Behaviorism.
I XXX
Logical Behaviorism/Sellars: is essentially a thesis on the importance of mental terms. Carnap, Hempel: they concentrated mainly on "pain" as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: e.g. "Superspartans" who never express their pain in any form.
I XXXI
Ryle: tried to analyze all mental predicates as the expressions of behavioral dispositions. However, as theoretical concepts disposition expressions cannot easily be identified with the conditions for verification of a disposition. Carnap: intelligence test: someone may fail without us denying him at once any intelligence. Carnap here VsLogical Behaviorism: otherwise you would indeed be forced to define the intelligence through test conditions as the logical behaviorism had assumed. Def Methodological Behaviorism/SellarsVsRyle/Sellars: admittedly introduces mental terms in reference to the observable behavior but does not hold onto the fact that these terms should be defined in reference to the behavior. (Or, what is the same: that psychological statements must be fully translated into statements about observable behavior).

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Cavell, St. Fodor Vs Cavell, St.
 
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III 222
Voluntary/CavellVsRyle: Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense.
III 224
FodorVsCavell: Fallacy: Cavell overlooks the difference between what a native speaker says (when speaking) and what a native speaker says about what he and others say (metalinguistic comments). However, the latter need not be true for the linguist to begin his investigation. Cavell has not shown that an empirical description is possible only if the metalinguistic assertions are true. If the linguist wanted to separate true findings from false ones before he starting with the description of the language, he would have to know a whole lot about the language before he begins with his work. If you cordon off empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant, you make a distinction without a difference. Distinction Without Difference/Fodor: E.g. when differentiating empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant.
III 225
Cavell: empirical are E.g. statements of native speakers about the phonology of the language, but not statements about syntax and semantics. FodorVsCavell: 1) this is inconsistent: conversely, every argument that shows that the native speaker is privileged to findings about syntax and semantics would equally show that he is privileged to such about the phonology. That would be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument, because then the native speaker could never err about pronunciation (?). 2) Even if CavellVsRyle was right, that would not show that Ryle’s error is not empirical. Language/Empiricism/Cavell: his position is very extreme. Since he refers to the findings of native speakers as the truths of transcendental logic, he actually excludes the relevance of empirical confirmation! FodorVsCavell: he overlooks the fact that there are infinitely many findings that require empirical confirmation: E.g. "My name is not Stanley Cavell"... etc.
FodorVsCavell: 1) error: the assumption that we could only question the findings in a sensible way if there is a specific reason to believe they might be wrong. This makes credulity a virtue and philosophy a vice.
III 230
FodorVsCavell: 2) admittedly: it would be extraordinary to request reasons if we were often mistaken about what we say. Fodor: but if we are only sometimes mistaken, then it is always appropriate to demand reasons! From Cavell’s view it follows, however, that even if our lives depended on it, it would not be appropriate to question the findings! FodorVsCavell: 3) wrong assumption that what we say about our language is rarely wrong. He overlooks his own distinction between type I and type II findings. He is certainly right that we do not often err about type I.
Fodor: but we can often be mistaken with respect to type II findings: they are a kind of theory, an abstract representation of context properties. (see above III 220 Type I Findings: "We say...... but we do not say...." ((s) use findings) Type II Findings: The addition of type I findings by explanations. Type III Findings: Generalizations.).
III 232
FodorVsCavell: E.g. Baker/Professor: can be understood in two ways: a) what type of information does the Professor require? (Fodor: that would be non-empirical information. But Cavell is not asking for them. b) Cavell asks: if we already know that the language use of the baker is idiosyncratic, does then follow that the professor has no right to his "we" findings?. Cavell: No, that does not follow. Fodor: but you should bear in mind that this is irrelevant to the resolution of conflict between native speakers!
FodorVsCavell: he’s right: the existence of different language use does not exclude the "we" findings. But he says the right thing for the wrong reasons: the finding of the professor is one about the standard use. There could be no generalizations at all if deviating use could not be tolerated in certain dimensions.
III 233
FodorVsCavell: it looks philosophically more impressive if you say: "Your deviating language use shields your view at reality," as if it merely restricted the possibilities of expression. But even that is not necessarily the case if someone uses two non-interchangeable words synonymously.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Chomsky, N. Searle Vs Chomsky, N.
 
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John R. Searle
SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique.
Dennett I 555
Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value.   There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries).
- - -
Searle I 273
SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism.
By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased.
- - -
IV 9
SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate.
IV 204
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
VI 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files.
- - -
VIII 411
Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of syntactic theory/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning.
VIII 412
For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar)
2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative)
3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),.
Also structuralism has phrase structure rules.
VIII 414
It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules.
VIII 420
Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man.
VIII 421
If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication.
The essence of language is its structure.
E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure.
Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else!
Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him".
ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology.
VIII 422
Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition.
Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!).
VIII 426
Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words!
Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not.
Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes!
VIII 429
Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma:
a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion mention/use).
b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate!
SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker.
The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination.
VIII 432
The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular.
E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition!
b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion.
VIII 433
ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings?
Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc.
Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones.
VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages.
SearleVs: the same dilemma:
a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or
b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements.
VIII 434
SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list.
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional.
Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act.
VIII 436
Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role.
VIII 437
Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Disposition Theory Verschiedene Vs Disposition Theory Stegmüller IV 34
Disposition/Geist/Ryle: Meinen, Bedeutungserfassen, Intentionalität: sind nicht Vorkommnisse im Bewusstsein, sondern Fähigkeiten, eben Dispositionen.
IV 35
D.h. im Fall von plus/quus wie von glau läuft haargenau die gleiche geistige Geschichte nebst identischen mentalen Zuständen und Bewusstseinsvorgängen ab. Fazit: die entscheidenden Dispositionen wurden in der Vergangenheit erworben.
Der Unterschied besteht dann auch nicht erst in der Gegenwart, er bestand schon in der Vergangenheit!
RyleVsKripke: dann hätte ich eben auch schon in der Vergangenheit die Standard Funktion der Addition benutzt.
IV 35/36
KripkeVsRyle: dreifache Kritik: 1. externe Kritik: bestreitet, dass überhaupt irgendwelche Annahmen über Dispositionen relevant sind. Das Problem ist gar nicht kapiert. Wie kann er sich auf Disposition als Rechtfertigung berufen? Eine Weisung an mich selbst zeigt gar nichts.
VsVs: a) ich habe eben eine Hypothese über mich selbst.
VsVsVs: wieso soll gerade diese Hypothese von zahllosen anderen möglichen die richtige sein?
IV 37
VsVs: b) wir lassen die Vergangenheit ruhen. Richtig ist, was mir jetzt richtig erscheint! WittgensteinVsVsVs: das führt dazu, dass man hier nicht mehr von "richtig" reden kann!
2. interne Kritik: (manche meinen fälschlich, Wittgenstein selbst habe sie vertreten): besteht in der Angabe eines Kriteriums für eine Funktion F, die ich mit einem solchen Symbol meine.

Def "Endlichkeitsproblem"/Stegmüller: Endliches kann nicht einfach auf Unendliches übertragen werden. (Nicht nur Erfahrungen, sondern auch Dispositionen sind endlich).
IV 38
Def "quus"/glau/Kripkes Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: Neudefinition: das skeptische Problem reproduziert sich: diejenige Funktion sei die Quaddition, die für alle Paare, die hinreichend klein sind, um von mir addiert zu werden mit der Addition übereinstimmt, und für die übrigen das Ergebnis 7 liefert. Damit habe ich immer dieselben Dispositionen gehabt. VsDispositionstheorie.
Dispositionstheorie/Stegmüller: a) kann sich zu verteidigen versuchen, indem sie Disposition nicht wörtlich versteht, sondern als eine Idealisierung der tatsächlichen Praxis. Ceteris paribus Disposition.
KripkeVs: dann müsste ich immer phantastischere Annahmen darüber machen, was ich täte, wenn mir dies und das passierte.
IV 39
b) Die Idealisierung könnte anders interpretiert werden: "wenn ich die Fähigkeit hätte..." KripkeVs: das wird zirkulär. Es setzt voraus, dass die von mir gemeinte Funktion etwas Festliegendes sei. Die "Tatsache" müsste vorausgesetzt werden, dass ich eine ganz bestimmte Intentin habe!.
Dilemma für die Dispositionstheorie:
a) entweder nur Disposition für endlich viele Fälle, oder
b) Idealisierung der Reaktion. Problem:
ba) bei genauer Spezifikation dieser Bedingungen kann man nichts über meine Reaktion sagen.
bb) eine Tatsache wird voraussetzt.
IV 40
KripkeVsDispositionstheorie: sie räumt keinen Platz für immer mögliche Fehler ein! Der Dispositionstheoretiker kann sich hier nicht damit verteidigen, dass es hier eben eine Kluft gibt zwischen dem, was er meinte, und dem, was er "meinen sollte".
Denn die "Funktion, die er tatsächlich meint" steht für ihn ja nicht durch eine von der Disposition unabhängige Tabelle von vornherein fest.
IV 41
Vielmehr ist nach Ansicht des Dispositionalisten die Funktion aus der Disposition abzulesen. Daher muss für ihn die Disposition, Fehler zu machen Teil der Gesamtdisposition sein!
def "Skaddition"/Kripke: wäre die Disposition unserer Person einschließlich der Disposition, Fehler zu machen.
IV 42
Regel/Kompetenz/Kripke: Kompetenz kann Regeln nicht erklären, weil sie Regeln voraussetzt. (Das richtet sich nicht VsChomsky).
VsDispositionstheorie: Übereinstimmungen können auch lediglich darauf beruhen, dass uns zuweilen Fehler unterlaufen.
IV 47
Addition/Dispositionstheorie/Kripkes Wittgenstein: (s.o. "externe Kritik (1)"): Angenommen, es träfe zu, dass ich mit "+" die Addition meine. Problem: was für eine Relation besteht zwischen dieser Annahme und der Art von Antwort, die ich auf die Frage nach !117 + 159" geben werde?
Dispositionstheorie: alle Varianten geben fälschlich an, es sei diese und jene deskriptiv faßbare Relation.
Meinen/Intention/normativ: wenn man aber Meinen so versteht, dass das, was ich jetzt meine, das bestimmt, was ich künftig sagen sollte, ist das normativ, nicht deskriptiv.
Das ist der Hauptpunkt VsDisposition.




Dodwell, P.C. Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 258
Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer.
I 259
VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware.
The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine.
I 259
Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value.
I 260
The idea of ​​a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them.
DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements!
Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (see Brandom).
Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual.
Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs).
I 261
Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway)
Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls.
Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside.
Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology:
As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character.
I 262
No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology!
Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain.
(Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.)
RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea:
I 263
if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement:
Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain.
The latter is doubtful.
RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself.
Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs.
Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle.
I 263/264
It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?").
I 265
Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid.
I 266
For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills:
RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations.
At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs).
Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature.
Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes.
Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious.
I 267
Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the ​​"irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".)

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Fodor, J. Rorty Vs Fodor, J.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 245
Representation/RortyVsFodor: he confuses a meaning of "representation", which may be accurate or inaccurate, with a different meaning for which this would not apply.
I 256
Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here, you have to be satisfied with the phrase "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among themselves!
RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there is a problem here. Maybe it's just the idea of ​​the little man in the head, which makes us ask the question: "how is it done?".
I 257
RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for recognizing similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe ever be abstract? Presumably, that we need to be able to find out similarities. But then we do not need the notion of ​​a "not abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this! Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the potential qualitative variations of the contents of a pack of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite.
Rorty: So if we talk about "complicated expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract.
Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires postulating additional control systems, or they are not learned!
Either 1) infinite recourse, because what applies to recognition would also need to apply for learning.
Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an innate ability.
I 267
Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the ​​"irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".)
I 277
Mentalese/A Priori/Fodor/RortyVsFodor: Fodor's thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we can at any time be wrong about it, i.e. we may be wrong about something a priori. (>Kripke).

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Hare, R.M. Ryle Vs Hare, R.M.
 
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Hare II 138
Rules/Hare: we cannot discover the rules of the dance by dancing it. This contains two demands at once. 1) that the dance is Tango 2) that it is danced properly Körner: an execution may be relevant while being uncharacteristic.
II 141
but not necessary that the tango is danced like that (historical, contingent fact) although there is a correct description, it is not synthetically a priori.
II 142
Ryle: it may be that we know how a particular dance is performed without being able to say it VsRyle: but not in speech situations. HareVsVs: when we explain the use of an expression, we do not need to use it ourselves. Then we can see its use in all contexts, without being able to tell how it is used. Difference: a) decide whether a statement is logically true b) use term in a "logically true" way
II 142
Knowledge/Saying/Ryle: it may be that we know something without being able to say what we know. Example How a particular word is understood, or how a particular dance is performed. HenleVsRyle: but we should not extend this to speech situations.
II 143
It is not clear that we can always know how a word is used, even if we cannot tell how it is used.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Hegel, G.W.F. Ryle Vs Hegel, G.W.F.
 
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I 204
Knowledge/Recognition/RyleVsHegel: The distinction betw Trial and Done verbs (tasks and services) frees us from another theoretical nuisance: "know", "realize", "solve" cannot be used with adverbs such as "mistakenly" and falsely or "incorrectly", you cannot know something wrong, it is a different grammar. ((s) HegelVsRyle: Phenomenology, Preface - Hegel there: we can definitely know something wrong E.g. imperfect geometric drawings.)

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Identity Theory Ryle Vs Identity Theory
 
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Pauen V 89
RyleVsIdentity theory: category error: refers to inner events to explain outward behavior. PauenVsRyle: harmless practice like "interface", "data highway".
It is by no means always a mistake to use a term outside its normal context.
Of course, Ryle also accepts metaphors, but he has no useful criterion for distinguishing permitted metaphors from impermissable ones. Even the everyday language transcends everything that Ryle considers to be permissible.
Disposition/VsRyle: E.g. even with headaches, someone could refrain from taking a tablet. E.g. one could take an umbrella to give it back to someone without believing it rains. One could fast in spite of starvation, etc. I could enter a music store to buy notes for someone else, etc.
---
V 90
When asked for reasons, it is impossible to arrive at a complete list. This would, however, be necessary if the meaning of a mentalistic expression is actually to be understood in the disposition analysis. Each of these sentences also contains a mentalistic expression.

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Malcolm, N. Rorty Vs Malcolm, N.
 
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Frank I 610
Knowledge/Certainty/MalcolmVsIncorrigibility: (a propos Wittgenstein's "certainty"): we cannot claim any knowledge, e.g. in cases of pain. It is pointless to say, "I know that I am in pain." RortyVsMalcolm: intends to maintain incorrigibility.
- - -
Rorty I 238
MalcolmVsChomsky/Rorty: internalized control system is a typical error of the traditional "theory of ideas". It is wrong to assume that a person must be guided when speaking. But no explanations are to be found here.
I 239
RortyVsMalcolm/Rorty: Fallacy (goes back to Wittgenstein): 1) meaning cannot be explained by internal ostension but only by behavior.
I.e. applies
2) psychology can only be dealing with empirical correlations between behavioral dispositions and external circumstances. VsRyle/Rorty: this is wrong, as critics of Ryle have shown; too operationalist. There may also be a plethora of equally necessary "internal" conditions.

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Parsons, Ter. Hilbert Vs Parsons, Ter.
 
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I 37
Nichtexistente Objekte/unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten/HintikkaVsQuine/Hintikka: These: es gibt nichtexistente Objekte, und zwar in der wirklichen Welt (WiWe). (>Possibilia). HintikkaVsQuine: die Philosophen, die sie ablehnen, haben zu stark in syntaktischen Bahnen gedacht.
Hintikka. These: man muss die Frage eher semantisch (modelltheoretisch) beantworten.
Fiktion/Ryle: Test: gilt die Paraphrase?
Terence ParsonsVsRyle: Ryles test schlägt fehlt in Fällen wie Bsp „Mir. Pickwick ist eine Fiktion“.
HintikkaVsParsons: die Relevanz des Kriteriums ist überhaupt fraglich.
I 38
Ontologie/Sprache/sprachlich/HintikkaVsRyle: wie sollten linguistische Fragen wie Paraphrasierbarkeit über ontologischen Status entscheiden? Lösung/Hintikka: für die Frage ob es nichtexistente Objekte gibt: Modelltheorie.
Bsp Puccinis Tosca: her geht es darum, ob die Soldaten Kugeln in ihren Gewehrläufen haben. ((s) sic, von Puccini, nicht von Verdi).
Pointe: selbst wenn sie welche haben, wären es nur fiktive! ((s) innerhalb der Geschichte).
((s) D.h. damit die Geschichte überhaupt erzählt werden kann, muss man annehmen, dass über den entsprechenden Satz mit “wahr” oder “falsch” entschieden werden kann, abhängig davon, ob Kugeln in den Läufen sind. Sonst wäre der Satz unverständlich.)
Modelltheorie/Hintikka: liefert eine ernstzunehmende Antwort. ((s) „wahr im Modell“ heißt, in der Geschichte ist es wahr, dass Kugeln in den Läufen sind).
HintikkaVsParsons: man sollte nicht zu stark syntaktisch argumentieren, d.h. nicht bloß fragen, welche Schlußfolgerungen gezogen werden dürfen und welche nicht.
Akzeptanz/Akzeptierbarkeit/Inferenzen/Hintikka: fragen nach der Akzeptierbarkeit von Inferenzen und von Sprache und Intuitionen sind syntaktisch.
sing Term/ontologische Verpflichtung/Existenz/Parsons: Parsons spricht davon, dass der Gebrauch von sing Term uns zu einer existentiellen Generalisierung verpflichtet. Und damit auf eine Referenten. D.h. es ist eine Verpflichtung zu einer Inferenz.
HintikkaVsParsons.
I 41
Nichtexistente Objekte/mögliche Gegenstände/unverwirklichte Möglichkeiten/Hintikka: aber sind nicht einige dieser nichtexistenten Objekte in unserer eigenen aktualen Welt (WiWe)? Hintikka: These: ja, einige dieser bloß möglichen Objekte sind in der WiWe. bona fide Objekt/Hintikka: kann in einer Möwe existieren und in einer anderen fehlen.
Weltlinie/Hintikka: wenn es darum geht, welche gezogen werden können ist Existenz nicht das wichtigste Problem. Eher Wohldefiniertheit.
HintikkaVsLeibniz: wir erlauben auch, dass ein Objekt in mehreren MöWe existiert.
Frage: wenn Bewohner zweier verschiedener Möwe dann identisch sein können, wann sind sie dann identisch?
I 42
Existentielle Generalisierung/EG/HintikkaVsParsons: das zeigt, dass sein Kriterium der EG falsch ist, denn sie kann fehlschlagen aus Gründen, die nichts mit Nichtexistenz zu tun haben. Bsp
(1) Königin Victoria wußte, dass Lewis Carroll Lewis Carroll ist
daraus kann man nicht schließen, selbst obwohl Caroll existierte, und dies von der Königin gewusst wurde, dass
(2) (Ex)Königin Victoria wußte, dass Lewis Carroll x ist.
Und daher
(3) Jemand ist so, dass Königin Victoria wußte, dass er Lewis Carroll ist
(2) und (3) sagen dasselbe wie
(4) Königin Victoria wußte, wer Lewis Carroll ist.
Das ist aber nicht von (1) impliziert (entailed).
Existentielle Generalisierung/EG/Hintikka: die Äquivalenz von (2)-(3) mit (4) ist aber ganz unabhängig davon, ob die Quantoren nur über existente oder auch über nichtexistente Objekte gehen.
Der Grund für das Fehlschlagen der EG ist nicht ein Fehlschlagen der Eindeutigkeit.
Eindeutigkeit schlägt allerdings fehl, denn in verschiedenen Situationen, die mit dem Wissen der Königin kompatibel sind, kann der Name Lewis Carroll auf verschiedene Personen angewendet werden. Daher kann nicht nur ein einzelnes, bestimmtes Objekt als Wert von „x“ fungieren.
Daher findet die EG keine Anwendung und (1) und dennoch kann sie so verstanden werden, dass sie den Äußerer auf die Existenz von Lewis Carroll verpflichtet. Daher schlägt Parsons Kriterium fehl.
Ryle, G. Anscombe Vs Ryle, G.
 
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Danto II 323
Motif/Ryle: tryed to refute that motifs can be causes. Motif: Disposition. A statements about a disposition is not an explanation of causes! E.g. I can say the glass was broken, because it was hit against the table (cause), but I can also say that it was broken because it was fragile. Ryle: Motif statements are law-related judgments.
AnscombeVsRyle: if that were the case, then a specific motif could not possibly trigger a specific action only once in the life of a person! E.g. a person who uses the visit of an aunt only once as a white lie would be necessarily considered as predisposed to lie in general.
However, motifs may be unique incidents (VsDisposition). Then no prediction can be derived from the motifs.
Ryle, G. Armstrong Vs Ryle, G.
 
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Lanz I 282
Def dispositions/Ryle: nothing more than pairs of environmental effects and modifications of behavior. E.g. "x is fragile = x will break when it is dropped."
ArmstrongVsRyle: one element is missing: the structural basis of the disposition, the state of the object with which the disposition is identical. This state is causally responsible for the breaking. It is the task of science to elucidate the nature of such conditions and causes.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Ryle, G. Austin Vs Ryle, G.
 
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Vendler I 243
Voluntary/Ryle: this word is only used for acts that seem to be the result of a person's guilt. AustinVsRyle: you can also make a gift voluntarily.
Voluntarily/Cavell: middle way between Austin and Ryle: the action must at least be suspect.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

Ven I
Z. Vendler
Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967
Ryle, G. Davidson Vs Ryle, G.
 
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Frank I 639
Asymmetry/Authority/First-person perspective/Third person/Davidson: pro Ryle: every attempt at explaining the asymmetry by knowing something in a certain way must lead to skepticism. DavidsonVsRyle: instead of explaining the asymmetry, he simply denies it.
But since it obviously exists, one should not draw the conclusion that there is no first-person authority from the lack of a particular way of knowing something.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Ryle, G. Dennett Vs Ryle, G.
 
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II 203
DennettVsRyle: notorious are his assertions that thinking could only take place in the public world and should not take place at a personal place.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Ryle, G. Fodor Vs Ryle, G.
 
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II 118
Use Theory/Ryle: sentences have no ways of use! Therefore sentences are excluded a priori propositions from the study of philosophical language analysis. Further: sentences do not belong to language, but only to speaking.
Language/FodorVsRyle: this ignores the fact that forming an infinite number of new sentences is the most important part of language! But this can only be based on recursive (formal) procedures.
Rorty I 256
Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here you have make do with the sentence "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among each other!
RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there was a problem here. Maybe it’s just the notion of ​​the little man in our head who lets us ask the question: "how is it done?".
I 257
RortyVsFodor: assuming we needed an abstract formula for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why does the formula have to be abstract? Presumably, because we need to be able to figure out similarities. But then we do not need the idea of ​​a "non-abstract" formula, because each formula must be able to do this!. Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the content of a package of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite.
Rorty: So if we speak of "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems, we will always speak about something abstract.
Dilemma: either the explanation for the acquisition of these control systems requires postulating additional control systems or they are not learned!
Either 1) the infinite regress, because what applies to recognition, would also need to apply for learning.
Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have a unlearned ability.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Ryle, G. Kripke Vs Ryle, G.
 
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I 53
KripkeVsRyle: The usual argument doubts that the essentialism makes sense, and says that the answer to the question whether a property of an object is accidental or essential depends on how the subject is described. This argument is therefore not of the opinion that all the properties are accidental. If you have a identity criterion, then the question whether Nixon has specific characteristics in another possible world is a well-defined question. Sometimes, in the case of numbers, it might seem easier (but even here it is argued that identity criteria are given completely arbitrary).

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Ryle, G. Lewis Vs Ryle, G.
 
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Lanz I 282
LewisVsRyle: psychologische Ausdrücke sind Ausdrücke für kausale Rollen. Die Wissenschaft identifiziert die tatsächlichen Träger dieser kausalen Rollen aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach als Gehirnzustände.
Lewis I 34
Alltagspsychologie/LewisVsRyle): sie ist niemals eine frisch erfundene, terminieinführende wissenschaftliche Theorie gewesen. Die Geschichte, daß Ausdrücke für Geistiges als theoretische Termini eingeführt wurden, ist ein Mythos! (>Sellars Mythos von unseren Ryleschean ancestors). Lewis: doch obgleich es ein Mythos ist, kann es doch ein guter oder ein schlechter sein: ein guter ist es, wenn unsere Namen für Geisteszustände in der Tat gerade das bedeuten, was sie bedeuten würden, wenn der Mythos wahr wäre. Anmerkung: Zwei Mythen, die nicht gemeinsam wahr sein können, können doch gemeinsam gut sein.
Lewis I 35
Mein Mythos sagt: Namen von Farbempfindungen sind T-Termini, die durch als A-Termini benutzte Namen von Farben eingeführt wurden. Ein anderer Mythos besagt umgekehrt: Farbnamen waren T-Termini, die durch als A-Termini benutzte Namen von Farbempfindungen eingeführt wurden.Die beiden Mythen können nicht gemeinsam wahr sein, denn was soll zuerst da gewesen sein, die Farbe oder die Farbempfindung? Doch können sie beide gut sein! Wir könnten es mit einem Zirkel zu tun haben. Aber, na wenn schon.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Ryle, G. Rorty Vs Ryle, G.
 
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Richard Rorty
Frank I 597
Sensation/Thought/RortyVsRyle: his approach encounters the difficulty that our everyday language seems to support the Cartesian notion of two series of events persistently.
Fra I 598
That is not the problem with opinions, feelings, etc. Here we are not tempted to consider them as episodes instead of dispositions. Mental/Rorty: only the first class a) (thoughts, feelings) generates the contrast to the physical, which is more than a mere linguistic contrast. (see below) They are paradigmatic for a separate area.
b) (moods, feelings, etc.) these are such that in no way would bring forth the idea of a separate area if we had not heard of thoughts and feelings.
If we had no mental concepts, but only concepts of opinions and desires, then we would have no body mind problem.

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Ryle, G. Searle Vs Ryle, G.
 
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John R. Searle
I 118
SearleVsPrivileged Access/SearleVsRyle: this is a spatial metaphor, like a private room, but I would have to distinguish myself from the room which I enter. There is no sort of a by me accessible room. While I can observe another person just like that, I can however not watch their subjectivity! What's worse:
I 119
I cannot observe my own subjectivity because every speech observation itself is what should be observed. - - -
V 216
"Voluntary"/Ryle: is normally used in connection with any acts of which it is generally believed that they should be avoided.
V 217
SearleVsRyle: there are normal or standard situations. The explanation has nothing to do with the analysis of special words, but forms a moment of explanation of the operation of assertions.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Ryle, G. Sellars Vs Ryle, G.
 
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I XXXIII
Propositions/thoughts/RyleVs "category mistake": as beliefs, desires or motives thoughts are no space temporally localized events or states. Therefore, they cannot occur as antecedents or causes of actions. SellarsVsRyle: he suggested to understand mental predicates like "to be convinced", "to believe" etc. as expressions of dispositions but without acknowledging that again there is an explanation like in the way of the Freudian ego or super-ego .
Belief/Ryle: to be convinced means to behave in a certain way.
I XXXIII
Disposition/explanation/to appear/Sellars: goes one step further than Ryle by asking how once can also explain the behavioral dispositions themselves. His tie seller John developed a kind of theory, which specifically refers to the language behavior of a community of Rylean ancestors.
I 77
Inner episode/category mistake/SellarsVsRyle: inner episodes are by no means a category mistake, they can even be very well "speak" with the means of intersubjective discourse. And in fact through a critical examination of inner episodes of a different kind, namely with thoughts.
I 79
Episode/tradition: modern empiricism: a) thoughts are verbal or linguistic episodes. SellarsVs: there is not enough language behavior to explain all thoughts.
b) To think/tradition: be any form of "intelligent behavior" both linguistically not linguistically.
RyleVs: actually no episodes but hypothetical or mixed-hypothetical-categorical facts about this or other behavior. ((s) This seems to be by Ryle, but Ryle is not explicitly mentioned here by Sellars).
SellarsVs: Problem: whenever we refer to a component of non-habitual behavior as intelligent, we seem then to think it necessary to thereby refer to a thinking. (hidden circle. VsRyle).
I 88
Category Mistake/Sellars: e.g. to assume that the combustibility of wood is so to say latent burning. SellarsVsRyle: nevertheless, not every non-observable episode is the consequence of category mistakes.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Ryle, G. Verschiedene Vs Ryle, G. Lanz in Metz I 279
VsRyle: his analysis is not convincing for elements of conscious experience as feelings or perceptions or mental images or thoughts that are currently occurring. E.g. pain: here something is present to the the consciousness when it is neither recognized thorugh behavior nor verbal utterances.
Hare II 142
Wissen/Sagen/Ryle: es kann sein, dass wir etwas wissen, ohne sagen zu können, was wir wissen. Bsp Wie ein bestimmtes Wort verwendet wird, oder ein bestimmter Tanz getanzt wird. HenleVsRyle: man sollte das aber nicht auf Rede Situationen ausweiten.
II 143
Es ist keineswegs klar, dass man hier stets wissen kann, wie ein Wort verwendet wird, auch wenn man nicht sagen kann, wie es verwendet wird. Wissen/Sagen/HareVsHenle: in der Sprache ist das aber vielleicht klarer als irgendwo anders.
Bsp Wenn wir den Gebrauch eines Ausdrucks erklären, müssen wir ihn nicht selbst verwenden. Folglich können wir seinen Gebrauch in allen Kontexten in vollem Umfang kennen, auch ohne sagen zu können, wie er gebraucht wird.
Bsp ein Kind kann den Gebrauch des Wortes "Vater" gelernt haben, und es richtig verwenden, aber vielleicht nicht sagen können, wie es gebraucht wird, weil es den Gebrauch von "bedeuten" noch nicht gelernt hat!
Henle verwechselt die Fähigkeit
"aus logischen Gründen zu entscheiden", ob eine Aussage wahr ist
mit der Fähigkeit
den Ausdruck " die Aussage ist logisch wahr" zu verwenden.
Verwechslung Erwähnung/Gebrauch. (Tun ohne Wissen).
Hare: wer nicht weiß, wie der Ausdruck "logisch wahr" verwendet wird, könnte zwar das erstere, nicht aber das letztere tun.




Ryle, G. Schiffer Vs Ryle, G.
 
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Stephen Schiffer
I 266
Meaning Theory/M.th./Schiffer: some of them offer a reductive analysis of semantic terms, but that does not work.
I 267
We learn more about our cognitive apparatus, if we ask why our m.th. fail. We also learn something if we only try a concept analysis. E.g. if we try to complete the following scheme, which is impossible: "x presents in y gdw ..." But:. SchifferVsRyle: "Analytical" connections between concepts do not bring us much further. It would be nice if we knew everything about the conceptual roles of our semantic and mental terms, but I do not see how we could find out more.
M.th./Schiffer: some philosophers see it here just as their task to give an "explanation" rather than a conceptual analysis or meaning analysis of semantic concepts. E.g.
M.th./Semantics/Devitt: (Devitt 1981,68): the problem of semantics is given in part by human speech behavior. The main problem of semantics is to explain the semantic terms that occur in the semantic theory. What is it for an inscription to have meaning? Why is this sound sequence true?.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Ryle, G. Hintikka Vs Ryle, G.
 
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I 224
Memory/Tacit Knowledge/HintikkaVsRyle: you can also use your own memory as a source of knowledge. That is what Sherlock Holmes does with his interlocutors ("deductions").

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Ryle, G. Solipsism Vs Ryle, G.
 
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Chisholm II 31
Wahrnehmung/ SolipsismusVsRyle/RutteVsRyle: eigentlich ein Begründungsproblem: was spricht an Erfolg/Mißerfolg dafür, auf Außendinge als Verursacher zu schließen? Jeder Wahrnehmende glaubt daran. Einzige Gegenposition: der Solipsismus.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Ryle, G. Vendler Vs Ryle, G.
 
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Vendler I 239
RyleVsLinguistics: bringt keinen Nutzen für die Philosophie. Cavell dito. VendlerVsRyle.

Ven I
Z. Vendler
Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967
Ryle, G. Chisholm Vs Ryle, G.
 
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I 69
Privileged access/ChisholmVsRyle: each of us has it: every person is so that they can attribute certain properties directly to themselves. (s) VsChisholm: uses the term "self" here, although he declared it impossible to form propositions with it. But these are no propositions that "carry their location with them" ((s)), but rather sentences that contain the reflexive pronoun in general. Chisholm: However, we have not explained privileged access by the use of "I" as many philosophers do, but vice versa I 70 Use of the first-person pronoun through direct attribution.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Ryle, G. Cavell Vs Ryle, G.
 
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II 170
Alltagssprache/Cavell: hier gibt es drei mögliche Typen, Feststellungen über sie zu machen: Typ I Feststellungen: "Wir sagen ...... aber wir sagen nicht...."
Typ II Feststellungen: Die Ergänzung von Typ I Feststellungen durch Erläuterungen.
Typ III Feststellungen: Verallgemeinerungen.
II 171
AustinVsRyle: Bsp ein Geschenk kann man freiwillig machen (ohne etwas schuldig zu sein) aber das ist nicht etwas, was man normalerweise nicht tun sollte.
II 173
CavellVsRyle: verlangt eine explizite Erläuterung (Typ II Feststellung): dazu ist er im allgemeinen auch berechtigt, aber gerade in Bezug auf sein Bsp "freiwillig" geht die Verallgemeinerung daneben: II 174 (Bsp Austin: freiwilliges Geschenk).
Austin These wir können nicht immer von Handlungen sagen, daß sie freiwillig sind, selbst wenn sie offensichtlich auch nicht unfreiwillig waren.
CavellVsRyle: er hat das nicht völlig vernachlässigt, sein Fehler ist, daß er diese Handlungen unvollständig und jene, bei denen die Frage nicht auftauchen kann, falsch charakterisiert.
Er sieht nicht, daß die Bedingung für die Anwendung des Begriffs "frewillig" ganz allgemein gilt.
II 175
Er nimmt fälschlich an, "nicht freiwillig" bedeutet "unfreiwillig". Cavell: das übersieht auch der Utilitarismus.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002
Solipsism Skepticism Vs Solipsism
 
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Chisholm II 31
Wahrnehmung/RutteVsRyle: eigentlich ein Begründungsproblem: was spricht an Erfolg/Mißerfolg dafür, auf Außendinge als Verursacher zu schließen? Jeder Wahrnehmende glaubt daran. Einzige Gegenposition: der Solipsismus.
VsSolipsism/Rutte: hat eigene subjektinterne Prüfprobleme. Er glaubt an vergangene und zukünftige eigene Erlebnisse, an Verläufe und Ordnungen. Er verläßt sich auf Erinnerung und methodisches Vorgehen. Er möchte künftige Erlebnisse aufgrund von Ordnungen prognostizieren und muß daher als Mills "permanente Empfindungsmöglichkeiten" glauben.
Er macht genauso starke Behauptungen wie der Realist.
II 32
Seine Beweislast wäre nur geringer, wenn er sich der Behauptungen über die Welt enthielte.
II 37
SkepticismVsSolipsim: glaubt zuviel: es gibt überhaupt keine Erkenntnis und Vernünftigkeit. Der hier vertretene Standpunkt räumt sowohl dem Realisten als auch dem Solipsisten eine rationale Haltung ein, wenn sie nur gläubig und glaubensbereit ist.
II 41
Realismus: will über den Erlebniserfolg hinaus auch Wahrnehmungserfolg. D.h. er will auf Außendinge schließen können! Dazu muß er aber an die Außenwelt glauben, da er sonst nichts zu überprüfen hätte. VsSolipsism: verhält sich dagegen inkonsequent (also unvernünftig), wenn er mit diesem Erfolgsziel seinen Glauben an den Realismus ausdrücken würde.
Beim Streben nach Erlebnis Erfolg wäre der Solipsismus also überflüssig, er könnte sich einer Stellungsnahme enthalten.
RealismVsSolipsism: Asymmetrie: während der Solipsismus etwas Inkonsequentes und damit Überflüssiges ist, kann man das vom Realismus nicht sagen. Er ist nicht in jedem Fall überflüssig. Wir dürfen bei ihm bleiben, wenn wir ihn schon vertreten.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Wittgenstein, L. Kripke Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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I 43
E.g.: Wittgenstein: "Moses does not exist" means that "no human being has done this and that".(KripkeVs). Kripke: This is about the difference between reference and meaning: The theory in question is regarded as a theory of the meaning of the name "Moses" and not simply as a theory of his reference.
KripkeVsWittgenstein: In any case I think it is wrong that "Moses exists" actually holds this meaning (that he has done something).
I 70
KripkeVsWittgenstein: However, if the description has the function to rigidly define a reference, it is clear that this is "not" what the sentence "Moses did not exist" means; because in the counterfactual case, for example that no one led the Israelites out of Egypt, we can then ask: Does it ensue that Moses did not exist in such a situation? It seems that it does not ensue. For surely Moses would have been able to spend days more pleasantly. - - -
NS I 39
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Problem of Infinity: How can a finite number of examples define an infinite number of new cases?
Wrong solution: through meaning
Wrong solution: through disposition
NS I 40
Another pupil obviously has a different disposition, i.e. individual dispositions are not enough. Wittgenstein’s solution: collective dispositions.
KripkeVsWittgenstein: there are no facts (>Problem of Normativity).
2. Problem of Normativity: which facts lay down which is the correct answer?
Kripke: We can establish a new praxis at all times.
New Literature/Newen/Schrenk: Pragmatic solution:
Def Persuasion/New Authors/Newen/Schrenk: To have convictions with a defined meaning you need to take part in social practices and to mutually ascribe convictions with specific meanings. (Solution for Kripke’s Wittgenstein). (Literature. 2-24).
- - -
Putnam III 219
Belief/Elisabeth Anscombe: Did once ask Wittgenstein what he would do if one of his friends was believing in faith healing. Would he try to dissuade him? Wittgenstein said yes, not knowing why however. KripkeVsWittgenstein: Classifies it as a distinct proof for Wittgenstein’s relativism.
PutnamVs: Wittgenstein only finds it useless.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 35ff
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: The crucial dispositions have been acquired in the past, the difference was already present in the past. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are actually irrelevant a) When I have a hypothesis regarding my disposition, I still do not know whether it is the right one -
IV 37
b) If we wanted to "let the past rest" and were only asking what we consider to be right at this moment, we lose the term "right".
IV 38
Kripke: Important argument: I have always had the same dispositions! – Disposition/VsKripke: a) it could be an idealization of my praxis KripkeVs: fantastic new assumptions will be necessary VsKripke: b) Idealization "if I had the possibility..." KripkeVs: It requires a function/fact or a table that is independent from the disposition.
IV 39f
KripkeVsWittgenstein: No table it is infinite, it is impossible to have checked everything. To mean, to conceive: no happenings in the consciousness but dispositions, dispositions are not happenings as well.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Ryle Versus Brandom I 340
BrandomVsRyle: VsPrivileged Access - person-reflection is internalization of P-reflection.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Privileged Access Versus Brandom I 340
Kant: BrandomVsRyle: Vsprivileged access - person-reflection is internalization of P-reflection - on the other hand, later in the text: per.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Linguistics Versus Vendler:
I 239
RyleVsLinguistics: no benefit for philosophy - Cavell ditto - VendlerVsRyle.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Experience Nagel, Th.
 
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III 26
Erlebnis/Nagel: These alle Wesen haben spezifische Erlebnisse, die nicht mit den Mitteln jener psychologischen Begriffe darzustellen sind, die wir in der ersten Person, subjektiv, verstehen könnten. Das bedeutet aber nicht, daß wir nicht über Erlebnisse auf eine ganz allgemeine Weise nachzudenken vermögen, die jedoch kein subjektives Verständnis einschließt!
Wir müssen sie aber auch weiterhin als subjektive Erlebnisse betrachten ï·" nicht bloß als Verhaltensdisposition oder funktionale Zustände. (NagelVsPutnam, NagelVsRyle)!
method. Behaviorism. Sellars, W.
 
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I XXXI
Def methodological behaviorism / SellarsVsRyle / Sellars: does lead a mental Termini overlooking the observable behavior, but does not hold it firmly, that these terms should be defined in terms of the behavior. (Or, what is the same: that psychological statements must be fully translated into statements about observable behavior).
Vs Operationalism. Sellars, W.
 
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Rorty I 118
SellarsVsRyle / Rorty: the parallel statement about macro and micro phenomena does not compel to the operationalist thesis that there can be no micro entities.

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000