Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Euthyphro: (goes back to Plato's homonymous dialogue) This is about the question whether something is good because it pleases the gods or whether it pleases the gods because it is good. See also projectivism, detectivism, attribution, properties, justification, circularity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Crispin Wright on Euthyphro - Dictionary of Arguments
I 108 Definition Euthyphro/Plato ("Eutyphro contrast") Realist, Socrates: certain actions are liked by gods because they are pleasing to God. The gods have the ability to recognize the property, the property of Godliness is one thing, to track it another. This is the "detectivistic" version. Extension falls apart. Contrary to this: Anti-realist, Eutyphro: certain actions are pleasing to god because they are liked by gods This is constitutively dependent on the opinion of the gods, not to explore epistemically, not independent of the opinions. The "because" here is conceptual, "projectivistic". Extension: coincides here. Realist/Dummett: certain statements (in the questioned discourse) are super-asserting, because they are true. (Constitutive independence of truth of the super-assertibility). >Assertibility. Anti-realist: such statements are true because they are super-assertible. >Superassertibility, >Antirealism. I 142 Euthyphro/Plato: Certain actions are pleasing to God, because the gods like them (awarding of a predicate, projection). Counter position: Realism: they are liked, because they are pleasing to God: Here something is detected, there is an ability, it is "detectivistic". Color/Johnston: shape is read detectivistically, color projectivistically. I 143 Euthyphro/Wright: basic equation: For all S, P: P if and only if (CS, then RS) S: each actor "P": all the judgments of a very broad class of judgments; "RS": expresses that S shows a certain relevant reaction; "CS": fulfillment of certain optimality conditions for that particular reaction. The fulfillment of the conditions C through S ensures that no other circumstances of an alternative could give a greater credibility. Basic equation/Mark Johnston: E.g. x is square if and only if x is seen by standard observers under standard conditions as square. - This also applies for red. >Standard conditions. Shape/color/Johnston: central difference: shape: gets detectivistic - color: is read projectivistically. Moral discourse: this discours is like the discourse about color. I 152 Euthyphro/projectivistic:> a priori knowledge - detectivistic: not a priori, not analytical. >a priori, >Analyticity, >Knowledge, >Morality, >Color, >Perception, >Judgments._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |