|Reference, philosophy: reference means a) the relation between an expression and one or more objects, thus the reference or b) the object (reference object) itself. Terminological confusion arises easily because the author, to whom this term ultimately goes back - G. Frege - spoke of meaning (in the sense of "pointing at something"). Reference is therefore often referred to as Fregean meaning in contrast to the Fregean sense, which describes what we call meaning today. See also meaning, sense, intension, extension.|
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|Rorty I 300
Reference: when we abandon the notion of meaning (like Feyerabend) then we abandon the reference as determined by the importance. (The idea that "defining attributes pick out" the referent of an expression.)
Rorty I 300
Neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend have denied the need for a theory of reference. However, they suggest that in reality we understand only a concept of "truth" and "reference" that is relativized to a "conceptual system" .
Rorty I 300
Neither Quine nor Sellars, nor Kuhn, nor Feyerabend still think that there should be an observation language comon to all alternative systems of concepts. But then the empirical idea had to be dropped, that one could at any time specify operational definitions of theoretical terms.
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000