Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Contradictions Feyerabend
 
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II 74
Sentence of Contradiction/Method/Logic: (VsFeyerabend) a method which does not obey the principle of contradiction is not science but chaos. It follows that it is not possible to examine the freedom of contradiction in the same way as the relativistic invariance or the agreement with observations!

Fe I
P. Feyerabend
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Fe II
P. Feyerabend
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Experiments Hacking
 
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I 287
Experiment/HackingVsLakatos/HackingVsFeyerabend: an e.g. is neither a statement nor a report but an action, which is not about mere words.
I 293
E.g. Herschel’s theory of thermal radiation was (falsely) aligned with Newton, but that did not affect his observation - he noted that infrared had to be included in the white light - a previously existing theory would have prevented him from finding out - HackingVsTheory Ladenness of observation.
I 299
Observing is a skill. (HackingVsHanson?).
I 380f
Experiment/Hacking: is never repeated, always improved - an e. usually does not work, therefore observation is not so important!.
I 418
Crucial experiment/Experimentum crucis/Hacking: E.g. Michelson-Morley.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Explanation Fraassen
 
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I 23
Explanation/FraassenVsReichenbach: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the demand of hidden variables. ---
I 25
Explanation: if mere regularity makes a macroscopic theory poor, then the same happens to a microscopic one - coincidence: also coincidence can have an explanation. ---
I 39
Explanation/FraassenVsAugustinus: the fleeing of the mouse from the cat must not be explained by perception - but with Darwin: the fleeing mice survive. There is no account by reason. Analogously it applies that the successful sciences survive - without this having to be explained. ---
I 86
Theory/Explanation: For example, one could have two types of mechanics, one for physiologies and one for astronomers - problem: one cannot explain a complex phenomenon with this - e.g. man who is walking on the moon - if both theories have no common models, a new theory on lunar gravitation must be established - empirical adequacy: requires the integration of these "mini-theories". ---
I 87
Explanation: if we consider some kind of questions to be more important, this is no reason to believe that the theory that explains them is more probable - however, the social situation of the researcher plays a role in the evaluation of theories. ---
I 93
Explanation/Ernest Nagel: explanation is the organization and classification of our knowledge - FraassenVsFeyerabend: he misunderstood the fact: that this is a function of interests - FraassenVsFeyerabend: then one can stop to research if one believes, what one says - naive view of scientific security - then the scientists ought to swear by an oath that they are looking for explanations -FraassVsFeyerabend: in reality one must always doubt the adequacy. ---
I 97f
Explanation/FraassenVsTradition: explanation does not have to be true! - a) "we have an explanation" (has to do with acceptance) - b) "the theory explains" (without acceptance) - e.g. Newton's theory was wrong nevertheless it explains much - ((s) then a theory cannot be a conjunction of sentences, for then no sentence may be false.) - Harman: Explanation leads to acceptance - explanation/Fraassen: something does not require that theory coincides with the world as a whole. ---
I 98
One cannot assert the truth of a theory before its explanatory power - Explanation: is not an additional property for empirical adequacy - e.g. "the computer computes" - no one would say "the hammer struck the nail". ---
I 106
Explanation/VsHempel/Morton Beckner: e.g. evolution is not deterministic - e.g. the giraffes's neck is not determined by dietary scarcity - only by the compatibility of genetic and natural selection mechanisms - Putnam: also Newton's explanation is no deduction, but a demonstration of compatibilities. ---
I 110
Definition Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff P is a consequence S which is "relative" to K and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. ---
I 111
Explanation: Problem: 1. Incompleteness: disease explains a rare secondary disease that is triggered by it - but not why this patient is affected - asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow: is always in relation with a certain sun position. - Causation: only goes in one direction. ---
I 111
Why question: does not occur when the spectrum is explained by the atomic structure. ---
I 124
Explanation: has to do with "why" - to find prominent factors in the causal network - problem: the network as a whole does not explain typical cases - science, however, describes the network - ((s) therefore science does not equal an explanation. Explanation must at least say that there is a structure that can be described in principle - though never fully.) ---
I 146
Explanation: for evaluating a response to a why question as an explanation, it is not a matter of whether this is true - the evaluation uses only the part of the background information that provides the general theory about these phenomena plus additional information that does not include the facts to be explained - ((s) e.g. framework conditions). ---
I 155
Explanation/Description/Fractions: explanation and description do not differ in the information - but explanation: is a three-digit relation theory-fact-context - description: is two-digit: theory-fact - Explanation: is an applied science (not pure science). ---
I 205
Explanation/Thomas Aquinas/Fraassen: everything that is explained must be explained by something else. ---
I 206
The premises must contain more than the conclusion - in addition: generalization: e.g. that all magnets attract iron. ---
I 213
Explanation/Fraassen: only observable regularities require explanation.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Incommensurability Putnam
 
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III 161f
Incommensurability/Putnam: even before Kuhn in Saussure: basic units of language cannot be determined from the sounds -> Whorf: if individual languages have many quite different color predicates, then the meaning is reserved for individual languages . -> Idiolect > DerridaVsWhorf: the meanings are not only individual languages but reserved for the individual texts. -> Deconstruction - DerridaVsSaussure: the concept of the sign can be completely forgotten. PutnamVsDerrida: he misunderstands Saussure's project of a theory of meaning.
---
III 165
Solution/Putnam: maintaining concept of meaning equality, but realizing that it may not be understood as in the sense of self-identity of objects and signified. PutnamVsDerrida (How VsFodor): "meaning equality" is interest relative, and presupposes a normative judgment on rationality in a situation.
---
V 157
Incommensurabilityy/PutnamVsFeyerabend: it is contradictory to state, Galileo's concepts are incommensurable and then to describe them in detail afterwards. - One must also understand the old language to be able to say that the predictions are identical.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Meaning Change Brandom
 
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I 670
Change of concept/Change of meaning/QuineVsFeyerabend: Solution: The semantically relevant is not the meaning but the reference - what we want to represent, and not what we say about it - the extensional content is communicated - even from a Zoroastrian you can find out whether the sun is shining - inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter then. Instead, there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible worlds. ---
I 671
Content/Concept change/Scheffler/Boyd/Putnam: content is no longer viewed as inferential role: inference can be re-introduced at two levels: a) some inferential accuracies can be read from inclusion relations between the extensions of predicates -b) insight into the relativity of extensions against various context elements leads to a new concept of intentions: - Definition intension: functions of indices to extensions! A more robust type of content that is at best shared by the audience. (BrandomVs) - (Scheffler/Boyd/PutnamVsFeyerabend: Progress as talk of more and more objects that bring more and more predicate extensions into play) - inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter - instead there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible world. ---
I 671F
Inferential contents as functions/Change of concept: possible solution: ordered pairs of circumstances and consequences of the use - Advantage: It would not be necessary to always admit that the meaning of the word changes with every new belief - BrandomVs: cannot explain why one intension and not the other is now associated. ---
I 673
Problem: functions can only be constructed by arguments which are beyond behavioral dispositions. ---
I 673
Change of concept/Intensional theory/BrandomVs: not easy to show: e.g. that the early theorists used "electron" intensionally in a way that allowed plenty of room for our rethinking - QuineVs: reference instead of importance (see above).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Meaning Change Putnam
 
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Rorty I 300
Meaning Change/Putnam/Rorty: The search for a criterion for the semantic change was disastrous. It was recognized that Feyerabend had put his own argument forward wrongly when he spoke of meaning change. PutnamVsFeyerabend: for Feyerabend the meaning depends on the whole theory. Assuming the empiricism changes the meaning of the term, that would equal the task of distinguishing between meaning questions and questions of fact.
  To say that the semantic rules of German cannot be distinguished from the empirical opinions of its speakers, would mean to throw the notion of a semantic rule of German overboard.
  Each appearance of a sensation would have disappeared because "Sensation" depends on the fact that you are constantly moving back and forth between an unusual and the traditional conception of meaning.
---
Putnam I 63
Theory/Putnam: two theories do not have to have equivalent terms, but only the same reference. ---
Cavell I 268
Comprehensibility/Putnam: before Riemann the corresponding terms were incomprehensible. For example, the geometry of the universe is dependent on mass density. ---
I 269
Meaning Change/Putnam: if we get said that straight lines can behave in a non-Euclidean way, then, according to the idea, the old grammar is not contradicted; it is simply abandoned. Yes, the concept of the straight line has been changed. Putnam: That may be. But his denotation has not changed. Anyone who aligns these cases to cases where the denotation changes is completely wrong. ((s) Denotation equals here reference, designation, description?)
Definition Denotation/Duden: (a) the meaning which refers to the object: (moon: earthtrabant)
(b) the formal relationship between sign and signified.
---
I 270
Putnam: then one would ask: what are then the straight lines in the old sense? If scientific revolution meant a new definition of terms, or if we always had to change our criteria, then we could not speak of the same objects!
Projection of old concepts into new situations is also necessary to understand metaphors and jokes.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Feyerabend, P. Goodman Vs Feyerabend, P.
 
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IV 202
VsFeyerabend: The statement "Nothing goes" is just as feasible as the statement "anything goes". And just as feasible as the statement "something goes". The main objective of our proposal is not to avoid difficulty, but to develop a wider range and more sensitive instruments. First: what is wrong with some familiar core concepts?

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989
Feyerabend, P. Popper Vs Feyerabend, P.
 
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II 33
PopperVsFeyerabend: critical rationalists indeed admit that one can criticize and change standards, but they hinder effective review by the requirement that a critique must be rational on the basis of the arguments. The arguments must be understandable and indeed already in the moment when they are put forward. This excludes an anticipatory criticism.

Po I
K. Popper
Objektive Erkenntnis Hamburg 1993
Feyerabend, P. Putnam Vs Feyerabend, P.
 
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V 156
Incommensurability/PutnamVsFeyerabend: PutnamVsIncommensurability thesis: it refutes itself. It states that the term E.g. "temperature" from the 17th century cannot be equated with ours in terms of meaning or reference. This thesis should apply for the observation language as well as for the so-called "theory language." Feyerabend/language: our normal language is nothing more than a false theory. PutnamVsFeyerabend: we could not translate other languages or earlier stages of our own language, if this hypothesis was really true.
---
V 156/157
According to Feyerabend (and Kuhn when he is in particularly incommensurable mood) we could conceptually grasp the members of other cultures, including the scientists of the 17th century only as living beings that respond to stimuli (and that utter sounds that are similar to English or Italian in an oddly way). So more or less animals. PutnamVsFeyerabend/VsKuhn: it is totally inconsistent, if one wants to make us believe Galileo's concepts are "incommensurable", and then goes on to describe them in detail.
Smart pro Feyerabend: it is certainly a neutral fact that we need to aim with our telescope above this treetop here to see the Mercury, and not, as predicted by the Newtonian theory, above this chimney there.
---
However, Feyerabend could allow that we use Euclidean geometry and a non-relativistic optics for our theory of the telescope. He would say, although this is not the real truth about our telescope, the tree and the chimney, but it is still legitimate to do so.
PutnamVsSmart/PutnamVsFeyerabend: the difficulty is that you need to understand the language of Euclidean non-relativists at least partially, to be able to say that the predictions are the same.
How can I translate the logical particle ("if then", "no", etc.) from Italian of the 17th Century if I cannot find a translation manual?
---
V 158
Translation/Quine/Davidson: (VsKuhn, VsFeyerabend): first, it has to be admitted that we can find a translation scheme, what is the point then in this context, to say that the translation does not "really" capture meaning and reference of the original? The claim that the scheme does not exactly capture the meaning or reference of the original, can be understood in the light of the admission that one could find a better translation scheme. But it is only seemingly reasonable that all possible schemes should fail to capture the "real" meaning or reference.
---
V 160
Convergence/Putnam: is totally rejected by Kuhn and Feyerabend. According to that we do not increase our knowledge, the science is only making instrumentally "progress". (Technology). We are getting better in "transporting people from one place to another". PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: that too is incoherent: we can only understand the idea of the instrumental (technological) progress when such terms as "transport people from one place to another" maintain a certain degree of permanent reference.
---
I 83
Electron/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: E.g. Bohr's electron refers according to the two to nothing. And only that because not all of Bohr's assumptions have been confirmed. PutnamVs. ---
I 84
Principle of leap of faith/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: there is nothing that corresponds exactly to Bohr's electron, but they have mass and charge, and that is pretty much so. We must give leap of faith and treat Bohr as someone who refers to these particles. ((s) in order for scientists to able to engage in dialogue and to speak of the same entity.)

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Feyerabend, P. Quine Vs Feyerabend, P.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Feyerabend: (he took Quine s holism seriously): speaks of incommensurability of theories and systems. The transmission model of communication corresponds to an accumulation model of progress.
  E.g. If "electron" for us means something completely different than for the early theorists, how can we deny the former assertion?
Brandom I 670
QuineVsFeyerabend: solution: that is semantically relevant to the meaning but not the reference! What we want to represent, and not what we say about it.   E.g. Even from the mouth of a Zarathustra disciple you can find out whether the sun is shining or not.
  What is communicated, is the purely extensional content!

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Feyerabend, P. Rorty Vs Feyerabend, P.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Rorty I 300
Semantic Change/Criterion/Rorty: the search for a criterion for semantic change was disastrous. It became clear that Feyerabend had put forward his own argument wrong when he spoke of semantic change. Meaning/PutnamVsFeyerabend: for Feyerabend, meaning depends on the entire theory. If we were to assume that empiricism changed the meaning of an expression, it would be the same as abandoning the distinction between questions of meaning and questions of fact.
To say that the semantic rules of German cannot be distinguished from the empirical opinions of its speakers would be to throw the notion of a semantic rule of German overboard.
Any appearance of sensation would be lost, for "sensation" depends on the fact that you are constantly moving back and forth between an unusual and the traditional conception of meaning.
V 19
VsFeyerabend/Rorty: Putnam's and Davidson's criticism can at most do something against a few careless points in some early writings by Feyerabend.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Feyerabend, P. Verschiedene Vs Feyerabend, P. Brandom I 671
SchefflerVsFeyerabend: Fortschritt ist verstehbar als die Rede von immer mehr Gegenständen, die immer mehr Prädikat-Extensionen ins Spiel bringen, und man immer mehr Wahres über jene Gegenstände sagen kann, indem man sie unter die Prädikat-Extensionen klassifiziert. (Auch früher Putnam, mit Schülern und Bewunderern: Field, Boyd, Devitt).
Fey I 44
Feyerabend: man weiß heute daß das Brownsche Teilchen ein perpetuum mobile zweiter Art ist, und das sein Vorhandensein den 2.Hauptsatz der Wärmelehre widerlegt. (GenzVs.)
II 86
KüngVsFeyerabend.
II 92
SpinnerVsFeyerabend: Parallele zu Hitler: »ich werde nie nach einem Rezept handeln«. Feyerabend: na und, soll ich mir die Nase abschneiden, weil Herr Hitler auch eine Nase hatte? Lassen wir Herrn Hitler in seinem wohlverdienten ist aber ohne.
Fey I 338
Täuschung/Feyerabend: Bsp ein bewegtes Muster, daß gerade zum Stillstand gekommen ist. Feyerabend: man sieht, daß es sich in der entgegengesetzten Richtung bewegt, aber ohne seine Lage zu ändern. Die einzige phänomenologisch richtige Beschreibung dieses Sachverhaltes lautet: »es bewegt sich im Raum, aber es ändert seinen Ort nicht« und diese Beschreibung ist widersprüchlich. OwenVsFeyerabend: das sind Erscheinungen, nicht wirkliche Ereignisse. FeyerabendVsOwen: das behebt nicht die Schwierigkeit. Denn wenn man das »erscheint« einführt, da muß man es an den Anfang des Satzes stellen: »es scheint, daß es sich bewegt und seinen Ort nicht verändert«. ((s) >Sellars).





Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Relativism Feyerabend Vs Relativism
 
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II 113
Culture/Cultures/Feyerabend: ... "a rational-liberal (-marxist) society cannot contain a black culture in the full sense of the word. It cannot contain Jewish culture in the full sense of the word, nor medieval culture in the full sense of the word. It can only tolerate such cultures as secondary outgrowths of a basic structure which is itself an unholy alliance of science, rationalism (and capitalism)."  AgassiVsFeyerabend: that is a suggestion to transform Jews, Indians, and blacks through a kind of therapy into "real" Jews, Indians, and blacks. Feyerabend: this was never mentioned. I do not intend to convert people from one state to another. Especially not with therapeutic methods. But I would urge that people who want such a transformation get the opportunity to do it. I criticize the scientific and rational education exerted on them de facto on behalf of Science by the State.

Fe I
P. Feyerabend
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Fe II
P. Feyerabend
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979