Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 103
Knowledge/Consciousness/color researcher Mary/Jackson/Nagel/Chalmers: (Jackson, 1982, Nagel 1974). E.g. Color researcher Mary knows everything there is to know about colors - but she has never seen colors.
All neurophysical knowledge cannot explain how it is to see red. The knowledge of how it is (experience) does not follow from physical knowledge alone.
Bat-Example/Nagel/Chalmers: boils down to the same: it remains an open question: it is compatible with all physical facts that bats or even mice have a consciousness, and it is also compatible with them that they have none.
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I 104
Jackson/Chalmers: Jackson has presented his argument JacksonVsMaterialism, not VsReductionism, not against a reductive explanation of our conscious experience.
See also Lewis (1990), and Nemirov (1990).
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I 141
Knowledge/intension/fact/Chalmers: every time, if one knows a fact under one way of giveness, but not under another, there will be an additional, different fact which one does not know. E.g. Morning star/Evening Star, Superman/Clark Kent, Water/H2O.
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I 142
The new fact that one learns (also e.g. color researcher Mary, when she first sees a color) is a fact in relation to the way of giveness.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


> Counter arguments against Chalmers
> Counter arguments in relation to Knowledge



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30