Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Bridge Laws Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 107
Bridge Laws/Explanation/Awareness/Chalmers: The fact that consciousness accompanies a given physical process is an additional fact, it is not explainable by telling the physical facts. ---
I 107
Bridge laws/Bridge principles/Chalmers: can they help in the explanation of consciousness? No, they are not reductive themselves. And the fact that we need them would just show again that consciousness cannot be explained reductively. Physical Facts: nothing I've said here implies, incidentally, that the physical side would be irrelevant to consciousness! Perhaps they can also help to understand the structure of consciousness: patterns of similarity and dissimilarity of experiences.
---
I 108
VsChalmers: one could argue that bridge laws are always involved when it comes to higher and lower-level phenomena. In such cases, these bridge principles are not additional facts about the world. 1. ChalmersVsVs: We can refute this with arguments that come from the domain of twins and possible worlds with an identical physical structure: it is inconceivable that a being which physically resembles me would not be alive, yet it does not follow logically that it has an awareness, too.
2. ChalmersVsVs: There is no "inverted life" as there are inverted spectra.
3. If one has all the physical facts, one has also all biological ones.
4. With regard to life, there is no epistemic asymmetry.
5. Life is - unlike consciousness - analysable in functional terms.
---
I 237
Bridge Principles/Chalmers: Between physical processes and experience can serve as a criterion for the presence of consciousness in a system. The bridge principles are then an epistemic lever, which, however, cannot be tested.
Bridge principles are not conclusions themselves from experiments. They preceed them and control them.
Cognition/Consciousness/Chalmers: according to my proposal, there is a coherence between these two and for this we need bridge principles: here the accessibility to global control.
The most common bridge principle is the possibility to report as a criterion for experience. Experience is conscious when you can report on it.
Problem: experience without language in animals. Solution: behavioral control, Logothetis and sound (1989).

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Cognition Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmer: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for the implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: there are also models by Churchland, (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all my criticism VsDennett from above applies.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Cognition Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 111
Cognition/explanation/consciousness/cognitive models/Chalmers: Cognitive models are very good when it comes to explaining things like learning and behavior, but not in the explanation of conscious experience. In all that is cognitively explained, the question remains why it is accompanied by something like consciousness.
---
I 112
Cognitive models can certainly cover the psychological side of consciousness (behavior explaining, learning, information processing), but not the phenomenal side of conscious experience. ---
I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows is still everything it needs to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the different functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and Chalmers I 370.
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: There are also models by Churchland, (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all applies my criticism VsDennett from above.
---
I 172
Cognition/Chalmers: it is wrong to assume that it is separate from consciousness, even if it belongs to another sphere (the physical). For example, one has a (physical) perception of something green which is psychologically individualized. On the other hand, we also have perceptions about our consciousness. ---
I 218
Cognition/consciousness/psychology/Chalmers: the coherence between conscious experience and cognitive structures is remarkable. We can recognize principles: Principles: 1. Reliability principle: Our judgments of the second level about consciousness are generally correct.
---
I 219
If I judge that I hear something, then I usually hear something. 2. The principle of deducibility (reversed reliability principle): although many experiences often escape us, we usually have the ability to notice them.
---
I 222/223
3. Principle of structural coherence: conscious phenomenal experiences are always accompanied by (appropriately characterized) psychological consciousness. ---
I 223
E.g. Structural features of the facial field are reflected in our experiences of larger and smaller, brighter, darker, etc. objects, and also in our reactions to them. This also applies to implicit structures such as relations between colors.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Conceivability Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 73
Conceivability/Idea/Chalmers: when two worlds resemble each other in terms of all micro-physical conditions, there is no room for the notion that they differ in terms of higher-level properties such as biological phenomena. This unimaginability is not caused by any cognitive limitations. It is rather logically impossible that these worlds differ.
---
I 98
Imagination/Conceivability/argument/proof/VsChalermers: some may argue that conceivability is not an argument - there may always be details which have not been taken into account. ChalmersVsVs: but then one would have to specify somehow which details these are.
Chalmers: the only way in which conceivability and possibility are disjointed is connected to necessity a posteriori: e.g. the hypothesis that water is not H2O seems conceptually coherent, but water is probably H2O in all possible worlds.
Necessity a posteriori/Chalmers: however, necessity a posteriori is irrelevant to the problem of whether our conscious experience is explainable.
---
I 99
Conceivability/Chalmers: one might think that one could imagine a situation in which Fermat's last sentence is wrong. But it would turn out that the situation was described wrongly. As it would turn out, the terms were misapplied. ---
I 130
Idea/Conceivability/VsDescartes/Chalmers: Descartes' argument from the mere conceivability is considered as rejected. From the fact that it is conceivable that A and B are not identical does not follow that they are not. VsChalmers: Is that not true to the same extent for the zombies' example?
---
I 131
ChalmersVsVs: the difference is that it is not about identity here, but about supervenience! If one can imagine the existence of all physical properties without the existence of conscious properties, then it is simply that the physical facts do not exhaust everything. This is something completely different. Supervenience is also much more fundamental here.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Consciousness Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 161
Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception. ---
Dennett I 534
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today. ---
Dennett II 23ff
Language/animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question of which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought without language but consciousness without thinking. ---
Metzinger/Rosenthal II 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what is conscious and what is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
---
Metzinger II 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world - it relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer. ---
Metzinger II 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of P-B and Z-B. (phenenmenal conscious and access-conscious). ---
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: these models also exist by Churchland (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all, my criticism VsDennett from above applies.
---
Chalmers I, 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b) Consciousness is what stands out in brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Context/Context Dependence Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
Schwarz I 201
Contextual Intension/Chalmers: (Chalmers 2003, §3). LewisVsChalmers: the falsity of a sentence where no one says anything comes from compositional rules; situations do not always have to be utterance contexts. Therefore, truth conditions are not "contextual intensions. (Lewis, 1980a, 28f).

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Dualism Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 125
Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism. ---
I 134
Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false. ---
I 135
This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...). N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has.
N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument.
ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative.
2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts.
---
I 136
For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton. Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains.
---
I 154
Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded.
---
I 155
Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism. ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type.
It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism:
---
I 155
Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic. ---
I 156
Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism.
Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)
---
I 157
ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples: VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers:
1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random.
2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently.
ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses.
ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant.
---
I 158
ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties.
ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical.
ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them.
---
I 162
Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. ---
I 162
Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed. ---
I 171
Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Interactionism Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 156
Dualism/Definition Interactionist Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism.
Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)
---
I 157
ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to effect any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter arguments: VsInteractionist dualism/Interactionism/Chalmers:
1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random.
2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently.
ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain when the wave function collapses.
ChalmersVsInteractionist dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant:
---
I 158
ChalmersVsEccles: if there are his psychons, then they can do without purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties.
ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of the behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus it adheres to the causal unity of the physical.
ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: Even if one were to assume psychons, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychons. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychons without being able to prove them.
---
I 162
Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is not physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Inverted Spectra Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 99
Inverted Spectra/Consciousness/Chalmers: in order to demonstrate the lack of explainability of our consciousness, it suffices to show the logical possibility of a physical world with our identical world where facts about our conscious experience differ from those in our world. This is about positive facts, not about a lack of facts. ---
I 100
Someone who lives in my world might experience something as blue that I perceive as red. Of course, he would call it "red" just like me. The rest of its color perception would be arranged so that no differences could be noticed. Explanation: The simplest explanation would be that two of the axes of our three-dimensional color space are interchanged, the red-green axis and the yellow-blue axis. (An enlightening discussion of the human color space can be found in Hardin, 1988). This is not only conceptually consistent and it does not appear to be excluded from neurophysiology either.
HarrisonVsInverted spectra/HardinVsInverted Spectra/Chalmers: (Harrison 1973, Hardin 1987): Thesis:
The human color space is asymmetric so that such a reversal is not possible. For example, warm/cold colors associated with different functional roles ("positive", "negative").
ChalmersVsVs:
1. Nevertheless, nothing is conceptually contradictory in inverted spectra. 2. Instead of an inversion of red and blue, one could assume an inversion of only slightly different color hues (Levine 1991).
---
I 101
There is also no reason why an inversion of the spectrum needs to use only natural colors. 3. (Shoemaker, 1982): Even though our color space is asymmetric, there is no reason to believe that there might be creatures with a symmetric color space that are physically identical to us.
Conceivability/Reductive explanation/Chalmers: if such assumptions are conceivable, this has an impact on the question of the possibility of reductive explanations.
Consciousness: both the conceivability of zombies as well as the one of inverted spectra show that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts. At most the existence of conscious experience could be explained reductively, but not the specific character of our experience.
---
I 263
Inverted Spectra/Chalmers: we must exclude the possibility of inverted spectra for functionally isomorphically structured systems. Inverted Qualia come first in > John Locke.
---
I 264
VsChalmers: even materialists argue that the nature of experiences is based on the physiological nature, that is to say, in the case of differently constructed systems (for example, machines). Inverted Spectra/Schlick (1932): they cannot be ascertained verificationistically. Therefore, there can be no real difference.
ChalmersVsSchlick: this is not sufficient to draw the conclusion that there is no fact here in regard to conscious experiences, namely, because the nature of Qualia is conceptually not linked to behavior. ((s) > nonfactualism).
---
I 265
Invariance Principle/Chalmers: the principle is not shaken by the natural (not only logical) possibility of inverted spectra. It is also not shaken by examples of reorganization, rewiring, etc. (Gert, 1965, Lycan 1973, Wittgenstein, 1968) It is also not shaken by kidnapping to a twin earth with a yellow sky. (Block 1990). Here the representations after an acclimatization period will be about yellow. The invariance principle (the preservation of conscious experiences with a changed physical structure of a functionally consistent system) remains.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Materialism Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
Stalnaker I 242
Definition Type-A-materialism/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Chalmers 1996, 165-6) thesis: consciousness as far as it exists, logically supervenes on the physical for functionalist or eliminativistic reasons - Definition type-B materialism: thesis: consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, so there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal - yet materialism is claimed. ---
Chalmers I XIII
Materialism/Chalmers: to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides. ---
Chalmers I 41
Definition Materialism/Physicalism/Chalmers: the thesis that all positive facts about the world supervene globally logically on physical facts. (> Supervenience/Chalmers) ---
I 42
Materialism is true when all the positive facts about the world are entailed by the physical facts. (See also Chalmers I 364). That is, if for every logically possible world W, which is physically indistinguishable from our world, all positive facts which are true of our world are also true of world W. This corresponds to Jackson's physicalism:
Definition Physicalism/Jackson: (Jackson 1994): Criterion: every minimal physical duplicate of our actual world is simply a duplicate of our world (See also Chalmers I 364).
---
I 123
Materialism/ChalmersVsMaterialism: if my assumptions about conscious experience (phenomenal consciousness) are correct, materialism must be wrong: 1. There are conscious experiences in our world
2. There is a logically possible world that is physically identical to our actual world in which the positive facts about consciousness are not valid in our world.
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are additional facts, beyond the physical facts.
4. Therefore, materialism is wrong.
---
I 124
The same conclusion can be drawn from the logical possibility of worlds with interchanged conscious experiences. So when God created the world, after securing the physical facts, he had more to do, than Kripke says: he had to make that the facts about consciousness remain.
The failure of this kind of materialism leads to a kind of dualism.
---
139
MaterialismVsChalmers: could argue that the unimaginability of certain worlds (see above) is only due to our cognitive limitations. Then the corresponding world would not even be logically possible! (This would be a possible interpretation of McGinn 1989.) Analogy: one might suppose that the decision e.g. about the continuum hypothesis or its negation is beyond our cognitive abilities.
ChalmersVsVs: this analogy does not work in the case of our understanding of modalities (modes of necessity and possibility).
E.g. it is also not the case that a smarter version of the color researcher Mary would know better how it is to see a color.
---
I 144
Materialism/Chalmers: Chalmers would simply deny that Mary makes any discoveries at all. This is the strategy of Lewis (1990) and Nemirov (1990): Mary only acquires an additional ability (to recognize), but no knowledge. ChalmersVsNemirow/ChalmersVsLewis: Although there are no internal problems with this strategy, it is implausible.
---
I 145
Mary really learns new facts about the nature of the experience. She has reduced the space of epistemic possibilities. Omniscience/Chalmers: for an omniscient being, there is no such narrowing of possibilities.
Loar: (1990) he derives from this new knowledge of Mary conditionals: "If seeing red things is like this, and seeing blue things is like this, then seeing violet things is probably like this."
DennettVsJackson: (Dennett 1991) Mary does not learn anything at all. She could not be deceived, e.g. by experimenters holding a blue apple instead of a red one in front of her. She has already learned the necessary from the reactions of others in her environment.
ChalmersVsDennett: but this does not show that she had the decisive (phenomenal) knowledge.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Property Dualism Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Chalmers I 130
Property Dualism/SearleVsProperty Dualism/SearleVsChalmers: Searle (1992) has a similar view as I do, but denies that this is a property dualism. Rather, the ontological status of consciousness is the same as that of physical properties, such as being liquid. This is not a mere terminological difference to my dualism. In Searle, basal physical facts do not cause the higher level ones, they constitute them. Constitution is a much closer relationship than causation. (FN 2/chapter 5).

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Qualia Block
 
Books on Amazon:
Ned Block
Chalmers I 250
Qualia/absent qualia/Block/BlockVsChalmers/BlockVsInvariance Principle/Chalmers: (Block 1978): Block thesis: in the case of identical biochemical realization in a non-human system, the Qualia, which accompany the conscious experience in humans, must be missing. E.g. suppose the corresponding organization had been realized in a country, instead of in an organism: This country can certainly have no conscious experiences.
Invariance principle/Chalmers: it follows from this that, in the case of an identical biochemical organization, conscious experiences are possible in a system.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Qualia Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 251
Qualia/Missing Qualia/ChalmersVsBlock: (Block 1978) Thought experiments, in which system properties that reflect a human consciousness system in an economy or in the Chinese population are realized as a whole, have at most intuitive power. They are intended to show that such a system, in which an individual e.g. should stand for a neuron, as a whole system cannot develop a consciousness. ChalmersVsBlock: just as intuitively, we argue, when we say that it is hardly credible that a piece of gray mass produces consciousness and yet it does!
We would not see any experiences in an economy as a whole, but we do not do that in the brain either!
---
I 252
Likewise, we can explain the functioning of the whole system in the case of the population as well as the brain, even without conscious experiences. On the other hand, it would not in principle be ruled out that a corresponding organizational structure in a population as a whole would bring about conscious experience, but one would have to considerably increase the speed of the signal lines.
BlockVsVs: we know about neurons that can do the job, we do not know this of homunculi (that would be individuals in the population in the example).
---
I 253
Fading Qualia/VsChalmers: For example, suppose parts of the brain would be replaced by silicon chips (Pylyshyn 1980), Savitt (1982), Cuda (1985), then it could be that Qualia faded or disappeared bit by bit. ---
I 254
ChalmersVsVs: If the individual chips get enough input information (and if they check somewhere) then it makes no difference and the qualia remain. Bit by bit, all neurons could be replaced by chips. ---
I 256
A being with weaker Qualia is systematically mistaken about everything it experiences. Things I perceive as different will be homogeneous for it. The being will nevertheless believe,... ---
I 257
...that it has these complex experiences that are actually missing him. It has lost contact with its experiences. This seems implausible. Fading Qualia: are nevertheless logically possible.
---
I 261
ChalmersVsVs: it is reasonable to assume that no system can be misunderstood as to its experiences. ---
I 262
Invariance of the behavior/VsChalmers: could there be a system that is completely differently structured than me, but behaves the same as I do? Such a system would have to be conscious in the same way! VsVs: On the other hand, Block's example of a huge display with all inputs and outputs is not surely conscious. (Block 1981). So something must be wrong with the argument.
ChalmersVsVs: 1. My argument does not apply to behaviourally equivalent systems. A perfect actor does not have to be of the same opinion as the person represented.
2. A thought experiment with equivalent behavior cannot be introduced bit by bit as with replacing neurons with electronic chips.
---
I 263
A system like this would be rational in any case. ---
I 266f
Def Dancing Qualia/Chalmers: Assuming that 10%, 20%, 30% ... of the brain are replaced by silicon chips, and the resulting Qualia may change rapidly between systematically weak or unsystematic, we do not care. There must only be two points A and B so that... ---
I 267
1. no more than 10% of the brain has been exchanged between A and B, and 2. A and B have significantly different experiences.
Problem: There may be some unnoticed differences between different experiences. (> Sorites).
Switch: we assume that I have a backup system of my brain and can switch back and forth from time to time.
---
I 268
After switching, I'll be like the new system - we call it Bill. He may have a blue instead of my red experience. I could even go back and forth, that would be the dancing qualia. N.B.: when switching back and forth, I will not notice any difference!
---
I 269
A change or altered behavior would require a functional difference between the two systems, contrary to the stipulated (functional) isomorphism. Since this is not the case, I cannot acquire any new beliefs, such as, for example, "My qualia just jumped." If it were otherwise, we would have to accept a completely new, changed psychology and phenomenology. N.B.: it could even be that our Qualia are actually constantly dancing in front of our eyes!
---
I 270
The only place where you could draw a principal line would be the functional level! Solution/Chalmers: the only thing that prevents us from accepting the possibility of the dancing qualia in our own case is the following principle:
Principle: If someone's conscious experiences change significantly, one notices the change. ((s) Circular between "significant" and "noticeable"). If we neglect the principle, we have no longer any defense against skepticism.
---
I 271
VsChalmers: Objections refer to gaps in the argument about the perception history, speed, weak inversions,... ---
I 272
...unnoticed qualia, which for their part are interchanged, e.g. at the edge of the facial field,... ---
I 273
...multiple changes. ChalmersVsVs: none of these arguments is critical for my argument.
Absent Qualia/Chalmers: absent qualia are extremely implausible, dancing and interchanged Qualia are even extremely implausible.
Functionalism: But this does not confirm functionalism in its strongest form (the thesis according to which the functional organization is constitutive for consciousness), since such qualia are not logically excluded.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Rules Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 329
Rules/Artificial Intelligence/VsAI/VsChalmers/Chalmers: Arguments related to the alleged impossibility of (strong) artificial intelligence point out that artificial systems follow strictly rules and are therefore incapable of creativity and flexibility. ChalmersVsVs: this only applies to symbol processing and not all systems of artificial intelligence are limited to symbol processing. Connectivist models do not exist in symbol manipulation. It may be that these systems follow rules on a level, but that does not show up in behavior.
Level/Hofstadter/Chalmers: (Hofstadter 1979) the level on which I think is not necessarily the level on which I add.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Systems Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 247
System/Function/Functional Organization/Consciousness/Chalmers: which functional organization may be necessary for consciousness? And what is functional organization? Definition Functional Organization/Chalmers:
1. A number of abstract components
2. For each component, a number of different possible states
3. A system of dependency relations that determine how the state of each component depends on previous states of all components and inputs in the system, and how outputs of the system depend on previous states of the components. The nature of the components and the states remain open.
---
I 248
Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Such an organization can be realized not only by the brain, but also by electronic systems. Levels: such a system will have different levels, depending on how finely we distinguish the elements. If we want to assess cognition, we need at least a system that is able to change its own behavior.
---
I 249
Definition Principle of organizational invariance/Chalmers: a system with the ability of conscious experiences will have qualitatively identical experiences if the fine-grained organizational structure remains the same. ((s) VsChalmers: Only if the inputs remain the same and the system has no time register.) Chalmers: that's what I call my non-reductive functionalism. It can be viewed as a kind of combination of functionalism and property dualism.
VsChalmers: 1. Some authors believe that there must be a certain biochemical equipment to make consciousness possible so that there will be no conscious electronic systems.
2. Other authors believe that robots may have consciousness but that their experiences will not be comparable to ours. (> Lack of Qualia).

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Vitalism Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 108
Vitalism/Consciousness/VsChalmers: could a vitalist not argue,... ---
I 109
...that life would also be added as an "additional fact" to a physically-described body as consciousness, and so could not be explained by the physical facts? ChalmersVsVs: Vitalism comes from the doubt that physical mechanisms can cope with all those complex functions that are related to life.
But faced with all our present knowledge, the vitalist would admit that life was explained. There is not even a conceptual space for all these functions without the assumption of life.
All that the vitalist could take into account in the end would be that the functional explanation does not explain the "knowing how it is to be alive".

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Zombies Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 94
Zombies/Robots/Chalmers: zombies and robots are logically possible. There could be a twin of me, who is molecular identical with me, but without inner experience. ---
I 95
Zombie Identity/Chalmers: The identity between my zombie twin and I will insist on the following levels: 1. Functional: he will process the same information as I do.
2. Psychological: he will show the same behavior.
Phenomenal: the zombie will not be identical with me: he will not have the same inner experiences.
---
I 96
Zombies/Chalmers: it is not a matter of whether the assumption of their existence is plausible, but whether it is conceptually incoherent. In any case, there are no hidden conceptual contradictions. ---
I 97
Conceivability: since such a zombie is not conceptually excluded, it follows that my conscious experience does not logically follow from the functional constitution of my organism. Conclusion: (phenomenal) consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical.
---
I 131
Zombies/Necessity a posteriori/VsChalmers: one could argue that a zombie world would be merely logical, but not metaphysically possible. There is also a distinction between conceivability and true possibility. Necessary a posteriori/Kripke: For example, that water is H2O, this necessity is only a posteriori knowable. Then it is logical, but not metaphysically possible, that water is not H2O.
VsChalmers: it was unnatural to assume the same for zombies, and that would be enough to save materialism.
ChalmersVsVs: the notion of necessity a posteriori cannot bear the burden of this argument and is only a distraction maneuver. ((s) It is not brought into play by Kripke himself).
---
I 132
ChalmersVsVs: the argument against me would only have a prospect of success if we had used primary intensions (e.g. water and H2O), but we are dealing with secondary intensions (e.g. water and "wateriness"). Therefore, psychological/physical concepts a posteriori could pick out other things than what would correspond to the a priori distinction. ---
I 180
Zombie/Behavior/Explanation/Chalmers: since the relationships within my zombie twin are the exact reflection of my inner being, any explanation of his behavior will also count as an explanation of my behavior. It follows that the explanation of my assertions about consciousness is just as independent of the existence of consciousness as the explanation of the assertions of the zombies. My zombie twin can adopt this argumentation, and complain about me as a zombie. It can mirror the whole situation.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Chalmers, D. Lewis Vs Chalmers, D.
 
Books on Amazon
Schwarz I 201
Contextual Intension/Chalmers: 2003, §3). LewisVsChalmers: In a sentence in which nobody says anything the wrongness of sentence only surfaces in compositional rules. Situations are not necessarily always contexts in which something is expressed. This is why truth conditions are not "contextual intensions". (1980a,28f).

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Chalmers, D. Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D.
 
Books on Amazon
I 194
Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w..
Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context)
I 195
defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token).
Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference.
StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device.
Difference:
a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning,
b) not as meaning.
Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth.
- - -
I 202
Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but
Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages.
I 210
Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended
b) meta-semantically.
I 211
Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference
StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. Necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently.
Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts.
Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has?

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Two Dimensional Sem. Stalnaker, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 201/202
zwei-dimensionale Semantik/Stalnaker VsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: These ich denke, das zeigt etwas über die Natur mentaler Repräsentation und nicht nur über das kontingente Funktionieren von Sprachen.
I 204
zwei-dimensionaler Rahmen/Stalnaker: ich werde die zwei Arten, ihn zu interpretieren aufzeigen a) semantisch
b) metasemantisch.
These mit dieser Unterscheidung möchte ich Notwendigkeit a posteriori reduzieren wie es Jackson und Chalmers getan haben. Damit kann das Problem der Intentionalität gelöst werden.