|Terminologies: here, special features of the language use of the individual authors are explained._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Deflationary/Terminology/Chalmers: a deflationary concept of belief would be purely psychological (explaining behavior), not phenomenal (connected with Qualia). Which is the true concept, is not so decisive for my project. More important is the separation of the psychological and the phenomenal.
Alertness/Attention/awareness/Terminology/Chalmers: Consciousness is always accompanied by attention, but not always vice versa. Awareness (also attention) falls more on the psychological side of differentiation.
Newell (1992) distinguishes between "awareness" and "consciousness".
Chalmers: With "awareness" (attention) I will mean from now on "psychological consciousness" (behavior explaining, functional).
Definition Proto-phenomenal Property/Chalmers: as the only one, a proto-phenomenal property does not contain experience itself, but it can contain several simultaneously present ones. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal.
To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. > Dualism.
Registration/Chalmers: registrations are judgments in a weaker sense: representational states, e.g. of the facial field, which are not yet judgments._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014