Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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David Chalmers
I 17
Pain/Chalmers: pain is an example for the fact that concepts have a double meaning a) as a psychological concept for the explanation of behavior, (> functional role) - b) as a phenomenal concept of the first person (> Qualia).
Both aspects naturally tend to occur together. But that is not a conceptual truth about pain!
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I 18
Everyday Language/Chalmers: everyday language brings psychological and phenomenal aspects together, although these are actually separated. This applies to many mental concepts.
Learning: Here, the psychological aspect may be stronger.
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I 19
Emotions: the phenomenal aspect is probably predominant here.
Belief: here the case is more complex because intentionality plays a role, e.g. whether one believes a proposition and at the same time has a hope about it. At the same time, beliefs are used to explain behavior.
Contents/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1990a): Thesis: the content of a belief depends entirely on the connected consciousness state. Without consciousness, everything is as-if-intentionality. (Searle: See Chalmers I 360).
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I 146f
Pain/Knowledge/phenomenal/physical/identity/Kripke/Chalmers: Kripke's argument is based on identity, which is always necessary identity accordingto him.
Pain/Kripke: it is pointless to say that there is something pain-like that is shown as a pain in the course of an examination, unlike in the case of water/H2O:
Water has somehow been exposed as H2O. This identity is a necessity a posteriori after the discovery.
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I 147
ChalmersVsKripke: Kripke's argument, unlike mine, is based on a certain essentialism in relation to different states. With me, it is never about disembodiment. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between Kripke and me. Both of us are concerned with modal arguments with necessity and possibility.
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I 148
Brain State/Pain/Kripke: Thesis: You could have that particular brain state without feeling that particular pain, because for pain, only feeling is essential. (See also Feldman (1974), McGinn (1977)).
Materialism/Pain/Boyd: (Boyd 1980): the materialist does not have to assume that mental states in all possible worlds are physical states, as long as this is the case in the actual world.
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I 149
Pain/Intension/Kripke/Chalmers: if Kripke says you cannot imagine a situation in which the feeling of pain but not the pain itself is absent, that means that the primary and secondary intensions are collapsing.
ChalmersVsKripke:
1. The possibility of disorganization is inconsistent as an argument against materialism, but in our case is not decisive.
2. The same applies to the arguments based on identity.
3. An essentialist metaphysics is not decisive (for our purposes), apart from the fact that the feeling of pain is essential for pain - but it is about the meaning of "pain".
4. Kripke's apparatus of the rigid designators (> cross-world identity) is central to our problem, but has a deep core in the failure of the logical supervenience we have established.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26