Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments


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Physical/Psychic, philosophy: involves the question to which domain - the physical, ultimately biological, or the mental domain - a subject of research is to be counted to, is the subject of discussion in various disciplines such as philosophy of mind, neuro-philosophy or psychology. See also identity theory, naturalism, physicalism, functionalism, naturalism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 42
Psychological/Physical/Law/Law-like/Chalmers: Thesis: It is natural to assume that my principles of coherence between consciousness and awareness that is, that consciousness is always accompanied by awareness, and vice versa, are the same in all human organisms, and are therefore a law-like correlation. We can argue that this coherence is a natural law. That is, that it applies to all systems. ((s) If a system has any kind of consciousness at all).
Chalmers: this also applies to the remarkable correlation between the structure of consciousness and the structure of awareness. It is too specific to be a coincidence.
I 243
Chalmer's thesis: for every system the structure of consciousness ((s) phenomenal) is mirrored and reversed by the structure of consciousness somewhere (awareness, psychologically).
Then we can say that consciousness arises from the functional organization of a system that is necessary for awareness. Then the structure of consciousness is determined by the structure of attention (psychological awareness).
This, of course, is not a fundamental psychophysical law. This would have to link more basic structures than something like "consciousness".
I 244
Can we rule out that there must be some additional X-factor, so we can talk about consciousness?
I 245
Solution/Chalmers: if we accept consciousness as an additional non-physical fact - in addition to the physical - as well as independent psychophysical laws, an "X-factor", no matter how it is structured, becomes superflous.
I 246
Best explanation/simplicity/Chalmers: my approach is the simplest and therefore a conclusion on the best explanation as it is often practiced in physical theories.
I 276
Psychological/physical/Chalmers: how simple can the organization of a system with conscious experiences become before experience disappears?
I 277
We will need a lot of psycho-physical laws.
I 284
Physical/psychological/Information/Chalmers: whenever we receive a phenomenal information, we will also find this information physically realized:
I 285
We do not know exactly how the phenomenal information is encoded, so we do not know exactly how the information space is physically realized, but we know that it has to be realized. The physical information does not have to be realized locally.
Psychological/phenomenal/Chalmers: it is natural to suppose that this double live of information spaces corresponds to a duality on a deeper level.
We might even assume that this double realization is the key to a fundamental link between physical processes...
I 286
...and conscious experiences. We need a kind of construct here and information seems to be as suitable as anything.
Thesis: It could be that principles of the double realization of information can be developed into a system of fundamental laws for a combination of the physical and the phenomenal domain.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-01-23
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