Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
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Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

II 177
Language/Necessity/Cavell: Question: are there logical requirements or only empirical findings?
(Cavell thesis: (according to Fodor): logical necessities do consist in language philosophy).
Cavell: logical necessities do not exist between language and world but only between sentences.
The opportunity in which we express a sentence (circumstances) cannot be regarded as part of meaning or logic.
II 178
To mean/Must/Necessity/Language/Cavell: e.g. "He would not say that unless he meant ..." if we assume that the speaker and we already understand the meaning and use of an expression, one could conclude:
II 170
1. the pragmatic implications are unrestricted and therefore any deviation is possible.
2. there are restrictions of use, then
a) since all necessity is logical, the "pragmatic implications" are "quasi-logical implications",
b) then there must be a "third kind of logic", since the pragmatic implications cannot be deductively constructed.
c) there is also a non-logical necessity.
II 180
Necessity/Language/Cavell: it must now be argued that from the fact that an expression is used in its usual way, something follows: it entitles one to draw certain conclusions.
Learning what these implications are is a part of learning the language itself.
Full understanding is implicit understanding.
II 200
Must/Cavell: when I say "You must ..." and if that is correct and appropriate, then nothing you can do proves that I am wrong.
II 201
Should/Cavell: when I say that you should return the borrowed money, it only makes sense if there could be a reason to suppose that the money was perhaps a present.
This is an analogy to the distinction between a mere execution of an action and a good execution.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-23