|Necessity, philosophy: different kinds of necessity are distinguished, differing in their strength. For example, physical, logical or metaphysical necessity. See also necessity de dicto, necessity de re._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Cavell II St. Cavell Müssen wir meinen was wir sagen? aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Phil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Language/Necessity/Cavell: Question: are there logical requirements or only empirical findings?
(Cavell thesis: (according to Fodor): logical necessities do consist in language philosophy).
Cavell: logical necessities do not exist between language and world but only between sentences.
The opportunity in which we express a sentence (circumstances) cannot be regarded as part of meaning or logic.
To mean/Must/Necessity/Language/Cavell: e.g. "He would not say that unless he meant ..." if we assume that the speaker and we already understand the meaning and use of an expression, one could conclude:
1. the pragmatic implications are unrestricted and therefore any deviation is possible.
2. there are restrictions of use, then
a) since all necessity is logical, the "pragmatic implications" are "quasi-logical implications",
b) then there must be a "third kind of logic", since the pragmatic implications cannot be deductively constructed.
c) there is also a non-logical necessity.
Necessity/Language/Cavell: it must now be argued that from the fact that an expression is used in its usual way, something follows: it entitles one to draw certain conclusions.
Learning what these implications are is a part of learning the language itself.
Full understanding is implicit understanding.
Must/Cavell: when I say "You must ..." and if that is correct and appropriate, then nothing you can do proves that I am wrong.
Should/Cavell: when I say that you should return the borrowed money, it only makes sense if there could be a reason to suppose that the money was perhaps a present.
This is an analogy to the distinction between a mere execution of an action and a good execution._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002