|Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Knowledge/Antiquity/Chisholm: Knowledge requires an identity between the knowing and the known object - Chisholm dito primary form of reference requires identity: self-attribution.
Knowledge/Cognitive Theory/Chisholm: from pondering what is more sensible: trust cognitive abilities until objections are present - epistemically clear, if unquestioned by unjustified (weak) - epistemically acceptable: more rational than the contrary.
Epistemic Principle 6: something is epistemically clear if it is epistemically acceptable.
Epistemic Principle 7: in self-presenting property: if clear and considered, then evident - then contact with reality.
Epistemic Principle 8
Principle of perception: if epistemically clear, then beyond reasonable doubt that subject perceives something which is F when properties are mutually supportive themselves, then evident that subject is something w. what F is - (but not as F, e.g. thief) - therefore not de re.
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
Immanent knowledge/Gombocz: is only believed knowledge and not a known knowledge like with a transcendent being - mediate minimal knowledge: W1) justified by exactly one truth that it is true - indirect ignorance: of less than one truth. Minimal Knowledge: A person knows that he/she believes at least one truth is justified.
Socrates: "I know that I know nothing: common sense: he knows much more: e.g.: the name of his wife, etc. - Vs: there is no Gettier-justification for that (bona validitate, not only bona fide) It is about that he believes his proposition justified, whether he knows them or not._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004