|Knowledge: Knowledge is a conscious relationship to sentences or propositions, which legitimately attributes to them truth or falsehood. What is known is true. Conversely, it does not apply that everything that is true is also known. See also knowledge how, propositional knowledge, realism, abilities, competence, truth, facts, situations, language, certainty, beliefs, omniscience, logical knowledge, reliability_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Definition knowledge: justified true beliefs - must be caused in the right way. - (Goldman) - (Gettier)
Knowledge: in order for the token "that is green" to express knowledge, one must not only have a symptom of the presence, but one must also know that this token is a symptom of the presence.
Justification: it presupposes - BrandomVsSellars: it presupposes that the reporter has to justify himself.
Knowledge/Brandom: 1) the one who knows must assign an inferentially structured, propositionally substantial definition (belief condition) - 2) assign an inheritable authorization for this definition - 3) the account holder must accept the same propositional definition that is assigned.
Knowledge/Plato: true opinion plus logical explanation is necessary.
Knowledge/Reliability theory/Brandom: one could believe that p without believing that one knows that p - because a belief is a different precondition of knowledge, it follows that if one does not even believe that one knows that p, then one does not know that one knows._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001