|Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Truth / GeachVsAristotle: confused two pairs of concepts: 1 sentences: w / f - 2 predication: "true-of" - Tarski: "true-of" basic, satisfaction
Truth / Tarski: satisfaction ("true-of"): can not be applied to components, but only on whole sentences - even complex sentences correspond to a propositional function - semantic truth definition: relevant relation: predicate to the thing of which it is predicated true : sentence but not a fact
Truth / Oxford: only for few allegations - GeachVs: then "p v q" would not be truth-functional!_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Logic Matters Oxford 1972