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|EMD II 335 (Is there a Prbl.w.sQ?)
Language/Davidson: Davidson’s criterion: A language may not have an infinite number of basic concepts. - Kripke: Otherwise it cannot be the first language.
KripkeVsDavidson: We only have to demand that only a finite number of axioms contain new vocabulary (weaker).
EMD II 338
Truth theory/Kripke: (here): Condition i) the axioms define truth implicitly (i.e. we assume that the referential variables have intended domains and the substitutional variables have intended substitutional classes (which implicitly defines a quantity of truths of L.) - ii.) a) the new axioms must have a true interpretation in the old vocabulary (with the intended interpretation)... - b) equivalence schema for each closed sentence of the object language that only contains old vocabulary - Advantage: The ontology does not contain quantities of expressions of the meta language. - iia): is the requirement that there is a new interpretation of the predicates that contains the old ones. - iib): guarantees that T(x) contains a single extension (uniqueness). - Tarski: only needs i) for its explicit truth definition (only old Vocabulary)
(i) is satisfied (without presupposed truth concept) by (4) - (6) in the old vocabulary.
EMD II 347
Truth Theory/Davidson//Kripke: meta language may also contain semantic vocabulary! Translation is also guaranteed if both sides contain semantic vocabulary. - Kripke: Quite different in Tarski: Truth and all semantic terms explicitly defined in non-semantic vocabulary.
Frank I 32
Mental/Physical/Kripke/Frank: Teaches the difference of the logical subjects of the physical and the mental. - I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalist one (semantic structures)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994