|Vocabulary: A language’s vocabulary comprises all the words currently used by its speakers. The vocabulary is written down in dictionaries in comparison to grammar and syntax rules laid down in “rule books”. Vocabulary can be reduced to its use at a particular time or by individual speakers for the purpose of research. See also idiolect, language, private language, conservatism, words, meaning of a word, meaning. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|EMD II 335 (Is there a Prbl.w.sQ?)
Language/Davidson: Davidson’s criterion: A language may not have an infinite number of basic concepts. - Kripke: Otherwise it cannot be the first language.
KripkeVsDavidson: We only have to demand that only a finite number of axioms contain new vocabulary (weaker).
EMD II 338
Truth theory/Kripke: (here): Condition i) the axioms define truth implicitly (i.e. we assume that the referential variables have intended domains and the substitutional variables have intended substitutional classes (which implicitly defines a quantity of truths of L.) - ii.) a) the new axioms must have a true interpretation in the old vocabulary (with the intended interpretation)... - b) equivalence schema for each closed sentence of the object language that only contains old vocabulary - Advantage: The ontology does not contain quantities of expressions of the meta language. - iia): is the requirement that there is a new interpretation of the predicates that contains the old ones. - iib): guarantees that T(x) contains a single extension (uniqueness). - Tarski: only needs i) for its explicit truth definition (only old Vocabulary)
(i) is satisfied (without presupposed truth concept) by (4) - (6) in the old vocabulary.
EMD II 347
Truth Theory/Davidson//Kripke: meta language may also contain semantic vocabulary! Translation is also guaranteed if both sides contain semantic vocabulary. - Kripke: Quite different in Tarski: Truth and all semantic terms explicitly defined in non-semantic vocabulary.
Frank I 32
Mental/Physical/Kripke/Frank: Teaches the difference of the logical subjects of the physical and the mental. - I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalist one (semantic structures)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994