Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 72 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Anti-Realism Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 229
Anti-Realism/Field: many forms (which have nothing to do with our purpose) are reductionist: (E.g. reduction of the external world to human experience) or quasi-reductionist (e.g. theories that match in statements about human experiences must be cognitively equivalent. ) - (I.e. have the same understanding of "true").
I 249
Truth Definition/Anti-RealismVsTarski/Anti-RealismVsKripke - Anti-RealismVsModel Theory: VsOntology of sets (Anti-Platonism dito). - ((s) Because model-theoretic statements for the A-R are trivially true, because they have no references.)

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Assertibility Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 307
Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (according to Rorty): if you retreat to that, you may say that e.g. "X is gold" can be justifiably asserted at Archimedes' times, and is no longer justifiably assertible today. But he would have to dismiss the statement that X was in the extension of gold, just like the statement that "X is Gold" was true, as meaningless. (>de re/de dicto). Putnam: (according to Rorty): Follows 3 trains of thought:
1) Against the construction of 'true' as meaning the same as "justified assertibility" (or any other "soft" concept that had to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can provide a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) A certain kind of sociological facts requires an explanation: the reliability of the normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can only be explained on the basis of realism.
3) Only the realist can avoid the conclusion from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is highly probable that none of the terms that are used today refers ".
Wright: Truth/Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (Reason, Truth and History): PutnamVs equating truth and assertibility ("rational acceptability"), but for other reasons:
 1) Truth is timeless, assertibility is not.
 2) Truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
 E.g. idealization: not to achieve friction-free surfaces, but talking about them pays off, because we come very close to them.
---
VI 30
Rorty: "justified assertibility" (pragmatism, Dewey) PutnamVs: "naturalistic fallacy": a given belief can satisfy all such conditions and still be wrong. PutnamVsRorty et al.: ignore the need to admit the existence of "real directedness" or "intentionality". Putnam: an "ideal audience" (before which a justification is sufficient) cannot exist. A better audience can always be assumed.
---
Putnam I 96
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified sensibly - not to specify any conditions for science - PutnamVsKuhn. if you do not believe in convergence, but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectors intuitionistically and understand truth intra-theoretically. ---
I 141
Truth/Assertibility/Tarski/Putnam: from his truth-definition also follows assertibility - the probability of a sentence in the meta-language is equivalent to that in the object language. ---
I 246
Truth/Justified Assertibility/Kripke's Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement - PutnamVsKripke: that would be a wrong description of the concepts that we actually have - and a self-contradictory attempt at taking an "absolute perspective".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Barcan-Formula Cresswell
 
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HC I 128
Barcan-Formula/BF/Kripke: takes for each possible world an individual domain, giving it a semantics, where in contrast to our the Barcan formula is not valid. ( > Accessibility) - Accessibility / LewisVsKripke: with Lewis via individuals, therefore Barcan formula for Lewis is valid. -
HC I, 150f
Barcan-Formel/poss. wo./Semantik/Hughes/Cresswell : BF is invalid in semantics that assign d different domains of individuals to diff. poss. wo.. - ( > Accessibility) -
HC I, 150f
Barcan-Formula/H/C: Vs : that everything that exists is necessary f, does not exclude that there could be things (or could have been ), not-f . - Then it would not be a necessary truth that everything is f . - VsVs: this proceeds from the assumption that objects not only may have other properties in different poss. wo., but that there might even be objects that do not exist in the actual world. - (( s) making the difference in the two sides of the formula) . -> Extension of the existence predicate -> existence of difference / "there" ?
HC I 156
Barcan-Formel/Existenz/MöWe/Hughes/Cresswell: three perspectives : a) all powo have the same domain of individuals : BF then valid (which include T and S4) objects are the same, properties and relations change - b) new things arise: BF invalid in any case concerning T and S4 - c) even more liberal: objects can be removed.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Barcan-Formula Kripke
 
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Hughes/Cresswell I 128
Barcan-Formelula/Kripke: assumes for each possible world a different domain of individuals, thereby obtaining a semantics in which the Barcan-Formula is not valid in comparison to our domain.(> Accessibility) - Accessibility/LewisVsKripke: Lewis about individuals, therefore Barcan formula valid in Lewis.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Causal Relation Armstrong
 
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II 134
Necessary Causal Relation: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit - contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands - (s) if it did not expand, it would still be water and still freezing - frozen. Not defined by volume, but by MiSt
II 154
Humean View/Place: Logical Relation like Necessity/contingent only between propositions - Causal Relation only between actual and individual situations - Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change) - causal necessity: matter of counterfactual conditionals - in nature no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke) - causal necessity special case of logical necessity - statements about causal necessity always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory - Situations are separated
II 155
Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect - otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Causal Theory of Names Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
I 316
EvansVsCausal Theory (of names): the theory cannot exclude that the speaker who listened to the name Louis in the pub, will always refer to Louis XIV in the future - Kripke's causal theory involves the intention of the speaker to preserve the causal chain.
I 317
Name/EvansVsCausal Theory/EvansVsKripke: Kripke is ambivalent: if the link is useful for him, he uses it. - The criteria for "About whom does he believe something?" deviate dramatically from those of "Who is the original namegiver?" - The causal theory ignores the important context. E.g. if names are assigned according to rules, a speaker could make up names without causal connection by simply applying the rules.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Causality Kripke
 
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Rorty II 131
Kripke/RortyVsKripke: the Kripkeans rely on a privileged vocabulary for scientific description. - Causal forces are independent of description. ---
Stegmüller IV 82
Causality/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripke/Stegmüller: even an omniscient being could, if it considers the individual events, only see the sequence, but not the necessity - in the universe it encounters possible worlds where less strict laws apply.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Concepts Putnam
 
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Horwich I 392
Concepts/Ockham/Putnam: could be mental particulars. - I.e. if characters are particulars as "signs", then any concept we have of the relation between sign and object is another sign. - PutnamVsOckham: Problem: this relation cannot be unambiguously identified by holding up a sign with COW - or another sign, with REFERS. ---
I 393
On the other hand: if concepts are not particulars, there may be uses of signs (if they are "in the head") - (Putnam pro). - But: Problem: the use does not clearly single out a relation between the concepts and "real objects". - ((s) "Concept": Here "way of using characters") - If concepts are neither particulars (signs) nor ways of use, only the mysterious "grasping of forms" remains. ---
Putnam V 40ff
Concepts/Putnam: cannot be identical to inner notions, because concepts are public - they are (partially) skills, not incidents. ---
I 63
Cluster Concept/Putnam: E.g."human" as a list of properties - PutnamVs: the speaker does not need to have any knowledge of the laws that rule the electrons. - Even if reference was "socially" determined, this cannot correspond to what "every speaker implicitly means". ---
I 190
Concept/Possible World/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent concepts - e.g. the term "this statue" is not equal to the term "this piece of clay". - PutnamVsPossible Worlds: Question: is there in the real world (the actual world) an object to which one of these concepts applies essentially and the other one only accidentally? - Possible Worlds deliver too many objects. PutnamVsKripke:/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. - Modal properties are not part of the materialistic equipment of the world. - But Kripke individuates objects by their modal properties. - Essential Characteristics/Putnam: I have not shifted them to "parallel worlds" but rather to possible states of the real world - (e.g. a liquid other than H20 is water). - This is essentialist in as far as it allowed us to discover the nature of water. - We just say water should be nothing else (intention). - That's simply our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) - (Kripke ditto). - VsMaterialism: this semantic interpretation does not help him, because it already presupposes reference. - (Materialism wants to gain reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Conventions Putnam
 
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V 124
Heat/molecular movement/identity/Putnam: the identity of heat with molecular motion is conventional - only naive physics denies this - PutnamVsKripke?

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Correspondence Theory Davidson
 
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Rorty I 328
Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson it is a relation without ontological preferences, it can connect any words with any object! Nature prefers no mode of presentation! (VsAnthropic Principle).
Rorty VI 134
Correspondence: does not add anything enlightening to the simple concept of being true. Perhaps we should rather say "mostly true" and admit that people have different views on questions of detail. Match/Correspondence/Davidson / Rorty: does not add anything intelligible to the concept of "being true".

Horwich I 497
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/VsCausal Theory of Reference/DavidsonVsKripke: if, conversely, reference were fixed by a physical relation, the correspondence between the two correspondences would need an explanation - because according to causal theory it would be possible that we often refer to things that we cannot reliably report - then it would be an empirical ((s) contingent) fact that our beliefs are mostly true.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Cross World Identity Wiggins
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 303
WigginsVsKripke: even if names are rigid designators: the question remains whether we can evaluate sets of names for all the worlds ("necessary existence") - Problem: cross world identity.

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Cross World Identity Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I XV
Cross-world identity/Hintikka: cross-world identity remains a crucial problem. Thesis: it is to trace an object (or its trace) in the worlds that it has in common. That is, it boils down to a re-identification, between time slices of the same event development. It is a matter of continuity.
The problem corresponds to the stability theory of sets of differential equations.
---
I XVI
Catastrophe theory/René Thom/Hintikka: the problem is closely related to the catastrophe theory. Cross-world identity/Hintikka:
Quine: considers it a hopeless problem.
HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it to be guaranteed. He cheats.
Worldline/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: 1. We must allow that some objects not only exist in certain possible worlds, but that their existence is unthinkable there! That is, world lines can cease to exist - even worse: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds.
Problem: this is not permitted in the usual knowledge logic (religious logic).
2. World lines can be drawn in two ways:
A) object-centered
B) agent-centered.
Analogy: this can be related to Russell's distinction between knowledge through acquaintance and description.
---
I 78
Cross-world identity/Hintikka: Problem: e.g. the problem can be an intentional (opaque) context (belief contexts). Here the existential generalization (EG) fails. That is, if a sentence A[b] is true for a subject, we cannot conclude that there is an object from which the sentence A is true (Ex) A [x]. ---
I 79
Solution/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the solution is to accept different individuals in different worlds. If the semantics of possible worlds is right, we somehow manage to determine the cross-world identity. Knowledge/knowledge-who/knowledge-what/semantics of possible worlds: E.g.
(4) (Ex) Victoria knows that Lewis Carroll is x.
Model-theoretically, this means that "Lewis Carroll" picks out the same individual in all the worlds that are compatible with Victoria's knowledge.
This is synonymous with
(5) Victoria knows who Lewis Carroll is.
---
I 80
Possible Worlds/Universe/Cross-World Identity/HintikkaVsLeibniz/Hintikka: Problem: when worlds are whole universes, the framework between them changes too often that it is questionable how to re-identify individuals. ---
I 80
Cross-world identity/cross-world identification/Hintikka: normally we hold a large part of the world fixed when we identify two individuals. Comparability Hintikka/(s): thus alternatives become comparable. To make alternatives to different parts comparable, we extend them. The extensions should have a part in common.
In an extreme case, they share their story. Identical: two individuals are indentical when their story coincides. This leads to the fact that cross-world identification is partially reduced to re-identification. That is, it becomes the problem. How space-time can be traced back to a common basis.
Advantage: we do not have to consider every single possible world.
---
I 81
Cross-world identification/cross-world identity/Locke/Kripke/Hintikka: Thesis: Causation plays an important role. ---
I 205
Cross-world identification/cross-identification/perception/Hintikka: here we have to assume a situation when it comes to perceptual identification. For there must be in them a perceptible, and the different situations (worlds) must share the perception space of the subject. Semantics of possible worlds/perception/HintikkaVsSemantics of possible worlds: Hintikka has overlooked this point.
Situation/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: Furthermore, the semantics of possible worlds should investigate relations between smaller and larger situations.
---
I 206
Descriptive cross-world identification/descriptive/Hintikka: descriptive identification should take place between parts of the world that are larger than the actual perceptual cross-identification. So a comparison between "bigger" and "smaller" situations.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Descriptions Searle
 
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John R. Searle
I 43 f
"Topic-neutral" (Austin): is not nomological - SearleVs "topic-neutral" e.g. digestive does not need an additional state which must be described separately.
II 317
Description/Frege: delivers the sense, but not the definition (otherwise Aristotle is analytically Alexander's teacher). ---
II 319
Description/SearleVsKripke: some labels are rigid: when they include the identity condition for the object - e.g. "the object that I perceive" - also: every description can be made rigid by taking the actual world as an index - then "the inventor of bifocal glasses" is clear. ---
V 146
Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Searle: every sentence with reference can be replaced by an existence theorem - Searle: this is the true discovery of the theory of description. ---
V 236ff
Theory of description/Russell: Sentence with description: hidden existence assertion - SearleVsRussell: propositional act (expression of the proposition, certain reference) can never be identical with the illocutionary act of assertion (pA is part of iA) - (s) reference is not existence assertion. ---
V 240
Searle: from the fact that a speech can be carried out only under certain circumstances (conditions) does not follow that the mere execution already claims that the conditions are satisfied - e.g. "bring this to the King of France" is not a claim and contains none.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Dispositions Kripke
 
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Stegmüller IV 41
Disposition/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/VsKripke/Stegmüller: The function can be read from the disposition - then the disposition for errors must be part of the overall disposition - KripkeVs: this again requires facts relating to the correct table or correct function - Kripke: but the function does not exist before the disposition - Competence cannot explain rules, because it presupposes rules - Competence is normative, not descriptive. ---
Stegm IV 47
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: if one understands "meaning" as what I am currently meaning determines what I am to mean in the future, then it is normative, not descriptive - Disposition Theory: claims to be descriptive but it is not - Language/Kripke: Strictly speaking, we must not problematize it because we could then no longer formulate our question understandably.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Domains Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 98
Individual domain/Possible Worlds/Montague/Hintikka: Thesis: Montague assumes a constant domain of individuals. HintikkaVsMontague: precisely this assumption leads to problems. Especially in religious contexts.
Individual/Montague: Individuals are the domain of functions that function as the sense of a singular term.
Belief Context/opaque context/belief/propositional attitude/HintikkaVsMontague: Problem: Montague does not devote contexts with propositional attitudes a special approach (setting contexts). E.g. "knowing who", e.g. "remembering where", e.g. "seeing what". This is a defect because Montague had been interested in propositional attitudes.
---
I 176
Domain/variable/individual variable/quantification/Hintikka: my own approach (semantics of possible worlds) has been called "interpretation of the restricted domain". HintikkaVs: this misunderstands the logical situation: it is about the fact that the individuals have to be well-defined for the set of worlds with which we have to deal.
N.B.: the set of worlds changes with the propositional attitudes. So the the actual world, e.g. does not have to be included!
Propositional attitudes/Hintikka/(s): different attitudes (beliefs, doubts, seeing, etc.) demand different sets of worlds.
Variables/values/Hintikka: it may be that the domain of our variables can be a superset of the set of the actual individuals (if the set of possible worlds does not contain the actual world).
E.g. it may be that someone has correct beliefs about all the actual individuals, but also mistakenly believes that there are still more individuals that he only imagines.
Hintikka: therefore my approach can be called with the same right one of the "extended domains".
---
I 176
Individual domain/domain/Russell/Hintikka: Russell, on the other hand, seems to have actually represented a set of the restricted domain by restricting it to objects of acquaintance. ---
I 196
Possible world/individual domain/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The speech of worlds is empty if there is possible experience that could make them different. Possible worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds should be best determined as by the connected possible totals of experience.
And then separation cannot be excluded.
---
I 196
Separation/Hintikka: separation is useful in a few models of cross-world identification, re-identification in time. E.g. a computer could be dismantled and two computers could be built from it. This could be revised later. Re-identification/Hintikka: is the key to cases of separation and fusion.
Separation/Hintikka: there is a structural reason why it is so rare: if world lines are composed of infinitesimal elements as the solutions of differential equations, the separation corresponds to a singularity, and this is a rare phenomenon.
Separation/Hintikka: the arguments against them are circular in a deep sense. They are based on the idea that for quantification the individual area should remain fixed. (HintikkaVsKripke).

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Dualism Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 32 ff
Dualism: a) property dualism: - b) substance dualism: - c) "concept dualism". ---
I 40
SearleVsMonism: it is wrong to start counting. ---
I 54 f
SearleVsKripke: Dualist mind/body. ---
II 326
VsDualism: behaviorism: E.g. to have hands is to have a disposition to certain behavior - Functionalism: hands can be completely described by causes/effects - Turing theory: to be in a computer state with specific inputs and outputs (for hands) - theory of action: to say, a system had hands, i.e., to take a certain attitude towards the system.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Epistemology Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
III 87
Interest/knowledge/epistemology/recognition/Putnam: recognition is driven by interests (ChomskyVs) - but VsChomsky: that does not mean that we are free to choose our interests - or that interests were not open to criticism - also reasonableness depends on the circumstances - the claim that a term is relative to interests does not mean that all interests were equally reasonable. ---
I 200
Kripke/Putnam: assumes that we have something like "intellectual intuition" - PutnamVsKripke - that should correspond to a "transcendental correspondence"?

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Errors Brandom
 
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I 424ff
Objectivity of conceptual standards: we cannot all individually (each of us) be wrong about them, but we can also be wrong about them all together! (electron, mass in outer space). Error about proper use. ---
I 102f
Error: everyone individually and all together can be wrong about whether a conceptual content is appropriate in a particular situation. ---
I 269
Objectivity/Error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to give allegations objectively representational content. These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community can be wrong with such an assessment. Universal error is only possible with standards, not with concepts, see above I 105). (VsDavidson).
---
I 921
Error/Brandom: The words that community as a whole could not be mistaken were put into the mouths of Wittgenstein, Kripke and Wright - if that was true, practice would not have to orient itself on the accuracy of representations - BrandomVsKripke).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Essence Lewis
 
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IV 35
Definition Essence/Lewis: the totality of the being is the average of the key attributes, of those attributes that a thing shares with all and only its own counterparts (CP) - Definition counterpart/Lewis: of something is everything that has (singular, because coextensive) the essential attribute of it - that does not mean that the attribute is the essence of the counterpart! - It does not even have to be an essential attribute of the counterpart - (s) Essence not transitive about worlds. ---
V 247
Event/Essence: events have their essence built in: the necessary conditions for their occurrence. ---
V 248
E.g. An event is necessarily a change if it is necessary that the event happens in the region when something changes throughout the region - E.g. An event is necessarily a death if it is necessary that the event only occurs in the region when something dies everywhere in the region, and not everywhere in a larger region. ---
V 254
Event/Essence/Lewis: E.g. Nero singing while Rome burns. - Fire accidental. - But the singing is necessarily singing. - Conclusion: we cannot find the the essential properties of events through description - they may be accidental. ---
V 264
Event/Essence/Lewis: There are no events that significantly involve Socrates. - I.e. which cannot happen in a region that does not contain Socrates or a counterpart of him. - ((s) Counterpart is the solution to the problem: the death of Socrates? - Lewis: counterpart relation: is more of an extrinsic matter. - counterparts are held together by similarity. - It is usually extrinsic. - LewisVsKripke: origin and role are not intrinsical. ---
V 265
E.g. Death of Socrates: Being involved in the same region is not sufficient (goblins might also be that), because the counterpart relation is not the same for parts as for the whole - a counterpart of a part is not necessarily a counterpart! - ((s) in a different possible world I could be missing an arm). ---
V 266
Lewis: E.g. Death of Socrates: assuming we have a death which involves a particular segment of individuals (whether accidental or essential, if we have one that involves it accidentally, then we have another one that it involves it essentially) - Assuming the segment is in fact part of Socrates, namely accidental. Not all counterparts are parts. - ((s) Socrates might as well have died later). - So now we finally have Socrates involved in his own death in a way that we have bypassed unseemly extrinsic events. ---
Schwarz I 54
Possible world/Essential qualities/Kripke/Schwarz: origin is an essential property. - Also biological species. ---
Schwarz I 227
Essence/Possibility/Possible worlds/Po.wo./Lewis: thesis: what possibilities there are is not contingent. - You can also not acquire any information about it. - Lewis: for every way how things may be, there must be a possible world - (s) will S5 always automatically apply to them?.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Explanation Dummett
 
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EMD II 108
Explanation/Dummett: E.g. "b satisfies (S or T) iff b satisfies S or b satisfies T, for example: "B satisfies (If it were the case that b satisfies S, then it would be the case that b satisfies T)": this does not explain the meaning of the logical constants. - Just as "London denotes London" does not explain the meaning of London.
III 39
Intention/explanation/truth/Dummett: the intention to tell the truth is not sufficient to explain the concept of truth - neither the truth conditions for multiple languages.
III 152
Sense/understanding/Explanation/DummettVsKripke: The erroneous conclusion that the sense of what was said to explain a word can be identified with the sense of the word itself is caused by Kripke’s views - but the means of explanation do allow the meaning to come to light.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Externalism Davidson
 
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Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory.
Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: complete sentences, interpretation.
---
I 8
Definition Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content - DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief - externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro). ---
I 72
Externalism/Davidson: pro variant: from twin earth, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore no threat of the 1st person authority - Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts. ---
I 74
Externalism/Burge: two forms: a): social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) - b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual - Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content - DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error. ---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 185
Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal Theory - Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke/DavidsonVsPutnam: whole sentences, interpretation - reference of single words/Davidson: theoretical construct - ((s) derived from whole sentences). ---
Frank I 626ff
Externalism/Davidson: it does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause. ---
Frank I 663
Externalism/Authority: if thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended - VsDescartes: inner states not certain - Burge: false use of terms: possibility to not know his own thoughts - DavidsonVsBurge: beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning. ---
I 663-667
Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": only observing internal states - Burge: external factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments" - e.g. wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself possible e.g. arthritis) - DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person. ---
I 676
Mind/Tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: if stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave his way out? - but the "objects" do not interest it, but their cousins, the propositions - but the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Gavagai Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
I 194 ff
Gavagai: Quine asks how the sentences of the natives are to be distinguished into contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other. For the natives it is enough to know which phrases are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths.
I 195
If claims are justified by the community, not because of the nature of the inner episodes, it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged notions.
Horwich I 453
Hermeneutical circle / Gavagai / RI / Davidson / RortyVsKripke: to go back and forth in the h.c. is no building block theory (like that of Kripke: correspondence between words and objects - causation has to do with the reference)) - instead it is more like the "reflexive equilibrium" of Rawls.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Identification Hintikka
 
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I 56
Identification/individuation/knowledge-what/logical form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s)> one-class, monotony). E.g. knowing that "such a person did it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who is such a person. ((s) but that means that one knows y!
Solution/Hintikka/(s): the solution is the set of worlds compatible with this knowledge > Relevance!). (> Semantics of possible worlds).
---
I 77
Identity/object/thing/object/semantics of possible worlds/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must be assumed as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well-founded. Perhaps one must, however, presuppose the criteria of identification and of identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that does not mean that the problem of identification is not a permanent problem for philosophers.
Cross-world identity/Hintikka: thesis: cross-world identity is connected with the problem of re-identification.
---
I 78
It is about different moments in the same story, the other is about different worlds. However, this is always about interrelations and characteristics of individuals. Individuation/Hintikka: Thesis: Identification cannot be treated independently of individuation.
---
I 90
Object/thing/identification/identity/individuation/space time/Hintikka: Space-time is still just a means of identification. What determines the result of the identification is the triple of the functions f, g, h.
This function specifies the totality of the motions of the mass points in our model. They are the hard core of identification and individuation.
Matter/Hintikka: Identification and individuation are based on material reality.
---
I 117
I/Hintikka: Descartes' cogito directs our attention to the doubling of the pronoun of the first person singular. "I" can depend on one of the two ways of identification (perspective(/public)).
E.g. "I, Hintikka, swear ..." is not a tautology!
---
I 125
Public identification/Quine/Hintikka: "Bringing a face together with a name".

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Identity Castaneda
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 168
Identity / Castaneda: we are contingently identical with our thinking and experience contents (VsKripke, VsNagel) - I 168ff ~ equivalence: weaker tahn identity statements of the first and third person - only equivalent, not identical

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Pauen
 
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V 161
Identity/Kripke/Pauen: Thesis: identity must be necessary if it is to be identity at all - E.g. either it is true in all worlds that C-fiber irritation is identical with pain or it is not true in any - they are not identical then. ----
V 162
VsKripke/Pauen: there seems to be an argument against it: heat is also a rigid designation expression (kinetic energy) but we can imagine a world in which we have heat sensation without molecular motion - KripkeVsVs: then it is about heat sensation, not heat. - Imaginability/Pauen: is crucial for Kripke. - The imaginability of pain, which are not irritated C-fibers, eliminates the identity. - Today largely accepted: that psychophysical identity, if it exists at all, must be necessary.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Identity Wiggins
 
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EMD II 289f
Identity/Wiggins: Problem: from (1)(x)(y)(x = y)> (Fx ↔ Fy)), (2)(x)(y)[(x = y)> (N(x = x) ↔ N (y = x))] and the superfluous (3)N(x = x) should follow: (4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)]. ---
II 292
Problem: (4) does not work in opaque contexts e.g. to be taken for Jekyll and not immediately for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. ---
EMD II 292
Identity/possible world/Kripke: E.g. Supposing Hesperus would not be Phosphorus. Okay, but Phosphorus is Phosphorus. And besides, Hesperus is Phosphorus. So if H would not be P, P would not be P. - WigginsVsKripke: yes but certainly not if H would not be P? This does not work as easily as Kripke wants it to work. ---
Simons I 115
Identity/extensionality/Wiggins: E.g. Tibbles whole cat, consists of Tib(body) and tail (tail). - N.B.: if no accident happens, one must still distinguish the whole (individual cat) from the sum (Tib + Tail) - although they consist of the same parts - Sum: can be split. - Process: cannot be split. - Difference in modality de re - despite coincidence as four-dimensional object - therefore QuineVsModality de re - here differ sum and process, although they coincide as four-dimensional objects.

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Identity Hintikka
 
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I 77
Identity/object/thing/semantics of possible worlds/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must be assumed as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well-founded. Perhaps one must, however, presuppose the criteria of identification and of identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that does not mean that the problem of identification is not a permanent problem for philosophers.
---
I 151
Knowing-who/Identity/Psychology/Psychiatry/Hintikka: there are interesting examples here. One must be able to recognize oneself as the same in different situations.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Identity Theory Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
II 209f
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imaginable: Pain without a brain condition - difficult to exclude for materialists - QuineVsKripke: that is only difficult if the materialist believes in metaphysical necessity.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Identity Theory Searle
 
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John R. Searle
I 54
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: if it was true that C-fiber stimulation is pain, then the identity would be necessary - such as the one from heat and molecular motion - but it does not seem to apply, that pain is necessarily a certain brain state - Kripke: objection of common sense (Butler): nothing mental can be equated with anything non-mental, without skipping the mental - SearleVsKripke: still dualist. ---
I 56
Token/Token-identity theory/(Lewis)/Searle: cannot say as a materialist, that the commonality of people who believe that Denver is the capital of Colorado, is precisely this intellectual property because the materialist denies this - solution: function of neurophysiological state. ---
I 56
SearleVsIdentity Theory: skips the mind - mind just there, and no problem at all. - LeibnizVsIdentity Theory: not all properties are identical: some are just physical, some mental.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Identity Theory Jackson
 
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Frank C. Jackson
Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie Das Leib Seele Problem in der angelsächsischen Philosophie des Geistes von 1949 bis 1987 in Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: For example: Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist has access to the world only via black-and-white screens. He knows everything there is to know in terms of science about the visual system of human beings. Let's suppose he'll get a color screen. Is it not obvious that he is now learning something new, namely how colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: This leaves that out.
MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective contra objective), but about different discriminatory abilities! The one recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it another recognizes a feature due to sensory states.
So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world! (> Representation).

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Imagination Pauen
 
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V 163
Conceivability / NagelVsKripke: unclear whether possibility can already be derived from conceivability. - Imagination of mental and neural processes uses different modes of imagination. - Conceivability also does not guarantee the non-identity that it is a psychological fact. - Intuitions are bad witnesses for what is possible in principle.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Intensions Anscombe
 
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Frank I 96
I/Intension/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here the "way of givenness" is unimportant. 97
The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.".
His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as subject, then they true and then if the predicates of x are true.
AnscombeVsLogicAnscombeVsKripke: for this reason, he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes".
But this is too superficial: if you are a speaker who says "I", you cannot find out what it is that says "I". For example, we do not look from which device the sound comes.
Thus, we must require our logicians to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I".
I 98
Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no difference between "I" and "A" (see Logic/Anscombe).


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Knowledge Field
 
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I 83
Knowledge/Logic/Field: logical knowledge: when logic is confined to the if-then form: no knowledge about what does not follow. - Solution: differentiated deflationism: two parts: i) Knowledge, which mathematical statement follows from other mathematical statements. (ii) additional knowledge about the consistency of mathematical statements (and other fundamental). - ((s) About that was no conclusion of something). - consistency/(s): is itself not a conclusion. - Field E.g. a knowledge about all models is not a logical knowledge. - Syntactically: E.g. "There is a derivative of B from A": is not a logical knowledge, but knowledge about existence. - Deflationism: both is logical knowledge. - VsDeflationism: the fundamental is metalogical. ---
I 88
Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. - FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. - Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. - Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical, because we find no contradiction. ---
I 93
Knowledge/Possibility/Field: there is knowledge of possibility that is not only based on knowledge of necessity. - Only by thinking about the logical form. - Problem: E.g.: "There are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 apples": every statement of the same logical form as this is also a logical truth. - (But in terms of content, it is wrong) - Then one no longer had to rely on the actuality. - Then it would be categorical knowledge. - E.g. apples/Field: here we have stronger reason to believe in the possibility than in the actuality. - Field: but there are infinitely many physical entities: namely, space-time regions. ---
I 94
Logical Knowledge/Frege: Thesis: Problem, whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. - FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another?

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Kripke Semantics Hintikka
 
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I XIII
Kripke semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: Kripke semantics is not a viable model for the theory of logical modalities (logical necessity and logical possibility). Problem: the right logic cannot be axiomatized.
Solution: to interpret Kripke semantics as a non-standard semantics,...
---
I XIV
...in the sense of Henkin's non-standard interpretation of the logic of higher levels, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. ---
I 1
Kripke semantics/Hintikka: Kripke semantics is a modern model-theoretic approach that is misleadingly called Kripke semantics. E.g. F: is a framework consisting of
SF: a set of models or possible worlds and
R: a two-digit relation, a kind of alternative relation.
Possible worlds: w1 is supposed to be an alternative, which could legitimately be realized instead of w0 (the actual world).
R: the only limitation we impose on it is reflexivity.
Truth-conditions/Modal logic/Kripke semantics/Hintikka: the truth conditions for modal sentences are then:
---
I 2
(TN) Given a frame F, Np is true in w0 ε SF iff. P is true in every alternative wi ∈ SF to w0. (T.M) Given a frame F, Mp is true in w0 ε SF iff. P is true in at least one alternative wi ∈ SF to w0.
Model theory/Modal logic/Hintikka: Kanger, Guillaume and later Kripke have seen that when we add reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry, we get a model theory for axiom systems of the Lewis type for modal propositional logic.
Kripke semantics/modal logic/logical possibility/logical necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke semantics: Problem: if we interpret the operators N, P as expressing logical modalities, they are inadequate: we need more than one arbitrary selection for logical possibility and necessity of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world.
But in the Kripke semantics it is not necessary that all such logically possible worlds are contained in the set of alternatives. ((s). That is, there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (See below the logical possibility forms the largest class of possibilities).
Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities.
---
I 12
Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes, concentrating on pure modalities. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic.
But somehow it seems clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities.
Metaphysical possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: Kripke has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are.
---
I 13
Worse: he has not shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Nagel
 
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I 66
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/NagelVsKripke: Kripke is more reductionist than Wittgenstein would have wished - "it’s not about (naturalistic) facts from the past.
I 68
Solution/Nagel: there are no alternative meanings. - Nagel: but we are still using our language; even in the attempt to assert its impossibility.
I 69,
It is possible that some of my words mean nothing, but in order to detect that I have to use other words properly.
I 69/70
Mean/Kripke/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Nagel: problem: the gap between the non-normative and normative. The act of meaning implies the difference between right and wrong answers - behavior, beliefs, dispositional or experience-based facts imply no such consequences - therefore these cannot consist in them.
I 72
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/StrawsonVsKripkeNagel: we understand the language well enough to recognize when inconsistencies are attributable solely to the sense or to the meaning.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Cavell
 
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I 216
Kripke's Wittgenstein: nothing can be meant, because no rule and no presence controls the meaning of words - there is no fact, due to which a word means something - Solution: Implementation of socially controlled assertibility conditions. ---
I 216
Kripke's Wittgenstein/Cavell: skeptical paradox: nothing, no rule, no present can control the meaning of my words. This is the end of the possibility of meaning something at all. Solution: Introduction of socially sanctioned assertibility conditions.
Kripke: Main point: the absence of meaning-imparting facts.
CavellVsKripke: 1. probably Wittgenstein himself did not see the paradox like this. He would also not ask for such facts as to guarantee the meaning and which should be more stable than our practice.
---
I 217
CavellVsKripke: 2. Kripke goes unintentionally from "inclined to" to "be entitled to" about: Wittgenstein: "If I have exhausted the reasoning, I am inclined to say .."
Kripke (unlike Wittgenstein) seems to believe that agreement is something like a contract.
---
I 218
Its solution is more skeptical than the problem that is to solve it. ---
I 220
Kripke's Wittgenstein/Cavell: for Kripke, rules are more fundamental than criteria for Wittgenstein's skepticism against meanings. CavellVsKripke: the problem of the ordinary remains underexposed.
---
I 221
For me, the rules are subordinated to the criteria. ---
I 233
Kripke's Wittgenstein/CavellVsKripke: Solution: it is about whether the newcomer accepts what Emerson calls conformism, or not. It is about the permanent crisis of a society that believes itself to be based on consensus. When the child is marginalized as crazy, it is both the power of a society and its powerlessness.
---
I 243
Kripke's Wittgenstein/CavellVsKripke: I do not think his reading is wrong, I doubt his need. If so, the problem needs to be redesigned. +...

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Kripke’s Wittgenstein Schulte
 
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Sch I 160
Kripke s Wittgenstein / SchulteVsKripke: the paradox arises because one could interpret a signpost in virtually any direction. - VsKripke: error to assume that there is an interpretation here at all - instead: training: drawing no conclusions between the seeing of the sign and the reaction - solution: act as part of a practice.

Sch I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Sch II
J. Schulte/U.J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001

Logical Knowledge Field
 
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I 88
Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that the axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. - FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. - Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. - Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical - because we find no contradiction. ---
I 94
Logical Knowledge/Frege: Problem: whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. - FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another? ---
I 113
Pure Logical Knowledge/Field: must be knowledge that makes no existence assumptions.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Logical Possibility Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 86
Logical possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. - FieldVsKripke: yes it is, this is due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be read "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". ---
I 87
E.g. Carnap: "He is a bachelor and married": is logically wrong - (> meaning postulates) - FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not belong to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. - consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) - should not only be true, but logical. - ((s) Even without meaning postulates. Meaning postulate/(s): this is about the extent of the logic.) ---
I 118
Logical possible/FieldVsKripke: "It is possible that there is an electron": is true in all models, therefore logically true. (> Logical possibility is itself logically true).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Meaning McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I, 160ff
Meaning/Quine: New: "empiricist meaning": is intellectually prestigious, because it can be explained completely by the lawful operations of the receptivity. On the other hand, the old concept of meaning stands on the wrong side of this duality. (> McDowell, see also content). Meaning/Quine: the joke in Quine is that meaning in the intuitive sense cannot be determined by exogenous factors.
---
L 184/5
McDowell: if we drop the Third Dogma (schema/content), it is not surprising that the meaning is now underdetermined by the "empiricist meaning". ---
I 185
McDowell: the "empiricist meaning" cannot be a real meaning anyway, since, as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty," it can have nothing to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not show that meaning is at all underdetermined. We would have to show that we have an indelible leeway if we are looking for a kind of understanding that brings us out of the field of "empiricist meaning". An understanding that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of justification, the space of reason. This cannot be learned from Quine.
---
I 119
Meaning/McDowell: we must not construct it "socially-pragmatic" or "communitarian". (Wittgenstein did not do that either).   Otherwise it is no longer autonomous. Uninhibited Platonism would be a tendency to the occult.
  Wittgenstein: has not asserted that meaning is nothing but approval or rejection by the community. (> Kripke).
---
I 119
Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: comes to the conclusion that there is nothing that constitutes the receptiveness for the claim that makes the meaning to us; instead, we must understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community. ---
I 121
Thesis: Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education assures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhumane. This leaves no real questions about norms. ---
EMD II XIV
Meaning/McDowell: truth theory is not sufficient for a meaning theory because of the equivalence of "snow is white" and "grass is green". - This is true, but not meaningful. - McDowell: Thesis: we need additional psychological concepts. ---
II XV
Problem: then the propositional settings must be as fixed as the meanings. -> Radical Interpretation/RI.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Meaning (Intending) Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
I 63ff
Mean: According to Kripke, Wittgenstein is not only convinced that no fact that affects me would make true that I meant something, but he also believed that this concept should not be explained with reference to truth conditions, but with respect to assertibility conditions. (>Assertibility).
I 63ff
Mean: The fact that I refer to addition when I say "plus" cannot consist in a fact that affects my behavior, my state of consciousness or my brain, because any such fact would have to bee finite, and could not have infinitely far-reaching normative consequences.
I 63ff
Mean: Which fact in the past caused that I meant addition with "plus"? Answer: none. If there was no such meaning in the past, it cannot exist in the present. Kripke: in the end, the ladder has to be thrown away.
I 63ff
NagelVsKripke: we cannot throw away this particular ladder. We would otherwise have no chance to formulate the arguments that lead to the paradoxical conclusion.
I 73
Nagel: some of Wittgenstein’s remarks suggest a false picture. "that’s just the way I act" and "I follow the rule blindly." It will have to be the arithmetic judgment.
I 186
Def Mean/Peirce: opinion is the willingness to act according to it in relatively inconsequential matters (Weaker than belief).

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Metaphysical Possibility Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 86
Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth - FieldVsKripke: that is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be seen as "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". ---
I 87
E.g. Carnap: "He is a bachelor and married": is logically wrong - (> meaning postulates) - FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not belong to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) - should not only be true, but logically true. - ((s) Even without meaning postulates - (meaning postulate/(s): this is about the scope of logic.)

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Metaphysical Possibility Stalnaker
 
Books on Amazon
I 64
Metaphysically necessary/Metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Stalnaker: that means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify about it - the modal operators are then the quantifiers - error: one can also be mistaken, but only about how one should understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be.
I 102
Def metaphysically possible world/Metaphysically possible/Stalnaker: are all possible worlds. - ((s) They are not a particular subset of all possible worlds, metaphysical is not something "special". - If a world is not metaphysically possible, it is impossible. - If there are metaphysical laws, then they are contingent.
I 102
Metaphysically possible/Metaphysical possibility/Epistemic/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke: There are epistemic possibilities that are metaphysically impossible. - E.g. that water is not H2O - E.g. that Charles is not the son of Elizabeth II. - Kripke: But these are metaphysical possibilities in other description.
I 167
Metaphysically possible/Kripke/Stalnaker: E.g. Shakespeare didn’t have to write any of his works - but he could not have been anything other than a human being. - He could not have had other parents than the ones he had - (essentialism).
I 168
Some VsKripke: Shakespeare could have had some properties counterfactually, but not all.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Modal Properties Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
I 189
Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical" is the statue missing.
VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two objects?
E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules.
Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Supposing there are "intrinsic connections" to my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with quantity-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes some external objects.
Then this spacetime region will have a similar quantity-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects.
Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity.
Problem: if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be real essences in the world in a sense that the set theory cannot explain.
Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him.
---
I 190
Term/Possible World/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent terms - e.g. the term "this statue" unequals the phrase "this piece of clay" - PutnamVsPossible Worlds: Question: Is there in the actual world an object to which one of these terms significantly and the other only accidentally applies to? - Possible worlds provide too many objects. PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: its ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it - modal properties are not part of the materialistic means of the world - but Kripke individuated objects by their modal properties - essential properties/Putnam: I have not shifted them into "parallel worlds" but instead into possible states of the actual world - (other liquid than H20 water) - which is insofar essentialist that we have thus discovered the nature of water - we just say water should not be anything else (intention) - that is our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) - (Kripke ditto) - VsMaterialism: this does not help the semantic reading because it presupposes reference - (materialism wants to win reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Model Theory Field
 
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I 85
Model theory: semantically: "all models in which A is true are models in which B is also true": B follows from A - proof theory: syntactically "there is a formal derivation of B from A". ---
I 116
Model theory/Field: if one says that a logically true sentence is true in all models, a model exists in a set of objects plus the fixing which predicates (if any) of them are true in the model, which names (if any) denote these objects, etc. - Moreover ist is an attribution function. - Then the truth conditions can be recursively defined. Def logically true: here: true for each model.
---
I 117
Kripke: with him a non-empty set of possible worlds is called actual. Definition possible/Kripke: a sentence of the form "MA" (diamond) will then be true in a model if and only if A is in at least one possible world in a model true. Problem/Kripke: in order that "MA" is logically true, A itself has to be logically true.
Solution/FieldVsKripke: we do not accept a possible world". - Our model is the "actual world portion" of the Kripkean model.
---
I 121
Proof Theory: does not provide any results that could not be obtained otherwise. ---
I 116
Model theory/modal logic/FieldVsKripke: unlike Kripke: without possible world. - "Which sentences with the operator "logically possible" are logical true?" N.B.: Both model theories are platonic (pure set theory).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Models Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
II 210
Models/QuineVsKripke: they enable proof of consistency, but no clear interpretation - when are objects identical? -Bischof Buttler ("no other thing"): identity does not follow necessarily. ---
IX 223
Model: exists where contradictions cannot be deduced. ---
X 77
Model/Quine: of a scheme: is a quantity-n-tuple: a set corresponds to each schema letters (for predicates), at the beginning of the n-tuple is a non-empty set U, the universal set or the range of values ​​of the variables x, y, etc. the remaining sets of the model are the values ​​of the set variables a, b, etc. Fulfillment: a model fulfills a scheme, if its set-theoretic analogue (sentence) is true.
X 78
E.g. a Model.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Nonfactualism Cavell
 
Books on Amazon
I 234
Fact/Nonfactualism/Meaning/Rule/Wittgenstein/Cavell: there is no fact concerning me that can justify what I say and do beyond what the other, perhaps a child, says and does. But I do not wish to draw a skeptical conclusion from this.
---
I 239
Fact/Nonfactualism/CavellVsKripke: if I said (in the early writings) "there is no reason to share these things with each other (e.g., sense of humor, morality), then that is different than when Kripke says there is "no fact", Cavell: otherwise it would look too much like cognitive deficiency.
---
I 240
In addition, there is no room for the idea of reasons that "run out".

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Object Putnam
 
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Horwich I 409
Object/thing/language/Internal Realism/world/Putnam: thesis: objects themselves are also made as they are discovered. -FieldVsPutnam: Then you would have to regard non-seperate parts as language-dependent, but they are language independent. ---
Putnam I 247
Realism/reality/objects/Spacetime Points/Putnam: Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the spacetime region, which it occupies? - Quine: the chair and his constituent electromagnetic and other fields are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region. - KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, however, have the same mass (E.g. statue/clay) - the chair could take another spacetime region. - QuineVsKripke: this evidence is worthless because modal predicates are hopelessly vague. - Lewis: Quine is right, in terms of the chair, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates.- LewisVsKripke: not the chair, but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. - Putnam: it is nonsense to ask whether the chair is identical with the matter or coexists with it - no convention: if the chair is blue - Convention: whether it is a spacetime region, and if we have to decide that. - Spacetime points: are imagined by some authors as predicates - then the spacetime region is a set of properties. - Putnam: that is a matter of opinion - (> four-dimensionalism).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Pain Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 17
Pain/Chalmers: pain is an example for the fact that concepts have a double meaning a) as a psychological concept for the explanation of behavior, (> functional role) - b) as a phenomenal concept of the first person (> Qualia). Both aspects naturally tend to occur together. But that is not a conceptual truth about pain!
---
I 18
Everyday Language/Chalmers: everyday language brings psychological and phenomenal aspects together, although these are actually separated. This applies to many mental concepts. Learning: Here, the psychological aspect may be stronger.
---
I 19
Emotions: the phenomenal aspect is probably predominant here. Belief: here the case is more complex because intentionality plays a role, e.g. whether one believes a proposition and at the same time has a hope about it. At the same time, beliefs are used to explain behavior.
Contents/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1990a): Thesis: the content of a belief depends entirely on the connected consciousness state. Without consciousness, everything is as-if-intentionality. (Searle: See Chalmers I 360).
---
I 146f
Pain/Knowledge/phenomenal/physical/identity/Kripke/Chalmers: Kripke's argument is based on identity, which is always necessary identity accordingto him. Pain/Kripke: it is pointless to say that there is something pain-like that is shown as a pain in the course of an examination, unlike in the case of water/H2O:
Water has somehow been exposed as H2O. This identity is a necessity a posteriori after the discovery.
---
I 147
ChalmersVsKripke: Kripke's argument, unlike mine, is based on a certain essentialism in relation to different states. With me, it is never about disembodiment. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between Kripke and me. Both of us are concerned with modal arguments with necessity and possibility. ---
I 148
Brain State/Pain/Kripke: Thesis: You could have that particular brain state without feeling that particular pain, because for pain, only feeling is essential. (See also Feldman (1974), McGinn (1977)). Materialism/Pain/Boyd: (Boyd 1980): the materialist does not have to assume that mental states in all possible worlds are physical states, as long as this is the case in the actual world.
---
I 149
Pain/Intension/Kripke/Chalmers: if Kripke says you cannot imagine a situation in which the feeling of pain but not the pain itself is absent, that means that the primary and secondary intensions are collapsing.
ChalmersVsKripke:
1. The possibility of disorganization is inconsistent as an argument against materialism, but in our case is not decisive. 2. The same applies to the arguments based on identity.
3. An essentialist metaphysics is not decisive (for our purposes), apart from the fact that the feeling of pain is essential for pain - but it is about the meaning of "pain".
4. Kripke's apparatus of the rigid designators (> cross-world identity) is central to our problem, but has a deep core in the failure of the logical supervenience we have established.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Perspective Hintikka
 
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I 115
Knowing-who/seeing/visual perception/perspective identification/Hintikka: Definition Seeing/Hintikka: Seeing an Object: People and bodies who occupy the same gap in John's perception field can be identified by him. He also knows that different objects can be at different times in the same place.
N.B.: John does not have to know who this person is!
Knowing-who/Seeing-who/Hintikka: we also need an identification based on public (object-centered) criteria.
Public/Perspective/Language/Logical Form/Hintikka: the difference between perspective and public identification is also expressed linguistically:
E.g. public: an identification is successful if it is true that
(1) John sees who b is.
(2) John remembers who b is.
(3) John knows who b is.
---
I 116
On the other hand: perspective:
(4) John sees b
(5) John remembers b
(6) John knows b.
Hintikka/(s): the perspective can be a mere regarding, letting the eyes rest on something without knowing who or what that is.
Cross-world identification/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: It is more about the way of identification (public/perspective) than about rigidity or non-rigidity.
The way of identification decides about what counts as one and the same individual.
---
I 120
Definition identification/visual perception/perspective/private/Hintikka: to identify b in the perspective sense means, to find a gap for b among the visual objects. That is, to locate b visually. Logical form: visual identification corresponds to answering a question of where. ((s) Localization in the facial room).
Perspective/Hintikka/(s): perspective does not correspond strictly, but as a contrast to the public, the private point of view.
Definition identification/visual perception/public/t/Hintikka: identification is the ability to locate b on the map of abstract more-than-personal knowledge.
That is, the ability to interpret what you see. That is,
Logical form: visual identification, public: to answer a what-question or a who-question.
Interpretation/seeing/perception/Hintikka: the interpretation here is to attribute a meaning to our senses.
Analog: analog means to interpret abstract characters as letters (seeing-as).
((s) Stronger/weaker: to look at a printed page, find that it is printed/stronger: read).
Public/Identification/Hintikka: it is dangerous to interpret our methods of public identification in this way.
Perspective/private/Hintikka: the perspective identification provides an independent conceptual system.
Symmetry/asymmetry/identification/logical form/everyday language/identification/perspective/public/Hintikka:
Symmetry: in logic (logical form) there is a symmetry between the expressions for public or perspective identification.
Asymmetry/everyday language: in the normal language, this symmetry does not exist.
Reason: for public identification, we have hidden quantifiers,
Perspective: here we need a direct object construction.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Possibility Field
 
Books on Amazon
I 86
Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. - FieldVsKripke: yes it is, this is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be read "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". ---
I 87
E.g. Carnap: "He is bachelor and married": is logically wrong. (> Meaning postulates) - FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not count to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. - Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) - should not only be true, but logically true. - ((s) also without meaning postulates.) ((s) Meaning postulate/(s): here it is about the extent of the logic.) ---
I 203
Geometric Possibility/Field: instead of logical possibility: there are different geometries. - Precondition: there are empirical axioms which differentiate the possibility from impossibility. - However, the existence quantifier must be within the range of the modal operator. ---
I 218
Problem of Quantities/mathematical entities/me/Field: For example, it is possible that the distance between x and y is twice as long as the one between x and w, even if the actual distance is more than twice as long. - Problem: extensional adequacy does not guarantee that the defined expression is true in every non-actual situation - that is, that we must either presuppose the substantivalism or the heavy duty Platonism. - That is what we do in practice.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Possible Worlds Wiggins
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 290
Possible Worlds A: Telescope theory: HintikkaVsKripke (realistic view) similarity decides on cross-world identity - fixed point: identification on similarity requires that not all properties shift? Feldman: You could have been like me the way I am and thus less as you are - even while I would have been more like you really are than how you’d been - B: Constructivist theory / Kripke: possible worlds are devised.

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Possible Worlds Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 74
Possible Worlds/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: Possible worlds seem to take the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia as ((s) self-evident). Possible worlds/Leibniz: thesis: there is a determined set of worlds among which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: that is extremely doubtful.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios.
---
I 75
We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. Semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: one can build a theory of questions and answers on the semantics of possible worlds.
---
I 76
This is about what is possible in more than one world. For this we must assume much more than is assumed in an extensional language. Reference/semantics of possible worlds: here it is not enough to accept only the referents which have our expressions in the actual world.
---
I 196
Possible world/individual area/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The talk of worlds is empty, if there are no possible experiences that could make them different. Possible worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds hould be best determined as by the connected possible totals of experience.
And then separation cannot be ruled out.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Possible Worlds Leibniz
 
Books on Amazon
Hintikka I 74
Possible Worlds/VsSemantic of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Problem: it seems to make the worlds and complete sets of Possibilia absolute ((s) to assume them as self-evident). Possible worlds/Leibniz: Thesis: there is a fixed set of worlds from which God makes a selection. HintikkaVsLeibniz: this is extremely doubtful.
Possible worlds/Hintikka: we should rather call it world stories or scenarios.
---
I 75
We can limit the set of worlds to those that are conceivable. ---
Holz I 120
Possible worlds/Leibniz/Pape/Holz: is for Leibniz the negative background of a positive world. The background, by virtue of which the positivity of the one realized world first acquires its justification. Namely, in a comprehensive sense of a logical, ontological and moral justification! The force of the negation is stronger than that of the position.
Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: a world is always the totality of everything real and possible, and this possible is the real possible (puissance) of which the real is a selected partial quantity.
Possible worlds/LeibnizVsKripke: other possible worlds cannot be worlds of other possibilities (otherwise this (our) world (the actual world) would not be a world, but only a partial quantity).
---
I 122
One must not multiply the world's things by several worlds, for there is no number that is not in this one world, or even in each of its parts. To introduce another species of existing things is to misuse the concept of existence.
World/Leibniz: not the sum of the parts, but their ordered connection. The world is the world law composing the individuals.
Order/Leibniz: does not arise from the world, but the world itself is the order, the order is the world-creating one.
Now however, due to the a priori necessary principles (see above) no other order than the existing one is to be thought of!
Possible worlds/Leibniz: therefore, worlds, which are structurally different from ours, remain undefined in content and unthinkable. They would be mere shadow worlds.
It is, however, impossible for a priori thinking to exclude the possibility of such differently ordered worlds.
Leibniz: the conceivability of possible worlds is a necessary possibility of thinking.
---
I 122/123
Solution/Leibniz: and these possible worlds would still be formally possible as actual non-worlds even if there were no world at all, but nothing. Possibility/Reality/Leibniz: as worlds, however, they are only possible when they are not nothing.
This is due to the fact that the (definition) possible ontological cannot be determined otherwise than as force, which urges to utter.
The nothingness of possibility, however, would not be conceivable because it would not be a possibility and thinking is always thinking of at least possible. (If necessary, the possible nothing!)
Nothing/Leibniz: is then a possibility among other things. In the infinitesimal sense, the minimization of the possible or a world whose content tends toward zero, whose possibilities mutually cancel each other out.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Proper Names Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
I 614
Proper names/Name/Brandom: can only be understood in terms of the sortal associated with them - e.g. you can not just point to an equestrian statue and call "it" a "lump". It depends on whether you are referring to the statue, or the lump of clay. ---
I 805f
Name/Reference/Kripke: if it is determined that the name is used "as usual", different beliefs cannot endanger the reference - BrandomVsKripke: the concept of reference should not be assumed in order to be able to inherit an expression anaphorically - Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! - (not even for canonically pronominal "he", "it") - in the anaphoric chain, the quote redemption principle is not applicable - BrandomVsKripke: no paradox, but we can use names in a way that is excluded by the disquotation scheme - e.g. "Cicero" (Spy): not all need to belong to the same chain, but you also do not need quasi-names (such as quasi indexical expressions (Castaneda)). ---
I 807
Name/Frege/Brandom: according to Frege supposedly linked with property - KripkeVs - Brandom: this is not Fregian: according to Frege, properties are part of the meaning (reference), and not of the sense - they are not immediately comprehensible - Brandom: conceptual contents expressed by names are opaque. ---
I 811
Definition Names/Brandom: anaphoric chains of co-typical tokenings.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Proper Names Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
I 310
Names/Evans: pro distinction: speaker name (Intention/belief) // what the name designates - EvansVsKripke: VsIdiolect ((s) So an individually defined reference.) ---
I 310
Names: saying the name is not a designation. ---
I 311
Names/KripkeVsSpeaker's Reference. ---
I 324
Names/EvansVsKripke: it is not about causal relations between being baptized and present speaker behavior. But this is about the relation between the states of the thing and the information set of the speaker. - "Intended Referent" is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the fact that x is the source of the causal origin of the information set. ---
I 329
Definition Name/Evans: (on trial): 1. There must be common knowledge that "NN" is the name of x - 2. It must be intended that the success of the reference is based in each case on the common knowledge that a name was used and not a predicate! - (Naming instead of satifying). - The intentions must become manifest, so that the common knowledge arises. ---
I 331
Names/Evans: wrong name: e.g. Bible: "Malachi" was by no means the name of the Prophet, but Malachi means: "my messenger" - ((s) e.g. "Istanbul": actually comes from "estan poli" = "into the city": ("there it goes into the city") - this was then coined as a new name for Constantinople.) For example, a copyist is mistaken for the author, but from the fact that the name did not mean the mathematician follows evidently not that the community meant the writer, or that they had asserted falsehoods about him. ---
I 333 ~
Name/Pub-Example/Evans: (somebody hears the name Louis respectfully pronounced) - There is an important gap between: 1. intend to refer to the j and to believe that a = j, and 2. intend to refer to a - these are two reasons to withdraw a sentence: a) the thing does not bear the name NN - b) the thing is not NN! (+) - e.g. of the returnees it was not "turnip" instead "turnip has not returned". - ((s) No predication is withdrawn, but the name.)

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Proper Names Lewis
 
Books on Amazon
II 217
Meaning/name/Lewis: may be a function of worlds on possible individuals - by generic names: function from worlds on quantities. ---
IV 216
Pseudo name/Lewis: Category S/(S/N) is introduced in addition to any name in the lexicon. - Makes a sentence of a name and a sentence - the category S/SN can now be renamed in nominal phrase (NP) - names: are then superfluous as subjects, but not as objects. - Then replace name: transitive verbs (S/N)/N are replaced by - pseudotransitive verbs: (S/N/(S/(S/N)). ---
Schwarz I 223
Names/description/reference/Kripke/Putnam: there is no generally known description for names and species expression that defines to what the expression refers. Descriptions are irrelevant for reference. - LewisVs magical theory of reference: Reference is not a primitive irreducible relationship - non-semantic information is enough to construct a descriptions of which we know a priori that the name picks it out - (Lewis: pro description theory). ---
Schwarz I 224 f
Names/LewisVsKripke: are no rigid designators - ((s) perhaps one counterpart for each description? - E.g. discoverer of incompleteness theorem, son of mother, etc.).

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Proper Names Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 288
Names/Searle: presuppose any other representation - have no explicit intentional content. ---
II 291 ff
Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: exaggerates analogy between reference and perception - overweights parasitic cases - presupposes omniscient observer - Meteorology baptizes future events. ---
II 291 ff
Names: Mill: no connotation, only denotation - Frege: meaning of a name is detected by description. ---
II 292
Names/SearleVsKripke: causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention - causal chain not pure, self-descriptive - baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise successful reference explained by successful reference (circular). ---
II 311
Names/meaning/reference/Searle: E.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is" - we speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries - E.g. swapped spots: Identification: "the spot that causes the experience" - Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A." ---
Wolf II 168
Names/Searle: meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true - we cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle - (Strawson ditto) - Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name - solution/Zink: Localisation. ---
Searle V 145
Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". ---
V 145
There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance - Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts. ---
V 245
Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description (description), we must unfortunately assume substances. - From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties - Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning - SearleVsWittgenstein. ---
V 247
Names/Mill: have no sense - FregeVsMill: E.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar, not more informative than Everest = Everest - FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects - identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information. ---
V 256
Names/SearleVsFrege: not entirely clear - E.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description.- SearleVsKripke: names not rigid, otherwise like logical equivalents - Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Proper Names Burge
 
Books on Amazon:
Tyler Burge
Wolf I 27
Names/BurgeVsKripke/BurgeVsDonnellan: not singular terms, but predicates (like Russell). E.g. "There is a time t for speaker S a reference action x on an object y, such that the following is true: y is a Socrates and y is bald".
The sub-proposition "y is a Socrates" thus has a truth-condition for itself. Reference is not eliminated. Twofold reference: for reference action and naming.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Proper Names Burkhardt
 
Books on Amazon
Wolf II 337
Namen/Kripke: haben keinen Fregeschen Sinn (Bedeutung) - BurkhardtVsKripke: der muß aber manchmal ergänzt werden
II 341
Namen/BurkhardtVsFrege: seine Ansicht ist falsch, Eigennamen hätte sowohl Bedeutung als auch Sinn - BurkhardtVsStrawson: wenn Namen keinerlei Bezeichnung, was soll dann Konvention sein?
Namen/Wittgenstein: doch "mere tags" - Burckhardt: dann muß das Kontextprinzip für Namen aufgegeben werden
II 345
Bedeutung/Namen/Burkhardt: drei Möglichkeiten: 1. Namen haben Bedeutung, dann ist das, gemäß der Konventionen der Träger - 2. alle Namen haben dieselbe Bedeutung: nämlich ihre eindeutige Referenzfunktion! (Gebrauchstheorie) - 3. Namen haben gar keine Bedeutung
II 358
Namen/Burkhardt: können auch appellative Funktion haben: Bsp "Einstein ist der Kopernikus des 20. Jahrh." - Vorstellungen über Eigenschaften - These so läßt sich die Bedeutung doch in Referent und Sinn aufteilen. So ist alles Subjektive getilgt - die eine oder die andere Seite kann dominieren, der Sinn kann an die Stelle des Referenten treten

Burk I
A. Burkhardt
Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Recognition Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 209
Re-identification/Hintikka: with this problem situation semantics and semantics of possible worlds are in the same boat again. Situation semantics: situation semantics rather veils the problem. For overlapping situations it assumes, e.g. that the overlapping part remains the same.
Re-identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine and Hintikka consider re-identification as hopeless because you cannot explain how it works.
Re-identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that's why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects.
HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: this is either too pessimistic or too optimistic.
But ignoring the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Reference Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 395
Theory of reference/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: might refute that - (but not a theory of meaning). ---
Putnam III 52f
Counterfactual Conditional/reference/Representation/Fodor: Thesis: to explain the actual nature of the reference by means of counterfactual conditionals. Asymmetric dependence - Cat token expressions are triggered by cats, but also by many other things. ---
III 54
Reference by causal attachment to the world. So also through images and mockups. - If not by cats, then not by pictures of cats. ---
III 56
Then (counterfactual) law: pictures of cats trigger "cat". - N.B.: ultimately dependent on real cats. ---
III 57 Fodor: if not pictures, then also not cats as a trigger. - PutnamVs.
---
III 61
Reference/Hermeneutics: there cannot be necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x - FodorVs. that leads to meaning-holism, which in turn is followed by a meaning-nihilism. ---
III 64
PutnamVs: E.g. witch, perhaps analytically female, nonetheless there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for "witch". - A witch-law would be wrong because of non-existence - because there is no world with witches - however, appropriate counterfactual conditionals could be true. - N.B.: their truth is not explained by the law. - (Armstrong: anyway vice versa). ---
III 65
PutnamVsFodor: for correct asymmetric dependence (the word through the trigger) this counterfactual conditional has to be wrong: if conmen cannot trigger any statement, then soldiers cannot either. ---
III 69
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: previous speech behavior of previous generations is a contributing cause - otherwise "backward law": false: if cats do not trigger, then there is also no previous behavior - but right vice versa - (but only if the cause is interpreted as a causal factor). - FodorVs: its causality underlies the colloquial cause-term (direct response? behaviouristic?) - PutnamVs: that is interest-relative. ---
III 78
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: cannot reduce them with the help of the terms law, counterfactual conditionals, causality. ---
III 133
Reference/Fodor. according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability of reference: individual sciences or everyday language causality. ---
III 140
Refernce: the fundamental physics, cannot explain the possibility of referring to something or the assertion of something. It cannot even do it when it comes to their own territory. ---
III 208
Reference: from the fact that some words do not refer without causal link it does not follow that reference itself would be causal. - It is only subject to causal restrictions. ---
V 75
Reference: Thesis: Input is shaped by concepts. - There are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions. ---
V 79
Reference/externalism: (external, divine position): Problem: what actually is reference - Reference cannot be causal because "alien" always refers to aliens. ---
I 34
Reference: if it is fixed, you can come up with any theories on the subject. ---
I 35
Physical broadband concepts such as size and cause allow also to formulate failed markings - Kripke: then names are usable without having true beliefs about the referent. ---
I 65
Reference: in logic: that what corresponds to the description - Field: has shown that this does not fulfill the task. ---
I 67ff
Primitive Reference/Putnam: E.g. creatures that can distinguish 17 properties and number them: "Pee-sevunteen-this" (sic): in fact, feelings of the beings themselves - amounts to causal theory of reference - when expanded to absent, past, future objects not necessary and sufficient conditions are introduced. ---
I 69
Semantic rise: one day the mass introduces the concept of a reference: "Uk-ook reefur-this" (sic) - that would not be our reference, otherwise paradoxes arise. - It only becomes a correct language with quantifiers - N.B.: with quantifiers the causal connection between X and the reference to X is dissolved. ---
I 70
Field: Tarski has shown how reference to primitive reference (show plus noise) can be traced back. - +> Gricean intention> Intention.
Rorty I 312
(According to Rorty): Putnam: a "causal" theory of reference cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly relate to something is just as mysterious as the question, how the term "cat" has done this.
---
Rorty IV 20 ff
Rorty: relation/Putnam: early: only causal theory of reference (not intentional). Can save us from relativism. ---
Rorty VI 123
Rorty: causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke, also self-criticism on earlier writings: The description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that neither in a greater nor lesser extent stand in an "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" relationship. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vsdifferentiation "Intrinsic"/"relational".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Reference Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 96
Reference: for each distinction between referees of expressions one needs some ontological categories, anything, even coarse to tailor the things.
I 317f
RortyVsPutnam, RortyVsKripke: If the concept of "really talk about" is confused with the concept of reference, one can easily get the idea like Kripke and Putnam that we had "intuitions" about the reference. Of course, there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical-scientific use. But then "reference" has nothing to do with "talk about", and only comes into play after you have made a choice between the interpretive strategies.
I 316ff
Real questions of existence are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson. What is then the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all.
I 321
For Davidsons ’pure’ philosophy of language neither one nor the other is necessary.
Horwich I 450
Reference/Davidson: is a byproduct of the translation - reference/Kripke: causation must have something to do with reference - Reference/Strawson: you find out what somebody is referring to by finding out for what most of his beliefs are true. - RI: reconciles the two approaches: Strawson right when he is understood holistically. - Quine: middle position between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of causation and reference is a matter of the coherence of the beliefs of the natives and the field linguists. - Kripke: modular approach: causal paths of objects to speech acts - then all beliefs can also be wrong - That means that one does not know what one is referring to. - DavidsonVsKripke: this is precisely the gap between conceptual scheme and content. - Solution/Davidson: reversed: first maximize coherence and truth, then reference as a byproduct - then it can be as it likes! - Important argument: This ensures that in the most direct cases the intentional objects are the causes of the beliefs - the Gödel-Schmitt case must then be an exception. - I 451 otherwise the term of reference had no content. - (like analytical). RI/DavidsonVsKripke: works if we know most of the intentional objects of the native. - RI begins at home: we assume for ourselves and for the native that most beliefs are true - (I 452 that requires no causality!) - then we have to reject intermediate links "the determined meaning" or "intended interpretation", "imaginations". - Meaning/belief/Quine/Davidson: cannot be found out independently of one another.
Rorty I 323
Reference Theory/PutnamVscausal reference theory/Putnam/Rorty: a "causal" reference theory cannot help: - because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly refer to something is just as enigmatic as the question of how the term "cat" can do it.
IV 23
Reference/Reference Theory/Putnam/Rorty: early: only causal theory of reference - not intentional - can spare us from relativism. - ((s) later: non-intentional theory does not explain learning.)

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Representation Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 162
Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions) - SellarsVsLocke: puts both together.
I 278~
R: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists.
II 76
Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey - later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality.
II 112
PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented. PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation.
VI 45
R/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism.
VI 51
R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense -
VI 49
R/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance.
VI 54
Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.) - RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii.
VI 63
R/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world -
VI 71~
Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs. R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs).
DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.)
VI 107f
R/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians. But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former?
VI 125 f
RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us!
VI 130
Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything.
VI 139
Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling.
VI 140
Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. - (Taylor: handling) - Coping is more primary than representation. - Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Rigidity Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 319
Description/SearleVsKripke: some descriptions are very well rigid: when the identity condition for the object includes this object. - E.g. the object, I perceive. - In addition, any description can be made ​​rigid by taking the actual world as an index. - Then the inventor of bifocal glasses is unique.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Rigidity Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 116
Cross-world identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it is more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. The way of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual.
HintikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is implicitly founded on Russell's notion of the logical proper name. There is, however, no excellent class of rigid expression terms.
Proper names/names/HintikkaVsKripke: proper names are by no means always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives, with different referents. Therefore it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?".
Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: Russell focuses on the perspective.
---
I 117
Kripke/Hintikka: on the public identification.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Rules Kripke
 
Books on Amazon
Wright:
Rule sequences/Kripke: In Wittgenstein "skeptical paradox": negates any possibility of rules and meanings containing real limitations.
At the end remains the attempt to keep afloat with the Charybdis.
---
Wright I 264
McDowellVsKripke: Error, the destruction of the Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) is to be understood as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is merely a logical sentence. McDowell: Wittgenstein’s concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity.
---
Wright I 264 ff
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: Debate on any apparent assertion, e.g. that I formally meant addition when I said "+" in the past. Then I have defended this against a skeptic. Now one should conclude that, even if I lost this fight, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules, and so on would be foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning would be no more understandable under the pressure of skepticism than the epistemology of the past or of the material world or the minds of others are still. But that would be a mistake! E.g. In attempting to justify that I meant addition with "+" in the past, I am granted complete reproduction of all aspects of my mental life. All relevant facts would have to show in my behavior and my mental life, and therefore be graspable by me.
Now if I lose anyway, it becomes apparent that there are no such facts.
Wright: In the argument, no over-objectification of the nature appears as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have appeared in my behavior.
---
Wright I 264 ff
WrightVsKripke: But that is vulnerable: However, it is not a mistake of sublimation of the rules (raise to a higher level). If anything is unprotected against the skeptical paradox, then a humanized Platonism is no less so than the over-objectified version. Quietism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Wright: Is definitely obliged to quietism: because realism (that there are no facts regarding any rules) must be inflated to a comprehensive irrealism.
An irrealism of the meaning must therefore trigger an irrealism of the truth.
Global Minimalism/WrightVs: that’s deceptive simplicity! Properly considered, the result of the irrealism based on Kripke’s skeptical paradox is that the discourse on rules is minimally capable of being true, at most.
---
Wright I 264 ff.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein: no behavior allows conclusions on internal rules (in the past) about addition, therefore these are also no rules about meaning, not even in the present, therefore also not on truth as well!

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Science Kripke
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty II 131
Kripke/RortyVsKripke: The Kripkeans rely on a privileged vocabulary for scientific description - causal powers are independent from description.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Scope Cresswell
 
Books on Amazon
I, 179f
Scope/Cresswell: E.g. everyone loves someone - :(a) everyone is such that someone is so that the former loves the second - b) someone> - someone is so that everyone is so that he, the second named, loves him, the former - game theoretical semantics/CresswellVsHintikka: has brought nothing new, what Kamp/Heim did not already have - game theory: sequence of choice. ---
II 48
Scope/description/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: sentences about propositional attitudes can always give descriptions a wide range. That is, to make them rigid. ---
II 126
He*/scope/Cresswell: large scope: then it can also be interpreted as "I" - narrow scope: allows "he", "she" or "it" - gods-example/solution/Cresswell:> - speaker index. ---
II 126
"Now"/scope/Cresswell: analog to the case of "I" - narrow scope: here "now" becomes "then". - "here"/Cresswell: Problem: that "people coordinates" could lead to an infinite list - because of the context dependency. - CresswellVs: instead I use (1973a, 110-119) properties of utterances. ---
II 143
Hob/Cob/Nob-Example/Geach/Cresswell: (Geach 1967, 628): Cresswell: needs a quantifier, which is simultaneously inside and outside the scope of the attitude-verb. - Solution/Hill/Kraut: intensional objects as surrogates for individuals and a further quantifier. ---
II 150
Names/scope/Cresswell: normally names have a wider reach than modal operators - this is the "modal objection" VsKripke. - KripkeVsVs: 1972, 279.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Speaker Meaning Searle
 
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John R. Searle
IV 179
Semantic reference/speaker reference/Kripke: in the case of an error both can vary. - Idiolect/Kripke: here the semantic relation is determined by a general, the speaker reference is determined by a specific intention of the speaker - SearleVsKripke: if I have both general and special, then I have no general statements with respect to descriptions.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Strength of Theories Hintikka
 
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I 7
Standard semantics/Kripke semantics/Hintikka: what differences are there? The ditch between them is much deeper than it first appears.
Cocchiarella: he has shown, however, that even in the simplest quantifying case of the monadic predicate logic, the standard logic is radically different from its Kripke cousin.
Decidability: monadic predicate logic is, as Kripke has shown, decidable.
Kripke semantics: Kripke semantics is undecidable.
Decisibility: Decisibility implies axiomatizability.
Stronger/Weaker/Hintikka: as soon as we go beyond monadic predicate logic, we have a logic of considerable strength, complexity, and unruliness.
Quantified standard modal logic 1. level/Hintikka: the quantified standard modal logic of 1. level is in a sense more powerful than 2. level logic (with standard semantics). The latter is, of course, already very strong, so that some of the most difficult unresolved logical and quantum-theoretical problems can be expressed in terms of logical truth (or fulfillment) in logical formulas of the second level.
Definition equally strong/stronger/weaker/Hintikka: (here): to show an equally difficult decision-making problem.
Decision problem: for standard logic 2. level can be reduced to that for quantified standard modal logic 1. level.
Reduction: this reduction is weaker than translatability.
---
I 9
Quantified standard modal logic 1. level/Hintikka: this logic is very strong, comparable in strength with 2. level logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (HintikkaVsKripke). The stronger a logic is, the less manageable it is.
---
I 28
Branched quantifiers/branching/stronger/weaker/Hintikka: E.g. branching here:
1. branch: There is an x and b knows...
2. branch: b knows there is an x ...
Quantification with branched quantifiers is extremely strong, almost as strong as 2. level logic.
Therefore, it cannot be completely axiomatized. (Quantified epistemic logic with unlimited independence).
---
I 29
Variant: variants are simpler cases where the independence refers to ignorance, combined with a move with a single, non-negated operator {b} K. Here, an explicit treatment is possible. ---
I 118
Seeing/stronger/weaker/logical form/Hintikka: a) stronger: recognizing, recognizing as, seeing as.
b) weaker: to look at, to keep a glance on, etc.
Weaker/logical form/seeing/knowing/Hintikka: E.g.
(Perspective, "Ex")
(15) (Ex) ((x = b) & (Ey) John sees that (x = y)).
(16) (Ex)(x = b & (Ey) John remembers that x = y))
(17) (Ex)(x = b & (Ey) KJohn (x = y))
Acquaintance/N.B.: in (17) b can be even John's acquaintance even if John does not know b as b! ((S) because of y).
---
I 123
Everyday language/ambiguity/Hintikka: the following expression is ambiguous:
(32) I see d
Stronger: (33) (Ex) I see that (d = x)
That says the same as (31) if the information is visual or
weaker:
(34) (Ex) (d = x & (Ey) I see that (x = y))
This is the most natural translation of (32).
Weaker: for the truth of (34) it is enough that my eyes simply rest on the object d. I do not need to recognize it as d.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Substitution Hintikka
 
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I 194
Substitutability of identity/intensionality/Hintikka: a sure indicator of intensionality is the failure to preserve the identity of the individual domain. If it happens that the identity fails from one possible world to another, we have a counter-example to the known law ((s) Leibniz's law):
(Substitutability of identity) (x)(y) (X = y > F[x] > F[y])).

((s) identical objects have all properties in common).
This is sometimes called the "bound variable form of identity".
Equivalent to:

(x)(y) ( x = y > neccessary (x = y))

((s) What is identical is necessarily identical).
Hintikka: this failure of the substitutability of the identity is to be distinguished from the failure for any singular terms. Here it can simply be because a singular term refers to another thing in another possible world.
---
I 195
Identity/Individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity can fail for certain individuals in the transition to another possible world. That is, that world lines can branch (> separation). Separation/KripkeVsSeparation/Substitutability of identity/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes separation because the substitutability of identity is valid for him. A separation would violate the transitivity of the identity according to him. After a separation, the individuals would not be identical, even if they were identical after the transition. Therefore, the substitutability of identity is inviolable to Kripke.
HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular:
Transitivity of identity/Hintikka: can mean two things:
A) Transitivity within a world
B) between worlds.
The plausibility of transitivity belongs to the former, not to the latter.
Transitivity of the identity between possible worlds is simply to exclude separation. This is the circularity in Kripke's argument.
Substitutability of identity/Hintikka: many authors have noted that identity and quantification remain meaningless in intensional contexts unless we have the substitutability of identity.
HintikkaVs: that is simply wrong: after the world lines are defined, we can formulate the truth conditions for sentences with arbitrary intensional expressions. And then, independently of the behavior of the world lines.
Modal logic/Substitutability of identity/Hintikka: it is double ironic that the defenders of conventional modal logic want to save the substitutability of identity by saying that without it, possible worlds and intensional logic makes no sense. For substitutability of identity excludes separation.
Fusion/Hintikka: to exclude it, we need the reverse form instead substitutability of identity we need identity of substitutability:

(identity of substitutability) (x)(y) (possible (x = y) > x = y)

((S) possible identity is identity, i.e. ultimately it is necessary).
Problem/Hintikka: identity of substitutability is not valid in some conventional systems of the quantified modal logic, including that of Ruth Barcan Marcus.
For these systems, we must allow separation when we go from possible worlds to the actual worlds (travel home).
Direction/Interpretation/Hintikka: but in interpretation there is nothing to distinguish between the directions.
---
I 196
It is only a coincidence that these systems do not contain retrospective operators (Saarinen, see above). That is, every defender of these conventional systems secretly defends the possibility of separation. That is, the rejection of substitutability of identity.
---
I 196
Separation/Hintikka: separation is useful in a few models of cross-world identification, re-identification in time. E.g. a computer could be dismantled and two computers could be built from it. This could be revised later. Re-identification/Hintikka: re-identification is the key to cases of separation and fusion.
Separation/Hintikka: There is a structural reason why it is so rare: if world lines are composed of infinitesimal elements as the solutions of differential equations, the separation of a singularity corresponds, and this is a rare phenomenon.
Separation/Hintikka: the arguments against them are circular in a deep sense. They are based on the idea that for quantification the individual domain should remain fixed. (HintikkaVsKripke).
Possible world/individual area/HintikkaVsKripke: one should not demand that the individuals must remain the same when changing from world to world. The talk of worlds is empty, if there are no possible experiences that could distinguish them.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996


The author or concept searched is found in the following 63 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Nagel Vs Armstrong, D.
 
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Frank I 65
NagelVsArmstrong/KripkeVsArmstrong: the epistemic nature of the mental state is certain, i.e. I could have it without necessarily being aware that I have functional states. ShoemakerVsNagel/VsKripke: too idealism-friendly.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Barcan, R. Cresswell Vs Barcan, R.
 
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HC I 150
Existence/Modality/Barcan formula/BF/Hughes/Cresswell: there are versions of T, S4 with and without BF (but not of S5). Question: Can we provide an analysis of the validity that matches the versions without BF, namely PK + T and PK + T S4? Barcan formula/Camps: VsBarcan: Prior (1957), Hintikka (1961), Myhill (1958) Defense: Barcan (1962)
Barcan formula/BF/Hughes/Cresswell: for our purposes we best consider it in this form
(x) Lfx > L(x)fx (notation: (x) L phi x > L(x) phi x). Everyday language translation/Hughes/Cresswell: if everything necessarily has a certain property phi, it is necessarily the case that everything has that property. ((s) i.e. not: "there is necessarily".) > Fact ((s) fact/(s): would an operator "it is a fact that ..." then be intensional? Would he add something? Vs: Which is in the conditional tense anyway.)
VsBarcan/Hughes/Cresswell: because of the fact that everything that exists is necessarily phi the possibility is not excluded that there might be things (or might have been) that are not phi, and in this case it would not be a necessary truth, that everything is phi. Hughes/Cresswell: This objection is based on the assumption that in different possible worlds ) objects may not only have properties that are different from those they have in the real world , but that there may even be objects that do not exist in the real world at all. Semantics of possible worlds/Semantics/Predicate calculus/PC (/Modality/Hughes/Cresswell: now it is at least plausible to assume that the semantics that we have given for the modal predicate calculus implicitly negates this condition, since we assumed in each model a single individuals range which is the same for all possible worlds the validity of the BF indeed depends on this property of the semantics. ((s)> LewisVsKripke, KripkeVsLewis). I 151 Then we can gain a semantic in which BF is invalid by allowing models where different possible worlds are assigned different ranges.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Causal Theory Davidson Vs Causal Theory
 
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II 185
Externalism: possible misunderstandings: Neither Davidson s externalism nor his characterization of occasional T-equivalences commit him to a causal theory of reference as it is represented by Kripke, Putnam and Devitt. For them successful reference depends on whether the subject and utterance of the word are connected by the correct causal chain. Externalism / Putnam / Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory.
Externalism / DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: full sentences, interpretation.
Putnam / Kripke: causal theory: proper linking word - object - DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Causal Theory Evans Vs Causal Theory
 
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Gareth Evans
I 320
VsCausal Theory/Names/Generic Term/Evans: there are not two mechanisms at play, one for baptism and for the preservation of reference. Generic Terms, unlike names, can change their meaning! E.g. Madagascar: Marco Polo misunderstood the report by Malayan seafarers and transferred the mangled name for an area of ​​the mainland to the island.
I 321
EvansVsCausal Theory: It must also be improved for E.g. swapped babies. The man who bears the name bears it, because another baby was given that name! E.g. Suppose Bible scholars argued today that another than Goliath had slain David: Elhannan the Bethlehemite. David is said to have killed another Philistine. Now, if an entire speech community linked no other information than that Goliath was the man who was slain by David, that does not mean, however, that "Goliath" referred to that man in this community.
I 334
EvansVsCausal Theory/EvansVsKripke: E.g. a young man A leaves his village in the Scottish Highlands to make his fortune. 50 years later, a man B comes to the village and lives as a hermit behind the hills. Three or four villagers of that time are still alive and mistakenly believe it is the villager who left the place and whom they consequently call "turnip". This name comes into use in the village community. If the error is discovered, they are more likely to express the sentence "It was not Turnip, after all" than to absurdly express the phrase: "it looks as if Turnip did not come from the village". Evans: they had used the name of A to say false things about him. E.g. Should the elderly die, the way would be open for a new use of the name. Evans: It is important that the information that the old villagers give to the young. (E.g. "He was a beautiful type for women").
I 335
As rich, coherent and important for these could be that A might be the predominant source of their information. In this case they could then say "the man is not Turnip, after all". Alternative: "respectfully" the young villagers could continue to use the name respectfully towards the old villagers: Turnip, "whoever it may be". Name/Reference/Evans: reference is determined by sets of information and not by fitting! Nevertheless, the importance of causality is preserved. Also, the logic is not contradicted: identity statements are necessary! Information is individuated by its origin. If A is the source of a set of information, it could have been nothing else.
I 336
Consequently, nothing else could have been this a. EvansVsCausal Theory: false hope to be able to leave the intention of the speaker completely aside.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Causal Theory Searle Vs Causal Theory
 
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John R. Searle
II 303
SearleVsCausal Theory: the causal chain is simply a characterization of parasitic cases from the outside standpoint.
II 304
The descriptivist Theory allows a baptism at the beginning. Kripke's theory is merely a variant of descriptivist. The causal chain does not matter at all! The only chain that matters, is the passing of the intentional content!
E.g. chain having ten members. No additional intentions, omniscient observer. But what he observed, are not the features that secure the reference!
II 305
Reference is for Kripke only and solely secured by descriptive content! E.g. Miss 7 decides a change, consequently 8 9 and 10 do not speak about a mountain, but about a poodle.
II 308
Causal theory: intentionality transmission in the chain is the very essential. Descriptivism: merely casual act.
II 309
E.g. Suppose I only knew roughly about what "Structuralism" is, yet I could ask: "Are there any structuralists in France?", "Is Pierre structuralist?"
Descriptivism: finds it implausible that only thing that will be passed in the communication chain, was the intention to speak on the same subject. In real life much more is passed on, among other things the type of a particular thing.
II 310
Whether something is a mountain or a man, is even in the parasitic cases connected to the name. SearleVsKripke: E.g. I talk about Socrates' philosophy of mathematics, but bring everything up and think Socrates is the name of a number. "I believe that Socrates is not a prime number, but can be divided by 17". That meets Kripke causal theory, but I do not succeed to talk about Socrates.
SearleVsKripke: its view has the absurd consequence that it does not contain any restrictions on what may turn out to be the name reference.
E.g. Aristotle could be a bar stool in Joe's Pizza Place, 11957 in Hoboken. Even if it is a metaphysical de re necessity that Aristotle had these parents, this tells us nothing about how the name refers to these people and not to a bar stool.
II 311
Descriptivism: adheres to the intentional content first stage, and considers the parasitic cases as less important. Causal theory: emphasizes the parasitic cases, especially if we are not directly aware of the objects.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Davidson, D. Kripke Vs Davidson, D.
 
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EMD II 335
Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": A language cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: Otherwise it cannot be "first language".
II 338
KripkeVsDavidson: We only need to demand that only a finite number of axioms possess "new" vocabulary (weaker).
Horwich I 450
Reference/Radical Interpretation/RI/Field Linguist//Davidson/Rorty. Reconciles these two approaches saying that Strawson is right when his approach is seen holistically, i.e. if one places Aristotle’s formulation of the "whole and for the most part" first. Rorty Strawson: Yet his criterion cannot be applied to individual cases while being sure that one is right. Quine/Rorty: Stands between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of both, of the causation and of the reference, is equally a question of the conviction’s coherence of the native and the field linguist.
Reference/Kripke/Rorty: His approach is a "building block" approach: Here we see causal paths of objects leading to individual speech acts.
Conviction/true/Truth/KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: this approach leaves the possibility open that all our convictions could be wrong. Or that one basically does not know what he refers to (because one misunderstands all causal paths).
KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: which makes it possible to completely separate the reference and intentional objects.
DavidsonVsKripke / Rorty: Davidson warns exactly against this: The gap between scheme and content.
Solution/Davidson: Reverse order: We must first maximize coherence and truth, and then the reference, as a byproduct, can be like as it wants to be!
Important Argument: This ensures that the intentional objects of many convictions (the "most direct cases") are their causes.
((s) Vs: it would then still be possible according to Löwenheim that what appears to be direct to us is not the most direct.
DavidsonVsKripke: Kripke’s gaffe, e.g. the Gödel-Schmidt case must remain the exception.

I 451
Because if the gap between references and intentional objects (which one refers to, and the one of which one believes one refers to) would be the rule, then the term "reference" would have no content! He would be as useless for the field linguist as the term "analytic". Gavagai/RI/Communication/DavidsonVsKripke/Rorty: the field linguist can communicate with the natives when he knows most of his intentional objects.
Therefore:
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The radical interpretation (RI) starts at home. Then we can assume for ourselves as well as for the natives that most of our beliefs are true.
Rorty: Is this an answer for the skeptic or does it only express what JamesVsSkepticism says:that the question is a bad question?
Language/Representation/Intermediary/Medium/Davidson/Rorty:
Davidson rejects "intermediaries" (intermediate members) between the organism and its environment (to be able to perform RI). Intermediate links between the organism and object: e.g. "special meaning", e.g. "intended interpretation", e.g. "what stands before the mind of the speaker" Without them we can say "RI begins at home".

Horwich I 453
Solution/Davidson:fulfillment/DavidsonVsSkepticism/DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: For his refutation we need Tarski’s fulfillment ratio (word-world) instead of "correspondence" (which would correspond to the truth of sentences) of the relation proposition world). ((S) Because only whole sentences can be true). RI/Gavagai/Field Linguist/Davidson/Rorty: The field linguist is going to connect individual words of the native with objects (pieces of the world).
Translation/fulfillment/Davidson/Rorty: Problem: The fulfillment relation is not a basis for translations, the fulfillment is rather a byproduct of translations.
Hermeneutical circle/HC/Gavagai/RI//Davidson/RortyVsKripke: To go back and forth in the HC is not a building block-theory. It corresponds more to the "Reflective Equilibrium" of Rawls.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Davidson, D. Skepticism Vs Davidson, D.
 
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Horwich I 451
SkepticismVsDavidson/Rorty: wird einwenden, dass es viel mehr braucht als eine Darstellung dessen, was der Feld Linguist braucht. Dieser muss zwar annehmen, dass die meisten unserer eigenen Überzeugungen wahr sind, aber er hat keine Sicherheit, dass es so ist. DavidsonVsVs: dennoch ist es unsere einzige Möglichkeit einen Standpunkt außerhalb des Sprachspiels einzunehmen.
SkepticismVsDavidson: damit hat Davidson den philosophischen Punkt verfehlt. Sein Standpunkt ist "nicht weit genug draußen".
DavidsonVsVs/Rorty: kann nur auf (2) verweisen: 2. Wir verstehen alles über die Relation Überzeugung Welt, wenn wir die Kausalrelation mit der Welt verstehen: (das teilt er mit Kripke): mehr als die Kausalrelation gibt es da nicht zu verstehen.
Das Ergebnis ist ein Übersetzungs Handbuch cum Ethographiereport. ("Report"/Quine Davidson: weil man Bedeutungen und Überzeugungen nicht unabhängig von einander herausfinden kann).
Wörterbuch/Rorty: damit haben wir ein Übersetzungshandbuch für uns selbst.
Enzyklopädie/Rorty: Auto Ethnographie.
Welt/Wissen/DavidsonVsKripke/Rorty: über diese beiden hinaus gibt es nichts, was wir über unsere Relation zur Realität wissen können, was nicht schon wissen. Für die Philosophie gibt es hier nichts mehr zu tun.
PragmatismusVsSkepticism/Rorty: das ist es, was der Pragmatist dem Skeptiker schon immer gesagt hat. >Korrespondenz:
Korrespondenz/Erklärung/Davidson/Pragmatismus/DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory/Rorty: wenn Korrespondenz eine Relation zwischen Überzeugungen und der Welt ist, die sich verändern kann, während alles andere (auch die Kausalrelationen) gleich bleibt, kann sie keine Erklärung sein.
Erklärung/Wahrheit/Korrespondenz/Davidson/Rorty: wenn als Wahrheit als "Korrespondenz" verstanden wird, kann sie nicht als erklärender Ausdruck verstanden werden.

Horwich I 497
DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory/VsCausal theory der Referenz: wenn umgekehrt Referenz durch eine physikalische Relation fixiert wäre, brauchte die Übereinstimmung zwischen den beiden Korrespondenzen eine Erklärung. Denn nach der Kausaltheorie wäre es möglich, dass wir oft oder meist auf Dinge referieren, die wir nicht verläßlich berichten können. Danach wäre es eine interessante empirische ((s) kontingente) Tatsache, dass unsere Überzeugungen im allgemeinen wahr sind und keine Konsequenz unserer Interpretationsmethode.
I 498
Ist das ein Grund, eine solche Theorie anzunehmen? Putnam hat das vielleicht geglaubt. Sicher aber Michael Friedman:...

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Description Theory Evans Vs Description Theory
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
I 313
Reference/Meaning/Generic Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we are constantly using generic terms of whose fulfillment of conditions we have only the darkest ideas. E.g. chlorine, microbiology, etc. However, it is wrong to say that we do not say anything when we utter sentences that this generic term
I 315
Name/Causal Theory/Kripke/Evans: Kripke’s causal theory looks something like this: the chain of causality only retains the reference if the speaker intends to use the name for the same thing for which it was used by the person from whom he has learned the name. Evans: Question: Is it sufficient that such use is a so described causal consequence? E.g. (Evans) a group of people talk in the bar about a certain Louis, of whom S has never heard. He asks "What has Louis done?" It’s clear that he refers to a certain man with that!.
I 316
He might even continue to refer to him on a later occasion. VsDescription Theory: This is difficult to reconcile with it, because the chunk of information that S overheard could include any attitude and could match someone else much better. She has no explanation for why it is impossible that other descriptions outweigh this one. VsCausal Theory: It can probably ensure the right answer in this case. But it cannot rule out that S denotes a certain Frenchman - maybe Louis XIII - at any time in the future, as alien to the subject matter and as confused the speaker may seem, as long as there is a causal link to that conversation in the bar.
I 321
EvansVsDescription Theory: If we thought at the same time that the name refers to the person who was killed by Elhannan, then it shows that the conditions of the description theory are not necessary and not sufficient.
I 321/322
EvansVsKripke: this is the view for which Kripke should have argued, but did not argue. EvansVsDescription Theory: does not distinguish between the notions: a) that the described thing is determined by the intention of the speaker, and b) that the object fulfils the descriptions. EvansVsDescription Theory: point b) is the weakness: the "fitting in with" is absurd if, in the case of a speaker who is isolated from his community, it only fits this thing better than anything else because of a bunch of descriptions which the speaker associates.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Disposition Theory Verschiedene Vs Disposition Theory Stegmüller IV 34
Disposition/Geist/Ryle: Meinen, Bedeutungserfassen, Intentionalität: sind nicht Vorkommnisse im Bewusstsein, sondern Fähigkeiten, eben Dispositionen.
IV 35
D.h. im Fall von plus/quus wie von glau läuft haargenau die gleiche geistige Geschichte nebst identischen mentalen Zuständen und Bewusstseinsvorgängen ab. Fazit: die entscheidenden Dispositionen wurden in der Vergangenheit erworben.
Der Unterschied besteht dann auch nicht erst in der Gegenwart, er bestand schon in der Vergangenheit!
RyleVsKripke: dann hätte ich eben auch schon in der Vergangenheit die Standard Funktion der Addition benutzt.
IV 35/36
KripkeVsRyle: dreifache Kritik: 1. externe Kritik: bestreitet, dass überhaupt irgendwelche Annahmen über Dispositionen relevant sind. Das Problem ist gar nicht kapiert. Wie kann er sich auf Disposition als Rechtfertigung berufen? Eine Weisung an mich selbst zeigt gar nichts.
VsVs: a) ich habe eben eine Hypothese über mich selbst.
VsVsVs: wieso soll gerade diese Hypothese von zahllosen anderen möglichen die richtige sein?
IV 37
VsVs: b) wir lassen die Vergangenheit ruhen. Richtig ist, was mir jetzt richtig erscheint! WittgensteinVsVsVs: das führt dazu, dass man hier nicht mehr von "richtig" reden kann!
2. interne Kritik: (manche meinen fälschlich, Wittgenstein selbst habe sie vertreten): besteht in der Angabe eines Kriteriums für eine Funktion F, die ich mit einem solchen Symbol meine.

Def "Endlichkeitsproblem"/Stegmüller: Endliches kann nicht einfach auf Unendliches übertragen werden. (Nicht nur Erfahrungen, sondern auch Dispositionen sind endlich).
IV 38
Def "quus"/glau/Kripkes Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: Neudefinition: das skeptische Problem reproduziert sich: diejenige Funktion sei die Quaddition, die für alle Paare, die hinreichend klein sind, um von mir addiert zu werden mit der Addition übereinstimmt, und für die übrigen das Ergebnis 7 liefert. Damit habe ich immer dieselben Dispositionen gehabt. VsDispositionstheorie.
Dispositionstheorie/Stegmüller: a) kann sich zu verteidigen versuchen, indem sie Disposition nicht wörtlich versteht, sondern als eine Idealisierung der tatsächlichen Praxis. Ceteris paribus Disposition.
KripkeVs: dann müsste ich immer phantastischere Annahmen darüber machen, was ich täte, wenn mir dies und das passierte.
IV 39
b) Die Idealisierung könnte anders interpretiert werden: "wenn ich die Fähigkeit hätte..." KripkeVs: das wird zirkulär. Es setzt voraus, dass die von mir gemeinte Funktion etwas Festliegendes sei. Die "Tatsache" müsste vorausgesetzt werden, dass ich eine ganz bestimmte Intentin habe!.
Dilemma für die Dispositionstheorie:
a) entweder nur Disposition für endlich viele Fälle, oder
b) Idealisierung der Reaktion. Problem:
ba) bei genauer Spezifikation dieser Bedingungen kann man nichts über meine Reaktion sagen.
bb) eine Tatsache wird voraussetzt.
IV 40
KripkeVsDispositionstheorie: sie räumt keinen Platz für immer mögliche Fehler ein! Der Dispositionstheoretiker kann sich hier nicht damit verteidigen, dass es hier eben eine Kluft gibt zwischen dem, was er meinte, und dem, was er "meinen sollte".
Denn die "Funktion, die er tatsächlich meint" steht für ihn ja nicht durch eine von der Disposition unabhängige Tabelle von vornherein fest.
IV 41
Vielmehr ist nach Ansicht des Dispositionalisten die Funktion aus der Disposition abzulesen. Daher muss für ihn die Disposition, Fehler zu machen Teil der Gesamtdisposition sein!
def "Skaddition"/Kripke: wäre die Disposition unserer Person einschließlich der Disposition, Fehler zu machen.
IV 42
Regel/Kompetenz/Kripke: Kompetenz kann Regeln nicht erklären, weil sie Regeln voraussetzt. (Das richtet sich nicht VsChomsky).
VsDispositionstheorie: Übereinstimmungen können auch lediglich darauf beruhen, dass uns zuweilen Fehler unterlaufen.
IV 47
Addition/Dispositionstheorie/Kripkes Wittgenstein: (s.o. "externe Kritik (1)"): Angenommen, es träfe zu, dass ich mit "+" die Addition meine. Problem: was für eine Relation besteht zwischen dieser Annahme und der Art von Antwort, die ich auf die Frage nach !117 + 159" geben werde?
Dispositionstheorie: alle Varianten geben fälschlich an, es sei diese und jene deskriptiv faßbare Relation.
Meinen/Intention/normativ: wenn man aber Meinen so versteht, dass das, was ich jetzt meine, das bestimmt, was ich künftig sagen sollte, ist das normativ, nicht deskriptiv.
Das ist der Hauptpunkt VsDisposition.




Donnellan, K. Kripke Vs Donnellan, K.
 
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Searle VI 179
KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction spokesperson reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation may refer to somethings different than what he is talking about.
VI 179/180
Searle: That is, however, not quite right: e.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfills the description. # Kripke: In a given idiolect the semantic relation (without indexical parts) is determined by a general intention of the speaker.
The reference of the speaker is determined by a specific intention.
SearleVsKripke: This is precisely where the approach gets stuck: In the sense that when I have general as well as specific intentions, I actually have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them.
E.g. (without index): "The man who is eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building at 10 clock on June 6, 53." According to Kripke this is intended in my idiolect through my general intention.
VI 181
Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would need to be if it were correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: Beyond that no general intentions are necessary.
There are also an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intention.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Donnellan, K. Newen Vs Donnellan, K.
 
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NS I 96
Referential/Description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions! It is possible and with it communication can succeed, but it belongs to pragmatics (and is therefore dependent on context). But it is only parasitically to the attributive reading that exclusively indicates the actual meaning of descriptions correctly.
NS I 97
Speaker Reference/KripkeVsDonnellan/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: instead of referential use of descriptions. What the speaker meant on one occasion. We also need the concept of the intended object. This may even differ from the actually referenced object! ((s) Unlike the Godel Schmidt example).
On the other hand:
Semantic Meaning/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: is only specified correctly by Russell's truth conditions (tr.cond.):
E.g. Schmidt's killer is insane iff. the killer of Schmidt is insane.
Russell Language/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: only contains the attributive interpretation.
On the other hand:
D-Language/Kripke: contains referential and attributive interpretation.
Russell Language: Russell's truth conditions
NS I 98
Referential/Deception/Russell Language: there is also a referential use here, but only if someone erroneously thinks that he refers to someone in particular. He is mistaken to believe that Russell's truth conditions are fulfilled. The speaker only says pragmatically and not semantically that the predicate is satisfied. D-Language/Kripke: E.g. in the cafe: "Her husband is kind to her."
difference:
a) "No, he is not kind, but this is not her husband."
b) "He (this one!) is kind to her, but he is not her husband." ((s) twice "he").
D-Language/Kripke: although the D-language can handle b) (it would say that this is the referential interpretation), a) is difficult to explain, because here the description would have to be used both referentially and attributively at the same time.
NS I 99
KripkeVsDonnellan: if both interpretations are embedded in the semantics, we must assume, therefore, that e.g. "her husband" had two meanings simultaneously here. Newen/Schrenk: but there are new approaches that allow for both.
Pragmatics/Semantics/Newen/Schrenk: their border demarcation is controversial.
VsKripke: the referential use is still common. Thus pragmatics moves closer in the vicinity of semantics again.
Neale, Stephen/Newen/Schrenk: ("Descriptions") pro Russell semantics ((s) meaning through homophonic truth conditions).

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Essentialism Cresswell Vs Essentialism
 
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I 119
Metaphysics/Cresswell: this is not about metaphysics, i.e. we just assume that things may have different characteristics in different possible worlds. ((s) CresswellVsKripke: Properties not necessary, but here not a metaphysical thesis. Otherwise: CresswellVsEssentialism).

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Frege, G. Kripke Vs Frege, G.
 
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Cresswell II 151
Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions).
((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.)
Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter!
Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects.
Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect.
Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "Φωσφόρος" instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres".
Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre.

Stalnaker I 172
Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning
Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent.
a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified,
b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language.
I 174
Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states.
Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given.
StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues.
a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names
b) what circumstances lead to those semantics.
Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language.
Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time.
a) why a name has these referents and
b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content).
Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: Kripke (1972) (S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edition, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769, Dordrecht, 1972) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways.
a) as meaning
b) as the way how the reference is determined.
By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings.
I 192
Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics")
Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics?
Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language.
Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values.
Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain.
Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it.
Similar to Kripke:
Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies.
KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things.
Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words.
I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to:
Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language.
E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if
Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker")
Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents.

Tugendhat I 440
KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Hintikka, J. Kripke Vs Hintikka, J.
 
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Hintikka I 84
KripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations do not need to be analytic functions or functions allowing an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: It seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines.
HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict.
World line: we do allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Hintikka, J. Quine Vs Hintikka, J.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 73
Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: talk about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl the essence of human thought is in relation with unrealized possibilities.
Possibilia/Hintikka: we need them to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type.
Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory.
I 137
QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of cross-world identification. Cross-World Identificatin/Cross-Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If no identity conditions (IC) are given, the question is pointless whether an individual is "the same as" one in a different possible world.
HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism.
Worldlines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Nevertheless, they are not arbitrary. Their boundaries are given by the continuity of time and space, memory, location, etc.
I 138
It may even be that our presuppositions prove to be incorrect. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines that comprise all possible worlds we need in alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of quantified alethic ML is impossible. But for reasons more profound than Quine assumed.
Cross-World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible.
Quine/Hintikka: has even accepted this lately, with limitations.
Solution/Hintikka: Cross-world identification as re-identification.
I 139
Propositional Attitude/Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: we will focus here on the problem of propositional attitudes.
I 140
Quantification in Epistemic Contexts/Belief Contexts/Intensional/Hintikka: Ex (1) Albert knows who wrote Coningsby
(2) (Ex) K Albert (x wrote Coningsby)
Notation: (Ex) perspective (perceptual) identification (acquaintance) in the book: not reflected E).
Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: e.g. (2) can only then be inferred from
(3) K Albert (Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby)
i.e.
(3) * Albert knows that Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby.
... Only then can be concluded when we have an additional premise:
(4) (Ex) K Albert (Beaconsfield = x)
i.e.
(5) Albert knows who Beaconsfield is.
Quine per Hintikka: this solution is better than a criterion for rigid designators (rigidity, QuineVsKripke).
Everyday Language: it's of course simply very natural to speak in a way that you say you know who or what something is.
HintikkaVsQuine: he praises me for the wrong reasons. He turns things upside down. Although he does not commit the mistake I criticize, he forgives it.
I 141
Formal Language/Logic/Canonical Notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should view logical language as our native language and not set so much store by the translation into everyday language. It is only about semantic clarity anyway.
I 145
HintikkaVsQuine: does not understand the role my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: says you can also transfer these conditions to belief, knowledge, etc.
Quine: Hintikka requires that the subject know who or what the person or thing is. Who or what the term designates.
HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I only use some type of uniqueness condition.
Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (beliefs, see, know) is one of analogy, not of identity.
Solution: the sets of compatible possible worlds in the case of knowing, seeing, memory, belief are different ones every time.
I 146
Identification/Belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: any belief world (possible worlds) will include countless bodies and objects that are not individually recognizable, simply because the believer believes his world contains countless such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are pointless.
Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how can you exclude them?
Solution: the scope of variables to those objects about which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea, would have to be limited.
Problem: how do you determine how clear these ideas must be?
HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple if we quantify about individuals in doxastic possible worlds:
Ex Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything Jack believes":
Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify about the inhabitants of such worlds, by simply using a quantifier inside the operator.
((s) i.e. Jack, but not we, distinguish).
Problem: it could be that we might want to consider the people as our neighbors from the real world w0. ("qua neighbors").
Hintikka: but that is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions.
Problem: is more due to the notation of conventional modal logic which does not allow that us to turn around the evaluation process which runs from outside to inside so that it extends from the inside out.
Solution/Saarinen: "retrospective" operators (see above)
Solution/Hintikka: it may still be that we can track an individual back from w1 to w0, even if it does not meet the uniqueness conditions like (16) - (127). (They require an individual to be identifiable in all the possible worlds).
HintikkaVsQuine: he is wrong in that the question of identity is pointless if not all the uniqueness conditions are met.
On the contrary, it has to make sense for us to ever able to determine that the conditions are not met!
Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if it is not met, it only means that we cannot find an individual ((s) or its counterpart) in any possible world.
Uniqueness Condition/QuineVsHintikka: Quine's most serious objection is that these conditions are always indicated (indexical) i.e. that they are context-dependent. I.e. only in a particular situation it is about whether an individual is the same.
I 147
Knowing-Who/Knowing-What/Context/Quine: E.g. "Who is he?" only makes sense in a given situation. HintikkaVsQuine: of course he is right that the truth conditions vary with the situation, but that does not destroy the uniqueness conditions for epistemic logic.
HintikkaVsQuine: he only misunderstands the role these conditions play.
Truth Value/Hintikka: the truth value of sentences of the form
(18) (Ex) K(b = x)
and equally of
(19) (Ex) K(b = x)
become independent of the truth value of other types of simplest sentences! Question/Answer/T Question/Hintikka: we get a new class of atomic sentences!
Solution: distinction between identification through acquaintance/description.
I 148
World Lines/Identification/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Thesis the world lines have to be drawn before the conditions are ever applied. Drawing the world lines is never part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise circular). Truth Conditions/Atomic/Atomic Sentence/Hintikka: for my theory, the interplay of specific atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows how e.g. the truth value of sentences of the form
"knows + -one-question-word" sentences depends on the truth value of sentences of the form (18) - (19).
HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is similar to one that would criticize traditional truth value tables, because some of the sentences that are used to put them together are also blurred.
Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was.

I 160
Def Knowledge/Hintikka: what is true in all knowledge possible worlds (knowledge worlds) of a subject. And, conversely, what is true in all knowledge possible worlds of a person is their knowledge. Important argument: the world lines can be drawn differently, however, while the evaluations (the non-logical constants) remain the same.
The variation of the world lines can then be "seen" in the variation of the semantic power of the phrase n of the form know + indirect question.
I 161
Quine has used such variation to the reject the possible world semantics of sentences with "knowing-that". HintikkaVsQuine: for him it was actually about the structural (not the referential) system. And this remained untouched.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Identity Theory Jackson Vs Identity Theory
 
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Frank C. Jackson
Lanz I 285
Frank JacksonVsIdentity Theory: E.g. Suppose a perfectly informed neurophysiologist only has access to the world via black and white screens. He knows everything there is to know in the terms of science about the visual system of the people. Suppose he now gets a color screen. Is it not obvious that he learns something new now, namely what colored objects look like? VsMaterialism: Omits this. MaterialismVs: (VsNagel, VsJackson, VsKripke): it is not about different types of information (subjective versus objective), but about different distinguishing abilities! One recognizes a feature due to propositional knowledge about it, another recognizes a feature due to sensory states. So it is not about different types of objects in the world, but about different types of representation of objects in the world. (>Representation).

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Kant, I. Brandom Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 852
Kant: dualistic character of his distinction of the conceptual and non-conceptual (BrandomVs).
I 853
Kant: 1) Judgments are the basic form of consciousness. 2) Recognition and action are determined by normative assessments in conscious beings as opposed to non-conscious beings. 3) Dualism spontaneity and receptivity.
I 855
Brandom: For Kant, concepts relate to views 1) like shape to matter - 2) like the general to the specific - 3) like the work of spontaneity or intellectual activity to that of receptivity
Brandom: these are real differences, but they are independent and orthogonal to one another. None of the above differences is understood between the conceptual and something non-conceptual in the judgment. That which a judgment expresses, its content, is conceptual through and through.
So Kant threw together the second and the third point, by systematically not distinguishing between representations of the individual and individual representations. (see BrandomVsKripke)
II 13
Kant and Descartes: Mind primary, language secondary - BrandomVsKant and Descartes.
II 123
Law/action/BrandomVsKant: Proposal to replace "image of a law" with "recognition of a determination".

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Kripke, S. A. Anscombe Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Frank I 84
I/Descartes: not a kind of body. I could assume that I don’t have a body. I/Augustine: "the mind knows of itself, that it is thinking." "It knows its own substance."
Kripke/Anscombe: K. tried to rehabilitate Descartes’ argument for his dualism.
AnscombeVsKripke: he neglects his first person character by making it an argument for the non-identity of Descartes with his own body.
I 85
According to this, Descartes would have had to doubt the existence of Descartes as a human being, and in any case the existence of this figure in the world of his time, of this Frenchman, christened René... Descartes/AnscombeVsKripke: "I am not Descartes" was for him like "I’m not a body!" Forcing the argument into the third person perspective by replacing "I" with "Descartes" means to neglect this.
Descartes never thought, "Descartes is not Descartes" (which according to Anscombe is ascribed to him by Kripke).
I 85/86
AnscombeVsKripke: this discussion is not about the usual reflexive pronoun, but about a strange reflexive which must be explained from the standpoint of the "I". Grammarians call it the "indirect reflexive". (In Greek it is a separate form.) E.g. "When John Smith spoke of James Robinson, he spoke of his brother, but he did not know that."
So it is conceivable that someone does not know that the object of which he speaks is himself.
Now, if "I" is compatible with ignorance, the reflexive pronoun cannot be used as usual.
Now one may ask: was the person of which Smith intended to speak not Smith? Was the person not himself?.
Answer: not in the relevant sense! Unless the reflexive pronoun is itself a sufficient proof of reference. And the usual reflexive pronoun cannot do that.
I 96
I/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here, the "manner of givenness" is unimportant.
Fra I 97
The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as the subject, then they are true iff the predicates of x are true.
AnscombeVsLogic/AnscombeVsKripke: for this reason he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes".
But this is too superficial: If one is a speaker who says "I", then it is impossible to find out what it is that says "I". E.g. one does not look to see from which apparatus the noise comes.
Thus, we have to compel our logician to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I".
Fra I 98
Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no longer any difference between "I" and "A".

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Kripke, S. A. Antirealism Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Field I 249
Anti Realismus/A R/Metalogik/Field: kann der A R überhaupt etwas mit metalogischen Begriffen wie Konservativität und Konsistenz anfangen? Er möchte ja diese auch von einer mathematischen Theorie behaupten. Problem: Konsistenz ist normalerweise definiert als "ein Modell haben", Konservativität auch in modelltheoretischen Begriffen ((s) setzt ein Ontologie von Mengen voraus, die der A R ablehnt).
Pointe: wenn der A R diese Begriffe gebraucht, dann kann er nicht nicht leer zwischen Konsistenz und Inkonsistenz bzw. Konservativität und Nicht Konservativität unterscheiden, (s) weil alle Aussagen trivial falsch sind wegen trägerloser Begriffe).
Konservativität/Konsistenz/A R/Field: also darf der A R die beiden Begriffe nicht modelltheoretisch definieren. genauso wie:
Wahrheit/Anti RealismusVsTarski/Anti RealismusVsKripke: der A R sollte auch die Wahrheits Definition (W Def) der beiden ablehnen.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Kripke, S. A. Brandom Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 805/806
The legitimacy of a chain of name tokenings depends on how the reference is passed on, just like in an anaphoric chain. Caution: According to Kripke, different beliefs of the users of proper names do not change the reference of those Tokenings as long as the user "specifies that it is used in the name of references common in the community." (> Kripke).
I 965
BrandomVsKripke: That sounds as if one would need to have the concept of reference in order to use an expression in an anaphorically tranferring way. Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! The "Cicero" E.g. shows that not all need to belong to the same chain, but that there is also no need for quasi-names which would play a role that corresponds to quasi-indexical expressions in de-dicto attributions of strong de-re attributions.
Any belief, be it strong or be it weak, can be attributed de-re or de-dicto.
I 807
The fact that the anaphoric analysis does not come into play at Kripke is due to his "Millian" theory of the semantics of proper names. BrandomVsKripke: his front position between Millian and Fregean principle makes it unclear whether (Millian): direct attribution, direct reference, i.e. that it is not permitted to refer back to anything other than the reference.
It also does not seem reasonable to treat other cases like this. "This" and other demonstratives are not really "directly referential" but require implicit sortals.
I 855
BrandomVsKripke: difference descriptive/causally historical is alright, but it gets dark when he is alleged to have shown that these are two ways of looking at the relation of language and consciousness to the world. Because that is not applicable to predicates. Never was a descriptive theory of meaning drawn up by predicates. At least the basal predicates get their reference through connection with the properties. (see BrandomVsKant).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Kripke, S. A. Burge Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Tyler Burge
Cresswell II 150
Name/Range/Cresswell: usually, names have a longer range than modal operators. Cresswell: this is the "modal objection" (VsKripke). That is not always the way it has to be if counterfactual contexts are considerd as modal.
Ziff: E.g. "If Harmon had been Gaskin, then ..." (Ziff 1977, 326).
KripkeVsVs: (1972, 279).
Description theory/Bach/Cresswell: (Bach 1981, 371) calls it "nominal description theory".
Names/BurgeVsKripke: (1979, 412) he does not go into names in belief contexts.
McGinnVsKripke: is right in terms of the modal state, but
II 151
wrong in relation to the epistemic status of names.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Kripke, S. A. Davidson Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Esfeld I 67
DavidsonVsKripke’s Wittgenstein: (1990) pro Kripke: 1991. pro another interpretation of what a private language is.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Kripke, S. A. Dummett Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Wolf II 361
Rigid Designators/DummettVsKripke: (Frege): in modal contexts: Descriptions: to be construed as precluding the modal operator (MO), proper names: include MO E.g. Kripke: St. Anne did not have to be mother of Mary but still St. Anne, DummettVsKripke: "St. Anne" is not a predicate, not a candidate for being an accidental property of someone
BurckhardtVsDummett: false justification: "St.Anne" simply as a rigid designator - by Dummett: in essential properties it is different.

Stalnaker I 173
DummettVsKripke: (1973, 232) there can be no proper name, whose whole purpose is to have an object as a reference, without sense that defines the object somehow. Stalnaker: what kind of argument could indicate that we are not only speaking no such language, but that we are not even able to do it?

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Kripke, S. A. Evans Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Gareth Evans
I 310
Name/Description Theory/EvansVsKripke: there are two description theories that he does not distinguish: 1) meaning theory of the speaker relation: Upon a specific occasion of its use by the speaker S, the name N refers to x iff x is the one thing that satisfies all or most of the descriptions φ. (Bundle Theory).
2) The meaning theory of what a name refers to: what can be taken from a set of opinions from a group of speakers who believe and intend that they use a name to describe the same thing.
This does not imply that every speaker has to be in possession of the description.
EvansVsKripke: The fact that he does not distinguish the two of them, becomes evident from the fact that he sometimes refers to speaker descriptions and sometimes to the unsettling cocnept of "idiolect".
I 311
Name/EvansVsDescription Theory: the strong thesis that the conditions of the description theorist are sufficient is outrageous!
I 312
The strict truth conditions are completely unacceptable. Weaker thesis: a certain descriptive identification is necessary: ​​it is important to understand this:
EvansVsKripke: his E.g. do not show that it is false. (Although I also think so).
1) in order to say something, you have to target someone or something.
2) in order to have an intention, you have to be in possession of a description.
I 317
Criteria/EvansVsKripke: the criteria for "About whom does he believe something?" differ dramatically from those for "Who is the original name giver?".
I 323
Causal Theory/EvansVsKripke: like K.: the absurdity lies in the lack of any causal connection. But he locates the causal relationship wrongly: Evans’ thesis is about the causal relation between the states and behaviors of the thing and the amount of information the speaker, and not between being baptized and the current use. (Poor philosophy of mind).
E.g. A textbook states that Arthur had a son, Anir, "whom the legend perhaps confused with his burial site".
VsKripke: if he now said that the part of the group who say that Anir is a burial site, could designate a person there is little for this term.
I 324
Evans’ thesis "intended reference" is typically a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for x necessarily being the source of the causal origin of the amount of information which S associated with the name x.
Wolf II 30
Name/EvansVsKripke: both VsDescription Theory and VsCausal Theory. Per Description Theory: Reference is generally determined by the amount of information that can be extracted from the users.
Evans: Name stands for the object which has caused most information causally. But not causal chain! But causal relationship between states and activities of the object and the amount of information the speakers.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Kripke, S. A. Frege Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Stalnaker II 14
Diagonalized Proposition/Stalnaker: is not actually a special type of proposition, but only a way of how a proposition is determined or represented. FregeVsKripke/Stalnaker: in Frege, a sense is interposed which determines the reference as a function of certain empirical facts about the use of names.
Contingent A Priori/Necessary A Posteriori/Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: in such cases the modal status of the horizontal and diagonal proposition diverges.
Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: does not disclose anything about the nature of such cases, it only shows an abstract property of such propositional concepts.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Kripke, S. A. Hacking Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 156
baptism / Name / HackingVsKripke: real communities can ignore baptism rituals whenever they like.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Kripke, S. A. Leibniz Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 121
Possible World/poss.w./LeibnizVsKripke: Other possible worlds can therefore not be worlds of other possibilities (because then this (our) world (actual world; act.wrld.) would not be a world, but only a subset.)
I 122
Objects of the world cannot be increased by several worlds, because there is no number which is in this one world, or more precisely, which even is in each of its parts. To introduce a different category of existing objects would be to misuse the term of existence.



Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Kripke, S. A. Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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V 251/252
Ereignis/Kennzeichnung/Beschreiben/Benennen/Lewis: wird meist durch akzidentelle Eigenschaften spezifiziert. Auch wenn es sogar klar ist, was es bedeutete ,es durch sein Wesen zu spezifizieren. Ein Ereignis trifft z.B. auf eine Kennzeichnung zu, hätte sich aber auch ereignen können, ohne auf die Beschreibung zuzutreffen.
Def Ereignis/Lewis: ist eine Klasse, die aus einer Region dieser Welt zusammen mit verschiedenen Regionen von anderen möglichen Welten (MöWe) besteht, in denen sich das Ereignis hätte ereignen können. (Weil Ereignisse immer kontingent sind).
Was der Beschreibung in einer Region entspricht, entspricht ihr nicht in einer anderen Region (einer anderen MöWe).
Man kann nie ein vollständiges Inventar der möglichen Beschreibungen (Kennzeichnungen) eines Ereignisses erreichen.
1. künstliche Beschreibung: Bsp "das Ereignis, das im Urknall besteht wenn Essendon das Endspiel gewinnt, aber die Geburt von Calvin Coolidge, wenn nicht". "p > q, sonst r".
2. teils durch Ursache oder Wirkungen
3. durch Referenz auf den Ort in einem System von Konventionen Bsp Unterschreiben des Schecks
4. Vermischung von wesentlichen und akzidentellen Elementen: Singen, während Rom brennt. Bsp Tripel Eigenschaft, Zeit, Individuum, (s.o.).
5. Spezifikation durch einen Zeitpunkt, obwohl das Ereignis auch früher oder später hätte vorkommen können
6. obwohl Individuen wesentlich involviert sein können, können akzidentell zugehörige Individuen herausgehoben werden.
7. es kann sein, dass ein reiches Wesen eines Ereignisses darin besteht, zu schlendern, aber ein weniger fragiles (beschreibungsabhängiges) Ereignis könnte lediglich akzidentell ein Schlendern sein. (s) Und es kann unklar bleiben, ob das Ereignis nun wesentlich durch Schlendern charakterisiert ist.
8. ein Ereignis, das ein Individuum wesentlich involviert, mag gleichzeitig akzidentell ein anderes Involvieren: Bsp ein bestimmter Soldat, der zufällig zu einer bestimmten Armee gehört, Das entsprechende Ereignis kann nicht in Regionen vorkommen, wo es kein Gegenstück zu diesem Soldat gibt, wohl aber, wenn es ein GS von dem Soldaten gibt, dieses aber zu einer anderen Armee gehört.
V 253
Dann wird die Armee akzidentell involviert, über die Weise ihres Soldaten. 9. Wärme: nichtstarrer Designator (nonrigid): (LewisVsKripke):
nicht starr: was immer diese Rolle hat: was immer die und die Manifestation hervorbringt.
Bsp Wärme hätte auch etwas anderes als Molekülbewegung sein können.
Lewis: in einer MöWe, wo Wärmefluss die entsprechenden Manifestationen hervorbringt, sind heiße Dinge solche, die eine Menge Wärmefluss haben.

Schwarz I 55
Wesen/Kontextabhängigkeit/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in bestimmen Kontexten können wir durchaus fragen, Bsp wie es wäre, wenn wir andere Eltern gehabt hätten oder einer anderen Art angehörten. Bsp Statue/Ton: Angenommen, Statue und Ton existieren beide genau gleich lang. Sollen wir dann sagen, dass sie es trotz ihrer materiellen Natur schaffen, stets zu selben Zeit am selben Ort zu sein? Sollen wir sagen, dass beide gleich vie wiegen, aber zusammen nicht doppelt?
Problem: wenn man sagt, dass die beiden identisch sind, bekommt man Ärger mit den modalen Eigenschaften: Bsp das Stück Lehm hätte auch ganz anders geformt sein können, die Statue aber nicht – umgekehrt:
I 56
Bsp die Staute hätte aus Gold bestehen können, aber der Ton hätte nicht aus Gold bestehen können. Gegenstück Theorie/GT/Identität: Lösung: die relevante Ähnlichkeitsrelation hängt davon ab, wie wir auf das Ding Bezug nehmen, als Statue oder als Lehm.
Gegenstück Relation: Kann (anders als Identität) nicht nur vage und variabel, sondern auch asymmetrisch und intransitiv sein. (1968,28f): Das ist die Lösung für
Def Chisholms Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967): Bsp Angenommen, Kripke könnte unmöglich ein Rührei sein. Aber sicher könnte er ein wenig rühreiartiger sein, wenn er ein wenige kleiner und gelber wäre! Und wäre er ein bisschen mehr so, dann könnte er auch noch mehr so sein. Und es wäre seltsam, wenn er in jener MöWe nicht wenigstens ein kleines bisschen kleiner und gelber sein könnte.
GT/Lösung: weil die GR intransitiv ist, folgt aber keineswegs, dass am Ende Kripke ein Rührei ist. Ein GS eines GS von Kripke muss nicht ein GS von Kripke sein. (1986e,246)
I 57
KripkeVs Gegenstück-Theorie/KripkeVsLewis: Bsp wenn wir sagen „Humphrey hätte die Wahl gewinnen können“ reden wir nach Lewis eben nicht von Humphrey, sondern von jemand anderem. Und nichts könnte ihm gleichgültiger sein („he couldn’t care less“). (Kripke 1980,44f). Gegenstück/GT/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: die beiden Einwände missverstehen Lewis: Lewis behauptet nicht, dass Humphrey die Wahl nicht hätte gewinnen können, im Gegenteil: „er hätte die Wahl gewinnen können“ steht genau für die Eigenschaft, die jemand hat, wenn eins seiner Gegenstücke die Wahl gewinnt. Diese Eigenschaft hat Humphrey, kraft seines Charakters. (1983d,42).
Eigentliches Problem: wie macht Humphrey das, dass er in der und der MöWe die Wahl gewinnt?
Plantinga: Humphrey hätte gewonnen, wenn der entsprechenden MöWe (dem Sachverhalt) die Eigenschaft des Bestehens zukäme.
Lewis/Schwarz: diese Frage hat mit den Intuitionen auf die sich Kripke und Plantinga berufen, nichts zu tun.

Schwarz I 223
Namen/Kennzeichnung/Referenz/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975): These: für Namen und Artausdrücke gibt es keine allgemeinbekannte Beschreibung (Kennzeichnung), die festlegt, worauf der Ausdruck sich bezieht. These: Kennzeichnungen sind für die Referenz völlig irrelevant. Beschreibungstheorie/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: das wiederlegt nur die naive Kennzeichnungstheorie, nach der biographische Taten aufgelistet werden, die dem Referenten notwendig zukommen sollen.
Lösung/Lewis: seine Beschreibungstheorie der Namen erlaubt, dass Bsp „Gödel“ nur eine zentrale Komponente hat: nämlich dass Gödel am Anfang der Kausalkette steht. Damit steht die Theorie nicht mehr im Widerspruch zur Kausaltheorie der Referenz. (1984b,59,1994b,313,1997c,353f,Fn22).
((s)Vs: aber nicht die Kennzeichnung „steht am Anfang der Kausalkette“, denn das unterscheidet einen Namen nicht von irgendeinem anderen. Andererseits: „am Anfang der Gödel Kausalkette“ wäre nichtssagend.)
Referenz/LewisVsmagische Theorie der Referenz: wonach Referenz eine primitive, irreduzible Beziehung ist, (vgl. Kripke 1980,88 Fn 38), so dass wir, selbst wenn wir alle nicht semantischen Tatsachen über uns und die Welt wüssten, immer noch nicht wüssten, worauf unsere Wörter sich beziehen, nach der wir dazu spezielle Referenz o Meter bräuchten, die fundamentale semantische Tatsachen ans Licht bringen.
Wenn die magische Theorie der Referenz falsch ist, dann genügt nicht semantische Information im Prinzip, um uns zu sagen, worauf wir uns mit Bsp „Gödel“ beziehen: „wenn die Dinge so und so sind, bezieht sich „Gödel“ auf den und den“. Daraus können wir dann eine Kennzeichnung konstruieren, von der wir a priori wissen, dass sie Gödel herausgreift.
Diese Kennzeichnung wird oft indexikalische oder demonstrative Elemente enthalten, Verweise auf die wirkliche Welt.
I 224
Referenz/Theorie/Namen/Kennzeichnung/Beschreibungstheorie/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: Bsp unsere Bananen Theorie sagt nicht, dass Bananen zu allen Zeiten und in allen MöWe im Supermarkt verkauft werden. Bsp unsere Gödel Theorie sagt nicht, dass Gödel in alle MöWe Gödel heißt. ((s) >Deskriptivismus). (KripkeVsLewis: doch: Namen sind starre Designatoren). LewisVsKripke: bei der Auswertung von Namen im Bereich von Temporal und Modaloperatoren muss man berücksichtigen, was in der Äußerungssituation die Kennzeichnung erfüllt, nicht in der MöWe oder in der Zeit, von der gerade die Rede ist. (1970c,87,1984b,59,1997c,356f)
I 225
A posteriori Notwendigkeit/Kripke/Schwarz: könnte es nicht sein, dass Wahrheiten über Schmerzen zwar auf physikalisch biologischen Tatsachen supervenieren und damit notwendig aus diesen folgen, dass uns diese Beziehung aber nicht a priori oder durch Begriffsanalyse zugänglich ist? Die Reduktion von Wasser auf H2O ist schließlich nicht philosophisch, sondern wissenschaftlich. Schwarz: wenn das stimmt, macht sich Lewis die Arbeit unnötig schwer. Als Physikalist müsste er nur behaupten, dass phänomenale Begriffe in nicht phänomenalem Vokabular analysierbar sind. Man könnte auch die Analyse von Naturgesetzen und Kausalität sparen. Er könnte einfach behaupten, diese Phänomene folgten notwendig a posteriori aus der Verteilung lokaler physikalischer Eigenschaften.
a posteriori notwendig/LewisVsKripke: das ist inkohärent: dass ein Satz a posteriori ist, heißt, dass man Information über die aktuelle Situation braucht, um herauszufinden, ob er wahr ist. Bsp dass Blair der tatsächliche Premierminister ist (tatsächlich eine a posteriori Notwendigkeit) muss man wissen, dass er in der aktuellen Situation Premierminister ist,
Schw I 226
was wiederum eine kontingente Tatsache ist. Wenn wir genügend Information über die ganze Welt haben, könnten wir im Prinzip a priori entnehmen, dass Blair der tatsächliche Premierminister ist. A posteriori Notwendigkeiten folgen a priori aus kontingenten Wahrheiten über die aktuelle Situation. (1994b,296f,2002b, Jackson 1998a: 56 86), s.o. 8.2)

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Kripke, S. A. McDowell Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 119
Meaning / McDowell: we must not construct it in a "social-pragmatic" or "communitarian" way. (Wittgenstein has not). Otherwise it is not autonomous. Here, unbridled Platonism would be a penchant for the occult. Wittgenstein has not alleged that meaning would be nothing but as approval or rejection by the community! (> Kripke).
I 120
Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: concludes that there is nothing that constituted susceptibility to the claim the meaning poses; instead we need to understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community. Quietism/Wittgenstein /McDowellVsKripke: doesn't notice Wittgenstein's quietism: attitude to accept problems as unsolvable. Rejection of a constructive or doctrinaire ambition.

Wright I 264
McDowell's Wittgenstein: intends to open up an escape route out of the debate. Consequences of rules/Kripke: Wittgenstein: "Skeptical Paradox": negates any possibility that rules and meanings comprised real limitations.
Wright: In the end remains only the attempt to stay above the water with Charybdis.
McDowellVsKripke: error to understand the destruction of Scylla (Platonism, divine standpoint) as the logical core of the dispute over rules. In reality, the destruction is just a logical set.
McDowell: Wittgenstein's concern was to show that both horns are based on an inflated conception of fact and objectivity.
Kripke's Wittgenstein/Wright: McDowell does not do Kripke justice in every way.
I 265
It is not clear whether the skeptical argument can be limited to the destruction of Scylla (divine standpoint, overstatement of rules). "Skeptical Paradox": Step 1: debate on any ostensive assertion. Ex that in the past with "+" I formally meant addition. Then I have the defend that against a skeptic. One should conclude that even if I lose this dispute, no conclusion about the reality of meanings, rules etc. would be so foreseeable. So the epistemology of assertions about meaning under the pressure of skepticism would not be more intelligible than the epistemology of the past or the material world or other minds (Fremdpsychisches) still are.
But that would be a mistake!
Tradition: insists on the fundamental inaccessibility of other minds (Fremdpsychisches). Hence the examination of Kripke's skeptic must take place under the conditions of cognitive idealization.
Ex in the attempt to justify that with "+" I meant addition in the past, I am conceded the perfect playback of all aspects of my mental life. All the relevant facts would indeed be visible in my behavior and mental life, and therefore be tangible for me.
If I still lose, that only shows that there are no such facts.
It is then concluded that there are no facts with respect to what I mean in the present! And what anybody thinks in the present! And therefore no facts with respect to what any one expression means! (> Significance).
I 266
Wright: In the argument no over-objectification of the essence of the rules occurs as a premise! The only assumption: that facts about my previous meanings must have occurred in my behavior.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Kripke, S. A. Putnam Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 35
Names/Kripke/Putnam: central point: you can use a proper name to refer to a thing or a person, without having true beliefs regarding X.
---
I 36
The use of the name includes the existence of a causal chain. PutnamVsKripke: right: knowledge of a speaker does not have to set the reference in his idiolect.
The use of names is common.
Now you might say that terms of physical quantities are also proper names, not of things but of quantities.
----
I 189
Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical", is missing to the statue.
VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two items?
E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules.
Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Suppose there are "intrinsic connections" of my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with set-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes certain external objects.
Then this spacetime region will have a similar set-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects.
Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity.
Problem: but if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be in the world essences in a sense that cannot be explained by the set theory .
Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him.
Modal properties are not part of the materialistic establishment of the world..
But Kripke individuates objects by their modal characteristics.
Essential properties/Possible Worlds/Putnam: I, myself,(1975) spoke of "essential properties" but not in parallel worlds, but in other possible states of our world.
Example: We can imagine another "possible world" (not parallel), in which a liquid other than water has the taste of water, but none, in which H2O is not water.
This is insofar a kind of essentialism, as we have thus discovered the nature of water.
We just say water should not be anything else.
---
I 192
And that was already our intention, when we did not know the composition of H2O. Nature/essence/Putnam: is in this sense, however, the product of our use of the word. It is not "built into the world".
Nature/Kripke/Putnam: so it is also justified by Kripke.
Putnam: both our conception of "nature" does not help the materialists.
This purely semantic interpretation presupposes the reference. It cannot support the reference as an "intrinsic correlation" between thought and thing".
---
I 246
Truth/legitimate assertibility/Kripke Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement. PutnamVsKripke: then this would be a wrong description of the terms that we actually have. And a self-confuting attempt to take an "absolute perspective".
---
Rorty VI 129/130
Causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke/Rorty, self-criticism, PutnamVsPutnam: the description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that are neither in a greater nor lesser extent in a"intrinsic" or in an "extrinsic" relationship with it. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vs distinction "intrinsic"/"relational".

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kripke, S. A. Quine Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Putnam I 247
Def "Small Realism"/Putnam: ( "realism with a lower case r"): here, to say what we say and do what we do means being a "realist". But that brings problems with realism and "reality":
Reality/Realism/Wittgenstein: (trees and chairs), "the this and that to which we can point" are paradigms for what we call real. (1971, Lecture 25).
Realism/Reality/Objects/Space-Time Points/Putnam: here Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the space-time region it occupies?
Quine: the chair and the electromagnetic and other fields that constitute it are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region.
KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, but have the same mass (e.g. statue/clay). The chair could have occupied a different space-time region!
QuineVsKripke: this proof is worthless, because modal predicates are hopelessly vague.
Lewis: Quine is right as far as the chair is concerned, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates.
LewisVsKripke: not the chair but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. (Not "exactly this chair" within the meaning of the logical concept of identity (=).).
Putnam: so there are three questions:
1) is the chair identical with the matter or does the chair somehow coexist with the matter in the space-time region?
2) Is the matter identical to the fields?
3) Are the fields identical with the space-time regions?
Putnam: these questions are probably all three nonsense, but at least the first one is!

Quine II 209 ff
Replica on Saul Kripke The concept of possible worlds contributed to the semantics of modal logic. Kripke: meaningful model theory of modal logic.
Def Models/Quine: allow for proof consistency. They also have heuristic value, but they do not offer an explanation. >Model.
II 210
They can as clear as they want, nevertheless they can leave us completely in the dark regarding the primary, intended interpretation. QuineVsKripke: following questions regarding possible worlds: 1) When can objects between different worlds be equated 2) When is a designation expression rigid, 3) where is metaphysical necessity to testify?
The way in which Kripke refers to Bishop Butler is startling:
"As Bishop Butler said," Everything is what it is and not another thing." I.e. " heat is molecular motion" will not be contingent, but necessary." (Kripke p. 160)
QuineVsKripke: I can also interpret the bishop according to my own purposes: Everything is what it is, do not ask what it may be or must be.
Possible World/QuineVsKripke: allow proofs of consistency, but no unambiguous interpretation when objects are equal? Bishop Butler ("no other thing"): identity does not necessarily follow.
Kripke on the identity of mind and body: The identity theorist who thinks pain is a brain state ... has to claim that we are mistaken if we think it is conceivable that pain could have existed without brain states.
... The materialist therefore faces a very tricky objection: he has to prove that something whose possibility we deem to imagine is not possible in reality.
QuineVsKripke: the materialist will only feel the intricacy of Kripke's objection as far as he believes in metaphysical necessity. I can gratefully read Kripke in a way that he supports me in my desire to show what an intricate network the representative of the modality concept is spinning.
II 210f
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imagine: Pain without a brain state - for materialists difficult to exclude. QuineVsKripke: only difficult if materialist believes in metaphysical necessity.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Kripke, S. A. Rorty Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 318
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if we confuse the concept of "really talk about" with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arises. The only question of fact that exists here, concerns the existence or non-existence of certain entities, which are being talked about.
I 320
Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies was made. Reference is a technical term and therefore we have no intuitions about it at all! Real existential issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all!
It is not only possible to talk about non-existent entities, but also to find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kripke, S. A. Searle Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Wolf II 30
Names/Understanding/Searle: to understanding belongs the knowledge of one or more descriptions. Extreme case: simply identify the object. Intentional relationship. SearleVsKripke: ignores the intentionality.
Searle: Use of names is "mental reference" in a network of other intentional states and against a background of practice and pre-intentional assumptions.

Searle II 292
SearleVsKripke: the representation of the baptism is completely descriptive. It gives us either an intentional content in spoken form (description) or provides us ostensively with the intentional content of a perception.
II 293
By the way Kripke's theory does not use any causal link between the referring use of names and the named objects. The causal chains are not pure, every speaker must also have a intentionalistic member and intend to talk about the object. SearleVsKripke: Baptism should probably not be a cause, otherwise we would declare a successful reference to a chain of successful references. That would be circular.
II 294
Names/Donnellan:(similar to Kripke) postulates a "historically correct explanation", and secondly, "who that is, from whom" the speaker wants to predicate something. This requires an omniscient observer. E.g. "Socrates had a snub nose".
According to Donnellan owes this obviously no fact at all, which is about us, except for the causal chain. But for what keeps the omniscient observer looking for?
Searle: surely for intentional causation and content. There are always counterexamples of names that do not work this way at all.
II 295
Names/Rorty: Causal theory only needs "ordinary physical causation". Names/Gareth Evans: E.g. Madagascar originally referred to a part of continental Africa. The causal chain is thus a dissenting. Why does the name then today refer to the island?
II 296
Names/description/SearleVsKripke: E.g. Concise Biographical Dictionary ". Ramses VIII is a Pharaoh of a series of pharaohs in ancient times, about whom nothing is known." In reality, the example shows that a lot of him is known. Yes, he is almost from an ideal case for the most naive version of the description theory.
II 346
A perfect identifying description. It is parasitic to other speakers, but it is sufficient. SearleVsCausal theory/VsKripke: it exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception.
Perception: is nailed to each point of the world. By causal self-referentiality of the intentional content.
II 297
But with names that kind of causation does not exist (also of intentional causation). The conditions for successful use of a name can be met, even without causal connection.
II 298
E.g. tribe with the taboo of talking about the dead, and baptism of newborn babies, in which all must participate. Meets descriptive theory.
II 346
The teaching of names defines an intentional content, but no definition.
II 300
E.g. meteorologists can predict storms. They also assign names. But the future events cannot cause the name uses.
Searle IV 179
KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction speaker reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation can go to something other than that of which he speaks.
IV 179/180
Searle: However, that is not quite correct: E.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfils the description. Kripke: in a given idiolect the semantic relation is determined (without indexical shares) through a general intention of the speaker.
The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention.
SearleVsKripke: this is precisely where the approach is stuck: in the sense, as I have general and specific intentions, I have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them.
E.g.(without index): "The man who eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building on 17/06/53 at 10 am." According to Kripke in my idiolect this is determined by my general intention.
IV 181
Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would be if it would be correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: More than that, no general intentions are necessary.
There are an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intent.

Stalnaker I 173
SearleVsKripke: (1969, 93) it is wrong to assume that there could be a class of logically proper names, that means names that consist solely to have a certain reference for an object. It is fundamentally wrong to assume that there are signs that have only denotation without connotation
I 174
SearleVsKripke/Stalnaker: (1969,80) (like Frege): describes an axiom of identification: "a generalization of Frege's dictum that every referring expression must have a sense".
I 175
And it was also an attempt to say what the skills of the speaker are. Mill/Kripke/Stalnaker: do not seem to answer that.
Competence/skills/FregeVsMill/Stalnaker: Mill does not explain the speaker's skill to pick his object.
Stalnaker: but that can only be reviewed seriously, if the two issues are separated (see above).

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Kripke, S. A. Strawson Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon
Nagel I 72
I 72
Kripke's Wittgenstein/StrawsonVsKripke/Nagel: this distorts the image of what Wittgenstein has asserted: it is simply not in accordance with our most evident experience. We understand the meaning of what we say and hear well enough, to at least be occasionally able to detect inconsistencies and conclusions, in what was said, which (the inconsistencies and conclusions) are attributable solely to the sense or the meaning of what is said.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Kripke, S. A. Wright Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Esfeld I 122
Inferentialismus/Ich Du Beziehungen/Brandom/Esfeld: Problem: auch eine Gemeinschaft könnte willkürlich sein. Die Tatsache der Zustimmung könnten mit dem Recht der Zustimmung verwechselt werden. Das wird manchmal VsKripke erhoben.
WrightVsKripke: früher: die Gemeinschaft ist selbst keine Autorität. (Heute nicht mehr vertreten).
McDowellVsWright: was immer uns richtig erscheint, ist richtig!. Das bedeutet aber nur, daß wir hier nicht über "richtig" sprechen können!
Lösung/Esfeld: Ich Du Beziehungen: sind symmetrisch:
I 123
das läßt Raum für die Möglichkeit, daß die Gemeinschaft als ganze irren kann. sozialer Holismus/Pettit: der Mensch ist in Bezug auf Denken und Regelfolgen davon abhängig, daß es andere Menschen gibt. (Und zwar geht es dann immer um Beziehungen einzelner Menschen zueinander).
VsKollektivismus: der annimmt, daß die Gemeinschaft als ganze einen Einfluß auf ihre Mitglieder ausübt. (>Methode).
I 124
Pettit: s.Holismus ist eine kontingente These über die tatsächlichen Praktiken von uns Menschen. Esfeld: unsere Rekonstruktion soll hingegen auf alle MöWe zutreffen.
privates Regelfolgen/Pettit: ist von ihm offengelassen worden! Man kann auch in Isolation weiterhin Mitglied einer Gemeinschaft sein.
sozialer Holismus/Esfeld: impliziert nicht, daß eine Person, die in Isolation gerät, keine Überzeugungen mehr hat!
I 125
Dennoch ist der Begriff des "richtigen" Folgens dann nicht mehr anwendbar. Pointe: wenn die Gepflogenheiten der Gemeinschaft erst einmal internalisiert sind, könne man argumentieren, daß wirkliche Rückmeldung nicht mehr unerläßlich ist!
D.h. es gibt eine metaphysische Möglichkeit, daß die Konstituenten eines S (holistischen Systems) nicht länger von anderen Individuen ontologisch abhängig sind!
Bsp radikaler Robinson, der das ganze Leben in Isolation verbringt:
Kripke: ist liberal in Bezug auf einen solchen Fall. Wir könnten ihn in unsere Gemeinschaft aufnehmen und unsere Kriterien auch auf ihn anwenden. (s) Aber auch umgekehrt?
I 126
EsfeldVsKripke: wir können hier nicht so liberal sein. Es ist auch fraglich, ob die Behauptbarkeitsbedingungen für Regelfolgen wirklich erfüllt sind. Man kann vertreten, daß aich Kripkes Position direkte oder indirekte Interaktion einschließt. Privates Regelfolgen/Esfeld: weder die Wahrheitsbedingungen noch die Behauptbarkeitsbedingungen sind erfüllt.

wright I 264
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Regelfolgen/Kripke: bei Wittgenstein: "Skeptisches Paradox": macht jede Möglichkeit zunichte, dass Regeln und Bedeutungen reale Einschränkungen umfassen. Wright: Am Ende bleibt der Versuch, sich mit der Charybdis über Wasser zu halten. (Def "regelskeptische Charybdis ": Auffassung, nach der es überhaupt keine objektiven Erfordernisse gibt, die durch Regeln erzeugt werden, sondern ausschließlich natürliche uneingeschränkte menschliche Fähigkeiten . Also keine "allgemeine wirkliche Objektivität".)
I 265
Quietismus/Kripkes Wittgenstein/Wright: ist auf jeden Fall dem Quietismus verpflichtet: denn der Irrealismus (dass es keine Tatsachen bezüglich irgendwelcher Regeln gibt) muss sich zu einem umfassenden Irrealismus aufblasen.
I 266
Dann gibt es nirgendwo einschlägige Tatsachen in der Sache. Wenn es keine gehaltvollen Tatsachen gibt über das, was Sätze sagen, dann gibt es auch keine Tatsachen darüber, ob sie wahr sind, oder nicht. Ein Irrealismus der Bedeutung muss also einen Irrealismus der Wahrheit nach sich ziehen.
WrightVsKripke: das ist allerdings angreifbar: Es ist jedoch kein Irrtum der Sublimierung (auf eine höhere Ebene heben) der Regeln. Wenn irgendetwas ungeschützt ist gegen das skeptische Paradox, dann ist es ein humanisierter Platonismus nicht weniger als die überobjektivierte Version.
McDowells Skylla gehört gar nicht zur Szene der Kripkeschen Dialektik. Sie könnte höchstens auftauchen wenn dem Gegner ein Standpunkt verweigert wird. Damit würden dann aber die Behauptungen in der ersten Person als inferentiell dargestellt , Aber es ist ja doch so, dass das Wissen um frühere Bedeutungen zum größten Teil nicht inferentiell ist und keinerlei klar erkennbare Epistemologie besitzt.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Kripke, S. A. Verschiedene Vs Kripke, S. A. Wolf II 232
Identity/Schmidentity/VsKripke: einige haben behauptet, dass Identität nicht die Relation sein kann, die zwischen jedem Ding und ihm selbst und nur da besteht, weil das nicht die nontriviality von Identitätsaussagen erklären könnte. Kripke: "Test": wenn eine hypothetische Sprache diese Relation enthält und dieselben Probleme erzeugt werden, ist das keine Widerlegung dessen, dass "identisch mit" im Englischen für dieselbe Relation steht.

Stalnaker I 175
VsCausal Theory/Namen/VsKripke/Stalnaker: wurde für ihre Vagheit kritisiert. Man müsste noch die Art der kausalen Verbindung spezifizieren, Kripke: Thesis: er habe keine reduktionistische Analyse der Referenz geliefert, sondern nur ein alternatives Bild.
I 176
Kripke/Stalnaker: artikuliert eigentlich nur die naive Antwort, ohne die Details. VsMillsche Semantik/: ich werde ein Argument für die Unmöglichkeit einer Semantik, die den Referenten ohne zwischengeschalteten Sinn herausgreift untersuchen, das die beiden Fragen trennt und untersuchen, wo es Schwächen hat.
VsMill/VsKripke/Stalnaker: ein Argument VsMill behauptet, dass nicht jede wohldefinierte Sprache die Sprache einer Gemeinschaft sein kann. Z.B. so:
Sprache/VsMill/VsKripke: wenn die Semantik korrekt ist, müssen die Sprecher wissen, was sie sagen. Es mag sein, dass sie in Einzelfällen Wörter gebrauchen, die sie selbst nicht verstehen, aber
1.
a) wenn man gar nicht weiß, was man sagt, kann man auch nicht meinen was man sagt und b) wenn man das was Leute in einer Gemeinschaft sagen korrekt darstellt, muss man sagen, dass die Leute im allgemeinen meinen was sie sagen.
I 177
2. es könnte sein, dass wir einen semantischen Wert feststellen können ohne zu wissen was der Wert ist, sogar, dass niemand weiß, was der Wert ist.





K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Kripke, S. A. Martin Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon
Arm II 189
MartinVsKripke: ich glaube - kann das aber hier nicht zeigen - dass mein Modell der reziproken Dispositions-Partner reich genug ist, um Modalität zu erklären und auch Regelfolgen. (KripkeVs). weiter Inhalt/Martin: "broad content": kann in der Gerichtetheit eines disp. Zustands S (mental oder nicht mental) gefunden werden, die sich auf ein Einzelding X richtet und nicht auf irgendein X artiges. Das X ist dann das einzige in der Nachbarschaft, das als reziproker Dispo-Partner fungieren kann.

Mart I
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Kripke, S. A. Place Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon
Arm II 160
Classification/Knowledge/PlaceVsKripke: Martin's example of the old fisherman who classified whales as fish, although he had all the knowledge, shows that it cannot be about a mythical baptism of natural species in the sense of Kripke.
Arm II 66
Place: causally spoken: to say that a situation contingently depends on another, is to say that the relation between them is causal or is not causal. Independence, causal: = Not contingency. PlaceVsKripke: he blends these two radically different forms of necessity so that the concept of contingency disappears. Necessary/Kripke: heat = molecular motion. (II 67 Skinner: intuitive judgments are "contingency shaped": E.g. If all tables were orange crates, then the two expressions would not be logically independent. (s) then it would be no question of intuition?) PlaceVsKripke: his equating of heat and molecular motion is wrong, because it does not differentiate between categorical and dispositional properties! a) categorical: the heat of body b) dispositional, modal: the possible heat transfer (heat transfer) to another body)

Place I
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Kripke, S. A. Bigelow Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon
I 143
necessary identity/BigelowVsContingent identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should let the semantics decide and say that there is simply no contingent identity. ((s) BigelowVsKripke?).
contingent identity/Bigelow/Pargetter: instead of changing the semantics in order to admit it after all, we should rather explain why it seems to exist: E.g.
Description theory/Russell/Bigelow/Pargetter: provides a means to reconcile contingent with necessary identities: assertions of the form
F = G
Can be analyzed as contingent by saying that the properties F and G are contingently co-instantiated by a single thing. This is still consistent with the necessary self-identity.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Kripke, S. A. Schiffer Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 175
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/SchifferVsKripke: Paradox/Schiffer: Solution: Usually, by showing that one of the propositions must be rejected.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: we represent so canonically:
(P1)
(1) Yesterday Clem meant addition instead of quaddition with "plus". (2) But there is nothing in Clem's past, which could find that he meant the one in place of the other, there is simply not a fact.
(3). But (1) and (2) are incompatible: if there was not a fact that it stipulated, then it is not that he meant addition instead of quaddition in the past.
(P2) The same for the present.
I 176
Schiffer: if (P1) and (P2) are paradox, then also (P3):
(1) Clem believes that there are lions in Africa
(2)But there is nothing in Clem's past, which specifies that he believes that. There is no fact of belief about Clem, specifying this.
(3) Because (1) and (2) are incompatible, it is not the case that he believes that there are lions in Africa.
((s) difference to Kripke's Wittgenstein: there it says in (3) that he believes either addition or Quaddition (wherein Quaddition can be any deviation). But in (P3) it is said that he cannot believe that there are lions in Africa, and even Clem itself would have to notice that.). So that it is not possible at all to have an attitude is something different than the inability to determine the exact content of the attitude).
Schiffer: Here too it can be said that there is neither a "reducible" nor a "irreducible" fact.
Pointe: Pointe: if there is a solution to (P3), it could also be used for Kripke's Wittgenstein. How would the solution look like?
"Direct solution"/Kripke's Wittgenstein would ultimately be a physicalist reduction. That many want. But that is impossible. We cannot reduce "to mean".
Fact/Schiffer: if we are talking about the fact, then from the non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact, that, however, does not exist for Kripke's Wittgenstein.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/solution/Schiffer: both (2) and (3) are ambiguous in terms of "fact", it can be read here pleonastic or non-pleonastic.
pleonastic: here (3) is true and (2) false: Clem meant addition and believes that there are lions in Africa, so it is a fact that he does. ((s) in the "superfluous", non-ontological sense of "fact".)
non-pleonastic: here (2) is true and (3) false: there is indeed no objective language-independent fact which stipulates that Clem thinks or believes this and that.
Nonfactualism/solution: there is no property that is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it.
I 177
Belief-predicate/propositional attitude: E.g. "means by "plus" the addition" E.g. "believes that there are lions in Africa". SchifferVsKripke/Kripke's Wittgenstein: the fact that there are no non-pleonastic facts regarding belief and meaning, does not conclude that you cannot mean anything.
Conclusion/Schiffer:
(a) Clem means addition and believes that there are lions in Africa.
(b) the propositions about Clem's meaning and belief are not reducible to propositions without semantic, Intentional or Mentalese vocabulary. (They are irreducible intentionalistic).
(c) there is no non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact or property in respect of meaning or belief, that is in relation to the predicate "means addition" or "believes that lions ..." as the name "Greta Garbo" to Greta Garbo.
Schiffer: which makes the way for the ontological physicalism.
VsSchiffer: it could be argued: E.g. Clem died yesterday after he has used "plus" for 50 years. Now we have a complete sound film his life along with complete records of its neurophysiological life and his stream of consciousness.
I 178
Then we can formulate two empirically adequate hypotheses which exclude each other: 1. Clem meant addition, 2. Clem meant Quaddition. That is a mystery, isn't it? SchifferVsVs: this is indeed a mystery. Here I have another one: there are two empirically adequate hypotheses about myself, one that my sensory experience originates from physical objects, 2. that they are caused by Descartes evil demon ((s)> brains in the tank). Nevertheless, I believe in physical objects.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Kripke, S. A. Hintikka Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
Books on Amazon
I XIII
Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: the term is misleading. (Began in the late 50s). Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: is not a viable model for the theory of logical rules (logical necessity and logical possibility). (Essay 1).
Problem: the correct logic cannot be axiomatized.
Solution: interpreting Kripke semantics as non-standard semantics,
XIV
in the sense of Henkin’s non-standard interpretation of higher-level logic, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsQuine: we do not have to give them up entirely, but there will probably never be a complete theory. My theory is related to Kant.
I call them "epistemology of logic".
I XVI
Cross World Identity/Hintikka: Quine: considers it a hopeless problem
HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it as guaranteed. He cheats.
World Line/Cross World Identity/Hintikka: 1) We need to allow that some objects in certain possible worlds do not only exist, but that their existence is unthinkable there! I.e. world lines can cease to exist - what is more: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds.
Problem: in the usual knowledge logic (logic of belief) this is not permitted.
2) world lines can be drawn in two ways:
a) object-centered
b) agent-centered. (Essay 8).
Analogy: this can be related to Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description. (Essay 11)
I 2
Kripke Semantics/Modal Logic/Logical Possibility/Logical Necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke Semantics: Problem: if we interpreted the operators N, P so that they express logical modalities, they are inadequate: for logical possibility and necessity we need more than an arbitrary selection of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But Kripke semantics does not require all such logically possible worlds to be included in the set of alternatives. ((s) I.e. there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (see below logical possibility forms the broadest category of options).
Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities.
Modal Logic/Hintikka: the historically earliest purpose for which it was developed was precisely dealing with logical modalities. This was the purpose for which the Lewis systems were developed.
HintikkaVsKripke: does not only have a skeleton in the closet, but said skeleton haunts the entire house.
Equivalence Relation/Hintikka: if R is required to be reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, it does not provide the solution: it still does not guarantee that all logically possible worlds are contained in the set. It can (possibly together with with connectedness) only guarantee that w0 has a maximum number of sets as its alternatives that are, so to speak, already in SF.
I 3
KripkeVsVs/Hintikka: It could be argued that this does not yet show that Kripke semantics is wrong. It just needs to be reinforced. E.g. Nino Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella: additional condition: all models (in the usual 1st order sense) with the same domain of individuals do (w0) must occur among the alternative possible worlds to w0. ((s) No new individuals may be added or removed with regard to the original possible world w0).
Hintikka: technically it is of course possible.
"Old": (= Kripke semantics): non-standard semantics.
new: F must include all models that have the same individuals domain do(w0) of well-defined individuals as w0.
Individual/Individuals/Modal/Hintikka: an individual must be well-defined, but it does not have to exist! ((s) I.e. it can be expressed then that it is missing, E.g. the hero has no sister in a possible world).
Domain of Individuals: for each possible world is then a subset of the domain D.
I 4
HintikkaVs: Problem: this is unrealistically interpretative: this flexible approach namely allows non-well-shaped individuals. Then there is no point in asking whether this individual exists or not. Fusion/Fission: a flexible semantics must also allow fission and fusion between one possible world and the another.
Def Well-Defined/Individual/Hintikka: an individual is well-defined, if it can be singled out by name at a node of the world line.
World Line: can link non-existent incarnations of individuals, as long as they are well-defined for all possible worlds in which a node of the world line can be located.
Truth Conditions: are then simple: (Ex) p(x) is true iff there is an individual there, E.g. named z, so that p(z) is true in w.
Modal Semantics/Hintikka. About a so defined (new) semantics a lot can be said:
Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: corresponds to a non-standard semantics, while the "new" semantics (with a fixed domain of individuals) corresponds to a standard semantics. (For higher-order logic).
Standard Semantics/higher level: we get this by demanding that the higher level quantifiers go over all extensionally possible entities of the appropriate logical type (higher than individuals) like quantifiers in the standard semantics for modal logic should go over all extensionally possible worlds.
This is a parallelism that is even stronger than an analogy:
Decision problem: for 2nd order logic this is reduced to the 1st order standard modal logic.
Standard: does the same job in the latter sense as in the former sense.
Quantified 1st Order Standard Modal Logic/Hintikka: all of this leads to this logic being very strong, comparable in strength with 2nd order logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (see above HintikkaVsKripke).
The stronger a logic, the less manageable it is.
I 12
Kripke/Hintikka: has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes and focuses on pure modalities. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic.
But somehow it seems to be clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities.
Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are.
I 13
Worse: he has not shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics.
I 77
Object/Thing/Object/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke Thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must simply be provided as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well founded. Maybe you have to presuppose the criteria of identification and identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that also does not mean that the problem of identification was not an enduring problem for the philosophers.
I 84
KripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations need not be analytic functions or features that allow an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: it seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines.
HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict.
World Line: we allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations.
I 86
HintikkaVsKripke: our model makes it possible that we do not necessarily have to presuppose objects as guaranteed like Kripke. ((s) it may be that a curve is not closed in a time section).
I 116
Cross World identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it’s more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. The manner of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual.
HitikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is silently based on Russell’s concept of the logical proper name. But there is no outstanding class of rigid designation expressions.
Proper Names/Names/HintikkaVsKripke: are not always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives with different references. Therefore, it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?".
Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: focuses on the perspective
I 117
Kripke: on public identification.
I 195
Identity/Individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity for certain individuals can fail in the transition to another possible world. I.e. world lines can branch (fission). Separation/KripkeVsFission/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes fission, because for him the (SI) applies. A fission, according to him, would violate the transitivity of identity. After a fission, the individuals would by no means be identical, even if it should be after the transitivity. Therefore, for Kripke the (SI) is inviolable.
HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular:
Transitivity of Identity/Hintikka: can mean two things:
a) transitivity within a possible world.
b) between possible worlds.
The plausibility of transitivity is part of the former, not the latter.
To require transitivity of identity between possible worlds simply means to exclude fission. This is what is circular about Kripke’s argument.
I 196
Possible World/Individuals Domain/HintikkaVsKripke: it should not be required that the individuals remain the same when changing from possible world to possible world. Talk about possible worlds is empty if there are no possible experiences that might distinguish them. ((s) is that not possible with a constant domain? Also properties could be partly (not completely) exchanged). Possible World/Hintikka: should best be determined as the associated possible totalities of experience.
And then fission cannot be ruled out.
I 209
Re-Identification/Hintikka: also with this problem situation semantics and possible worlds semantics are sitting in the same boat. Situation semantics: rather obscures the problem. In overlapping situations, E.g. it assumes that the overlapping part remains the same.
Re-Identification/Quine/Hintikka: deems it hopeless, because it is impossible to explain how it works.
Re-Identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that’s why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects.
HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: that is either too pessimistic or too optimistic.
But mistaking the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Kripke, S. A. Stalnaker Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Stalnaker I 125
VsContingent Identity/Stalnaker: if it is possible that one thing would be two things, then there is an a that this thing in the possible world (poss.w.) is w1 and b and c in w2. Then the cross world identities b = a and a = c should both be true but the innerworldly identity b = c is wrong! (In w2). That precisely violates the transitivity of identity.
Solution/Stalnaker: we have to ask in which poss.w. this statement is made.
In w1 b = c is also true that means it is true in w1 that the individual that is b in w2 is identical to the one that is c in w2. That is no violation of the transitivity.
Versus:
From the perspective of w2: here b = c is wrong (see above). What about b = a and c = a? Those identify two individuals that are identical in w1 with an individual from w1. Problem: from the perspective of w2 the description "the individual that is identical to a in w1" is an unsuitable description. Hence:
w2: from the perspective of w2 identity statements are either false, without truth value or ambiguous. Analogous to
E.g. Russell is the author of Principia Mathematica – the author of PM is Whitehead - so Russell is Whitehead. (see above the counterpart relation has to be flexible, it may not require transitivity).

I 184
Metaphysics/Kripke/Stalnaker: not all his metaphysical assertions are equally convincing. On the one hand a) is hard to deny that we can accept potentialities and opportunities for certain individuals reasonably, regardless of the manner in which the individual is specified on the other hand:
b) is less convincing that Kripke denies some possibilities that individuals could have.
StalnakerVsKripke: it is not convincing that Kripke does not allow on the one hand, that Shakespeare could have had other parents,
on the other hand could have lived in another century.
How should that be possible?
KripkeVsVs/Stalnaker: would say that we are if we accept such things at all, we are confused. This counterfactual possibilities are not coherent.
Possible worlds/poss.w./Stalnaker: are not made to clarify metaphysical questions.
Metaphysics/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke's metaphysical theses do not require his theories on reference and intentionality.
Is it reversed that his causal theory requires his metaphysical image?
Stalnaker: the metaphysical thesis about the identification of individuals on poss.w. is easy to separate from the theory that names are rigid designators whose reference can be found on causal interaction.

I 181
Object/properties/thing/object/SearleVsWittgenstein/SearleVsTractatus/Stalnaker: (Searle was not directed at the time against Kripke, whose book was published later). Kripke/Stalnaker: but he also makes the metaphysical distinction between object and properties what Searle rejects.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Kripke, S. A. Chisholm Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 92
Name/ChisholmVsKripke: one should not place too much emphasis on the first use of a proper name. (also ChisholmVsKaplan).
I 109
Possible worlds/Po.wo./Kripke/Chisholm: Kripke sees possible worlds as certain things, although an indefinite number are such that it can be said of the particulars of the real world that they exist in it. ChisholmVsKripke: there is no reason to believe that there are possible particulars that are worlds, and that some of these particulars are able to include particulars that reside in this world. But for Kripke’s distinction rigid/Non-rigid this ontology need not be provided.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Kripke, S. A. Cavell Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 216
Kripkes Wittgenstein: skeptisches Paradox: nichts, keine Regel, keine Gegenwart kann die Bedeutung meiner Worte kontrollieren. Das ist das ende der Möglichkeit, überhaupt etwas zu meinen. Lösung: Einführung sozial sanktionierter Behauptbarkeitsbedingungen.
Kripke: Hauptpunkt: die Abwesenheit bedeutungsvermittelnder Tatsachen.
CavellVsKripke: 1. wahrscheinlich hat Wittgenstein selbst das Paradox nicht so gesehen. Er würde auch nicht nach solchen Tatsachen verlangen, die die Bedeutung garantieren, und die stabiler sein sollten als unsere Praxis.
I 217
CavellVsKripke: 2. Kripke geht unbemerkt von "geneigt sein" zu "berechtigt sein" über: Wittgenstein: "habe ich die Begründung erschöpft, bin ich geneigt, zu sagen.."
Kripke scheint (anders als Wittgenstein) zu glauben, Übereinstimmung sei etwas wie ein Vertrag.
I 218
Seine Lösung ist skeptischer als das Problem, das sie lösen soll.
I 220
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Cavell: für Kripke sind Regeln grundlegender als Kriterien für Wittgensteins Skepsis gegenüber Bedeutungen. CavellVsKripke: dabei bleibt das Problem des Gewöhnlichen unterbelichtet.
I 221
Für mich sind umgekehrt die Regeln den Kriterien untergeordnet. Kripke: Bsp "Tisuhl" Angenommen, ich betrete zum ersten Mal den Eiffelturm und sehe an seinem Fuß einen Tisch stehen.
Weiß ich dem Skeptiker zu antworten, der annimmt, daß ich in der Vergangenheit "Tisuhl" gemeint habe, also etwas, was ein nicht am Fuß des Eiffelturms befindlicher Tisch bzw. ein Stuhl ist, der sich dort befinden
Habe ich ausdrücklich an den Eiffelturm gedacht, als ich zum ersten Mal "den Begriff des Tischs erfaßte" und gab ich mir selbst Anweisungen, was ich mit "Tisch" meinte?
CavellVsKripke: wir können mit Wittgenstein sagen: wir sind nicht für alle Möglichkeiten mit Regeln ausgerüstet und wir gelangen mit unseren Gründen an ein Ende.
Die Lokalisierung im Eiffelturm wäre wie jedes andere Kriterium einem Grund gleich, den ich haben kann, um jedes beliebige Objekt so zu nennen, wie ich es außerhalb des Turms nenne.
I 248
Aber ich habe noch gar keine Kriterien, daher bin ich mit meinen Erklärungen nicht an ein Ende gelangt, ich habe sogar noch gar nicht mit Erklärungen angefangen. CavellVsKripke: wozu uns der Skeptizismus bringt ist so etwas wie ein Zwang, Kriterien von uns abzuziehen, aber nicht wie Kripke willkürlich mit Kriterien zu hantieren.
I 255
CavellVsKripke: dieser spricht davon, daß wir mit Blick auf unsere Kriterien "zur Übereinstimmung" gelangen. Aber das wäre ein Zurückweisen der Wittgensteinschen Idee der Übereinstimmung. Diese liegt für Wittgenstein in unseren Reaktionen. Wir stimmen im Gehen überein, aber das ist nicht erlangt worden. Wir sind zum Gehen gelangt.
I 256
Begriff/Wittgenstein: Begriffe leiten uns zu Untersuchungen, sie sind der Ausdruck unseres Interesses und lenken unser Interesse. Cavell: gewöhnliche Begriffe haben eine Geschichte, mathematische nicht. Diese haben ein Davor und Danach, keine Vergangenheiten und Zukünfte. Bsp "Tisuhl": zeigt, daß wir unsere gewöhnlichen Begriffe einer speziellen Form der Mathematisierung unterwerfen können.
I 257
CavellVsKripke: er beraubt uns unserer Kriterien, daher ist er zu skeptisch. Warum sollte die Antwort nicht sein: "So sei es!".

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002
Kripke, S. A. Lycan Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Frank I 114
IdentitätstheorieVsKripke: es ist gar keine wesentliche Eigenschaft einer Schmerzempfindung, ein psychisches Ereignis zu sein. Vielmehr nur eine akzidentielle Eigenschaft. (Feldmann) LycanVsKripke: Ereignisse haben keine wesentlichen individuellen Eigenschaften. (1987, S.16f).

Lyc I
W. G. Lycan
Modality and Meaning

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Kripke, S. A. Donnellan Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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I 27
Names/DonnellanVsRussell: logical proper names ("this") are no meaningful construction: according to the natural conception, it is precisely proper names that stand for an object without describing it. DonnellanVsKripke: for him it looks as if the name would somehow stand directly for the language-independent given object, I 27 Donnellan: but the name is only a means, which could also be replaced by another one.
Donnellan. I 205
Causal Chain/Donnellan: must be historically correct. In the case of negative existential propositions it breaks off or is blocked. Names/BurgeVsKripke/BurgeVsDonnellan: not singular terms, but predicates (like Russell). E.g. "There is a time t for the speaker S a reference action x to an object y, so that: y is a Socrates and y is bald". The part sentence "y is a Socrates" thus has a truth condition itself. Reference is not eliminated. Dual reference: To the reference action and to naming.
Kripke, S. A. Horwich Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Stegmüller IV 154
Meaning/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/HorwichVsWittgenstein/HorwichVsKripke: the list (see above) has to be completed: d) meaning addition with "plus" does not exclude that mistakes are made. That must not be violated by any concept of meaning. e) the meaning of "plus" is an intrinsic property! This stands in contradiction to d), though! Horwich: brain research could produce matches, by the way. Kripke and Wittgenstein have indeed shown that there must not necessarily be facts of meaning, but that there could be!
IV 154/155
Stegmüller: Wittgenstein as well would certainly welcome a return to empiricism, but a theory could probably determine the match as a fact (like the theory of Chomsky), but still only in the context of assertability conditions (justification conditions), not in the sense of a truth-functional semantics. Turing Machine/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Stegmüller/Chomsky: E.g. (Kripke) a machine fallen from the sky can be analyzed with respect to all relevant things. (Program and memory). a) Stegmüller: Chomsky thus accepts a view that contains a linear solution of the paradox. Due to differences in the program, we recognize, whether "plus" or "quus" is represented. Because we have a theory that tells us something about differences. IV 156 b) linear solution: linguistic competence. We distinguish well-formed and not well-formed vocalizations.
IV 157
"Switch Model"/Internalized Language: in the structural original state there may be many switches that are set to "zero", waiting to be turned into active positions. Language is nothing more than a present stable switch setting. (Internalized language).

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Kripke, S. A. Zink Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Wolf II 31
ZinkVsKripke: übersieht, dass Eigennamen auch allgemeine Terms sind: "jeder Eigennamen bedeutet mindestens alles das, was das Wort "Eigenname" bedeutet!

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Kripke, S. A. Burkhardt Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Wolf II 340
Namen/Burkhardt: Sprecher Referenz: Ebene der parole semantische Referenz: Ebene der langue.
Langue: das eigentlich Konventionelle oder Regelhafte der Sprache, hier liegt die Bedeutung der Eigennamen. Nur hier können sie starr bezeichnen.
Hier sind sie vor möglichen Fehlern der parole sicher.
II 341
BurkhardtVsKripke: ihm ist dieser Unterschied nicht klar.

Burk I
A. Burkhardt
Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Kripke, S. A. Wolf Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Wolf II 31
Bedeutung/Namen/WolfVsKripke: ist durch Verwendungsweise in Sätzen und durch den Beitrag zu den Wahrheitsbedingungen zu erklären.

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Kripke, S. A. Newen Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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NSI 106
Causal Chain/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: is formed a) by successive uses b) through a series of speaker intentions Names/Devitt/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: the standard meaning of a name is the causal network which is formed by the sketched causal chain of communication.
VsKripke/Newen/Schrenk: his theory, like all object theories, leads to the dilemma that informative identity sentences and negative existential statements and empty names cannot be treated adequately. Solution/Searle: mixed theory between object theory and description theory.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Kripke, S. A. Stegmüller Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Stegmüller IV 119/!20
Kripke: die skeptische Lösung ist von der hyperskeptical thesis (der Unmöglichkeit von Sprache überhaupt) logisch unabhängig. StegmüllerVsKripke: ist Opfer der Verwechslung des Privatsprachenarguments mit dem der Unmöglichkeit des privaten Regelfolgens geworden.
Auf das Problem des rule following stösst man erst, wenn man die skeptische Lösung bereits als gültig voraussetzt.

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Kripke, S. A. Schulte Vs Kripke, S. A.
 
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Wittgenstein VI 160
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Schulte: Kripke ist der Ansicht, Wittgenstein selbst benutze das Paradox , dass man den Wegweiser auch in jeder beliebigen Umkehrung deuten könne zur Fundierung seiner "skeptischen Einstellung". (>Rorty,>Wright,>McDowell). In letzter Konsequenz würde dann das Reden von Übereinstimmung und Widerspruch sinnlos, da keine Möglichkeit ausgeschlossen werden kann.
SchulteVsKripke/Kripkes Wittgenstein/Schulte: das "Paradox" ist jedoch Ausdruck eines Missverständnisses der Beziehung zwischen Regel und Handlung: es ist falsch, die Handlung als Interpretation einer Regel aufzufassen.
Interpretation: freilich lässt sich jede Regel in beliebiger Weise interpretieren.
Handlung: nach Regeln ist dagegen ein Handeln im Rahmen einer bestimmten Praxis. Hier gibt es Abrichtung und Kontrolle, daher auch richtig und falsch.
Wäre das Handeln ein Interpretieren, brauchte es keine Spiele als Institution zu geben! Dann könnte man jedesmal von neuem mit einer Deutung beginnen.
Das hieße jedoch, die Verhältnisse auf den Kopf zu stellen, denn nur im Spiel hat die Regel einen Witz.

Sch I
J. Schulte
Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001

Sch II
J. Schulte/U.J. Wenzel
Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Lewis, C.I. Hazen Vs Lewis, C.I.
 
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IV 45
Gegenstück-Theorie/GT//Kripke/HazenVsLewis: fordert, einige logische Prinzipien aufzugeben. LewisVsKripke/VsHazen: ich bin nicht der Meinung. Bsp
(1) ist ein klassisches logisches Schema der Logik mit Identität und Quantifikation. Auf der anderen Seite ist (2) ungültig in der qML, weil die Übersetzung in GT kein Theorem ist.
(1) (x)(y)(x = y >. __x__ ↔ __y__)
(2) (x)(y)(x = y >. M x ungl. y ↔ M y ungl. y).
Wie kann (2) falsch sein? Würde seine Leugnung bedeuten, dass wir zwei verschiedenen Dinge haben, die kontingent identisch sind,?
Oder vielleicht dass ein Ding kontingent selbstidentisch ist?
Nein, nichts so sinnloses. Die GT Übersetzung sagt:
nichts in der wirklichen Welt (WiWe) hat mehr als ein GS in irgendeiner anderen Welt. Dann sagt seine Leugnung, dass etwas in der WiWe mehr als ein GS in einer einzelnen Welt hat.
Bsp im Fall von Dee, Dee1 und Dee2 , wenn Dee aktual ist.
Problem: entsteht durch die doppelte de re Frage, aus der doppelte GS resultieren.
Trotzdem bleibt (1) wahr, weil (2) gar keine Instanz von (1) ist. Wir können also (2) alleine ablehnen.
Bsp ein anderer ungültiger Satz: (3) als Instanz von (1)
(3) (x)(y)(x = y >. (Ey)y ungl x ↔ (Ey)(y ungl y)
Aber: damit das eine Instanz von (1) wäre, müsste das letzte Vorkommnis von "y" an das anfängliche "(y)" gebunden sein, aber das ist es nicht, es gehört zum nähergelegenen "(Ey)".
IV 136
Einstellungen/Lewis: ich hoffe Sie davon zu überzeugen, dass es eine willkürliche Einschränkung ist, dass Objekte von Einstellungen Mengen von Welten (MöWe) sein sollen. Subjekt/Lewis: Subjekte von Einstellungen sind verteilt über Zeit und Raum, einige sind in Neuseeland, einige im Mittelalter.
Auch sind sie über den logischen Raum verteilt: einige leben in der WiWe, andere in anderen MöWe. Zugegeben: wenn wir über sie quantifizieren, lassen wir oft alle anderen aus, bis auf die Mitbewohner der WiWe. Aber nochmals: das ist eine willkürliche Einschränkung, die wir fallen lassen können.
Lewis: jedenfalls ich kann es, einige sagen, sie können es nicht.
HazenVsLewis: das Verständnis ist begrenzt auf das, was durch Modalität und weltbezogene Quantoren ausgedrückt werden kann.
LewisVsVs: denen kann ich nicht helfen. Es ist bekannt, dass die Ausdruckskraft einer Sprache, die querweltein quantifiziert, die Art Sprache übersteigt, die jene verstehen.
Subjekt/MöWe/Lewis: jedes Subjekt einer Einstellung bewohnt nur eine einzige Welt. (s.o.).
Ich möchte mich nicht mit denen streiten, die sagen Bsp Adam ist ein großes Aggregat, teilweise in jeder von vielen Welten.
IV 137
Vs: aber dieser Adam - wenn wir ihn so nennen können - besteht aus vielen kausal isolierten Teilen, von denen jeder eigene Einstellungen hat. MöWe/Quantifikation/Lewis: wenn wir also diese Beschränkung der Quantifikation auf eine Welt fallen lassen, haben wir eine riesige (über Zeit und Raum) verteilte Bevölkerung.
Bsp was passiert nun, wenn einer aus dieser über mehrere Welten verteilten Bevölkerung einen Glauben in Form einer Proposition hat, z.B. dass Cyanoacrylat Leim sich in Aceton auflöst?
Pointe: er lokalisiert sich selbst in einer Region des logischen Raums. (Durch seine Glaubenseinstellung einer Proposition, (nicht Eigenschaft)).
Es gibt Welten, in denen Cyanoacrylat Leim sich in Aceton auflöst und Welten, in denen er es nicht tut. Er hat einen Glauben über sich selbst ((s) dann hat er immer zwei Überzeugungen): denn dass er Einwohner einer der Welten ist, wo der Leim das tut. Damit schreibt er sich selbst eine Eigenschaft zu.
(MöWe/Naturgesetze/Mathematik/Lewis/(s): Lewis gesteht MöWe mit geänderten physikalischen Bedingungen oder anders sich verhaltenden Substanzen zu, (wobei nicht explizit von geänderten Naturgesetzen die Rede ist) aber keine Welten, wo die Mathematik geändert ist).
Glauben/Lewis: kann man allgemein als Selbstzuschreibung einer Eigenschaft ansehen.
Diese Eigenschaft ist allen und nur den Bewohnern einer bestimmten Region im logischen Raum gemeinsam.

Man kann auch etwas anders denken: eine Proposition teilt die Bevölkerung: in privilegierte Bewohner einer Welt in der Cyanoycrylat Leim sich in Aceton auflöst, und Unglücklichere, die nicht in einer solchen Welt leben (wie leider ich).
Mill, J. St. Dummett Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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Stalnaker I 179
Mere Knowledge/Mere knowledge/Reference/DummettVsKripke/DummettVsMill/Stalnaker: Dummett states the impossibility of a "bare knowledge of reference". Def Mere Reference/Mere Knowledge/Dummett (1991, 127) mere reference of the name a would be the knowledge of an object, the fact that a refers to it, which would, however, be a complete characterization of the determined knowledge. Stalnaker: this could be identified with knowing a certain proposition. - A proposition which is true iff a particular individual is the reference of the name a.
Dummett/Stalnaker: his argument for the impossibility of the bare reference corresponds to Searles principle of identification.
Principle of Identification/Searle/Stalnaker: We have no knowledge of a thing, that it has a certain property F, if we do not have the ability to describe the object or identify it.
Propositional Knowledge/Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: stronger: for every true knowing-what attribution: there must be a true propositional knowledge, the contents of which are a non-singular proposition which makes the method of identifying explicit and contains the knowing-what attribution: an attribution of propositional knowledge on which the knowing-what attribution rests. ((s), the object must be described by a second indication apart from only the attribution by the name in question. A second property except the name in question. Therefore, you need non-singular propositions).

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Putnam, H. Rorty Vs Putnam, H.
 
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Richard Rorty
McDowell I 175
Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together.
McDowell I 178
RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation.
Rorty I 304
RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning.
I 307
Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism.
3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers".
I 308
RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness".
I 312
Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory.
I 313
RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end.
2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it.
I 314
In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe.
I 315
Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world.
Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we
a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or
b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.)
I 319
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about.
I 320
Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all!
We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing.
I 324
Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory.
I 326
Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever.
RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time.
I 327
The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image".
Rorty V 21
Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists.
V 22
Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all?
Rorty VI 75
Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research").
VI 76
Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce!
VI 79
Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion.
VI 80
This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview!
PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ...
(Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.)
RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking.
VI 82
Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image?
VI 87
Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam).
VI 90
Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric.
Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today).
RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Putnam, H. Cresswell Vs Putnam, H.
 
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II 70
Meaning/In the head/Putnam/Kripke/CresswellVsKripke/CresswellVsPutnam: both only pretend to have shown that meanings are "not in your head". I myself do not know what does it actually meant by that. Therefore, I also do not know if my approach is incompatible with the two or not. ---
II 71
Twin Earth/TE/Putnam: his example fits exactly into my semantics, i.e. it can be solved.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Quine, W.V.O. Wiggins Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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EMD II 285
Notwendigkeit/QuineVsAristoteles: kann nicht unabhängig von der Weise betrachtet werden, wie die Objekte spezifiziert werden. Wiggins: Quine verspottet den Essentialismus.
WigginsVsQuine: bewegt sich seine Kritik auf der Ebene einer unreflektierten Akzeptanz der Aristotelischen dreidimensionalen Fiktion unserer Welt? Oder behauptet er, daß wir, selbst wenn wir in dieser provinziellen Ontologie verharren, die Wahl haben zu wählen ob wir unterscheiden wollen oder nicht unterscheiden wollen zugunsten einiger der Begriffe unter die die Dinge fallen, die wir wahrnehmen?
II 286
Begriff/Sprache/WigginsVsQuine: Quines Haltung ist hier nicht völlig klar. These nur ein bewußtes System von Unterscheidungen zugunsten von Substanzbegriffen und gegen Zufallsbildungen könnte die Bestimmtheit erklären, mit der unsere Kultur Fragen der Identität in der Zeit oder Dauerhaftigkeit behandelt.
II 303
WigginsVsKripke: auch wenn Namen starre Designatoren sind: Frage, ob wir Sätze mit Namen für alle MöWe bewerten können ("notwendige Existenz") Problem: Querwelteinidentität

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Scientism Rorty Vs Scientism
 
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Richard Rorty
II 131
Scientism/Rorty: pro: his strength is in that understanding is always based on objects described in a specific manner, but that the causal powers of objects that can benefit or harm us remain unaffected by the nature of their description! We get sick and die, no matter how the disease is described. (RortyVs"Christian Science"). RortyVsScientism: his weakness is that he concludes the thesis that this vocabulary was superior to others from the prognosis allowed by a specific description vocabulary and use of the causal powers of objects. Kripke followers still refer to this fallacy today. (RortyVsKripke).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Wittgenstein, L. Kripke Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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I 43
E.g.: Wittgenstein: "Moses does not exist" means that "no human being has done this and that".(KripkeVs). Kripke: This is about the difference between reference and meaning: The theory in question is regarded as a theory of the meaning of the name "Moses" and not simply as a theory of his reference.
KripkeVsWittgenstein: In any case I think it is wrong that "Moses exists" actually holds this meaning (that he has done something).
I 70
KripkeVsWittgenstein: However, if the description has the function to rigidly define a reference, it is clear that this is "not" what the sentence "Moses did not exist" means; because in the counterfactual case, for example that no one led the Israelites out of Egypt, we can then ask: Does it ensue that Moses did not exist in such a situation? It seems that it does not ensue. For surely Moses would have been able to spend days more pleasantly.
NS I 39
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Problem of Infinity: How can a finite number of examples define an infinite number of new cases?
Wrong solution: through meaning
Wrong solution: through disposition
NS I 40
Another pupil obviously has a different disposition, i.e. individual dispositions are not enough. Wittgenstein’s solution: collective dispositions.
KripkeVsWittgenstein: there are no facts (>Problem of Normativity).
2. Problem of Normativity: which facts lay down which is the correct answer?
Kripke: We can establish a new praxis at all times.
New Literature/Newen/Schrenk: Pragmatic solution:
Def Persuasion/New Authors/Newen/Schrenk: To have convictions with a defined meaning you need to take part in social practices and to mutually ascribe convictions with specific meanings. (Solution for Kripke’s Wittgenstein). (Literature. 2-24).

Putnam III 219
Belief/Elisabeth Anscombe: Did once ask Wittgenstein what he would do if one of his friends was believing in faith healing. Would he try to dissuade him? Wittgenstein said yes, not knowing why however. KripkeVsWittgenstein: Classifies it as a distinct proof for Wittgenstein’s relativism.
PutnamVs: Wittgenstein only finds it useless.

Stegmüller IV 35ff
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/Disposition/KripkeVsRyle: The crucial dispositions have been acquired in the past, the difference was already present in the past. KripkeVsRyle: 1. Dispositions are actually irrelevant a) When I have a hypothesis regarding my disposition, I still do not know whether it is the right one -
IV 37
b) If we wanted to "let the past rest" and were only asking what we consider to be right at this moment, we lose the term "right".
IV 38
Kripke: Important argument: I have always had the same dispositions! – Disposition/VsKripke: a) it could be an idealization of my praxis KripkeVs: fantastic new assumptions will be necessary VsKripke: b) Idealization "if I had the possibility..." KripkeVs: It requires a function/fact or a table that is independent from the disposition.
IV 39f
KripkeVsWittgenstein: No table it is infinite, it is impossible to have checked everything. To mean, to conceive: no happenings in the consciousness but dispositions, dispositions are not happenings as well.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Wittgenstein, L. Verschiedene Vs Wittgenstein, L. Hempel I 97
NeurathVsTractatus: (Carnap entdeckte als erster die Tragweite von Neuraths Ideen.) Neurath: Wissenschaft ist ein Aussagensystem, das aus Aussagen von nur einer Art besteht. Jede Aussage kann mit jeder anderen kombiniert oder verglichen werden. Aber Aussagen werden niemals mit einer »Realität«, mit »Tatsachen« verglichen.
I 98
Eine Trennung von Aussagen und Tatsachen ist Resultat einer verdoppelnden Metaphysik. Neurath VsWittgenstein: dritte Phase der Abkehr vom Tractatus: selbst dieses Prinzip wird noch eliminiert: es ist ohne weiteres vorstellbar, daß das Protokoll eines bestimmten Beobachters zwei Aussagen enthält, die einander widersprechen. Dann läßt man in der Praxis einen der beiden Sätze fallen.
I 100
Protokollsätze können daher nicht mehr als unveränderliche Grundlage angesehen werden.
I 101
Neurath: wir sind nicht gegen einen Richter, aber der Richter ist absetzbar.
Stegmüller IV 76
Kripkes Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/VsKripke: einige verteidigen Wittgenstein gegen Kripke: dieser habe keinen Begriffsnihilismus oder Bedeutungsnihilismus vertreten.
IV 77
Stegmüller: darum geht es aber gar nicht: es geht um die Möglichkeit des Erfassens von Bedeutungen. Der Begriff der "Bedeutung" wird dann aber sinnlos, wenn Menschen nicht die Möglichkeit haben, ihn zu erfassen! Nicht das Erfassen von Gegenständen ist das Problem, sondern das Erfassen der den Denotaten vorgelagerten intensionalen Gebilden, die Intension, den Fregeschen Sinn.
Stegmüller IV 152
GoldfarbVsKripke: die Relation token/type sei ein Spezialfall der "Fortsetzung einer Reihe" und des "Regelfolgens". Goldfarb: das ist nicht richtig:
1. Um festzustellen, ob zwei Tokens zu selbem Typ gehören, muss man bloß imstande sein, die wahrnehmbare Ähnlichkeit zu bemerken.
2. "Type" ist keine gemäß einer Regel zu erzeugende Folge, sondern eine ungeordnete Menge! Auch nicht für den Platonisten.
GoldfarbVsKripke: die Rechtfertigungsbedingungen (Behauptbarkeitsgbedingungen) treten überhaupt nicht an die Stelle der Wahrheitsbedingungen, sondern sind nur eine triviale Umformulierung.

Wittgenstein VI 167
Urmeter/Sinn/Wittgenstein/Schulte: auch hier Missverständnis: man hat gesagt:
VI 167/168
VsWittgenstein: selbst wenn der Satz "Der Urmeter ist nicht 1 m lang" immer falsch ist, hat er doch Sinn! Schulte: das stimmt aber nicht mit Wittgensteins Konzeption von "Sinn" überein. ((s) Sinn haben heißt, negiert werden zu können.).
Schulte: der Zug muss einen Witz im Sprachspiel haben! Bsp "Das Urmeter ist nicht 1 m lang" ist kein zulässiger Zug und er hat auch keinen Witz.
VI 175
VsWittgenstein/Schulte: dieser bringe Bedeutungstheoretisches und Erkenntnistheoretisches durcheinander. Von Wittgenstein nie ernst genommen. Will sowieso Grenzen überwinden, wobei derlei Theorien gar nicht zu seiner Philosophie gehören.





Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Wittgenstein, L. Horwich Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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Stegmüller IV 154
Referring/Kripke's Wittgenstein/HorwichVsWittgenstein/HorwichVsKripke: the list (see above) must be supplemented: d) referring with 'plus' to addition does not exclude making mistakes. That must not be violated by any concept of meaning. e) the meaning of 'plus' is an intrinsic property! However, this contradicts d)! Horwich: brain scans could incidentally produce matches. Kripke and Wittgenstein have indeed shown that there do not need to be any facts of meaning, but that there could be!.
IV 154/155
Stegmüller: Wittgenstein, too, would surely welcome a return to empiricism, but a theory could determine the match as a fact (like the theory of Chomsky), but still only in the context of assertibility conditions (justification conditions), not in the sense of a truth-functional semantics. Turing Machine/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Stegmüller/Chomsky: E.g. (Kripke) a machine fallen from the sky can be analyzed with respect to all relevant aspects. (Program and memory). a) Stegmüller: thus, Chomsky accepts a view that contains a linear solution of the paradox. Due to differences in the program, we can see whether 'plus' or 'quus' is represented. Because we have a theory that tells us something about differences.
IV 156
b) linear solution: linguistic competence. We distinguish well-formed and not well-formed vocalizations.
IV 157
'Switch Model'/Internalized Language: there may be many switches in the structural original state that are set to 'zero' and waiting to be turned on to active positions. Language is nothing more than a present stable switch setting. (Internalized language).

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Wittgenstein, L. Wright, von Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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Stegmüller IV 83
Ethik/Kripkes Wittgenstein/WrightVsKripke: jemand könnte auf den Gedanken kommen, und Kripkes Resultate auf moralische Überlegungen zu übertragen. Gebote und Verbote hätten praktisch keinen Inhalt mehr. Jede Handlung sowie ihr Gegenteil wäre zulässig. StegmüllerVsWright: tatsächlich hätte Kripke dieses Beispiel wählen können. Es findet sich auch bei Hume!
Skeptizismus in der Ethik würde lauten: "Es gibt keine objektiven Werte"."Normen existieren nicht".

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Possible World Versus Chisholm I 109
Mögliuche Welten/ChisholmVsKripke: nicht als Einzelgegenstände (Einzeldinge) die selber Einzeldinge enthalten. - Das braucht man auch nicht für die Unterscheidung starr/nichtstarr.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Externalism Versus Davidson I 116
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: Dass er mit der Triangulation die Alltagssituation so stark in den Vordergrund rückt, unterscheidet ihn von dem Externalismus Putnam's und Burge's.
Davidson II 185
Externalismus/DavidsonVsKripke,DavidsonVsPutnam: ganze Sätze, Interpretation.
Davidson I 72f
Externalismus: pro: Putnam, Burge, Davidson (modifiziert: Triangulation setzt Alltagssituation stärker in den Mittelpunkt). Vs: Searle - Quine: nicht eindeutig Vertreter des Externalismus.
II 185
Externalismus/Putnam/Kripke: richtige Kausalketten zwischen Wort und Gegenstand. >Kausaltheorie. Externalismus/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: ganze Sätze, Interpretation.
Frank I 661ff
Aber Davidson pro Volkspychologie, VsStich.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Causal Theory Devitt, M.
 
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Cresswell II 152
NuteVsKripke/NuteVsKausaltheorie/Cresswell: (Nute 1978): These Kripkes eigene Theorie ist in Wirklichkeit eine Beschreibungstheorie! Denn sie nimmt die Notwendigkeit einer richtigen kausalen Relation zwischen Sprecher und dem benannten Ding an, Diese Relation muß dazuführen, dass man eine adäquate Beschreibung geben kann, die der Bedeutung des Namens entspricht. Cresswell: das sein ähnlich zu sein wie
Def "chain"/Beschreibungskette/Namen/Terminologie/Devitt/Cresswell: (Devitt 1981, 29) (ausgerechnet Devitt, einer der härtesten Verfechter der Kausaltheorie):
II 153
These in opaken Glaubenskontexten referiert ein Name auf die geeignete Beschreibungskette.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Names Dummett, M.
 
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StalnI 172
Namen/Referenz/Sinn/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: These Namen haben ihre Referenten direkt, ohne Vermittlung eines zwischengeschalteten Sinns
Frege/Dummett/Searle: These zwischen dem Namen und seinem Referenten muß man den Sinn des Namens annehmen
a) weil der Gegenstand sonst gar nicht identifiziert werden kann, bzw. wir nicht erklären können, wie er identifiziert wird,
b) (DummettVsKripke) weil wir dann die Sprache nicht lernen können.
Names Evans, G.
 
Books on Amazon
I 311
Namen/EvansVsBeschreibungstheorie: die starke These, daß die Bedingungen des Beschreibungstheoretikers hinreichend seien, ist unerhört!
I 312
Die strikten Wahrheitsbedingungen sind ganz unakzeptabel. Schwächere These: eine gewisse deskriptive Identifizierung sei notwendig: das zu verstehen ist wichtig:
EvansVsKripke: seine Bsp zeigen nicht, daß sie falsch ist. (Obwohl ich das ebenfalls glaube).
1. um etwas zu sagen, muß man auf jemand oder etwas zielen.
2. um eine Intention zu haben, muß man im Besitz einer Beschreibung sein.
I 323
Evans These es geht um die kausale Relation zwischen den Zuständen und Verhaltensweisen des Dings und der Informationsmenge des Sprechers ï·" nicht zwischen dem Getauftsein und der gegenwärtigen Verwendung. (Schlechte Philosophie des Geistes).
Staln I 189
Namen/Bsp Evans/Stalnaker: sicher ist -žJulius-œ kein richtiger Name, aber richtige Namen funktionieren genauso, weil ihre Referenz und was mit ihnen gesagt wird, von den Tatsachen abhängt.
I 190
Genauso wurden Bsp Hesperus/Phosphorus durch verschiedene Kausalketten (oder historische Ketten) festgelegt!
Vs Essentialism Field, Hartry
 
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I 38
FieldVsEssentialism: diese Operatoren sind nicht-essentialistisch und daher ziemlich ungewöhnlich in der Modallogik. ((s) FieldVsKripke: nicht-essentialistische Modaloperatoren). These weniger karge Begriffe sind mit äußerster Vorsicht zu behandeln (Letzte Essays). Sie sind nicht sinnlos, im Gegenteil, man kann oft eine "hygienische" Erklärung von ihnen geben, indem man sie in Begriffen logischer Möglichkeit usw. (sogar essentialistischer) gibt.
Names Frege, G.
 
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Wolf I 13
Namen/FregeVsRussell: sing Term.
Newen/Schrenk I 101
Sinn/Namen/Frege: These der Sinn eines Namens wird durch die Kennzeichnung ausgedrückt. Das ist die sogenannte Kennzeichnungstheorie, eine einfache Variante der Beschreibungstheorie.
Staln I 172
Namen/Referenz/Sinn/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: These: Namen haben ihre Referenten direkt, ohne Vermittlung eines zwischengeschalteten Sinns
Frege/Dummett/Searle: These zwischen dem Namen und seinem Referenten muß man den Sinn des Namens annehmen
a) weil der Gegenstand sonst gar nicht identifiziert werden kann, bzw. wir nicht erklären können, wie er identifiziert wird,
b) (DummettVsKripke) weil wir dann die Sprache nicht lernen können.

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Vocabulary Kripke, S.A.
 
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Rorty II 131 Kripke / RortyVsKripke: the Kripkeans rely on a privileged vocabulary for scientific description - causal powers are description independent.
metaphys. possible Kripke, S.A.
 
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Staln I 167
metaphysically possible / Kripke / Stalnaker: E.g. Shakespeare did not have to write any of his works - but he could not have been anything other than a human being - he would have had no other parents than the one he actually had. - (Essentialism).
I 168
Other authors VsKripke: Shakespeare could have some properties counterfactually, but not all.
Names Lewis, D.
 
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Schw I 223
Namen/Kennzeichnung/Referenz/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975): für Namen und Artausdrücke gibt es keine allgemeinbekannte Beschreibung (Kennzeichnung), die festlegt, worauf der Ausdruck sich bezieht. Kennzeichnungen sind für die Referenz völlig irrelevant. Beschreibungstheorie/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: das wiederlegt nur die naive Kennzeichnungstheorie, nach der biographische Taten aufgelistet werden, die dem Referenten notwendig zukommen sollen.
Schw I 228
Namen/Prädikat/Eigenschaft/Lewis: These Namen können alles benennen: statt Prädikat "F" nehmen wir "F-heit" - Prädikate sind keine Namen und benennen nichts - Prädikat/(s): kein sing Term - SchwarzVsLewis/ RussellVsFrege: wenn man annimmt, daß jedem Prädikat ein Name für eine entsprechende Eigenschaft zugeordnet werden kann, folgt Russells Paradoxie.
Scientism Rorty, R.
 
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II 131
RortyVsSzientismus: seine Schwäche liegt darin, daß er aus der durch ein bestimmtes Beschreibungsvokabular ermöglichten Prognose und Benutzung der Kausalkräfte von Gegenständen die These folgert, dieses Vokabular sei anderen überlegen. Auf diesen Trugschluß berufen sich die Kripkeaner noch heute. (RortyVsKripke).
Names Searle, J.R.
 
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Staln I 172
Namen/Referenz/Sinn/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: These Namen haben ihre Referenten direkt, ohne Vermittlung eines zwischengeschalteten Sinns
Frege/Dummett/Searle: These zwischen dem Namen und seinem Referenten muß man den Sinn des Namens annehmen
a) weil der Gegenstand sonst gar nicht identifiziert werden kann, bzw. wir nicht erklären können, wie er identifiziert wird,
b) (DummettVsKripke) weil wir dann die Sprache nicht lernen können.

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Vs Kripke Burkhardt, A.
 
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Wolf I 341
BurkhardtVsKripke: thesis: that names are rigid description expressions, indeed applies to the rule, but must be supplemented, contrary to his view in other cases by Frege’s sense-term. BurkhardtVsFrege: his view is false, proper names have both meaning and sense.

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993