|Judgment: the use of the concept „judgment“ is not uniform. If the judgment is interpreted as the determination of the truth value ("true" or "false") of a statement, this is indicated explicitly, e.g. with the judgment stroke I- introduced by G. Frege. See also truth value, judgment stroke, sentence, statement, utterance, assertion._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Robert Brandom on Judgments - Dictionary of Arguments
Correct judgments are normative terms. Not natural. Conflicting judgments are not prohibited by the laws of nature.
Judgment/Dummett/Brandom: do not act as an expression of an inner judgment act, but as an internalization of the external act of assertion._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001