Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 114
Meaning holism/belief/Lewis/Fodor/Lepore: If, according to Lewis thesis, blief prevails over over the attribution of the intentional, then it must itself be holistic. - If meaning holism is to follow, the following would have to be assumed, for example: Def thesis of the primacy of belief/Lewis. Thesis: the conditions of intentional attribution contain the conditions for belief attribution. Therefore, if the former is holistic, so must also be the latter. - SH/Fodor/Lepore: we concede that the semantic holism might follow from this thesis. ((s) belief holism seems plausible).
IV 117
Belief holism does not lead to content holism, because content can be contradictory.
IV 117
Belief/Davidson: Thesis: centrality of belief: no propositional attitude without some beliefs - Fodor/Lepore Vs: you can wish for this and that without believing this and that - SH stronger: only semantically evaluable (t/f) states can be propositional attitudes - Belief/Hume/Fodor/Lepore: no connection between mental images (not t/f) and semantics (t/f) - orthogonal: Belief properties: strength, vitality/representation: properties ultimately geometric - i.e. the truth conditions are completely independent of the causal role.
IV 156
Holism/Davidson: the fact that most beliefs are true implies that they are also coherent. - New: also vice versa! -> Holism: - New: the interpreter cannot discover that the speaker is wrong in most utterances - He can only interpret the sentences that are caused by events and objects of the external world .
IV 157
Beliefs/RI/Davidson: most of them are true: if true, causes ipso facto. - ( in the light of the interpreter!) - Fodor/Lepore Vs: truth conditions for a sentence must not be identified with the currently prevailing truth conditions!

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-19