Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Robert Brandom on Beliefs - Dictionary of Arguments

I 788
You can weakly believe of Pegasus that he had wings.
But if you strongly believe in something, you have to be able to pick it out. Cf. >stronger/weaker
I 759f
Belief de re/Quine/Brandom: aroused interest in de re by distinguishing between the conceptual and relational meanings of belief - you do not have relational beliefs about an object by simply knowing the singular word - definition of weak de re: someone who only believes that the smallest spy is a spy does not know much about spies - not yet de re of any objects - epistemically strong: Example of Rosa Kleb who believes that she is the smallest spy (de re). >de re, >de dicto.
I 790
Definition strong/weak/belief/Brandom: you can weakly believe of Pegasus that he had wings - but if you strongly believe in something, you have to be able to pick it out.
II 226
Belief/Brandom: 1. you only believe what you believe to believe - 2. and also everything that one is more or less tied to by hione's s believes - e.g. if I believe that Kant revered Hamann and I believe that Hamann was the Magus of the North, I also believe that Kant worshiped the Magus of the North.
- - -
I 764
Belief/de dicto/Davidson/Brandom: Davidson only allows de dicto beliefs.
I 962
Belief/Def weak relation/Dennett/Brandom: what is expressed by de re attributions.
I 765
but strong de re convictions would have little meaning, if useful at all.
Belief/cnviction/Dretske: (widely spread thesis): de re convictions are understandable regardless of de dicto convictions.
I 765
Conviction/belief/Brandom: demonstrative, indexical de re convctions are conceptual, but not independent - they cannot stand alone - decisive are the weak ones - and not a special kind of contact with the object.
I 965
Belief/Brandom: Each conviction, be it strong or weak, can be attributed de re or de dicto.
- - -
II 48
Belief/BrandomVsDavidson: Definition via wish.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-02-27
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