Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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III 78
Language/language-dependent/Searle: some things can be viewed independent of language: E.g. that the man crossed the line - but not that he makes 6 points with this - institutional facts are never language independent - e.g. there is no pre-verbal way to represent the pawn as king - (game) points are not "out there" like men and balls - Searle:> meaning in the head.
III 79
Reasons only work because people accept them as reasons - language independent: are status functions: e.g. one can think that this is a screwdriver because one has seen many times that things are screwed with it - (s)Vs - QuineVsSearle? Network of our beliefs thoroughly language-dependent?
III 82
Searle: language is necessary if the status changes without a change of the physical state of an object.
Perler/Wild I 143
Language/Searle: Language is needed for: 1. Intentional states that deal with language - 2. that deal with facts, e.g. that this is a dollar note - 3. representation of spatially and temporally distant facts - 4. complex states - 5. formulations that contain descriptions, e.g. instead of "today it is warm" the date.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Language

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27