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Truth Value/Frege: A truth value cannot be part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense but an object. (truth value = object).
Sentence/Frege/(s): consists of sense components, not of objects. (>FregeVsRussell)
Subordinate clauses that begin with "that" (that-sentence, >opaque context, >propositional attitudes) have as meaning a thought, not a truth value.
Sentence: The idea itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as the subject. (>Ramsey) We must never forget that different sentences can express the same idea.
Neither is it impossible that the same thought appears in a decomposition as a singular one, in another one as a particular one, and in a third one as general one.
Sentence: The three proper names: "the number 2", "the concept prime number", "the relation of the falling of an object under a concept" behave as brittle to each other as the first two alone: no matter how we group them together, we get no sentence.
Sentence/Frege: does not represent a proposition (only a that-sentence does that, a subset) - but for a truth value. - There is a sentence for each proposition that expresses it and that states the truth conditions. - Vs: problem with sentences without truth value (neither true nor false, not an object, etc.).
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68
Sentence/Frege: except the idea (what can be t/f) there are two other aspects: a) "content" - b) "imagination".
Tugendhat II 243
Oblique Meaning//German Original: "odd"/Frege: name of a sentence. - Complex sentences: truth functions of their subsets - where that is not the case, subsets appear as names (oblique ("odd") meaning, Quote) - Nominalized Subset/Frege: only part of a thought - TugendhatVsFrege: such a subset cannot be replaced, so the truth-value potential cannot consist in its truth value.
Tugendhat II 245
Sentence/Frege/Tugendhat: since all sentences are derived from the subject-predicate form, subsets must sometimes be nominalized. - Exception: causal and conditional clauses.
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992