Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 112 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Abstraction Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
I 286
Intensional abstraction: "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring". ---
I 289
Class abstraction re-traced to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) - instead of: x^(..x..) - is not possible for intensional abstraction.
---
I 295
Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties: opaque (E.g. of the planet). ---
I 322
Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - New: irreducible two-digit Operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables are the only thing that remains - Primacy of the pronoun. ---
IX 12 ~
Class abstraction/Quine: "{x:Fx}" refers to "the class of all objects x with Fx" - in the eliminable combination that we have in mind "e" appears only in front of a class abstraction term and class abstraction terms appear only after "e" - the whole combination "y e {x: Fx}" is reduced according to a law: Concretization law/Quine: reduces "y e {x: Fx}" to "Fy" - existence/ontology: thus no indication remains that such a thing as the class {x:Fx} exists at all.
Introduction: it would be a mistake, e.g., to write "*(Fx)" for "x = 1 and EyFy". Because it would be wrong to conclude "*(F0) *(F1)" from "F0 F1" - therefore we have to mistrust our definition 2.1 which has "Fx" in the definiendum, but does not have it in the definiens.
---
IX 16
Relations abstraction/relation abstraction/Quine: "{xy:Fxy}" is to represent the relationship of a certain x to a certain y such that Fxy - Relation/correctness/Quine: parallel to the element relationship there is the concept of correctness for relations - Definition concretization law for relations/Quine: is also the definition correctness/relation: "z{xy: Fxy}w stands for "Fzw". ---
IX 52
Function abstraction/lambda operator/Quine: before terms, generates terms (expressions) - (Frege/Church: here also of statements, thus a second time class abstraction, but both group statements under terms and classes under functions - (QuineVsFrege,QuineVsChurch) - Definition lambda operator/Quine: if "...x..." contains x as a free variable, lx (...x...) is that function whose value is ...x... for each argument x - therefore lx(x²) the function "the "square of" - general: "lx(...x...)" stands for "{ : y = ...x...}" - identity: lx x{: y = x } = l. - lx {z: Fxy} = {: y = {z: Fxz}} -. "lx a" stands for "{: y = a}" - new: equal sign now stands between variable and KAT (set abstraction). ---
IX 181
Abstraction/order/Quine: the order of the abstracting expression must not be less than that of the free variables.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Ambiguity Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 48
Definition Systematic ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all of our expressions are systematically ambiguous; that is, they refer to different things depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect (intensional, opaque) contexts. ---
I 50
Semantics of possible worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: here there is no > systematic ambiguity, i.e. the expressions mean intensionally the same as extensionally. E.g. to know what John knows is to know the worlds that are compatible with his belief, and to know which ones are not.
---
I 51
Extra-premise: for this, one must be sure that an expression in different worlds takes out the same individual. Context: what the relevant worlds are depends on the context.
E.g. Ramses: here the case is clear,
On the other hand:
E.g. Herzl knew that Loris was a great poet
Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Atomism Wittgenstein
 
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Hintikka I 25
Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Thesis: all logical forms can be constructed from the shapes of objects. ---
Hintikka I 175
Logical Independence/Elementary Proposition/Atomism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (1931) Wittgenstein eventually abandons the quest for logical independence of elementary propositions. - It was a real failure. - Reason: color attributes (color predicates) are not independent - E.g. red exists in the degree q1r and red exists in the degree q2r, then it follows: if q2>q1, q1r follows from q2r. - Later Vs: does not work with impure and opaque colors either. ---
I 176
Atomism/Middle Period/Wittgenstein/Waismann/Hintikka: new: atomic sentences are no longer individually compared with the world, but as a sentence systems. - ("Holistic"). - WittgensteinVsAtomism: middle period. - New: I apply the whole color scale at once. - That is the reason why a point cannot have more than one color. -> Measuring - If I apply a set system to reality, then it is thereby said that only one fact can exist at a time. ---
II 138
WittgensteinVsAtomism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: 2 errors: 1) assuming the infinite to be a number and assuming that there would be an infinite number of sentences. - 2) that there are statements that express degrees of qualities - atomism; requires, however, that if p and q are contradictory, they may be further analysed until t and ~t result. ---
II 157
Atomism/Atom Sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in the analysis of atomic sentences you do not encounter -"particulars", not unlike in chemical analysis. ---
IV 14
Atomism/Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: if the world had no substance, ((s) = unchangeable objects), the atomic sentences would not be independent of each other. ---
apropos IV 36 ~
Tractatus/Atomism/Wittgenstein/(s): Atoms: undefined objects, quasi material things, (sounds), primitive signs - unclear whether thing (object) or immaterial, only components of the sentence are translated. - Thus, they are open to meaning theory which simultaneously derives from complex of objects, facts as well as connection of words, but (4.0312) the logic of the facts cannot be represented - the logical constants (and, or, not) do not represent. - Representative: sign for the object - internal properties: in the sentence different than the relations to the world (external). WittgensteinVsRussell, VsFrege: confusion mention/Use: internal/external.
---
VII 122
Atomism/Atom Sentence/Truth Value/Truth Functions/Tr. fnc./Laws of Nature/LoN//Tractatus/Te Tens: the truth values of the atom sentences determine the truth of all remaining sentences with logical necessity, also those of the Laws of Nature - but then you should not say that something is only possible impossible or necessary by virtue of natural law or causality. - (6.37) - Laws of Nature are the truth functions of elementary propositions. - Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. ---
VII 124
Laws of Nature: are not the ultimum; that is logical space.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Attribution Perry
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 451F
Proposition/propositional attitude/PerryVsFrege: The expressions in a report of what someone thinks, designate entities (not whole propositions) to which their antecedents refer. - ((s)> Cresswell: structured meanings).

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Bivalence Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 103
Principle of Bivalence/Truth/Dummett: PoB already presumes the concept of truth - and that is transcendental in the case of undecidable sentences - it goes beyond our ability to recognize what a manifestation would be.
EMD II 103f
Undecidability/anti-realism/Dummett: (without bivalence) the meaning theory will then no longer be purely descriptive in relation to our actual practice.
Dum III 17
Sense/Frege: explanation of sense by truth conditions - Tractatus: dito: "Under which circumstances" - DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for that one must already know what the statement that P is true means - Vs: if they then say P is true means the same as asserting P. - VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what should be explained. - VsRedundancy theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain the meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence
III 74
Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that in principle we can recognize it as true if it is true (e.g. unicorn, Goldbach’s conjecture) - but Frege’s argument does not depend at all on bivalence.
III 76
Bivalence, however, works for elementary clauses: if here the semantic value is the extension, it is not necessary to be possible to decide whether the predicate is true or not - perhaps application cannot be effectively decided, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without allocating the semantic value (truth value) - therefore distinction between sense and semantic value.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Classes Frege
 
Books on Amazon
Simons I 102f
Class/FregeVsSchröder: a) "logical" classes: = value ranges and
I 103
b) "concrete" classes: a calculus of collective classes is just one calculus of part and whole. - VsFrege: >Russell’s paradox - more vulnerable than Schröder’s "manifolds".

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Clauses Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 120
Clause/subordinate sentence/SearleVsFrege/SearleVsTarski/Tarski: subordinate clauses are not names of sentences - Words in quotation marks are not names of words - otherwise »» »regress« ««.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Compositionality Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
I 504f
Compositionality/Frege/Brandom: the same substitutional path that leads from the inference to the conceptual content of sentences also leads from the free-standing inferential content of composite sentences to the embedded content of embedded parts of sentences and on the other hand back to singular terms and predicates. ---
I505
Neutral between bottom-up and top-down. ---
I 506
BrandomVsFrege: blurs the distinction between freestanding and embedded contents.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Compositionality Pinker
 
Books on Amazon
I 151
Compositionality/PinkerVsFrege: must also consider the type of connection. ---
I 153
Different: baby saw chicken/chicken saw baby - this shows that the building blocks are not separated. ---
I 154f
Neural networks/thinking: active/passive, units. - Baby eats: does not say what - snail is eaten does not say by whom - wrong solution: imortance - right: representation - additional layer of units - similar to Mentalese.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Compositionality Schiffer
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I XVIII
SchifferVsCompositionality: we must reject it because we must also reject the theory of relation (without which we cannot have the compositionality) - understanding must be explained otherwise: Solution: conceptual role in neuronal lingua mentis without compositionality. ---
I 183
SchifferVsCompositionality: 1. verbs for propositional attitude can hardly be put into a compositional semantics - in addition E.g. -"is a picture of", "true", "big", "toy"(soldier) - adverbs, evaluative terms like - "should", "good", pronouns and demonstrative pronouns - "everyone", "all" - also counterfactual conditional and modal expressions represent a problem for compositional semantics. ---
I 183
Compositional truth theoretical semantics/Schiffer: attributes truth conditions to sentences. ---
I 184
Compositionality/SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural language does not need any compositional semantics for understanding - for new sets, we are not confronted with new words and even only with known constructions - pro Frege: meaning theory must determine compositional mechanisms, but this does not lead to the fact that the meaning theory must be truth-theoretical (must determine truth conditions). ---
I 208
SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: E.g. "and": the everyday linguistic meaning is not captured by the truth value table - compositional semantics would require that there is a non-logical axiom for each non-logical expression - this is not possible - propositions by E, Harveys spoken language receive their representational character via the connection with mental representation - therefore Mentalese does not need compositional semantics.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Compositionality Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 241
Compositionality/conceptual space/linguistics/Gärdenfors: how can conceptual spaces describe the mechanisms that act during the formation of composite meanings? (For compositionality Szabo 2004). Compositionality/GärdenforsVsFrege: thesis: since the communicative context changes the meaning of the expressions involved, the linguistic expression is under defined in its meaning.
Communication/Transformation/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the compilation of meanings often transforms these meanings.
---
I 242
Direct composition/Gärdenfors: (non-Fregean): direct compositions are mappings between semantic areas (Holoyak & Thagard, 1996; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Gärdenfors, 2000). Combination adjective-noun: e.g. blue rectangle: its meaning is defined as the Cartesian product of the blue region of the color space and the rectangle region of the shape space.
A product of compact and convex amounts will in turn be compact and convex. The mapping functions are continuous. The function product is also continuous.
N.B.: thus the fixed point properties remain in the composition. (See fixed point/Gärdenfors (I 97): certainty about the common focus on an object.
Meaning/GärdenforsVsFrege: the meaning of the compound structure is no longer formed by the meaning of the components but by the areas and functions. These can be located as regions in the product space (e.g., of color and size). It is assumed that the areas involved are separable. But in practice, they are not completely separate: some pre-processing must take place before the areas can be combined.
---
I 244
Head/Modification/Gärdenfors: the analysis with head and modifier will usually not work because our knowledge about the respective areas will change the representation of the modifier: e.g. white wine is not white, e.g. a large squirrel is not a big animal. ((s)> syncategorematic expressions in Analytical Philosophy). Solution/Gärdenfors: we need contrast classes. E.g. adjectives such as "large" need contrast classes, which introduce yet another property.
Then we can assume compact convex regions of metric spaces for the head and modifier, as well as a radial (continuous) projection between the spaces. (C. Berge, Topological Spaces, Mineola, NY, 1997).
Problem: e.g. Lion > Stone Lion: here, not all areas can be equally attributed, e.g. habitat, behavior, etc.
---
I 246
Metaphorical composition: even if the head and modifier have no common dimensions, one can create an image between the two by using convexity and compactness. For example, a bumpy road and a bumpy relationship share the geometrical quality of a dimension: a) the length b) the time. ---
I 247
Dimension: its diversity is sometimes seen as an obstacle: cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1980). > Metaphors/Gärdenfors. ---
I 249
Noun verb combination/Gärdenfors: in my analysis a force pattern can be applied to different situations. E.g. the engine is running - the clock is running. ---
I 250
Thesis about noun-verb combinations: the meaning of the verb is modified by the patient, but not by the agent. E.g. (From Keenan, 1984, p.20): a)
Oscar cut the lawn.
The machine cut the lawn.
b)
Oscar cut the dress.
The sharp stone cut the dress.
Gärdenfors: the meaning of "cut" varies greatly between the pairs, but not so strong within the pairs. This shows that the meaning is not modified by the agent.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Concepts Carnap
 
Books on Amazon
VI 5
Concept/Object/Carnap. also properties, relations etc. are all objects - to each concept belongs an object - but it dos not "fall under" it - term u object are the same -> functionalization of the term
VI 242
Concept/Object/CarnapVsFrege: border sometimes fluently! Question: if a real object or rather conceptual summary (e.g. furniture, coal inventory in Central Europe) - Relation: it is controversial whether E.g. distance is something real.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Concepts Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 26ff
Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept.
I 220
Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). - Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...". - What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human bein is timeless".
I 226
Concept/Frege: purely extensional view - therefore not "sense of the name", but reference of the predicate. - ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.) - But: Extension/Frege: Object - Concept/Frege: not an object - reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated. - "Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name.
I 228f
Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise " ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise" - sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity" - sentences about concepts need a quantifier.
I 230
Concept/Geach: cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. - VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x" - Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'."
I 234
Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction is unnecessary! - GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Content Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
I 139ff
Content/Brandom: any content is derived from the content of possible judgments. ---
I 145
Semantic content: role in the determination of accuracies practice - basis: inferential relations - those who have content are subject to standards - Frege: Concepts from judgments. ---
I 150f
Content/Brandom: must not presume concepts and semantic content - there is a reaction without content: E.g. iron rusts in wet conditions - solution: inferential role - e.g. measurements: an instrument has no concepts. ---
I 316
Circumstances/Content/Brandom: what the interpreter considers to be the circumstances is an essential feature of the empirical content. ---
I 479
Content/Brandom: must specify the circumstances in the context under which a person is entitled to a definition - content by accuracy of inferences: three problems: 1) functional links do not only exist intra-linguistically, but also with the world - 2) Sentences often have significant portions expressing no parts which do not expres propositions - 3) Representational vocabulary is also used in analysis (> reference). ---
I 530
Content/Brandom: of an expression is determined by the set of SMSICs that regulate the substitution inferences (richness) - new vocabulary must be joined with the old vocabulary by SMSICs. ---
I 566
Content/Brandom (of sentences): the explicit expression of the relations between sentences, which are partly constitutive for sentences to be full of content, can be considered the content of sentences - the contents that are transmitted to the sentences through practices of community, are systematically intertwined with each other in a way that they can be considered to be products of those contents which are connected to the subsentential expressions. ---
I 658
Content/Brandom: assertions are expressed, therefore sentences are full of propositional content - subsentential expressions are indirectly full of inferential content thanks to their significance through substitution - unrepeatable Tokenings are embedded in substitutional inferences and thus indirectly inferentially contentful thanks to their connection to other Tokenings in a recurrent structure (inheritance). ---
I 664
Content: there must be at least one context in which the addition of an assertion has nontrivial consequences. ---
II 13
Content/Brandom: is explained by the act and not vice versa. ---
II 35
Content/Brandom: non-inferential circumstances: (perception circumstances) are a crucial element of the content of a concept such as red - further content approves the inference from the circumstances to the consequences of using it appropriately, regardless of whether those circumstances are themselves specified in narrowly defined inferential concepts. ---
I 698
Content/Action/Brandom: states and actions, as premises and conclusions, obtain content by being embedded in consequences and inferences (instead of representation).
I 662
Definition content/equality/Frege : "Two judgements have the same content if and only if the conclusions that can be drawn from one in connection with various others, always also follow from the other in connection with the same other judgements" - BrandomVsFrege: this is a universal quantification via auxiliary hypotheses - such a requirement would erase the differences, because such a quantity could always be found: according to Frege, any two judgements have the same consequences if they are connected with a contradiction. ---
I 731
Narrow/Content/BrandomVs: (depends only on the individual): coherent history barely possible which only considers one individual - furthermore, the stories of similar individuals should be the same - but different context always possible.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Content Field
 
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I 253
Modality/Possibility//Physics/Field: a prefixed modal operator would change the content of a physical law. - ((s) This goes beyond the purely logical case p > Mp).
I 254
Contents/Content/Field/(s): is not preserved, although arbitrary conflicting conclusions may be believed as well. - Requirement: separation into two components, one of which remains fixed. - E.g. physics/mathematics.
II 107
Belief State/Contents/Deflationism/Truth Conditions/Field: if belief can be described as the state of acceptance of the sentence "snow is white", it can be described: - a) as belief state that snow is white and - b) as a state with the truth conditions that snow is white - Point: the connection of that-sentences with truth conditions is loosened. - (VsFrege, VsRussell).

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Context/Context Dependence Hintikka
 
Books on Amazon
I 108
Context dependency/context/compositionality/Frege principle/Hintikka: Problem: Context dependency violates the Frege principle. ((s) The meaning of a sentence can change then, although no component changes.) Any/every/he/a/Hintikka: bad solution: (16) analyze as
(20) John does not believe Mary likes him.
Problem: (16) says that it is compatible with John's beliefs that Mary does not love one while
(20) is compatible with the fact that John does not believe Mary likes him (John). This is then compatible with the fallacy of (17).
---
I 109
Any/context dependency/context/Hintikka: what we need is an explanation of how the interpretation of "any x" depends on the context. ---
I 109
Frege principle/compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside to the inside, we can allow that the Frege principle is violated. (i.e. the semantic role of the constituents in the interior is context-dependent). ---
I 110
HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: Meanings (meaning entities) should not be produced step by step from simpler in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be used as rules of semantic analysis.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Copula Geach
 
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I 221
Copula/Geach: if you understand concept and object correctly, you do not need copula. - Instead, you can use "falls under". - (In ancient times it was also handled like this) - ((s) "is a" suggests false identity (at most partial identity, i.e. classification) - Frege late: VsFrege early: nor "falls under" - "is a"/Frege: does not mean "belongs to a class"!
I 221
"Is a..."/Geach: is no logical relation between an x and an object (class) called "human."

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Correctness Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 308
Truth/correctness/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine, a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how is learning, speaking in unison, supposed to facilitate the prediction?
Consensus/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both do not take into account what consistency in judgments actually is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, it does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: Consensus means saying the same about the same.
Discrepancy: can only occur if sentences have a subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine even goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" As a sentence. He claims the difference between the word and the sentence affects only the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proved by the absence of evidence, but by positive facts (see above).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree with a sentence and its negation at the same time, lies in nature (natural necessity).
---
I 309
Thesis: the lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. Consensus/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they ignore the importance of consistency in the judgment.
Consensus: this is not about the fact that two people come together, but that they come together with the world.
Consensus/discrepancy/Millikan: are not two equivalent possibilities ((s)> Nozick: inegalitarian theory) There are much more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if a whole pattern (system) of matching judgments appears, mapping the same area (e.g. color), the probability that each participant maps an area outside in the world is vast.
E.g. just because my judgments about the timing almost always coincide with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to sort my memories correctly into the time sequence.
Objectivity/Time/Perspective/Media/Communication/Millikan: Thesis: the medium that other people form with their utterances is for me the most accessible perspective I can have in terms of time.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Denotation Berka
 
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Berka I 389
Signifikat/Berka: entspricht dem Sinn - Bedeutung/Berka: "Designat" oder "Denotat" BerkaVsFrege: wir unterscheiden also Bezeichnung und Bedeutung - Bezeichnen: wird auf Entitäten der Prälogik 1. Stufe - Bedeuten: auf Entitäten der Prälogik 2. Stufe angewendet

---designiert ----> Sachverhalt
Proposition <---- signifiziert -- Aussage ---
(Urteil) --- denotiert -----> WW

---

Ding
---designiert --> Eigenschaft
Konzept < ---- signifiziert --- Name ---- Beziehung

--- denotiert --> Individuum
Klasse
Relation

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Descriptions Russell
 
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Bertrand Russell
Cresswell I 117
Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects. ---
Geach I 61
Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer. ---
Newen/Schrenk I 90
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) - 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity.
Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided.
---
I 92
N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world. ---
Russell I VIII
E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott. ---
I 46
Labelling/Russell: always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features ---
I 96
Labelling/Principia Mathematica/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot define (ix)(jx) only its use - (> Definition).
---
III 122
Labelling/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.)

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Descriptions Tugendhat
 
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I 348
Descriptions/Frege (also Husserl): descriptions more fundamental than names - for finding the reference of names - MillVsFrege: Names more fundamental - VsMill: mysterious: "enclosed to the object itself" - solution/Mill: not to the object but to the idea of object. ---
I 378
Frege: names are abbreviations for descriptions - shortened description. ---
I 396
Description/properties/Identification/Tugendhat: doubtful whether descriptions can really pick out an object - "original" property: E.g. "the highest mountain", "the second highest mountain," and so on - problem: there can also be two mountains of the same height, at one point there can be multiple or none so-and-so - Tugendhat: there must be added something else, ostension, name or location - E.g. someone who is lead in front of the highest mountain, does not need to know that it is the highest - (s) and "this mountain" is not a property.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Existential Generalization Hintikka
 
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I 42
Existing Generalization/EG/HintikkaVsParsons, Terence: his criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. E.g.
(1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll.
From this one cannot infer, even though Caroll existed, and this was known by the Queen that
(2) (Ex) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is x.
And therefore
(3) Someone is so that Queen Victoria knew that he was Lewis Carroll.
(2) and (3) say the same as
(4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll is.
But this is not entailed by (1).
Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2) - (3) with (4) is, however, quite independent of whether the quantifiers go only about existent or non-existent objects.
The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of the unambiguousness.
Unambiguity, however, fails because in various situations, which are compatible with the knowledge of the queen, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different people. Therefore, not only a single specific object can function as the value of "x".
Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply in (1) and yet it can be understood that it obliges the one who utters it to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parsons criterion fails.
---
I 54
Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the existential generalization entitles us to move from one sentence S (b) to a singular term "b" to the existence statement (Ex) S (x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts.
Transition from "any" to "some". (> Existential Generalization)
E.g. epistemic context:
(10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w)
(11) (tentatively concluding) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x)
---
I 55
Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is.
Existential generalization/failures/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: assumed that we are dealing with ideas of speakers in intensional (opaque) contexts.
HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would in any case follow from (10) ((s) And that is just not desired). For one would have to assume that there is in any case any meaning under which George IV imagines an individual w.
Problem: "w" picks out different individuals in different worlds.
---
I 56
Semantics of Possible Worlds/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose (13) George knows that S (w)
to
(14) (Ex) George knows that S (x)
Whereby S (w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts.
Then we need an additional condition
(15) (Ex) in all relevant worlds (w = x)
But this is not a well-formed expression in our notation. We must say what the relevant worlds are.
Definition relevant world/Hintikka: are all those which are compatible with the knowledge of George.
Thus, (15) is the same with
(16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x).
This is the additional premise. That is, George knows who is w. (knowing-that, knwing-who, knowing-what).

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Extensionality Stechow
 
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61
extensional propositional logic / Stechow: cannot describe the meaning of "Modals" - e.g. the meaning of "must" is "follows from my knowledge" - [[must f]] says in epistemic meaning that [[f]] is a superset of my knowledge - the meaning function [[must]] is a relation between two sets of situations - (key point) - such meanings (sets of possible worlds) we do not have when sentences (extensionally) designate truth values. ((s) StechowVsFrege?)
A. von Stechow
I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik
www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006)
Externalism Davidson
 
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Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory.
Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: complete sentences, interpretation.
---
I 8
Definition Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content - DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief - externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro). ---
I 72
Externalism/Davidson: pro variant: from twin earth, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore no threat of the 1st person authority - Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts. ---
I 74
Externalism/Burge: two forms: a): social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) - b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual - Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content - DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error. ---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 185
Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal Theory - Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke/DavidsonVsPutnam: whole sentences, interpretation - reference of single words/Davidson: theoretical construct - ((s) derived from whole sentences). ---
Frank I 626ff
Externalism/Davidson: it does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause. ---
Frank I 663
Externalism/Authority: if thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended - VsDescartes: inner states not certain - Burge: false use of terms: possibility to not know his own thoughts - DavidsonVsBurge: beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning. ---
I 663-667
Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": only observing internal states - Burge: external factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments" - e.g. wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself possible e.g. arthritis) - DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person. ---
I 676
Mind/Tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: if stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave his way out? - but the "objects" do not interest it, but their cousins, the propositions - but the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Features Gärdenfors
 
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Peter Gärdenfors
I 47
Feature/Feature Analysis/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: in the tradition of Fregean logic and Tarski's theory of truth, a different approach has emerged than the one I have pursued: the assumption that a set of features of a concept is necessary and sufficient to determine meaning. ---
I 48
For this purpose see Jackendoff, 1983, p. 112; Goddard and Wierzbicka, 1994. In particular Katz and Fodor (1963), R. Lakoff (1971), Schank, (1975), Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976).
Group: GärdenforsVsFeature Analysis.
Concept features/GärdenforsVsKatz/GärdenforsVsLakoff, R./GärdenforsVsFodor/GärdenforsVsFrege: Experimental results speak rahter for dimensional representations that are based on similarities than on representations of features. (See Rosch, 1978, Prototype theory).
Prototype theory/Rosch: thesis: objects are more or less typical examples of a category and there is a graduated containment in categories.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Formalism Wittgenstein
 
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VI 119
Formalism/Substitute/Sign/Symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege: Frege: characters are either mere blackening or signs of something - then what they represent, is their meaning - Wittgenstein: false alternative - E.g. chess pieces: represent nothing - Solution: use like in the game instead of representation of something - ((s) use is more than mere blackening of the paper and less than representation of an object) - Wittgenstein: formalism is not entirely unjustified.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Formalism Thiel
 
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Thiel I 20
Formalismus/Thiel: Vollzieht sozusagen die "linguistische Wende" in der Mathematik. Es wird jetzt gefragt, was der Gegenstand der Arbeit des Mathematikers sei. Regeln für Handlungen. Symbole werden durch andere ersetzt. Dabei fragt der Formalist nicht nach der "Bedeutung". Mathematik: Lehre von den Formalismen oder formalen Systemen (>Bernays). Neben dieser "kalkültheoretischen Variante" des Formalismus gibt es die "strukturtheoretische" Variante. (>Hilbert). Verschiedene formale System können als von genau demselben mathematischen Objektbereichen gültig gedeutet werden. Wir können dies deren "Beschreibung" durch die formalen Systeme nennen.

Thiel I 279
Formalismus/Geometrie/Hilbert/Thiel: Hilbert hatte 1899 in seinen Grundlagen der Geometrie Termini wie Punkt, Gerade, Ebene, "zwischen" usw. verwendet, aber deren Sinn auf bis dahin ungewohnte Weise verstanden. Sie sollte nämlich nicht nur die Herleitung der üblichen Sätze ermöglichen, sondern in ihrer Gesamtheit überhaupt erst die Bedeutung der in ihnen verwendeten Termini festlegen.
I 280
Später nannte man dies "Definition durch Postulate", "implizite Definition" >Definition. Die Benennungen Punkt, Gerade usw. sollten allenfalls eine bequeme Hilfe für die mathematische Anschauung sein.
FregeVsHilbert: stellt im Briefwechsel klar, dass dessen Axiome nicht Aussagen sondern Aussageformen seine. >Aussageform.
Er bestritt, dass durch deren Zusammenwirken den in ihnen auftretenden Begriffen eine Bedeutung verliehen werde. Definiert werde vielmehr ein (in Freges Terminologie) "Begriff zweiter Stufe", heute würde man auch sagen eine "Struktur".
HilbertVsFrege: die Pointe des Hilbertschen Vorgehens ist gerade, dass die Bedeutung von "Punkt", "Gerade" usw offengelassen wird.
Frege und Hilbert hätten sich darauf durchaus einigen können, taten es aber nicht.
Axiome/Frege/Thiel: ein Axiom sollte eine im klassischen Sinne einfache, im Sinn völlig klare Aussage am Anfang eines Systems sein.
Axiome/Hilbert: Aussageformen, die zusammengefasst eine Disziplin definieren. Daraus hat sich die "schlampige" Redeweise entwickelt Bsp "Gerade" in der Kugelgeometrie sei eben ein Großkreis.

Thiel I 342
Intuitionismus und Formalismus werden oft als Alternativen zum Logizismus dargestellt. Die drei differieren so stark, dass ein Vergleich sogar Mühe bereitet.
I 343
Formalismus/Thiel: 1. "älterer" Formalismus: zweite Hälfte 19, Jahrhundert Schöpfer Hankel, Heine, Thomae, Stolz. "formale Arithmetik,", "formale Algebra". "Gegenstand der Arithmetik seien die Zeichen auf dem Papier selbst, so dass die Existenz dieser Zahlen nicht in Frage steht" (naiv). Def "Permanenzprinzip": es war üblich geworden, für hinzukommende Zahlen neue Zeichen einzuführen und dann zu postulieren, dass die von den Zahlen des Ausgangsbereichs geltenden Regeln auch für den erweiterten Bereich gültig sein sollten.
Vs: das müsste solange als illegitim gelten, als die Widerspruchsfreiheit nicht gezeigt sei. Sonst könnte man eine neue Zahl einführen, und
Bsp § + 1 = 2 und § + 2 = 1 einfach postulieren. Dieser Widerspruch würde zeigen dass es die "neuen Zahlen" in Wahrheit gar nicht gibt. Das erklärt die Formulierung von Heine, dass die "Existenz gar nicht in Frage steht".

I 343/'344
Etwas differenzierter behandelte Thomae das Problem als "Spielregeln". FregeVsThomae: dieser habe nicht einmal die Grundbestimmungen seines Spiels, nämlich die Entsprechungen zu den Regeln, Figuren, und Stellungen präzise angegeben.
Diese Kritik Freges war schon ein Vorläufer der Hilbertschen Beweistheorie, in der ja ebenfalls bloße Zeichenreihen unter Absehung von ihren etwaigen Inhalt auf ihre Erzeugung und Umformung nach gegebenen Regeln betrachtet werden.
I 345
HilbertVsVs: Kritiker Hilberts übersehen oft, dass zumindest für Hilbert selbst, der "finite Kern" durchaus inhaltlich gedeutet bleiben sollte und nur die "idealen" nicht finit deutbaren Teile keinen unmittelbar aufweisbaren Inhalt haben. Diese Pointe ist methodischer, nicht philosophischer Art. Für Hilberts Programm ist auch "Formalismus" der am häufigsten gebrauchte Ausdruck. Darüber hinaus geht die Auffassung des Formalismus in einem dritten Sinn: nämlich die Auffassung der Mathematik und Logik als ein System von Handlungsschemata für den Umgang mit von jedem Inhalt freien Figuren.
HilbertVsFrege und Dedekind: die Gegenstände der Zahlentheorie sind die Zeichen selber. Motto: "Am Anfang war das Zeichen."
I 346
Die Bezeichnung Formalismus stammte nicht von Hilbert oder seiner Schule. Brouwer hatte die Gegensätze zwischen seinem Intuitionismus und dem Formalismus der Hilbertschule zu einer Grundsatzentscheidung hochstilisiert. Brouwer: seine Revision des klassischen Mengen und Funktionsbegriffs bringt eine andere "Species Mathematik".
An Stelle der Funktion als Zuordnung von Funktionswerten zu Argumenten der Funktion treten Folgen von Wahlhandlungen eines fiktiven "idealen Mathematikers" der an jeder Stelle des unbegrenzt gedachten Prozesses eine natürliche Zahl wählt, wobei diese Zahl durch die verschiedensten Bestimmungen für die Wahlakte eingeschränkt sein darf, obwohl im einzelnen Fall der Wahlakt nicht voraussagbar ist.

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995

Formalism d’Abro
 
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A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967

33
Formalism: the formalist sees arithmetic and logic as complementary.
A certain agreement between the two doctrines results from the impossibility of defining the number and, in particular, the whole number (VsFrege). The formalists, however, assert an indirect possibility on the basis of axioms.

A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967
---
50
Intuitionism/formalism/d'Abro: The intuitionist is a rigorist, insofar as he considers definitions and proofs accepted by the formalist to be inadequate. It should be admitted that they are not given by logic, but by intuition.

E.g. Zermelo's (formalist) proof that the continuum is an ordered set. I.e., the points can be placed one after the other, with a successor for each point.

PoincaréVsZermelo: he invented a typical argument: the pragmatist rejected Zermelo's proof because it would take too much time to carry it out, and the number of operations to be performed would be even greater than Aleph's zero, not to be expressed with a finite number of words. The pragmatist will conclude that the theorem is pointless.

Groups: Formalists: Cantor, Hilbert, Zermelo, Russell - Intuitionists: Poincaré, Weyl
---
53
According to Weyl, the concept of the irrational number must either be abandoned, or thoroughly modified.

Brouwer: when dealing with infinite quantities, the sentence of the excluded middle does not apply.

The intuitionists assert with Poincaré that antinomies without any infinity are lopish.
Poincaré: The antinomies of certain logicians are simply circular.
---
54
Formalism/d'Abro: E.g. d'Abro sees no obstacle to define x in the following way:
(a) x has this and this relation to all members of type G.
---
55
(b) x is a term of G.
For an intuitionist, according to Poincaré, such a definition is circular.
For example, controversy about definitions that cannot be expressed in a finite number of words. It is refused by the intuitionists.

1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8...
This series, according to the intuitionists, is capable of being expressed in a finite number of words, since a rule can be formulated.
It should be noted that the difference is theoretical and not practically important, a proof that e.g. could be formulated in a trillion words would be acceptable.

Identity Frege
 
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Frege II 65
Identity/Frege: E.g. a = b: the meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". - But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". - >judgment >epistemological value >non-trivial identity.
Dum III 70f
Identity/VsFrege/Dummett: (Informative/Uninformative) Example a = b: some: in order to understand this, you need to know - if it is true - that it is true - Important argument: then it does not provide information. - FregeVs: there’s no need to know if two expressions designate the same object if you understand the expressions. ((s) You can also know the "general" reference.) - ((s) The intentions may just be different.)
Frege II 40
Identity/Statement/Assertion of Identity/Identity Statement/Frege: E.g. a = b: does not say anything about signs, but about objects. - Otherwise, no insight would be expressed by this, because signs are arbitrary anyway. - So it is not about "a" and "b" meaning the same thing. - That would be a statement about signs. - ((s) Instead: that they are different modes of givenness of the same object - (manner of givenness/(s): is not the sign)!.
II 65
Identity/Frege: a = b: Meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". - But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". Identity/Frege: same meaning, different sense. - Notion: therefore, the thought expressed by "a = a" is different from that expressed by "a = b".

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Identity Geach
 
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I 218
Identity/GeachVsFrege: is not a relation - "Is an A" does not mean "has identity with A" - (whereby "A" is a name). - VsFrege: (in Frege, basic principles of artihmetics) instead of "There are just as many Fs as Gs": "Either any given object F iff it is a G, or there is a relation that is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs". But this must not be an identity. ---
I 226
Identity/Geach: only objects can be strictly identical. - In terms, there is only analogous identity: if they are coextensive. ---
I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: Identity is relative. - If someone says "x is identical to y", this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same as y". - (Weird, that Frege did not represent this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single schema.
(1)l- Fa (x)(Fx u x = a) - everyday-language: whatever is true of something which is identical with an object y is true of a and vice versa. - From this we derive the law of self-identity:
"l-a = a".
Because we take "Fx" for "x unequal a", then schema (1) gives us:
(2)l- (a unequal a) Vx(y unequal a u x = a) - this,of course, gives "l-a = a"
---
I 240
Identity/Geach: if we demand strict identity, regardless of the theory in which we move, we get into the semantic paradoxes such as Grelling's or Richard's solution: relative identity on theory or language, indissibility/"indiscernibility"/Quine -> Partial identity. ---
Tugendhat I 37
Identity/Dummett/Geach: "=" can only be used with reference to objects.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Identity Wittgenstein
 
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Hintikka I 22
Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) its agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts. Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be said linguistically. (6.2322)
---
I 140 Note
Hintikka: ... for Wittgenstein this is about the dispensability of the identity concept. He could also have said that this term already exists in the other elementary propositions. ---
I 364
Experience/perception/identity/Wittgenstein: the comparison between experiences in terms of their >identity does not belong to the primary but to the secondary language games. In a certain secondary language game, the relationship can partially be influenced by the possible documentary evidence.
---
II 338
Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. We have to differentiate this use of the equal sign from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. One can remove the identity sign.
---
II 338/339
Identity/logical form/sentence/Wittgenstein: in my writing neither (Ex, y) x = y, nor (Ex) x = x is a set. If there is a thing, then why to express this by a statement about a thing?
What tempts us to believe it is a fundamental truth that a thing is identical with itself? Thus, I did not yet met the sentence of identity.
---
II 416
WittgensteinVsRussell: he was just trying to get next to the list another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. ---
II 418
Identity/substitution/equal sign/Wittgenstein: E.g. "a = a": here the equal sign has a special meaning - because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. - Equal sign: its use is limited to cases in which a bound variable exists. ---
IV 103
Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essence of the equation is not that the sides have different sense but the same meaning. - But that this can be already seen at the two sides. ---
VI 179
Identity/Wittgenstein/Schulte: in overlapping silhouettes the question is meaningless, which is A or B after the separation. ---
VI 183
Pain/identity/criteria/Wittgenstein/Schulte: which criterion for identity? Well, simply, the one who is sitting there, or any description. But for my pain? No criterion!

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Idiolect Cresswell
 
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II 151
Def "extreme Fregeanism" / KripkeVsFrege / KripkeVsRussell / Cresswell (he ascribes this setting to both of them): thesis that names in general belong to idiolects - problem: then the Pierre-Example is not about Pierre, but the reporter of the case, and his idiolect! -

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Imagination Avramides
 
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I 141
WittgensteinVsFrege: goes even further than Frege and does not allow private imaginations. - No undetectable beyond communication.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Imagination Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
I 117
DummettVsSaussure: This representation of the communication process is obviously untenable. It imitates the equation of idea and concept by the British empiricists. (Vs) Concepts are represented as mental images (ideas).
I 117ff
DummettVsFrege: (consciousness subjective - thoughts objective): Dummett: categorial difference: mental images (ideas)/thoughts.
I 127
DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated because they are used only in a certain way - by this determination they can be communicated.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Indeterminacy Buridan
 
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Geach I
Indeterminacy/reference/Frege: "to refer to something indeterminate" is often rather: to refer indefinitely to something definite. Geach: in (4), (7), or (9) it is not a definite reference and also not an indication. (?).
In Buridan the "appellatio" is highly obscure to a "ratio", but that is Frege's "odd meaning" too! (GeachVsFrege).

Suppositio confusa/Buridan: respectively the first sentences of the following pairs
Suppositio determinata: respectively the second:

(10) To see, I need an eye
(11) There is an eye that I need to see with it
(12) There was always a living man
(13) There is a man who has always been alive
---
L 150
This can easily be clarified in modern logic with quantifiers.

Index Words Perry
 
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Frank I 22
PerryVsFrege: "today" is not a completing or "saturating" sense, absolutely no sense, but a reference object - meaning remains, reference varies. ---
Frank I 393F
Index words/Perry: without pointing component - demonstratives: with pointing component - meaning of index-words: their role - similar to the method for the determination of the object. ---
I 394f
Today/Meaning: constant, truth value with index word "today it's nice" is not constant, so the meaning is changing - if understanding is knowing the truth value. - Perry: role (determination process) changes, meaning constant - then the meaning cannot be a part of the thought. - What the speaker believes is irrelevant to the meaning of the index word. ---
I 419
Index words/Perry: true-false exam does not help. - E.g. Two lost wanderers: that the Mt. Tallac is higher than Jack's Peak, is affirmed by all. - ((S) This presupposes that the two do not stand side by side in sight - Perry:. There is no mountain, everyone believes it is Mt. Tallac, no customer from which all believe that he has made the mess - no Professor, who does not feel guilty -. What people have in common here is not what they believe (E.g. wanderers). ---
I 394 ff
Sense/Perry: is oft of understood as a term - then question: is the meaning of index words to be equated with an individual-concept or a general term?

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Index Words Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 285
Index words/I/Frege: calls for a public and private sense - e.g. when we talk of today tomorrow, we have to say "yesterday" - SearleVsFrege: that seems to be indexically de re - SearleVsFrege: Frege did not notice the self-referentiality of these expressions (unlike Monring Star/Evening Star).

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Individuation Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 177
Individuation/Thoughts/Sentence/GärdenforsVsFrege/Gärdenfors: thoughts cannot be sentences, because sentences cannot be identified language-independent.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Infinity Geach
 
Books on Amazon
I 166
infinite / GeachVsFrege: mathematical infinity is not, as Frege thought, an infinity of "objective objects", but consists in the infinitely many possibilities of the human language -> operationalism.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Intensions Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
V 47
Sense/Frege: extramental entity. - ("Old" intension) - thought content, which is detected - on the other hand new intension/PutnamVsFrege: there are meaning differences that escape the intension - i.e. understanding not only by linking with intension - VsFrege: detecting only by representation, not 6th Sense - representation is determined by environment(twin earth). ---
V 48f
Bracketing/Husserl: talk about what is going on in someone's head, without condition relating to actual nature of the objects - twin earth E.g. "belief that a glass of water is in front of him (namely for the believer himself, in full non-bracketed sense). ---
V 49
"Notional world"/Dennett: set of bracketed beliefs of a subject - reference of course is the actual substance (twin earth) - intension/tradition: notional world determines the intension - PutnamVs: this is wrong, therefore no uniform concept of meaning anymore.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Intensions Wittgenstein
 
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II 343
Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. ---
II 416
Intension/extension/Mathematics/Wittgenstein: in everyday language intension and extension are not interchangeable - E.g. I hate the man in the chair - I hate Mr. Schmitz - on the other hand in mathematics: here, there is no difference between "the roots of the equation x² + 2x + 1 = 0 and "2"- in contrast difference: counting bodies ((s) extension, also writing down) is something different than to determine them with a law ((s) intension) - Wittgenstein: law and extension are completely different - ((s) Physics). ---
III 136-139
Elementary PropositionVsIntension - (protection of formal logic) - intension/meaning/Tractatus/Flor: irrelevant - it is always about extension.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Introduction Strawson
 
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I 187
Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing (Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing). ---
I 188
VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech - one can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates not. ---
I 192
But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating. ---
I 193
Assertive mode primary. ---
I 194
Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode). ---
I 196
StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. ---
I 232ff
Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular. ---
I 234
Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement. ---
I 235
For universals nothing corresponding. ---
I 236
But no facts about the world but about the language - (s) no truth maker. ---
I 238
When U introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed. ---
I 239
Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease". ---
I 239f
U/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce - class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete - (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight - (2) have no factual weight. ---
I 241
Subject/predicate/thing/particular/U: 3. criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) - predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself. ---
I 242
E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact. ---
I 242
General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions. ---
I 254ff
Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition - new: other sense of introducing: introduction of practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also E1: introduces particular, E2: classes of particulars - then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universal) which can be introduced - where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal? ---
I 258
Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1. ---
I 263
Both theories independ, but connectable. ---
I 259
Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur - E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2 - Problem: What is at the end of the chain? -> Feature-universals.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Is Cresswell
 
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I 161
"is"/ Frege / Russell: ambiguous in everyday language - HintikkaVsFrege / KulasVsFrege: (1983): this is not true - Cresswell: ditto, but the normal semantics is not committed to Frege-Russell anyway.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Knowledge Field
 
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I 83
Knowledge/Logic/Field: logical knowledge: when logic is confined to the if-then form: no knowledge about what does not follow. - Solution: differentiated deflationism: two parts: i) Knowledge, which mathematical statement follows from other mathematical statements. (ii) additional knowledge about the consistency of mathematical statements (and other fundamental). - ((s) About that was no conclusion of something). - consistency/(s): is itself not a conclusion. - Field E.g. a knowledge about all models is not a logical knowledge. - Syntactically: E.g. "There is a derivative of B from A": is not a logical knowledge, but knowledge about existence. - Deflationism: both is logical knowledge. - VsDeflationism: the fundamental is metalogical. ---
I 88
Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. - FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. - Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. - Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical, because we find no contradiction. ---
I 93
Knowledge/Possibility/Field: there is knowledge of possibility that is not only based on knowledge of necessity. - Only by thinking about the logical form. - Problem: E.g.: "There are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 apples": every statement of the same logical form as this is also a logical truth. - (But in terms of content, it is wrong) - Then one no longer had to rely on the actuality. - Then it would be categorical knowledge. - E.g. apples/Field: here we have stronger reason to believe in the possibility than in the actuality. - Field: but there are infinitely many physical entities: namely, space-time regions. ---
I 94
Logical Knowledge/Frege: Thesis: Problem, whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. - FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another?

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Limits Carnap
 
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VI 242
Concept/object/CarnapVsFrege: border sometimes fluent! - Question: if a real object or rather conceptual summary (e.g. furniture, coal inventory in Central Europe) - Relation: e.g. it is controversial whether distance is something real.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Logic Wittgenstein
 
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Hintikka I 138
Frege/logic/Hintikka: his logic is considered as the theory of complex sentences - Wittgenstein in contrast: easiest parts of the world - eliminate logical constants - They do not represent. ---
I 205
Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no other author than Wittgenstein has ever had the thought, in the logic it had ultimately no more explanation than what is given to us in experience through the simple objects - all phenomenology is just logic. - HusserlVs - Husserl: possibilities are motivated by background beliefs. ---
II 160
Logic/WittgensteinVsFrege: 1. It is rather arbitrary, what we call a sentence - therefore logic means something else in my opinion than in Frege's. 2. VsFrege: All words are equally important - Frege: thesis: "Word", "sentence", "world" are more important.
---
II 238
Logic/arbitrary/Wittgenstein: the rules of logic are insofar arbitrary that they can be eliminated for greater expressiveness - E.g. sentence of the excluded third (SaD) is invalid - at least "contradiction" is used in different meanings - as well as double negation -. Some authors: "the application is different." WittgensteinVs: one cannot talk independently of a sign from its use. - ((S) Then it is another sign - against see below.
---
II 328
The sentence of the excluded third is universal. ---
II 327
Logic/Wittgenstein: it is not a science, but a calculus - in it you can make inventions, but no discoveries. ---
II 333
Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: one cannot construct a logic for all cases - because one cannot abstract both applications from the application. ---
VI 85
Logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Schulte: not we express with the signs what we want - but in the logic the nature of the nature-necessary sign states itself - (6,124). ---
VI 89
Logic/border/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic is not given a limit through the use of the language, of course - it is, so to speak, the common framework of "my" and "your" language. ---
VI 118
Logic/Wittgenstein: say/show: logic says nothing, it shows something about necessity - grammatical sentences (about the language) thus fall out of the language game -> training: no speakable rules but blind following. TrainingVsExplanation, instead: Description - (> tell/show). ---
IV 101
Logic/Tractatus: (6.1264) each sentence of logic is a, in characters expressed, modus ponens - (And this cannot be expressed by one sentence). - (> Show/tell).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Logical Knowledge Field
 
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I 88
Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that the axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. - FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. - Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. - Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical - because we find no contradiction. ---
I 94
Logical Knowledge/Frege: Problem: whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. - FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another? ---
I 113
Pure Logical Knowledge/Field: must be knowledge that makes no existence assumptions.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Mathematics Waismann
 
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I 84
Mathematics/Waismann: in our view, mathematics is not tautological, nor is it a mere branch of logic. It rests only on its own determinations. The belief that mathematics is more securely founded by logic is a misunderstanding.
2 + 2 = 4 does not correspond to a tautology, but to an instruction. It is much closer to an empirical proposition than a tautology. It is just a rule, similar to chess, which is obeyed or transgressed. This would not be possible in the case of a tautology, for what is it to obey or transgress a tautology?
The opinion that the entire mathematics is based on Peano's 5 axioms can no longer be maintained today. Mathematics is a multiplicity of systems.
The theorems of arithmetic are neither true nor false, but are compatible or incompatible with certain determinations.
Thus a certain dualism is overcome:
---
I 85
It was believed that only the natural numbers were eternal, irrefutable truths, or they expressed them, whereas the rational and real numbers were mere conventions. (Kronecker). WaismannVsKronecker: that is a half measure, and the whole development of arithmetic shows which way we have to go: the possibility of a number series 1,2,3,4,5,... - many have already been mentioned.
E.g. if we think that a distance is divided into parts by points, then it makes sense to say that the distance has 2,3,4... parts, but not: "the distance has a part." One would rather like to count here:

0,2,3,4...

and this corresponds to the sentence series: "The distance is undivided", "the distance is divided into two parts", ... etc. i.e. we do not count here according to the scheme we use, and yet this is an everyday case. ((s) linguistic overvaluation of "consists of." Solution: 1 = fake part.)
But not only the number series, but also the operations we might think of as changed: Suppose, we should carry out additions with many millions of digits. The results of two computers will not match then. Is the concept of probability introduced into arithmetics here? Or a new calculation is introduced.
The error of logic was that it thought it had firmly underpinned the arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are, however, flooded by our thinking, but they are not movable."
WaismannVsFrege: already the expression "justifying" the arithmetic gives us a false picture,...
---
I 86
...as if its building was built on ground truths, while it is a calculus, which proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system, which rests on nothing. We can only describe the arithmetic, i.e. specify their rules, but not justify it.

Wa I
F. Waismann
Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996

Wa II
F. Waismann
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976

Meaning Perry
 
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Frank I 396
Meaning / idea / PerryVsFrege: we must separate sharply meaning and thoughts - the thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content - the meaning corresponds to the role of words - the same role creates another de re-proposition in any context.

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Negation Austin
 
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I 236
Negation / AustinVsFrege: relates directly to the world and is not limited to statements about the world - (Frege, Tugendhat I 66): Negation / Frege: refers to the propositional content, not to the sentence.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Negation Frege
 
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Chisholm II 181 ff
Negation/Frege/Simons: Problem: negative facts - Solution: simply two truth values ​​(t/f) and a function that swaps the two - WittgensteinVsFrege: connection should not be represented as a function - Operator N: forms a conjugates negation from a sentence: the asserted (the used variables) is false - Notation: x^: all values ​​of x. - Negation/Simons: only has the smallest range: atomic sentences. - Operator N: always negates the disjunction, never the conjunction, because of Wittgenstein’s need for atoms. - Ontology: only complexes and the verbs E! and N.
Frege IV 61
Negation/Denial/Judgment/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. - That’s quite unnecessary - even a negative one judgment is a simple judgment.
IV 64
Negation/Denial/Frege: is not equal to the judgments. - It is not an "opposite pole" to the judgments.
IV 69
Description/Subordinate Clause/Subset/Name/Frege: E.g. "the negation of the notion that 3 is greater than 5" - this expression refers to a specific individual thing. - This individual thing is a notion. - The definite article turns the entire expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name.
IV passim
Thought/Frege: to every idea belongs its denial as an independent second idea. - Thoughts are not made up, but composed. - Their truth is not their being thought. - They are timeless, precisely because they must always carry a determination of time with them. - Thus, "today", "yesterday" and "I" become "He" (two thoughts). - By replacing "horse" with "mare" the thought does not change, only the coloring.
Tugendhat II 66f
Negation/Frege: not a property - not always with the sign of negation. - E.g. "Christ is immortal" is not negative per se. - The negation sign applies only to the propositional content. - Proof: Negation in subsets: only the whole sentence is asserted. - In the subset (non-asserting) the "not" belongs to the propositional content from the outset.
Tugendhat II 12
Proposition/Frege/Tugendhat: negation always refers to the propositional content, not the assertion.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Now Perry
 
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Frank I 22
Now/PerryVsFrege: "today" is not a completing or "saturating" sense, absolutely no sense, but a reference object - meaning remains, reference varies. ---
Frank I 394f
Today/Meaning: is constant, - however, the truth value of index word "today it is beautiful": is not constant, so the meaning is changing. - If understanding is knowing the truth value. - Perry: the role (the determination method) changes, the meaning remains constant. - Then, the meaning cannot be a part of the thought. - What the speaker thinks is irrelevant to the meaning of the index word.

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Numbers Black
 
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II 125
Numerals/ Numbers/ names / Black: unlike names for physical objects: E.g. "two people came in" here "two", is an adverb - it can be transformed into "another and another" - that s not possible for "red" - BlackVsFrege: the shows that numbers are no special objects - BlackVsPlatonism

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Numbers Field
 
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I 153
Numbers/Frege/Wright: Frege suggests that the fact that our arithmetical language has these qualities is sufficient to establish natural numbers as a sortal concept whose instances, if they have some, are the objects. - WrightVsFrege: but the objects do not have to exist. - Problem: Frege thus demands that empirical concerns are irrelevant. - Then there is also no possibility of an error. ---
II 214
Numbers/BenacerrafVsReduction/Benacerraf/Field: there may be several correlations so that one cannot speak of "the" referent of number words. - Solution/Field: we have to extend "partially denoted" also to sequences of terms. - Then "straight", "prim", etc. become base-dependent predicates whose basis is the sequence of the numbers. - Then one can get mathematical truth (> truth preservation, truth transfer) - E.g. "The number two is Caesar" is neither true nor false. (without truth value). ---
II 326
Definition natural numbers/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 is the empty set and every natural number > 0 is the set that is the only element which includes the set which is n-1 - Definition natural numbers/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: Every natural number n is the set that has the sets as elements which are the predecessors of n as elements. Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelos or von Neumann's approach "presents" the things "correctly" - there is no fact which decides whether numbers are sets. - That is what I call the Definition Structural Insight: it makes no difference what the objects of a mathematical theory are, if they are only in a right relationship with each other.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Numbers Geach
 
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I, 215ff
Numbers/Geach: naming nothing- not: E.g.: "There are two Daimon and Phobos" - how often a concept is realized is not a feature of the term. ((s) GeachVsMeixner) - Unit/Multiplicity/Geach: cannot be attributed to an object - Solution/Frege: they are attributed to the terms under which the objects fall. - Numbers: in mathematics sometimes as objects with properties E.g. Divisibility - Geach: then we need an identity criterion - Frege: Equality in numbers: "There is a one-to-one correspondence of Fs and Gs". - N.B.: this does not mean that the Fs or the Gs refer to a single object - a class. - Solution: Relation instead of class - E.g. One puts next to each plate a knife: no class but relation. ---
I 220
Numbers/Frege: Self-critique: Classes must not be used to explain what numbers are, otherwise contradiction: "one and the same object is both, the class of the M's and the class of the G's, although an object (this object, e.g. number(!)) can be an M without being a G. " - (+) - This shows that the original concept of a class contained contradictions. - Numbers can be objects (with properties such as divisibility), classes cannot. - Not contradictory: "one and the same object: the number (not class!) of the F's and the number of K's". ---
I 221f
Numbers/GeachVsFrege: Number is not "number of objects". - With this he rejects his own concerns to say that "the object of a number belongs to a class" (wrong). - "The number of the A's" is to mean: "the number of the class of all A's" (wrong) Solution/Geach: (as Frege elsewhere): the empty place in "the number of .." and "how many ... are there?" Can only be filled with a keyword in the plural - not with the name of an object or a list of objects. - conceptual word instead of class. ---
I 225
Numbers/Classes/Geach: not classes of classes. (Frege dito) - if we connect a number (falsely) to a class a, we actually combine it with the property expressed by "___ is an element of a". This is not trivial - because when we associate a number with a property, the property is usually not expressed in that form. ---
I 225
Numbers/Classes/Geach: false: "The number of F's is 0" - correct: "The class of F's is 0" - Class as number are equally specified by the mention of a property. ---
I 235
Numbers/Frege/Geach: not classes of classes (Frege does not say this either). - The error stems from the idea that one could start with concrete objects and then group them into groups and supergroups.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Numbers Wittgenstein
 
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II 32
Number/Wittgenstein: not a concept, but a logical form. ---
II 283
Numbers/cardinal/Wittgenstein: that there are infinitely many cardinals, is a rule that one sets up. ---
II 343
Number/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege: a number is a property of a property. - Problem: E.g. for blue-eyed men in the room. - Then the five would be a property of a property - to be a blue-eyed man in the room - e.g. to express that Hans and Paul are two, they would then have a property in common, which not exactly belongs to the other. - ((s) each would have the property to be different from the other.) - Solution/Frege: the property of being Hans or Paul. ---
II 344
Number/Wittgenstein: are not merely signs. - One can have two items of the form three, but only one number. - ((s) WittgensteinVsFormalism). ---
II 360
Number/Definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: numerical equality is a prerequisite for a clear correspondence. - Therefore, Russell's definition of the number is useless. - ((s) because circular, if you want to define number via illustration). ---
II 361
Definition/Wittgenstein: instead of a definition of "number" we must figure out the rules of usage. ---
II 415
Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is a property that is common to all triads. - ((s) Frege: classes of classes - does Frege not mean objects with classes (instead of properties)?). ---
II 416
Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. - E.g. Extension: it would be a tautology to say, ABC is three. - In contrast, meaingful: to say, in this room are three people. ---
IV 93
Definition number/numbers/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 6,021 - the number is the exponent of an operation.
Waismann I 66
Def natürlichen Zahlen/Wittgenstein: diejenigen, auf die man die Induktion bei Beweisen anwenden kann.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Wa I
F. Waismann
Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996

Wa II
F. Waismann
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976
Object Wittgenstein
 
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Dummett I 34
Object/Wittgenstein: assumes that we only recognize an object, if we are able to think a thought about this object. ---
Dummett I 35
WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. ---
Hintikka I 51
Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one of the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus includes the notion that what he calls "objects" does not includes any relations and properties. - Wittgenstein verbally: "to the objects also belong the relations". ---
I 55
Indestructibility of objects/Hintikka: - ""Red" cannot be destroyed." ---
I 57
Individuals: Relationships with zero argument places (Tractatus 5.554). ---
I 85
Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation - Everything that is, can only be described by names, another provision is not possible - neither it is nor that it is not - so the language is an interweaving of names. ---
I 99
Object/property/possession/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. possession is not essential for an object - not even for E.g. my hand - not even for my visual space. It is only subjectively perceived - because the objective space is constructed on its base. - ((s)> extrinsic property) - (PB VII 71, 99f) - so it may be useful to give a hand during repeated use a name. ---
I 106
Object/acquaintance/Fraud/error/Russell/Moore/Hintikka: thesis: because one can be fooled, the objects of acquaintance are not the same as the physical objects - ("Illusion Argument"). ---
I 181
Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: even the simplest objects Wittgenstein's are structured. - ((s) (see above) They have a logical form, formed by their possible occurrences in states of affairs.) ---
I 223
Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (average period): improper items: color spots in the visual field, tones etc. - actual objects: elements of knowledge.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Objectivity Frege
 
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I 59
Objectivity / Frege: independence of our perception, imagination, etc. - but not of our reason - otherwise it would be like trying to judge without judging.
Graeser I 35f
Def objectivity / reality / Frege / Graeser: Fixed .... Frege calls this objective and distinguishes it from what is real ((s) = variable?). - truth / GraeserVsFrege: Problem: circularity: Frege now comes in a position to say that the laws of being true are themselves true, and to explain what makes them true.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Objects of Belief Hintikka
 
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I 45
(A) Objects of knowledge/objects of belief/Frege/Hintikka: Frege was concerned about which objects we must adopt in order to understand the logical behavior of the language when it comes to knowledge.
Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege's objects of knowledge are the Fregean senses,> reified, intensional objects).
Hintikka: I am concerned first with the individuals we are talking about in epistemic contexts, and secondly, I am concerned about whether we can call them "objects of knowledge".
Semantics of possible worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: we can opppose his approach with the semantics of possible worlds. (Hintikka pro semantics of possible worlds).
---
I 46
Idea: Application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible worlds/Hintikka: the expression is misleading because it is too global.
Definition scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knowing person b. We can also call it b's worlds of knowledge.
Set of all worlds/Hintikka: the set of all worlds can be called illegitimate.
Objects of knowledge/Hintikka: objects of knowledge can be objects, persons, artefacts, etc.
Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for any entities. (Frege's thesis). These can be taken as Frege's objects of knowledge.
Identity/Substitutability/Substitutability in identity/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: Substitutability in identity is the thesis of the substitutability of the identity ((s) only applies restrictedly in intensional (opaque) contexts).
---
I 47
(...) E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star
From this, one cannot infer that Ramses knew that morning star = evening star (although morning star = evening star).
---
I 48
Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct context/Frege/Hintikka: the direct context is extensional and transparent.
Indirect context/Frege/Hintikka: the indirect context is intensional and opaque. For example, contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "extensional", "opaque" etc. are not from Frege).
Frege/Hintikka: according to his picture:

(4) Expression > Meaning > Reference.
((s) I.e. according to Frege, the intension determines the extension.
Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here the picture is modified:
(5) expression (>) meaning (> reference).
---
I 49
(B) Objects of knowledge/Possible Worlds Approach/HintikkaVsFrege:
Idea: Knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that compels us to consider certain possibilities. This is what we call possible world.
New: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) next to the referents, but we consider the same referents in different worlds.
Morning star/Evening Star/Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: Solution: "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" now take out the same object, namely the planet in the actual world.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Ontology Castaneda
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 459ff
Ontology / Guise Theory/ Castaneda with Kant, VsFrege: Vstranscendental objects with infinitely many properties / reference to all objects only from within experience and language - Davidson pro Frege: infinitely many properties - Castaneda: however, Frege s objects are suitable for general reference (derived; primarily for individuals) - Frege: object: transcendent, no semantic control.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Opacity Hintikka
 
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I 57
Opacity/Frege/Identity/opaque context/Hintikka: Frege had to do with the failure of the (substitutability in identity) ((s) that is, that the individuals may have a different names), not with the failure of existential generalization. ((s) That is, the individuals may not exist). Hintikka: therefore we need different additional premises.
Semantics of possible worlds:
Substitutability in identity: here, for substitutability in identity, we need only the assumption that we can compare the referents of two different terms in every world.
Existential generalization: here we must compare the reference of one and the same term in all worlds.
Frege/Hintikka: it seems now that Frege could still be defended in a different way: namely, that we now quantify via world lines (as entities). ((s) This would meet Frege's Platonism.)
---
I 58
World lines/Hintikka: world lines are somehow "real"! Are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"? HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world-bound individuals and world lines as individuals.
World lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". To use world lines is not to reify.
Solution/Hintikka: we need world lines because without them it would not even make sense to ask whether a resident of a possible world is the same as that of another possible world ((s) cross-world identity).
---
I 59
World line/Hintikka: we use the world line instead of Frege's "way of giving". HintikkaVsFrege: his mistake was to reify the "way of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual.
Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, we do not have to ask in this context "about what we quantify".

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Particulars Brandom
 
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II 162
Particular/Frege: cannot be explained without the notion of singular terms. ---
II 163
QuineVsFrege: yes they can, because they "intend" to refer.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Picture Theory Wittgenstein
 
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Danto I 70/71
Image Theory/Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: thesis: the world has the same shape as the language. - Without that the world itself would be somehow linguistically in its structure i.e. more of a reflection. ---
Hintikka I 67
Picture theory/Image theory/Facts/Object/Early Wittgenstein/Hintikka : - when the sentence is a linguistic counterpart of the matter. ---
I 68
Then that connection is no relation, but the existence of a relation - ((s) the relation of the state of affairs is the existence of the subject matter - this is Wittgenstein's position before the Tractatus - WittgensteinVs: Vs later - Russell: pro. ---
I 127
Image/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Bild/Abbild/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: comes from Frege - is also found in Tarski again. ---
I 131
Hintikka: thesis: the - image - theory? is in reality an anticipation of the first condition Tarski truth theory. ---
I 132
WittgensteinVsTarski : a truth theory is inexpressible. ---
I 132f
ARb/Expressions/Representation/Image Theory/Image theory/Complex/Wittgenstein/Hintikka : not a character (E.g. - R) represents something - but the linguistic relationship attached to it - the linguistic relation is not a class of pairs of individuals (Frege value pattern) - but a real relationship - WittgensteinVsFrege - TarskiVsWittgenstein/CarnapVsWittgenstein/(s): extensional semantics - Item/WittgensteinVsFrege: Elements of possible facts - then the relation that the - - R always corresponds to a special relation. ---
I 134/35
Image theory/Theory of reflection/(Abbild, Widerspiegelung)/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no image relation, but isomorphism - (truth conditions) no theory of language, but the truth. ---
I 135
Can be described as theory but not expressed (structural equivalence, isomorphism). ---
I 141
Image theory/Theory of reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: only simple sentences are images - not complex sentences - these would only be recipes for the construction of images - if you would permit this, you would have no argument for the special status of some sentences: - namely to be true. ---
I 161
Image theory/Theory of reflection/Reflection/Tractatus/Hintikka: Image unequal reflection - illustration: require that some of the connections allowed to play some of the possible configurations of objects - but it does not follow that the reflection must be complete - i.e. not each link must speak of a possible issue - Name: no image of the object - but it can reflect it - Sentence: Image - logic: reflection of reality (Widerspiegelung, Abbild). ---
I 183
Wittgenstein/Early/Middle/late/Plant/Hintikka: Image Theory: was abandoned 1929 - Hintikka: he has never represented a perfect picture theory - later than 1929: Vs the thesis that language functions according to strict rules - Hintikka: that he might never have represented - 1934/35: new: language games. WittgensteinVsTractatus: VsReflection. ---
I 184
Language/Medium Wittgenstein 1929: physical language instead of phenomenological language - ((s) b > Quine) - but it is always the ordinary language. ---
III 144
Language/Thought/World/Reality/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the actual relationship between language (thinking) and reality cannot be a part of reality itself - because the image B, which should reflect the ratio between A and S, would then be identical with A - hence the sentence can only schow its sense, it cannot express it.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Picture Theory Millikan
 
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I 102
Mapping Relation/Language/Millikan: we begin by coordinating at least some words with objects. Correspondingly, true sentences correspond with facts in the world.
Problem: wrong sentences do not correspond to any fact. Question: How can words which correspond individually to objects very well be composed that at the end the whole sentence does not correspond?
E.g. "Theaitetos flies": "Theaitetos" corresponds to "Theaitetos", "flies" corresponds to "fly".
Wrong solution: to say that the problem would be in the relation between Theaitetos and the flying. For the relation corresponds already with something, this can be instantiated (e.g. between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiated. Everything corresponds with something - but not the entire sentence "Theaitetos flies".
Solution/Frege: he combined singular terms with "values" which were the objects in the world.
---
I 103
Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted it in the same way as names, as complex signs, which at the end described the true or the wrong. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant!") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan: (Millikan: better than Frege): Complex aRb, whereby in the case of wrong sentences the correspondence with the world is missing.
Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another sense of "corresponds"! That is, words should correspond to things differently than sentences with the world.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Possible World Semantics Hintikka
 
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I 43
Semantics of possible worlds/non-existent objects/non-existence/possibility/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds should assume possible individuals as inhabitants not only of possible worlds, but even of the actual world. ---
I 50
Semantics of possible worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: here there is no > systematic ambiguity, i.e. the expressions mean intensionally the same as extensionally. E.g. to know what John knows is to know the worlds that are compatible with his belief, and to know which ones are not.
---
I 51
Extra premise: For this, one must be sure that an expression in different worlds picks out the same individual. Context: what the relevant worlds are depends on the context.
E.g. Ramses: here the case is clear,
On the other hand:
E.g. Herzl knew that Loris was a great poet
Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal.
---
I 53
Meaning function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the difference of my approach to that of Frege is that I consider the problems locally, while Frege regards them globally. Fregean sense (= way of being given)/Hintikka: the Fregean sense must be regarded as defined for all possible worlds.
On the other hand:
Hintikka: when Fregean sense is constructed as a meaning function, it must be regarded in my approach only as defined for the relevant alternatives.
Frege: Frege uses the concept of the identity of the senses implicitly. And as a function of meaning the identity is only given if the mathematical function applies for all relevant arguments.
Totality/Hintikka: this concept of the totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful.
Solution/Hintikka: precisely the semantics of possible worlds helps to dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) and to only consider the relevant alternatives, defined by the context).
Fregean sense/Hintikka: the Fregean sense was constructed as a quasi-object (object of setting, propositional object, thought object, object of belief), because they were assumed as entities in the actual world, however abstract they were.
---
I 54
Meaning function/HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses".
Object of knowledge/object of thought/Frege/Hintikka: Frege has the problem, unlike e.g. Quine never considered.
---
I 57
Meaning function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: in order to be a solution, the meaning function must be a constant function, that is, it must pick out the same individuals in all the worlds. ---
I 205
Semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: needs no conception of possible worlds as complete cosmological worlds, but only "small worlds", rather like event progress or situations, I also speak of "scenarios". Possible world/Hintikka: the expression possible world is misleading, if one considers it as complete worlds.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Predicates Lewis
 
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Schwarz I 121
Predicate/Lewis/Schwarz: singles out properties - which ones depends on possible worlds. ---
Schwarz I 228
Names/Predicate/Property/Lewis: Thesis: names can name anything: instead of predicate "F" we take "F-ness" predicates are not names and designate nothing - predicate/(s): Not singular terms. SchwarzVsLewis/RussellVsFrege: assuming that each predicate can be assigned a name for a corresponding property, Russell’s paradox follows -> heterology: no property corresponds to some predicates such as E.g. -is a property that does not apply to itself - Also, nothing that can be named with a singular term corresponds to predicates such as E.g. "is a class" E.g. -is part of- and E.g. -"identical with". - ((s) predicates can always be invented, whether the world contains adequate properties is an empirical question.) - ((s) properties belong to ontology - predicates: belong to ideology (alluding to Quine?)).

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Predicates Searle
 
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John R. Searle
V 152f
Predicate expressions do not mean properties. - Predicates: must not be indicative - (predicates are not necessarily demonstrative). ---
V 152f
Predicate/SearleVsFrege: tries to represent two irreconcilable positions: a) to extend the distinction sense/meaning to predicates - b) to explain the functional difference between indicative and predicative expressions - Searle: Frege must assume that predicates have a meaning, because he needs that for arithmetics: he needs quantification of properties - solution existence/property/Frege's successor: if two people have the same property, then there is something that they have in common - SearleVs: implication is not reference.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Proper Names Dummett
 
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III 64
Names/Davidson: we can only know that "Valencia" refers to Valencia. - DummettVsDavidson: he confuses awareness of the reference with knowledge - the fact that the word has a reference object (at all) - Names/DummettVsDavidson: the subject must understand the meaning of the name: not that the name refers to something, but what it refers to.
III 87f
Names/Kripke: meaning is not "the one who is generally thought to be the author of Waverley" - Dummett: knowing that (sentence is true): e.g. a child hears "postal strike in Milan" - but does not understand the proposition. - What is necessary for a proposition? - Certainly not knowledge about Ambrosius - Sentence: knowing-that "someone named Gustav Freytag was a lecturer in Wroclaw. - proposition, propositional knowledge: precisely the one who wrote Debit and Credit was a lecturer in Wroclaw - (description).
III 87 f
Names/Dummett: Standard explanation: Language use in community - actual baptism irrelevant, just like speaker, snatches of conversation - different: if only snatches of conversation, I must track speakers - Goedel: the concept of knowing-of-Gödel that he... has more substance than the concept of knowledge that "Goedel" is the name of the person who... - E.g. Goliath: confusion of the names, not the person - E.g. Obadiah (author, only action ((s) quasi "anonymous"): here confusion of persons, not the names, possible -
III 92
DummettVsCausal theory: just a theory about the sense of names, not one that replaces the sense with something else - it provides no explanation of the function of names in general.
III 93
E.g. hurricanes, constellations etc.- it is hard to prove that we named them wrongly - Causal theory does not explain the mechanisms of naming.
III 151
Dummett per description theory: verbal explanations of unfamiliar names help.
Wolf II 354
Meaning/Names/DummettVsFrege: (E.g. Dr. Lauben), the meaning cannot be basically subjective, because it is part of what is being communicated by the language - still Dummett considers the "sense" (subjective knowledge) to be part of the meaning.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Proper Names Frege
 
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I 54
Proper Name/Frege: the extension is presumed. - Otherwise, the negation would be: "Kepler did not die in misery or not the name is meaningless".
II 69
The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate), but always only an object.
II 72f
Proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Names/Understanding/Frege: understanding a name means to know what object it denotes. Problem: names without a carriers (E.g. unicorn). - Problem: E.g. Different names with the same carrier.
V 99/100
The fact that a name stands for an object is a consequence rather than part of the fact that it has a certain sense.
Chisholm II 144f
Names/Frege: "mixed proper name": contains linguistic and non-linguistic parts: the circumstances. -Circumstances: part of the meaning of an expression. - ChisholmVsFrege: he neglects ostension.
Dum III 68f
Names/FregeVsRussell: may well have the same sense as a specific description - what is actually considered to be a representation of an object: Valencia from the air, from the ground, within a specific buildin,g on the map? - Recognition: necessary: ​​the awareness that the object falls under the concept that determines the proper identity criterion (here: "city"). - Ability for recognition instead method of picking out. - ("red": recognition, not method for red).
Frege II 69
Name/Frege: can never be a predicate - but certainly part of a predicate.
Stalnaker I 183
Names/Proper Names/Frege/Stalnaker: for him there is a mental representation, i.e. we only have ideas about something that presents itself to us in a certain way. - ((s) This can be reconciled with Donnellan’s attributive use).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Proper Names Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 288
Names/Searle: presuppose any other representation - have no explicit intentional content. ---
II 291 ff
Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: exaggerates analogy between reference and perception - overweights parasitic cases - presupposes omniscient observer - Meteorology baptizes future events. ---
II 291 ff
Names: Mill: no connotation, only denotation - Frege: meaning of a name is detected by description. ---
II 292
Names/SearleVsKripke: causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention - causal chain not pure, self-descriptive - baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise successful reference explained by successful reference (circular). ---
II 311
Names/meaning/reference/Searle: E.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is" - we speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries - E.g. swapped spots: Identification: "the spot that causes the experience" - Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A." ---
Wolf II 168
Names/Searle: meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true - we cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle - (Strawson ditto) - Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name - solution/Zink: Localisation. ---
Searle V 145
Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". ---
V 145
There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance - Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts. ---
V 245
Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description (description), we must unfortunately assume substances. - From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties - Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning - SearleVsWittgenstein. ---
V 247
Names/Mill: have no sense - FregeVsMill: E.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar, not more informative than Everest = Everest - FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects - identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information. ---
V 256
Names/SearleVsFrege: not entirely clear - E.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description.- SearleVsKripke: names not rigid, otherwise like logical equivalents - Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Proper Names Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Wolf II 14
Bundle theory/names: proposed by Wittgenstein and Searle > Essential properties. ---
Wolf II 150
Names/Wittgenstein: I use the name N with no fixed meaning - Philosophical Investigations §79. ---
Hintikka I 302/303
Name/Object/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: as long as the links between language and the world are unanalyzed name-relations, the possible connections of the symbols are determined only by their own nature - by their own nature - name-relations are conventional - but the nature of the signs states itself - if we transform signs into variables, they are only dependent on the nature of the sentence -> logical form - meaningless connections must be prohibited by the convention - they are not excluded by the symbols themselves - so that the reflection is maintained - late : VsReflection - late: VsName-Relation. ---
Hintikka I 22
Names/existence/border/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in a logically formed language all names must denote something. But one cannot specify how many objects there are. ---
I 51
Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: to the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus counts the notion that what he calls "objects" does not include any relations and properties. Hintikka: the terminological counterpart of this error is: names are logically singular terms, so that predicates (including symbols for relations) cannot fall within that definition (falsely).
---
I 60ff
Signs/relation/name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: not the complex sign "aRb" says that it is in a certain relation to b, but that "a" stands in a certain relation to "b", says aRb. (3,1432) (quotation marks sic) - But Wittgenstein wants something else: The number of names that appear in the elementary proposition must be the same, according to Tractatus as the number of objects in the situation illustrated by the sentence. But about which situation it is, is not determined, however, solely by the name of a and b. Copi: (wrongly) thinks that Wittgenstein through the phrase "in certain respects" basically abstracts from relation-signs amd performs an existential generalization. (HintikkaVsCopi).
---
I 71
Names/existence/Wittgenstein: "I want to call 'name' only what cannot stand in the connection "X exists". And so one cannot say "Red exists" because, if red did not exist, it could not be talked about it. Names/existence/Wittgenstein: the existence of an object is seen from the fact that its name is used in the language. For the logical rules of inference is then a well-formed language to be presupposed that the individual constants are not unrelated.
---
I 85
Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation. Everything that actually exists, can only be described with names, another determination is not possible. Neither it is, nor it is not. So the language is also an interweaving of names.
---
I 127
Elementary proposition: does not consist of a series of names for individual things that are held together by additional links, but it consists of a series of "names" for objects that belong to different but matching logic types. ---
I 149
Picture Theory/Image Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Names are points, sentences, arrows, they have sense. The sense is determined by the two poles of true and false." ---
II 84
Name/Meaning/Wittgenstein: the meaning of the words "Professor Moore" is not the owner - 1. the importance does not go for a walk - 2. the same words also appear in a sentence like E.g. "Professor Moore does not exist" - meaning is set within the language - by explanations. ---
II 88
Number/Wittgenstein: the numbers in a pattern book are the names of the patterns. ---
II 365
Name/object/Wittgenstein: between the two there is no real relationship. ---
VI 71
Name/elementary proposition/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the names of the elementary proposition are fundamentally different from the nature of proper names. They are primitive signs that cannot be defined closer by any definition - but they can be explained by explanations - explanations are sentences that contain primitive signs - unlike a code elementary propositions do not obey appointment rules. ---
VI 172
Names/WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: late: the owner is not the meaning of the name. ---
IV 22
Name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the name means the object. (3,203).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Proper Names Burkhardt
 
Books on Amazon
Wolf II 337
Namen/Kripke: haben keinen Fregeschen Sinn (Bedeutung) - BurkhardtVsKripke: der muß aber manchmal ergänzt werden
II 341
Namen/BurkhardtVsFrege: seine Ansicht ist falsch, Eigennamen hätte sowohl Bedeutung als auch Sinn - BurkhardtVsStrawson: wenn Namen keinerlei Bezeichnung, was soll dann Konvention sein?
Namen/Wittgenstein: doch "mere tags" - Burckhardt: dann muß das Kontextprinzip für Namen aufgegeben werden
II 345
Bedeutung/Namen/Burkhardt: drei Möglichkeiten: 1. Namen haben Bedeutung, dann ist das, gemäß der Konventionen der Träger - 2. alle Namen haben dieselbe Bedeutung: nämlich ihre eindeutige Referenzfunktion! (Gebrauchstheorie) - 3. Namen haben gar keine Bedeutung
II 358
Namen/Burkhardt: können auch appellative Funktion haben: Bsp "Einstein ist der Kopernikus des 20. Jahrh." - Vorstellungen über Eigenschaften - These so läßt sich die Bedeutung doch in Referent und Sinn aufteilen. So ist alles Subjektive getilgt - die eine oder die andere Seite kann dominieren, der Sinn kann an die Stelle des Referenten treten

Burk I
A. Burkhardt
Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Proper Names Mill
 
Books on Amazon
Wolf I, 43 ff
Names/Mill: what is more appropriate: to conceive the name as something for an object or for an idea of the object? MillVsHobbes: "Perception" is too metaphysical.
---
Wolf I 43
Definition Name/Hobbes: "an arbitrarily chosen word, which serves as a characteristic to awaken in our mind a thought which resembles a thought which one had before, and which, expressed to others, serves them as a sign of a thought which the speaker had earlier in his mind." Names/Hobbes: names are not signs of things themselves. One only thinks of the stone.
---
Wolf I 44
MillVsHobbes: the word sun names the name of the sun and not our idea of the sun. ((s) The idea or imagination could change).
Mill: because the names not only share our ideas, but also teach the listener about our belief and this is a belief about the thing itself and not about the idea!
E.g. "The sun is the cause of daylight". This is not to say that the idea of the sun produces the idea of daylight.
Names/Mill: different types: some words are only parts of names:
E.g. from, to, often, truly, as well as pronouns like myself, to him, "John's", even adjectives.
These words express nothing which can be affirmed or denied.
Exception: e.g. "'heavy' is an adjective": here "heavy" is a complete name. Name of this sound sequence. > Mention/use
---
Wolf I 47
Names/Mill: through their mediation we are able to state general sentences. They, themselves, can also be divided into general terms (e.g. "human") and singular terms (e.g. Maria). (> Zink). "John" can only be affirmed by a single person (at least in the same sense).
---
Wolf I 49
Name/concrete/abstract/Mill: e.g. "white" is at the same time the name of an object and of many objects (concrete). "Whiteness" is the name of an attribute. "Age": is the name of an attribute. (abstract, generalization). Originates from Locke and Condillac.
---
Wolf I 50
"Attribute" is itself the common name of many attributes. Name/abstract/singular term/Mill: however, if an attribute does not allow degree differences or type differences, it is not a general term but a singular term:
E.g. visibility, tangibility, equality, rectangularity, milk white. No multiplicity of attributes, but a specific attribute.
---
Wolf I 51
Names/Mill: names always include some attribute in themselves, but they are not the name of this attribute! The attribute itself has its own, abstract name (singular term), for example, "The whiteness". ---
I 53
Names/Mill: names are not co-denotating, not connotative: they denote the individuals without any attributes. ---
Wolf I 54
E.g. originally, Dartmouth may be located at the mouth of the Dart, but John is not named like this because it was part of the meaning that the father might have had the same name. In addition, the mouth of the river may have shifted without changing the name of the city.
Proper names adhere to the things themselves (labels) and do not fall away if attributes of the object fall away.
Although only God may have the appropriate attributes, it is still a common name and does not belong here anyway.
---
Wolf I 55
Co-denotating names/Mill: these names are identifications: e.g. "the only son of Johann Müller". Also identifies attributes. ---
Wolf I 56
So whenever names have any meaning, the meaning is in what they co-denotate and not in what they denotate (the bearer). Non-denotating (normal) names have no meaning.
---
Wolf I 57
Names/Mill: names do not give the listener any knowledge of the subject. If perhaps he had already learned something about Cologne before, it was not through the word Cologne. ---
Wolf I 58
By knowing of how many objects the name can be, which it all denotates, we learn nothing, but only when we learn what it may co-denotate (attributes). On the same thing, we may also employ different names whose meaning is not the same.
MillVsFrege: Therefore the bearer (of the name) is not the meaning.
---
Wolf I 59
Co-denotating names/Mill: here there is an uncertainty. ---
Wolf I 61
Solution: to give a fixed co-denotation for concrete names with occurring predicates.

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998


K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Propositional Attitudes Perry
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 451f
Proposition / propositional stance / PerryVsFrege: the expressions embedded in a report of what someone thinks, designate entities (not whole propositions) to which their antecedents relate - ((s)> Cresswell: structured meanings).

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Propositions Castaneda
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 323
Propositions/Tradition: (not represented by anyone in pure form, not even by Frege): ideal convergence of the elements of thought, speech, reality and communication - propositions that are primarily defined as carriers of timeless truth values, fundamental support of linguistic meaning as constituents of reality and as publicly accessible contents of communication - Advantage: that leaves no gap between the content of thought, and that to which it is directed - for reality arise - CastanedaVs: this does not apply to indexical sentences - individuation: of indexical sentences: in the speech act, not by meaning.
I 340ff
Proposition/Tradition: (Frege, Moore): 1) psychological units, 2) ontological, 3) ontologically objective (intersubjective), 4) metaphysical units 5) logical units, 6) semantic u. 7) linguistic units of communication - CastanedaVs : discrepancies of between 1 - 7 in the case of diachronic flow of experiences in the changing world - VsTradition: fails with indexical reference with "I", "here", "now" - Problem: E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen in my liver": understanding without knowledge of the truth value - therefore meaning unequal truth value (VsFrege) - what is meant by the formation of a sentence is not some objective feature or thing in the world that is accessible to everyone.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Propositions Perry
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 396
Meaning/thought/PerryVsFrege: we must separate the meaning sharply from the thought- the thought is not a mental entity but corresponds to the informational content. - Meaning corresponds with the role of the words - the same role creates in every context another de re-proposition. ---
I 409f
Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. - New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. - VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. - Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. - Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. - Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re" - then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". - Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. - Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). ---
I 455f
Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots) - nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. - Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. - Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul - VsExtra-sense: does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states - people understand sentences but do not form beliefs. - List of extra senses for everyone: too long - Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language - rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I"is doing this" - problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough - the same meaning cannot perform different references..

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Propositions Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
II 274
E.g. Heimson/Perry/Searle: tightening: Heimson was Humes doppelganger on the twin earth, ecxcept for the micro-structure - the sentence has in both cases the same Fregean sense - but the propositions must be different because they have different truth values - so Fregean sense is not enough to determine which proposition is expressed - it cannot explain the indexicality - Kaplan: therefore different theory of propositions: "direct reference", "singular propositions": here the proposition is not the intentional content in the head of the speaker, but it has to contain the real object - SearleVs> see self-reference. ---
V 144
SearleVsFrege: missed the distinction between sense and proposition - Proposition/Searle: circumstances are necessary in addition to the terms.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Proxy Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
VI 119
Formalism/Substitute/Sign/Symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege: Frege: characters are either mere blackening or sign of something. - Then this is what they represent, their meaning. - Wittgenstein: false alternative. - E.g. Pieces: represented nothing. - Solution: use like in the game instead of representation of something. - ((s) use is more than mere blackening and less than representation of an object - Wittgenstein: Formalism is not entirely unjustified.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Qualia Shoemaker
 
Books on Amazon
Stalnaker I 220
Qualia / common sense / Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are internal, intrinsic, but also locally comparable. - VsFrege-Schlick view - Thesis: Qualia are not comparable, because it is meaningless to assume that e.g. exchanged spectra represent at all something communicable - StalnakerVsShoemaker. per "old-fashioned" Frege-Schlick view.

Shoem I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003


Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Reference Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
I 41
Frege: first reference, then "sense". Trend today: for singular terms: Meaning = Reference - DummettVs: absurd in complex terms (descriptions).
I 47
Reference: words - not sentences or parts of sentences (Dummett: feeling for the language). Def reference of an expression: is that which is common to all other expressions where it is clear that their substitution instead of the original expression does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs.
I 48
Frege: theory of reference prevails over theory of "sense". - "Sense" determines the reference - Husserl: Reference = "sense". Use gives meaning - sense gives reference (Frege) - meaning not equivalent to reference: e.g. unicorn
RussellVs distinction sense/reference (meaning/reference) (RussellVsFrege).

EMD II 128
Reference/Frege/Dummett: does not show everything that the speaker knows when he understands an expression > sense - knowledge of reference is not sufficient for meaning. E.g. identity a = a is uninformative - Dummett: the same goes for every atomic sentence.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Reference Russell
 
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Bertrand Russell
Dum I 59
RussellVs distinction sense/reference (meaning/reference) (RussellVsFrege)
Newen/Schrenk I 92
Name / identifier / Russell: are non-referring - Reference / Russell: only logically proper names ("this", etc.)
McGinn I 178
Reference/Russell/McGinn: possible only by acquaintance - like Gareth Evans. The distinguishing knowledge is the basis of the reference. "Knowledge of."

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Relation-Theory Burge
 
Books on Amazon:
Tyler Burge
Shiffer I 7
Relation Theory/Belief/Burge: (Burge 1980): Propositions about propositional attitudes have the form of a relational propositional-attitude predicate with singular arguments for at least one person and something believed. This is a semantic value of the grammatical object of the verb of the propositional attitude. SchifferVsRelation Theory/SchifferVsFrege/(s): makes mentalistic assumptions, "inner entities".

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Sensations Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty I 128
Wittgenstein: sensations would have some half of an existence between nothingness and something, they would "fell out" of the world like the beetle in the box. Wittgenstein: sensation "not something, but also not nothing. The result was that a nothing would do the same services as the something about what cannot be stated." (Philosophical Investigations § 304.)
RortyVsWittgenstein: confusion of the concept of incorrigibility with the notion of incommunicability.
---
Rorty VI 147
Sensation/Wittgenstein: Feeling alone (without language) is not enough. ---
Dummett I 35
WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, for the subject itself unrecognizable.
---
Wittgenstein VI 118
Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: a sentence about the sensations, because it completely remains at the level of linguistics, is outside the true/false dimension. ---
VI 199f
Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: has no object. ---
VI 200
Expression: is not description (but more direct).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Sense Castaneda
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 325
Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: the denotation within intention in propositional contexts is not Fregean meaning, but Fregean sense - reversal of Frege: the world reference can only be explained by the objects being explained as systems of Fregean senses - then "sense "and "reference" get entirely new meanings.
Frank I 400~
Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: Guise Theory: (of designs): Vs distinction sense/meaning - from this also follows: VsFrege: indirect speech does not lose its reference - expressions always denote the same thing, namely guises (designs) - VsPerry: that also makes his distinction of designating and expressing unnecessary.
I 432 ~
Extra-Sense/Castaneda: E.g. Ivan believes that he* is required on the phone - here is (Ivan) Ivan referencce) and ego(Ivan) its special meaning i - in an assertion of speaker a "I" expresses ego(a) - PerryVsCastaneda: this explanation leads to a gap in the theory of reports of beliefs - anyone who can believe anything of Ivan, can believe the corresponding proposition of Ivan that "i" is required on the phone - KretzmannVs: still private, not even God could grasp extra-sense - PerryVs: misunderstanding, "he*" cannot be replaced by description without Index - but that does not mean that the proposition "he himself is in the hospital" can be known by none other - "i"/PerryVsCastaneda: different psychological role for Ivan and Sheila still has to be explained - that Ivan but not Scheila is the reference is not enough - Ivan must also believe that he* is i, but that is initially nothing more than that i is i! - And Sheila also believes that - in addition: information that it is about their own extra-sense - Problem: Extra-sense does not help if Ivan does not know that he was appointed Editor - facts about the language are no solution.
I ~459ff
Sense/Frege: psychological mediator role - CastanedaVs, PerryVs -.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Sense Dummett
 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 72ff
Sense/Dummett: property of a single sentence, not full usage of language.
Dum I 122
Sense/Capture/DummettVsFrege: the thought is not presented directly to the consciousness - rather grasping the sense: set of skills.
I 123
The fact that the glasses are in the other jacket cannot be content of the consciousness.
I 124
Such examples (glasses) lead to an opposite direction according to which language is explained by thoughts that are considered to be language-independent, and not vice versa (> Evans) - Saussure s conception of language as a code will avoid such a declaration - VsFrege: sense of the word is not the same as a part of the thought. EvansVsCompositionality.
III 25
Sense/Dummett: from division of states of affairs: 1) where the statement could be misused.
2) where it could be not misused.
ad 1) Statement: false - conditional: false - atomic sentence or without truth value.
ad 2): statement: true, Conditional: true or without truth value, atomic sentence: true.
III 28
Sense/Dummett: entirely determined by one knowing when it has an designated truth value and when a non-designated - finer distinctions only needed in complex sentences with operators.
III 74
Sense/Dummett: not only through verification method, but understanding what circumstances must be realized - (Goldbach’s conjecture).

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Sense Mates
 
Books on Amazon
I 99
Sense / meaning / Frege / Mates: both should not be confused because the compositionality applies to both ((s) seperately) : - e.g. (1) morning star / Aevening star are the same (2) m.s. / m.s. are the same - (1) and (2) do not have the same meaning - E.g. a = a is not the same sense as a = b - n.B.: nevertheless m.s. and e.s. have the same meaning (reference) - meaning / Frege: m. of a statement: the truth value (object) - sense of a statement: thought, content, proposition - ((s) decisive place in the literature).

truth value / MatesVsFrege: do not exist - yet per Frege, without whose metaphysics - sense (manner of presentation) uniquely determines the meaning (reference).

Mate I
B. Mates
Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969

Mate II
B. Mates
Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981

Sentence Meaning Stechow
 
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30 ~
VsFrege: a semantics that applies only truth values for sentence meanings cannot exporess this verb meaning (> stance > propositional attitude).
110 ff
Sentence meaning / Stechow: in connection with (existence-) presupposition: now partial function of situations to truth values - no longer sets of possible worlds - ((s) no longer defined if the domain of objects does not exist) - presupposition: limiting the scope (domain restriction). - Def plug: "says", "believes": blocks the forwarding of presuppositions to the top - no limitation - filter: "if", "and": block presuppositions - hole: specific words let presuppositions in the embedding sentence by.
A. von Stechow
I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik
www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006)
Sentences Frege
 
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II 48
Truth Value/Frege: A truth value cannot be part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense but an object. (truth value = object).
II 51
Sentence/Frege/(s): consists of sense components, not of objects. (>FregeVsRussell) Subordinate clauses that begin with "that" (that-sentence, >opaque context, >propositional attitudes) have as meaning a thought, not a truth value.
II 74
Sentence: The idea itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as the subject. (>Ramsey) We must never forget that different sentences can express the same idea. Neither is it impossible that the same thought appears in a decomposition as a singular one, in another one as a particular one, and in a third one as general one.
II 77
Sentence: The three proper names: "the number 2", "the concept prime number", "the relation of the falling of an object under a concept" behave as brittle to each other as the first two alone: ​​no matter how we group them together, we get no sentence.
I 7
Sentence/Frege: does not represent a proposition (only a that-sentence does that, a subset) - but for a truth value. - There is a sentence for each proposition that expresses it and that states the truth conditions. - Vs: problem with sentences without truth value (neither true nor false, not an object, etc.).
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68
Sentence/Frege: except the idea (what can be t/f) there are two other aspects: a) "content" - b) "imagination".
Tugendhat II 243
Oblique Meaning//German Original: "odd"/Frege: name of a sentence. - Complex sentences: truth functions of their subsets - where that is not the case, subsets appear as names (oblique ("odd") meaning, Quote) - Nominalized Subset/Frege: only part of a thought - TugendhatVsFrege: such a subset cannot be replaced, so the truth-value potential cannot consist in its truth value.
Tugendhat II 245
Sentence/Frege/Tugendhat: since all sentences are derived from the subject-predicate form, subsets must sometimes be nominalized. - Exception: causal and conditional clauses.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


F III
R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Sentences Prior
 
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I 6
Sentences/Prior: sentences are different from what we want to say with them - as well as what we think is different from what we think about.
---
I 13
Sentences/Prior: not about propositions - e.g. "The sentence S is only seemingly about propositions" is itself only seemingly about propositions." (solution: it is a sentence about the sentence) - E.g. "the proposition that the sun is hot, is true" about the sun. ---
I 19
Sentences/Prior: sentences denote nothing, just names - sentence: no relation between two names but between name and predicate that is expressed by the clause - expressing instead denoting - instead of "fear +" that -sentence":"fear that" + sentence - left predicate right connection. ---
I 52f
Sentence/PriorVsFrege: sentences denote nothing, not even "truth".

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Sentences Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 252f
"Purely indicative" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - E.g. tax auditor/director -> propositional attitude - expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference - every truth function is sign transparent. ---
I 332
Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variables: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after singular term - Proposition resists change the truth value - Proposition remains nameless in "x0p". ---
I 337
Sentence: is not class of its expressions, otherwise non-expressed = zero class (all same meaning) - sentence not property of expressions either - solution: sentence as a consequence: class of pairs - partial sign: class of expression incidents. ---
I 336
Words describe - sentences do not (No singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has meaning: the singular term is formed by bracketing the sentence. (not a proposition!) - Proposition here: completion of the correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing. ---
Prior I 35
Sentence/Quine: is not an object - Then also no quantification, no bound variables for it - PriorVsQuine: unproblematic: E.g. "J. believes p": J. does not believe anything, this ultimately stands for a sentence. ---
Quine VII 109 ~
Sentence/QuineVsFrege: sentences must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" not as variables, accept the entities as entities named through expressions as values. ---
X 31
Sentence/Quine: we speak only of sentences if we want to generalize -" (and we cannot do that through objects). ---
X 35
Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in one dimension, which cannot be grasped by a variable. ---
XII 39
Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead Proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S - English Translation: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - "QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence - "Quine: still not accepts linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitude: too artificial.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Sentences Strawson
 
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I 196
StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence stick together only by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. ---
I 214
Connection/relation/Strawson: a) stating connection: (s) "is a .." - b) stating bond "is in relation to ..", "is an example for.." - two-digit terms themselves are not again designations of relations - stating relations between things are not themselves relation. ---
I 216
1. Kind or sample binding/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier - b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs - 2. characterizing binding: E.g. Socrates is wise, is agile, argues - b) Socrates , Plato, Aristotle, are all wise, all die - 3. attributive binding: Summary of particulars due to the characterizing binding. E.g. Smiling, Praying - each of them symmetrical form: "x stands in characterizing binding to y" - asymmetrical: "x is characterized by y" - then y dependent member. ---
I 219
Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: "x is asserted bonded as non-relational to y" i.e. that universals can be predicted by particulars, but not particulars of universals - but also universals can be predicated by universals. ---
I 221
New: distinction between fact types instead of word types. ---
IV 53
Sentence/Strawson: the general form of the sentence is: "It behaves so and so".

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Sentences Gärdenfors
 
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Peter Gärdenfors
I 176
Sentences/Semantics/Gärdenfors: we should not analyze sentences or sentence meanings with propositions as sets of sentences, because sentence meaning is too context-dependent. Between sentences and propositions there is therefore no semantic mapping. Solution/Gärdenfors: sentences should be analyzed with Conceptual Spaces.
---
I 177
At first, it is not so obvious why we should express ourselves in sentences. GärdenforsVsFrege: his answer to the fact that thoughts are sentences is not enough because one does not know how thoughts could be identified in a language-independent manner.
Solution/Gärdenfors: Thesis: sentences express events. In addition, we should focus on utterances instead of sentences. Utterances are parts of communication. The sentence meaning can be changed here.
Attention: also plays a role in how events are represented. There are other aspects: see Croft & Wood (2000, Chapter 3); Langacker (2008, chapter 3): perspective, categorization.
Event/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the construction of an event contains at least one vector (force vector or result vector) and an object.
---
I 178
Sentence/Gärdenfors: Thesis on sentences: a (declarative) sentence typically expresses the construction of an event. Conclusion/(s): Gärdenfors assumes changing instead of rigid meanings because he considers sentences within communications in which the meanings can change. His approach with vectors in conceptual spaces contributes to this dynamic situation rather than propositions, which are in a rigid relation to sentences. Therefore, he also rejects mapping relationships such as semantic mapping.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Singular Terms Frege
 
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Brandom II 173
Singular Term / Frege, late: sentences are singular terms. - Predicates: frame - DummettVsFrege: he disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in language games - BrandomVsDummett: as if Frege had had no idea of Fregean force.
Dum III 113
Reference / Singular Term / Frege: in truth theories of Frege-type all singular terms have a guaranteed reference, always a reference object. - Therefore sentences with "Einhorn" are not wrong but without a truth value (truth value gap). - RussellVsFrege: sentences with "Unicorn" are always wrong.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Singular Terms Strawson
 
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Substitutions/Strawson / (s):
of singular terms: reversible
of predicates: not reversible.
---
I 198
Singular Term/QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsRamsey: (Singular Term) can occur at the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions not - singular term: quantifiable, Generic Term: not quantifiable - StrawsonVsQuine: not so important. ---
I 198
Singular Term/Quine: abstract singular terms: E.g. "piety", "wisdom": names of abstract objects - no general terms - Names of concrete objects: e.g. "Earth" - on the other hand general term: E.g "philosopher" - StrawsonVsQuine: no good explanation: we would not like to say that this would be true of many things - solution/Quine: in reality distinction between singular term and predicates - general term/Quine: the location which is taken by them, has no own status - decisive: predicates cannot be quantified. ---
I 203
"a philosopher"/Quine: no singular term. ---
IV 63
QuineVs singular Term: eliminable StrawsonVsQuine.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Speech Act Theory Davidson
 
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Dummett I 26ff
DavidsonVsFrege/DavidsonVsSearle: Theory of force unnecessary - description of speech acts not necessary - (concept of truth required).

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Substance Millikan
 
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I 109
Substance/Properties/Millikan: Thesis: "Substance" and "properties" are categories that are cut off relative to each other and relative to the operation of the negation. They do not mutually exclude one another. Properties/Millikan: are varied elements of facts, receptive to negation.
Substances/Millikan: are also variable, but relative to other transformations.
---
I 254
Substances/property/Millikan: substance and property are determined in relation to one another. Definition Substance/Millikan: substance is what it is and the same as it is relative to a set of property domains from which it necessarily has a property, while other properties are excluded in the property domain.
E.g. substance category/Millikan: corresponds to a set of substances. The identities are relations to the same opposite-predicate domains. E.g. gold, like other elements of the category of chemical elements, has an atomic number, a valence, a melting point, a color. But it does not have size, shape, mother, birthday, gesture.
Definition property/Millikan: (corresponding to substance) is what it is and the same as it is relative to a domain of opposites and to a set of elements of substance categories whose elements necessarily have a property from this domain and all other properties are excluded.
Grasping/property/Millikan: to grasp a property is to distinguish it from others, or to grasp the opposite parts relative to which the property is the same as that which it is.
---
I 255
Senseless/Millikan: thus we can recognize expressions as meaningless as e.g. "Gold is great". ---
I 274
Property/Object/Predicate/Substance/Individual/Ontology/Millikan: Strawson's distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute, but relative: Object/thing: For example, if my ring is made of gold, it cannot be made of silver at the same time.
Polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring ((s) it could also have been silver - the gold could have belonged to another object.). Then gold is a property (unlike another) and my ring is a substance.
But relative to other substances, the identity of gold seems like the identity of an individual.
Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or particular and property.
---
I 275
Variant: not only predicates are variants in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be replaced). Substance: when we consider gold as a property, it does not prevent us from understanding it as a substance. As Aristotle said:
Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances which exist; that is, substances that are not properties of something else.
Substance/Millikan: a substance is actually an epistemic category.
Substance/Millikan: e.g. gold, e.g. domestic cat, e.g. 69s Plymouth Valiant 100.
Substance/Category/Millikan: substances fall into categories, defined by the exclusivity classes with regard to which they are intended.
E.g. Gold and silver fall into this category because they belong to the same exclusivity classes: having a melting point, atomic weight, etc.
---
I 276
Imperfect Substances/Millikan: imperfect substances have only approximate properties. e.g. a domestic cat has a weight between 7 and 14 pounds. Perfect substance/Millikan: a perfect substance can also have time-bound properties:
E.g. Johnny sits at t1, but not at t2
E.g. water has a melting point at 0 degrees, in an atmospheric pressure, but not at 10 atmospheres!
E.g. Johnny has then however once and for all the property, to sit to t1.
---
I 277
Complete concept/Millikan: to have a complete concept, one needs time concepts. Accessibility: complete concepts for durable objects are not as accessible as concepts for substances such as e.g. domestic cat or e.g. gold.
---
I 281
Summary/Substance/Property/Identity/Self-identity/Millikan: Perfect Secondary Substance: e.g. gold: has an identity that is formally the same as that of an individual in relation to its properties.
Imperfect secondary substance: e.g. 69s Plymouth (contradiction to above) e.g. domestic cat: have a kind of identity that is formally analogous to the identity of perfect substances. For example, in accordance with laws in situ, instead of under all natural conditions.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Terminology Castaneda
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 325
Guise Theory/Castaneda: "Theory of ontological formations". Draws ontological consequences from the semantic discovery that private references have uneliminable meaning (non-substitutability) and from the intensionality conditions - not between thinking and the world, but primarily reference of thinking - because the private must no longer be excluded from the object area - furhtermore to thinking and world can remain typically propositionally structured. (VsLewis/VsChisholm).
I 337f
"Doxastic Accusative"/Castaneda: avoids facts as objects - thinking episodes are individuated by their accusatives - accusative: an attribute, not a thing.
I 386 ~
Doxastic Accusatives/Castaneda: Problem: pure universals are too far away, particularized properties or propositions are too big - Solution: Guise theory of formations: middle road: particularized properties, particularized to very thin, finite individuals.
I 463ff
Guise/CastanedaVsFrege: consubstantiation: sameness of Oedipus' father and Oedipus' predecessor on the throne - VsFrege: every singular term, denotes an object in each use - no varying denotation - designs one-dimensional, not like Frege: two-dimensional: purpose and object.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Thinking Dummett
 
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I 93 ff
DummettVsFrege: his theory of perception contradicts his thesis that every human can only grasp those thoughts which he understands as the sense of sentences. There are two interpretations.
I 105
Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activity) - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl s noema.
I 137 f
Strongest interpretation: we can only think in language - weakest interpretation: none of us can have a thought that we cannot express.
I 141
DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevails.
III 209
Language/thinking/Wittgenstein/Dummett: the role of language as a vehicle of thought is subordinate to its role as a tool of communication.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Thoughts Dummett
 
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I 19
Frege: Thought not the same as sense of the sentence - creatures with identical thoughts without linguistic manifestation possible.
I 32 f
Frege/thought: According to Frege the thought - the content of the act of thinking - is not part of the stream of consciousness. Frege capturing the thought: mental act - thought not content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs
Frege: Thoughts are objective, ideas are not. - If it were otherwise, we could never disagree.
I 194 ff
Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activities) - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl s noema.
I 120
A thought cannot be detected otherwise than as a complex. Evans: "generality condition": "This rose smells sweet" - no one who is unable to have other thoughts regarding this rose can have the thought or who does not understand what smelling sweet is. (Dummett pro).
I 89
Grasp: does not determine the truth value, but the truth conditions.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Thoughts Perry
 
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Frank I 395f
Thought is not the same as content: it may be that I now believe that it is a nice day today, but tomorrow do not think that it was nice yesterday, another thought, same content - then the thought is not the informational content.
I 396
Meaning / idea / PerryVsFrege: we must sharply separate the meaning of the thoughts. - The thought is not a mental entity but corresponds to the informational content - the meaning consistent in the role of the words - the same role creates different de re-propositions in any new context.

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Translation Searle
 
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John R. Searle
V 236
Translation/theory of descriptions/Russell/Searle: Translation is never an analysis - just an analog - meaning/Frege: way of givenness -RussellVsFrege: no relationship between description and meaning.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Truth Brandom
 
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I 182ff
Truth/Frege/Brandom: indefinable - The accuracy of inferences is not explained by something more fundamental, the power of the judgment is not explained by the fact that it would explicitly say of a sentence that it is true - Inference: there are erroneous conclusions because of irrelevance. ---
I 224
Truth/Brandom: the distinction between true and false sentences is related to the objectives for which one wants to use the language - philosophical semantics: has to do with practice - "horse" only means something in one practice. ---
I 226
Grice: contents through intention. ---
I 410
Truth/Reference/Brandom: the expressive function of "true" and "refers to" is incompatible with the explanatory function that is assigned to those expressions in the traditional theories. ---
I 412
Once the expressive role is properly understood, representation can no longer be accepted as a basic concept. ---
I ~ 463
Truth/Reference/Brandom: with a purely linguistic approach you can make assertions about extra-linguistic referential relations - truth is not to be a relation between executions and object - new: anaphorically indirect descriptions - word-word relation. ---
I 461ff
Truth/Brandom: no relation - truth no property, grammatical misunderstandings, philosophical fictions - instead: anaphoric analysis - "true" has merely superficial predicate form - BrandomVsFrege: false search for "common proposition" of true sentences - Solution: expressive power of "true" decides whether allocation is justified. ---
I 468
Truth/Brandom: "is true" is a pro-sentence forming operator, not a predicate, truth is not a property.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Truth Dummett
 
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EMD II 83
Truth/Dummett: comes from the act of asserting - closely related: correctness: saying something true means to say something correct.
EMD II ~ 87
Truth/Dummett: is an objective property of what a speaker says - and this is independent of the knowledge of the speaker or his utterance reasons - Truth explainable by more primitive notion of correctness - (correctness of sentences about the future, question, command).
EMD II 115
Truth/Dummett: still necessary for deductive inferences - def valid/Dummett: an inference that contains truth.
Dum I 26ff
Correspondence Theory/coherence Theory: meaning prevails over truth - Davidson: Truth prevails over meaning (truth conditions are defined later by the theory). - Dummett both together! Use/truth/Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes concept of truth superfluous > meaning before truth
III 8/9
Truth/Dummett: better: winning the game - necessary: ​​in addition declare that the goal is winning, not losing! - Part of the concept of truth is the stated goal to only make true statements. DummettVsFrege: The aim of the truth must be established before claiming, otherwise one could express the same thought, but deny it.
III 29
Truth/Dummett: in reality it is mostly about the distinction between designated /non-designated truth values
III 40
Truth/meaning/Dummett: "It is true that p if ... iff" is not sufficient - Use: Each conditional must be given a specific meaning. - We must be able to already understand "If P, then it is true that P"
III 45
Truth/Dummett: that through which a statement is true is that by which it can be recognized as true
Putnam II 214
Truth/Dummett: = Justification - Dummett believes in final verification - PutnamVsDummett: merely idealized verification possible. - The assertibility conditions for any sentence are not manageable. - We get to know the meaning conditions by acquiring a practice; that is not an algorithm, they cannot be formalized - hence rationality cannot be formalized either.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Truth Conditions Dummett
 
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EMD II 72
Truth Conditions/Tr.c./Dummett: are assumed given - but only for each type of speech act - theory of power must then distinguish between question, command, etc. - being able to specify truth conditions = being able to paraphrase the sentence, not just adding the predicate "true"! - The truth conditions themselves may not presume understanding of the sentence precisely then when the sentence is to be explained. - ((s) But you have to know what the sentence means, if you want to judge whether the fact is given, or whether a paraphrase is correct).
EMD II 95
Truth Conditions/tr.c./Dummett: E.g. observation of what it means for a tree to be bigger - Observation of skills: cannot figure out in principle in what exactly the ability consists (truth conditions for the attribution of skills).
EMD II 100
Truth Conditions/Dummett: you cannot know if you cannot tell when they are satisfied.
Dum III 17
Sense/Frege: explanation of sense with truth conditions - Tractatus/Wittgenstein: dito: "Under which circumstances" DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for this one must already know what the statement that P is true means - Vs: if that means that P is true, it means the same as asserting P. - VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what was to be explained - VsRedundancy Theory: we must either supplement it (not merely meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence.
III 122
Thinking-to-be-true/Dummett: the conditions for this are specified by the truth theory! - Vs: truth conditions not always recognizable, even if met. - VsVs: requires only knowledge of the conditions, not knowing of the fulfillment.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Truth Tables Wittgenstein
 
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II 73
Truth panel/Truth Table/Truth-panel/Truth-Table/WittgensteinVsRussell: no explanation, since it could also apply to other sentences. ---
II 322
Truth table/truth value table/WittgensteinVsFrege: he did not recognize that this table can be seen again as a symbol for the function, although it looks as if it would say something about the function. - ((s) As a symbol it is arbitrary and thus no explanation but only set next to it). ---
II 327
True/false/truth value/Truth Table/truth panel/Wittgenstein: the calculus with true/false (truth value) is boring and useless. - Just as the calculus by Russell. - Only justification: the true/false-calculus provides a translation of Russell's calculus. - Calculus: has only then value when it brings clarity over another.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Truth Values Prior
 
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I 51
Truth/the truth/Frege: all phrases denote "truth": because there are no different truths for different sentences, so as it is always the same truth that various accounts are true - analogy: sentences denote the truth, as number names name numbers - PriorVsFrege: false analogy: does not work with propositional attitude: "X believes that p" does not have to be wrong if p is false - (s) while different argument values provide other function values, one can attribute to the other any belief-attitudes (also false) without prejudging with it, if he can believe it - (i.e. whether the compound sentence gets wrong). ---
I 6§
Truth value/Prior: so we make up the term "truth value" for what we describe as identical if the condition (0) is true: (0) Efy i.e. "If f then y and if y then f" (spelling Lesniewski: E = equivalence) - because truth value is the description of the identical, truht value itself is not the "signified" (VsFrege).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Truth Values Tugendhat
 
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II 233ff
Truth value potential/Tugendhat: two names that denote the same object, have the same truth value potential - solution for the conflict: Frege: subsets, quotes: names of sentences - Searle: sentences never names - Tugendhat then truth value potential quasi transmission of the characteristics of sentences to names. ---
II 237
Truth Value/sentence/object/Frege: by substitutability it is proved that the truth values of sentences correspond to the object of the names - TugendhatVsFrege: only in reverse it can be proved that the objects of the names correspond to the truth values. ---
II 243
Odd Meaning/Frege: name of a sentence.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Truthconditional Semantics Strawson
 
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Graeser I 123
StrawsonVsWittgenstein / StrawsonVsDavidson / StrawsonVsFrege: Problem: the language include phrases or expressions that have no truth conditions -> truth-conditional semantics.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Understanding Wittgenstein
 
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Danto I 63
Definition understanding/Wittgenstein: understanding of truth conditions. To what refers the subject when his sentence is true. One does not need to know that the sentence is true, only what would be the case if it would be. Usually it takes more than understanding alone to know whether a sentence is actually true. ---
Dummett I 35
WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding is no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege) Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences.
---
Hintikka I 373
Understanding/Wittgenstein: is not a feeling-word. - Also propositional attitudes are no feelings. ---
II 46
Understanding/Wittgenstein: actually a translation. ---
II 300
Color/Understanding/Wittgenstein: to understand the word "yellow" it is not necessary that something yellow exists. - There also must not be anything, that's a foot long, because the measure is so long. ---
II 301
It depends on the language game, if one says, one must have been able to see green to determine: "this is not green." ---
VI 223
Understanding/understanding/Wittgenstein/Schulte: (Philosophical Investigations § 242): this includes not only accordance with the definitions, but also with the judgments.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Variables Prior
 
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I 30
Number variables/Prior: no names. E.g. if exactly 3 things j and exactly 4 things y, then more things are j than y. Then "3" no name but inseparable part of verb operator"Exactly 3 things __". ---
I 33
Variables/Quine: (bound) can only stand for names. So for things, not for sentences. QuineVsFrege: names are not for sentences, only for things - E.g. "For a j, jx" is the only way to read this, that there is at least one thing, so that x "does" this thing - Quine himself does not do that but he has "E" for "is element of".
---
I 35
Bound variable/name/Prior: E.g. open sentence "x is red-haired": what is x? - depends on how we stand for" understanding: a) x is for a name, such as "Peter" (Substitute) - b) or object Peter - PriorVsQuine: bound variables can also stand for sentences: "J. believes that p" (anything), then stands for a sentence. ---
A propos I 93 (external):
Sentece Variable/Wittgenstein: Tractatus: The term presupposes forms of all sentences in which it can occur - 3.312 It is therefore represented by the general form of the sentences which it characterizes - Witt.: namely in this form the expression will be constant and everything else can be variable - sentence variable: Aristotle innovation "a" for a whole sentence.
---
Prior I 148
Bound variables/Prior: represent logical proper names - "For an x: 1. x ft, 2. nothing else than x ft and 3. it is not the case that x yt". ---
I 164f
Bound variable/PriorVsAmerican logicians: not any stands for a name.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Verbs Gärdenfors
 
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Peter Gärdenfors
Gärdenfors I 181
Verbs/Croft/Gärdenfors: Croft (2001) Thesis: the role of verbs is described by Croft as a predication. GärdenforsVsCroft/GärdenforsVsFrege: the concept of predication is too abstract (it goes back to Frege) and does not describe the communicative role of verbs. Moreover, verbs are not adequately characterized by predication, since adjectives also predicate.
---
I 182
Verbs/Gärdenfors: have two roles: 1. Describe what has happened or should happen
2. Describe how it happens or should happen.
Thesis on verbs: a verb either refers to the force vector or the result vector - but not to both.
---
I 183
Meaning of verbs: a verb cannot mean something. Solution/Kiparsky: Kiparsky (1997) Thesis: a verb expresses at most a semantic role, e.g. a topic,...
---
I 184
...a direction, a path. Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2010, p. 25) extend this idea by associating semantic roles with argument and modifier position in an event schema. The verb can then only appear as either an argument or a modifier. ---
I 198
Verbs/Gärdenfors: semantic thesis: verbs refer to convex regions of vectors defined by a single semantic domain. Adjectives, however, refer to convex regions of a single domain.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Verbs Croft
 
Books on Amazon
Gärdenfors I 181
Verbs/Croft/Gärdenfors: Croft (2001) Thesis: The role of verbs is described by Croft as a predication. GärdenforsVsCroft/GärdenforsVsFrege: the concept of predication is too abstract (it can be traced back to Frege) and does not describe the communicative role of verbs. Moreover, verbs are not adequately characterized by predication, since adjectives also predicate.

Croft I
William Croft
Radical Construction Grammar: Syntactic Theory in Typological Perspective Oxford 2001


Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

The author or concept searched is found in the following 80 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity Fraassen Vs Analyticity
 
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EMD II 133
How-Question/Frege/Dummett: belongs to epistemology and not to theory of meaning. Sense/DummettVsFrege: this seems obvious at first glance. But if the meaning is not related to the method of verification, why does Frege not allow two analytically equivalent sentences to have the same sense?
EMD II 134
Analyticity/FregeVsQuine/Dummett: He had a well-developed theory of analyticity. Whereas, if two analytically equivalent sentences may differ in sense, there is no criterion for identity.
FregeVs/Dummett: Of course, if the concession were granted (which one?), it could not be maintained that the senses of sentences (the thoughts) are objects of beliefs. I.e. the sense is the reference of the propositional attitudes.
DummettVsFrege: but this thesis itself requires the assumption that sense is connected to the way of knowing how or to the belief reasons.
Question: Can we say that the sense only determines the object, i.e. the "what", or also the "how" or "why" it is believed?
Problem: At first glance, the two are too closely interlinked to be seen individually. Why should two things A and B not have the same sense? The only possibility seems to be that X can believe (or know) one thing without believing (or knowing) the other (opaque context).
What makes this at all possible is that the reasons of the expressions may be different.
It follows that a difference in the reasons of expression includes a difference in the belief objects.
II 135
DummettVsFrege: his fault is to have failed to insist that the theory of meaning must explain what manifests the recognition of the speaker.
II 136
Theory of Meaning/MT/Verification/DummettVsFrege: a verificationist theory of meaning explains meanings in terms of the actual ability to recognize the truth of propositions.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Analyticity Quine Vs Analyticity
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Danto I 239
QuineVsAnalyticity: we do not anticipate at which time we have to change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no clue.
Lanz in Metz I 272
The lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and science are on one and the same continuum.
McDowell I 158
QuineVsFirst Dogma: (distinction analytic/synthetic) against the notion that the truth of a synthetic sentence depended on two things: the meaning and the world. ((s) you cannot have meaning before you have the world).  Quine, however, preserves duality: Apparently, the truth depends both on the language and on extra-linguistic facts.
 McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we simply cannot distinguish them sentence by sentence.

Quine IV 407
QuineVsAnalyticity: reflects a failed notion of scientific theories and their reference to experience. There is no strict separation analytic/synthetic. "Roots of Reference": if you consistently proceed empirically, you gain an epistemologically harmless notion of analyticity.
Analytic/Kant: does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context!
II 407/408
Analytic/Quine: Kant should rather have said that a statement is analytic if it is true because of meanings and regardless of of facts. This explicitly draws a connection between analyticity and meaning. QuineVsAnalyticity: considerable difficulties exist with sentences like: Ex "No bachelor is married", "cats are animals." Obviously, these are not logical truths, their negation would be no formal objection.
(IV 410)
Ex Quine: "I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic or not. This is not because of the ambiguity of "green" and "extended", but because of the ambiguity of "analytical". Artificial languages: semantic rules for determining analyticity are only interesting if we already understand analyticity.
False notion: the idea that with the truth of a statement it is generally possible to distinguish between a linguistic and a fact component.
The whole difficulty is perhaps only a symptom of a false notion of the relationship between language and the world.

V 113
Logic/Frege/Carnap: the laws of logic apply because of language. I.e. its sentences are analytic. QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of meaning has not been given empirical meaning. Thus neither this linguistic theory of logic.
Solution/Quine: through our observation of language learning: we learn truth functions by finding connections between dispositions.
Alternation/Language Learning: the law that an alternation is implied by each of its components is learned with the word "or" itself. Something similar applies to the other laws. (>Minimum/Maximum/Chisholm). (>logical particles >logical constants).
Analyticity/Analytical/Language Learning/Quine: Ex we learn "bachelor" by learning that our parents agreed under precisely the circumstances under which they agreed to "unmarried man".
QuineVsAnalyticity: Important Argument: there are even disagreements about logical truths: Ex between classical logicians and intuitionists. Maybe we think that some truths are analytic and others are not?
Law of the Excluded Middle/SaD/Language Learning/Quine: the law of the excluded middle rejected by intuitionism is not linked in such a way with learning "or"! It is rather due to the blind spot of alternation.
Important Argument: perhaps the law of the excluded middle (Quine "law") which is true only in our point of view should only be seen as synthetic.
V 116
Analytic/Analyticity/Quine: the analytic propositions are a subclass of stimulus analytic propositions agreeing to which is a disposition of any speaker of a language community. QuineVsCarnap: but even now we do not have such strict contrast to the synthetic propositions.
Solution/Quine: Thesis: sentences that have been learned by many first are closer to analyticity than sentences that have only been learned by a few. The analytic propositions are those which are learned by all like that. These extreme cases, however, do not differ significantly from the neighboring ones. One cannot always specify which ones they are.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Austin, John L. Schiffer Vs Austin, John L.
 
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Stephen Schiffer
I 266
Austin: the expression : "the meaning of a word" is almost always a dangerous nonsense. (1961, 24, also Wittgenstein 1953 Ryle 1957) so all VsFrege. DavidsonVsSchiffer/DavidsonVsAustin/DavidsonVsWittgenstein : speaks of an entity that is designated by the "that" as in for example "that snow is white". (Davidson 1968).

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Berkeley, G. Frege Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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IV 47
FregeVsBerkeley: if everything is imagination, there is no bearer. If there is no bearer, there are no imaginations either. But there can be no experience without someone who experiences it. But then there is something that is not my imagination, and yet the object of my contemplation. Could it be that this "I" as a bearer of my consciousness is just one part of this consciousness, while another part may be a "moon image"? I.e. that something else is taking place while I judge that I’m looking at the moon? Then this first part would have a consciousness and a part of this consciousness would be I in turn, so regress. Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the bearer of my imagination. So that what I say something about is not necessarily my imagination. VsFrege: It could be argued, E.g. when I think that I feel no pain at this moment, doesn’t something in my imagination correspond to the word "I"? Frege: That may be. IV 48 I/Frege: the word "I" may be connected to a certain image in my consciousness. But then it is an image among other images, and I am its bearer just as I am the bearer of other ideas. I have an image of me, but I’m not this image! There must be a sharp distinction between the content of my consciousness (my imagination) and the object of my thinking (objective thoughts). Now the path is clear to recognize other people as an independent bearers of their imagination. Even imaginations may be the common object of thought by people who do not have these images. Imagination may become object.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Black, Max Dummett Vs Black, Max
 
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III 7
Truth Value/Tr.val./BlackVsFrege: if two seentences are materially equivalent, they have the same truth value. Problem: according to Frege certain sentences would have a meaning that they would not have according to normal conception:
E.g. "If oysters are inedible, then the wrong thing".
DummettVsBlack: if sentences stand for truth value, but there are also expressions (not sentences) for Truth Value, then this is a grammatical problem, not a logical one.
Truth Value/Grammar/Dummett: we can easily transform it from a noun into an adjective: "make true".

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Bundle Theory Newen Vs Bundle Theory
 
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New I 233
Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?).
Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems:
1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined
2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name.
Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato".
Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly.
Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description.
I 234
Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke:

(meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value.
I 235
E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato".
Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory:
E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"."
Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name.
KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is
I 236
the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object.
A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.)
Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable.
Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)".
Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning)
Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object.
Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense.
Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names).
Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition.
I 237
((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Carnap, R. Quine Vs Carnap, R.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Carnap VII 151
Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! (?)
However, if in the case of the lexicon (?) we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false.
VII 154
Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of ​​the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate.
QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects.
VII 155
CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations.
Lanz I 271
QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories!
I 272
There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. ---
Newen I 123
Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically.
I 124
Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap).
Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli.
Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities:
1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval
2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection.
This only applies for occasion sentences.
I125
Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers.
QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words.

Quine I 73
QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way.
I 74
Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference:
Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet.
Quine: theory has primarily to do with records,
Carnap: to do with terms.

I 466
For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general?
I 467
This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas?
However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers.

Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts.
It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form.
QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".)
Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania."

IV 404
Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself).
IV 416
QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology?
V 28
Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities.
V 29
Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning.
QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences.
V 30
Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.)
Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms.
QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role).

VII 40
But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience.
QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values ​​are revised in the same sense.

X 127
Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter.
Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect:
1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything.
2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation.
Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory.
QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world.
Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate.
X 133
We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge!

XI 99
QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences.
XI 129
Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values ​​of the variable.
Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values ​​of variables.
To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination).
XI 130
Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence.
XI 138
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference.
XI 142
Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers.
XI 150
Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things.
XI 151
CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice.

XII 69
QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope.
Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity.
Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G."

XII 89
Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory.
XII 90
QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).)
Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic.
XII 91
Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction.
Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts.
QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement.
XII 92
QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities.
But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts.
CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions.
XII 94
Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession.
2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools.
QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation?
Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization.
Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed.
Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism:
XII 95
Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences.
Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts!
Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories.
pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations).

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Carnap, R. Newen Vs Carnap, R.
 
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New I 115
Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network):
Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places.
Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations.
I 116
If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account.
Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism.
Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations.
VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations.
I 117
VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example
1) statements about our own consciousness
2) statements about the world of physical objects
3) about the consciousness of others
4) about intellectual and cultural objects.
Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment.
I 118
The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory.
Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories.
Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects.
Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color.
I 119
Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red.
Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction.
VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution:
I 120
(From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E
T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E

Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc.
Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C.
Problem: Carnap neglected
GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle.
NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial.
I 121
Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world.
NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen.

NS I 30
CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems:
1) problem of empty names.
a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence
b) how can various empty names be distinguished?
2) Problem:
 Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true.

NS I 101
Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory.
NS I 102
Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege.
VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic.
Solution: Searle: bundle theory.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Compositionality Schiffer Vs Compositionality
 
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I 220
SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?.
E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3).
Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory.
PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms.

I XV
SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.).
I 137
Paul and Elmar/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false:
I 138
Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye.
I 144
SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct.
In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics.
Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding!
I 182
SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.)
Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker).
I 192
SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality.
E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions.
(2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics.
E1: is not a fully-developed natural language.
I 193
Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language).
B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions).
Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it.
µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white.
Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language.

I 195
Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices)
M: Mentalese for Harvey
conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it).
Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof:
(3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol"
((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed)
(4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup
((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML)
and
(5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup
((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning).
I 196
Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics,
b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5)
We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary:
Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Descartes, R. Kant Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Danto I 179
KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking.

Kant I 73
Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I ​​think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing.

Field I 80
KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral.
But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle!
For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.)
Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise.
Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence.
Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here).

Stegmüller IV 362
Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis.
2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed.
3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim).
IV 364
VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic.
4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula).
MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it?
Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege.
IV 365
MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this.


Strawson V 22
"Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them.
V 23
StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system!
V 103
KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis.

Strawson V 140
Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim.
KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity.
V 143
KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject.
V 145
Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Description Theory Searle Vs Description Theory
 
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Searle V 236
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: the expression obtained by a translation is according to this interpretation by no means an analysis of the original expression, but merely an analogy. Sense/Frege: Question: what is the relationship between an indicative expression and its meaning? Answer: the sense of an indicative expression is "the manner of presentation."
RussellVsFrege: for him there is no relationship between certain descriptions and their meanings!
For him, a proposition that includes a description is the hidden form of a proposition that asserts the existence of an object.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Dummett, M. Brandom Vs Dummett, M.
 
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I 202
BrandomVsDummett: if he see the problematic aspect of the concept "boche" in that it causes a non-conservative extension of the remaining language, it is not right. The non-conservativity merely shows that the concept has a substantial content which was not already included in other concepts. E.g. Temperature: was introduced with certain criteria, with the introduction of new measurement methods, the complex inferential definition developed that determines the significance of today (> Measuring). Introduction: it is not to be asked if the conclusions were already accepted, but whether this conclusion is one that should be accepted! The problem with "boche" and "nigger" is not the novelty, but the unwanted conclusions.
Brandom II 173
But there are other ways of justification than showing that we’ve already been on them determined implicitly, even before the term was introduced. Background of material inferential practices. Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: this disregards the specific nature of the sentences of being able to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregian power).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Dummett, M. Tugendhat Vs Dummett, M.
 
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I 253
Bedeutung/Behauptung/Dummett/Tugendhat: Bsp Spiel: Behauptungshandlung, Behauptung und Gegenbehauptung, "ja"/"nein" entspricht "wahr"/"falsch" einer gewinnt, einer verliert. Dieses Schema soll jeder Äußerungen jedes assertorischen Satzes zugrunde liegen!
I 254
Der Sprecher übernimmt eine Garantie, die vom Hörer in Zweifel gezogen wird. (Searle so ähnlich, s. o.).
I 255
Neu: es wird umgekehrt gesagt: wenn der Ausdruck verwendet wird, welches dann die Bedingungen sind, unter denen er richtig ist. Das setzt voraus: 1. dass die Bedingungen, in denen der Ausdruck verwendet wird für die Richtigkeit der Verwendung gleichgültig sind.
2. dass die Bedingungen von denen die Richtigkeit abhängt, solche sind, deren Erfülltsein von der Verwendung des Ausdrucks selbst garantiert wird. Was der Ausdruck garantiert, ist, dass die Bedingungen seiner Richtigkeit (Wahrheit) erfüllt sind!
Die Äquivalenz "p equi dass p ist wahr" gründet darin, dass derjenige, der etwas behauptet, immer schon die Richtigkeit mitbehauptet.
I 256
Sprecher: Bedingungen und Vorhandensein zusammen garantiert. Hörer: trennt beides und stellt es getrennt in Frage. (Asymmetrie).
I 256/257
TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unbefriedigend: 1. Es ist noch nichts darüber gesagt worden, welches die Wahrheitsbedingungen einer Behauptung bzw. eines Satzes sind. Eine Möglichkeit wäre zu sagen, dass die Wahrheitsbedingungen eines Satzes ihrerseits durch einen Satz angegeben werden. Das setzt natürlich voraus, dass für die Erklärung eines Satzes immer schon ein anderer Satz zur Verfügung steht. Metasprache. (TugendhatVs). Die Erklärung muss in einer Verwendungsregel liegen.
Es genügt nicht, zu zeigen, dass der erste Satz wie der zweite verwendet wird, es muss gezeigt werden, unter welchen Bedingungen der eine Satz gebraucht wird.
2. Jedes Übernehmen einer Garantie setzt seinerseits die Verwendung eines assertorischen Satzes voraus, das ist also eine Pseudoerklärung.

II 231
TugendhatVsDummett: "Bedeutung" bei Frege sollte man nicht mit "Referenz" übersetzen!
II 232
Gerechtfertigt nur dort, wo Frege Sätze als Eigennamen auffasst!
II 247
Referenz/Tugendhat: durch meine Kritik an der Übersetzung Bedeutung = Referenz habe ich nicht den Primat der Wahrheit vor den Gegenständen in Frage gestellt. DummettVsTugendhat: es genügt nicht, die Bedeutung von Namen lediglich als truth-value potential zu erklären: 1.die Bedeutung könnte dann als bloße equivalence set von Ausdrücken aufgefasst werden.
TugendhatVsDummett: richtig bei Sätzen und Prädikaten, bei Namen muss man sich nicht damit begnügen.
DummettVsTugendhat: 2. Dass zwei Namen "a" und "b" dieselbe Bedeutung haben, wenn sie dasselbe truth-value potential haben, gilt nur bei extensionalen Prädikaten. Aber mit welchem Kriterium kann man extensionale von intensionalen Prädikaten unterscheiden? Es setzte voraus, dass wir ein Kriterium für die Bedeutungsgleichheit von Namen hätten, das nicht erst durch das leibnizsche Gesetz festgelegt wird.
II 248
Leibnizsches Gesetz/Dummett: kann nicht als Definition von "=" aufgefasst werden, sondern gründet darin, dass, wenn wir etwas von einem Gegenstand prädizieren, der Wahrheitwert der Behauptung unabhängig sein muss von der Gegebenheitsweise!. TugendhatVsDummett: nicht so bei Frege: Dummett weist selbst darauf hin, dass er das Leibnizsche Gesetz als Definition von "=" aufgefasst hat.
Tugendhat: wir können, was wir mit Identität meinen, nicht mit dem Gesetz erklären. Tugendhat pro Dummett.
TugendhatVsDummett: mit Sätzen als Äquivalenzklassen hat man nicht den Bezug zur Welt verloren: es geht nur um ganz bestimmte equivalence sets, die natürlich durch die Beschaffenheit der Welt bestimmt sind.
Dummett: Sätze nicht gleich Namen! (VsFrege).
II 249
Referenz/Dummett: semantische Rolle. Tugendhat: das ist genau dasselbe wie mein "truth-value potential". ((s) > semantischer Wert?).
II 250
Referenz/Frege: er hat nie von Referenz gesprochen Prädikate/Frege: er hat nie davon gesprochen, dass die Bedeutungen von Prädikaten als "quasi-objects" verstanden werden müssten.
Dummett/Tugendhat: der berechtigte Kern an Dummetts Kritik: aus dem truth-value potential folgt noch nicht, dass die Bedeutung eines Namens ein Gegenstand sei.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Dummett, M. Wittgenstein Vs Dummett, M.
 
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Dummett I 158
WittgensteinVsDummett / WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement is indicated by the description of its truth conditions.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Dummett, M. Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M.
 
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II 1
"Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking.
StalnakerVsDummett.
II 2
The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking.

Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto)
Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here.
Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes.
II 74
Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker:
K: I will be killed
P: I take precautions
Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary.
1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R
Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that.
Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid.
Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed.
Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps.
StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional).
a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from
II 75
2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion.
That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)).
Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed.
Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the
Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this:
A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B
So: C v D.
Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable.
Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails.

I 174
Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out.
Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states.
Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily.
StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions.
a) what is the semantics e.g. for names
b) what facts cause that this is our semantics.
Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language.
((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker).

I 179
Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F.
Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description).
That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind.
I 180
Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition.
singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it).
StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true.
Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Eliminativism Shoemaker Vs Eliminativism
 
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Stalnaker I 227
Utility theory/utility/scale/calibration/von Neumann/Morgenstern/Stalnaker: E.g. someone prefers duck before salmon and salmon before oatmeal A > B > C. Refinement of the scale: one asks the person whether he prefers to have B or prefers to have a 50/50 lottery ticket for A v C.
Does he select B, it means that B moves closer to the left on his scale, closer to A. This can be repeated for the things at stake in the lottery and thus ever further refinements can be concluded.
General: preferences between the lottery tickets define numerical values for the utility
But the scale is a conventional: every linear transformation of this scale provides an equivalent, that represents the same facts about the subjective preferences.
Question: does it make sense to compare preferences interpersonally?
I 228
Utility/Stalnaker: but here it is not about felt pleasure (as a "quality experience"). The numeric values do not represent facts about relations between people. Analogy/Stalnaker: the position VsInterpersonal comparisons is analogous to the question whether grams would be greater or smaller than kilometers.
Pointe: that we cannot say this is not because there were facts that were hidden from us.
qualitative/intentional/Stalnaker: if we oppose intentional to phenomenal (qualitative) states, it is clear that utility belongs to the intentional side.
Utility/analogy/Stalnaker: the question whether one can compare utility interpersonally is complicated and interesting. It is also about whether it is more likely that apply it to social groups.
I 229
Utility theory/von Neumann/Morgenstern//Stalnaker: should not be regarded as eliminativistical. According to it there are really facts about the preferences of those represented by the numbers but because the zero point and the units are arbitrary, interpersonal compare have no sense. StalnakerVsShomaker: I am afraid he takes the side of common sense VsFrege because he assumes that Frege is an eliminativist. ShoemakerVsEliminativism.
Qualia/secondary qualities/Shoemaker: thesis: we need qualia for facts about our experiences and for secondary qualities.
StalnakerVsShoemaker: a purely relational approach is capable of this as well.
RelationismVsQualia.

Shoem I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Fraassen, B. van Carnap Vs Fraassen, B. van
 
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VI 242
Concept/Object/CarnapVsFrege: border sometimes blurred! Question: Whether a real object or rather conceptual summary (e.g. furniture, coal inventory in Central Europe) Relation_: controversial whether E.g. distance is something real.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Frege, G. Austin Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 236
Negation/AustinVsFrege: affirmation and negation are on exactly the same level in the sense that there can be no language that does not contain conventions for both, and that both refer equally direct to the world and not to statements about the world. However, there can of course be a language that does not contain a means to fulfill the functions of ’true’ and ’false’. (Tugendhat I 66 Frege: propositional content).
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Frege, G. Black Vs Frege, G.
 
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II 124
Numbers/BlackVsPlato/BlackVsFrege: false Platonism: imagining them as "extraordinary" or "special", "eternal" objects.
II 125
Grammatically, however, the names of numbers (numerals) differ in important aspects from the name of physical objects. E.g. "Two people came in": Here "two" is public. Adverb.
This can be transformed into "one and one: "a man came in and then another."
This is not possible in the case of "red". (> Paraphrase).
BlackVsFrege: These grammatical facts show that numbers are no "special kinds of objects".
Frege: the great Frege, however, made no elementary mistake by accepting it anyeay, but he was never really satisfied with it.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Frege, G. Brandom Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 506
BrandomVsFrege: he blurs the distinction between free-standing and embedded contents. (Brandom also allows sub-sentential level).
I 592
BrandomVsFrege: his call for all truth values to be clarified results in disastrous consequences in his late work Basic Laws of Arithmetic.
I 662
Def Content/Frege: "Two judgments have the same content iff the inferences that can be drawn in conjunction with several other ones always also follow from the others in connection with the same other judgments."
I 807/808
BrandomVsFrege: That’s an all-quantification via auxiliary hypotheses: it is not enough to have one set of other judgments that lead to the same set of consequences. Such a requirement would erase the differences, because such a set can always be found: according to Frege, any two sentences have the same consequences if they are connected to a contradiction. Dual aspect: what constitutes evidence as evidence of an auxiliary hypothesis depends on the available auxiliary hypotheses (Holism).
Names: Fregean Line: the speaker connects a property (or conjunction of properties) with each name, which determines its reference as the only one.
BrandomVsFrege: it is hard to see why this should be Fregean. For Frege, properties are part of the "meaning", not of the "sense" - they are not immediately detectable. And how would this analysis be extended to predicates in Frege’s view? They are surely not to be determined by property sets.
Brandom: the conceptual contents expressed by proper names differ from conventionally conceived Fregean sense in that their individuation is not epistemically transparent. We can be in the dark as to whether two Tokenings belong to the same anaphoric chain or not. In this sense, we do not always know what we say and think.
Frege IV 85
(> Knowledge). Frege speaks about grasping, not about seeing! Frege: "Someone" refers to nothing. - "He" refers to nothing. (BrandomVsFrege: anaphora!).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Frege, G. Dummett Vs Frege, G.
 
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Brandom II 74
Frege (late): representation of independent reality DummettVsFrege: Falsely: property of sentences instead of transitions between them.
Brandom II 173
Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: the disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregean force).
Dummett I 15
Frege’s basic idea: Extraction of the concept (in the sense of the definition of 1890) by decomposition of a complete thought. (Begriffsschrift).
I 51
DummettVsFrege: It is questionable, however, whether this term can be explained without referring to the concept of the sentence. One must, for example, not only identify a proper noun in a sentence, but also be able to replace it in this position. How to explain the "occurrence" of the meaning of a name in a thought without relying on the form of its linguistic expression, is not clear. Frege: The meaning of every partial expression should be the contribution of this subexpression for determining this condition. DummettVsFrege: So we must know, contrary to Frege’s official theory, what it means that a proposition is true, before we can know what it means that it expresses a thought; before we can know what it means that an expression makes sense, we need to know what it means that it has a reference.
Tradition: It used to be argued: as long as the meaning is the way of givenness of the reference object, there can, if no object is present, be no corresponding way of givenness and therefore no meaning (Evans, McDowell). DummettVsFrege: The difficulty is triggered by the fact that Frege strictly equates the semantic value of a singular term and the object to which it is intended to refer. The slogan "Without semantic value no meaning" is impressive, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference.
Husserl has no doubts in this regard. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema".
DummettVsFrege: That does not show that the thesis the meaning (thought, see above) was not a content of consciousness is wrong, but rather that its reasoning, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity do not quite apply.
Dummett I 61
DummettVsFrege: For an incommunicable meaning which refers to a private sentiment, would, contrary to the sensation itself, not belong to the content of consciousness. DummettVsFrege: Independence from sensation is necessary for objectivity: E.g. color words, opaque surface, a color-blind person recognizes by this that others see the color.
I 63.
Frege: "Red" does not only refer to a physical property, but to a perceptible property (it appears as red to perople with normal vision). If we explained "appears red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do this the other way around. DummettVsFrege: The modified version by Frege is unsatisfactory, because it gives the word "red" a uniform reference, but attributes a different meaning to it, depending on the speaker.
I 64
Intension/Frege: "parallel to the straight line" different from "same direction as the straight line", DummettVs: Here, one must know the concept of direction or not "whatever value" other sense than "value curve" DummettVs: Here, the concept of value curve must be known or not. special case of the Basic Law V from which Russell antinomy arises.
I 79
Meaning: Contradictory in Frege: on the one hand priority of thought over language, on the other hand, it is not further explained.
I 90 ++ -
Language/Thinking/Perception
I 93 + -
DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to "interpretation".
I 104 -
Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activity) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema.
I 106
Frege: Grasping of the Thought: directly through the consciousness, but not content of the consciousness - DummettVs: contradictory: Grasping is an ability, therefore background (both episodically and dispositionally)
I 122 -
DummettVs Equating the literal meaning with the thought module.
I 124 +
DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated! Because they only appear in a particular way - by this determination they are communicable I 128.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Frege, G. Evans Vs Frege, G.
 
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Gareth Evans
Frank I 485
I/Here/Now/This/Index Words/Evans: are closely related. One and the same explanation pattern applies with three properties: 1) Criteria-free identification: in a certain sense there is even no identification at all! But this can be understood a a "broader sense of identification".
Problem: possible misunderstanding: identification criterion of singular term is the Fregean sense.
A "criteria-less sense" would then appear as a conceptual contradiction.
Solution/Evans: Fregean sense: should be understood as the particular way to think of an object designated by an expression.
2) Limited Accessibility: "I" is not accessible to anyone at any time.
Fra I 486
You have to be at the place in question in order to truthfully say "here". The behavior of "I", "this", etc. corresponds to this. I/Thoughts/Understanding/EvansVsFrege: it’s probably impossible for me to "grasp" other people’s "I" thoughts, but that does not mean it is impossible to understand them!
Communication/Evans: It is not absolutely necessary to think the thoughts of others in exactly the same form as they do themselves in order to understand them.
Limited Accessibility/VsEvans: Question: Is it not possible to have "here" thoughts, no matter where you are?
EvansVsVs: misunderstanding:
Fregean thoughts are carriers of un-relativized, absolute truth values. Thus it is impossible that one and the same idea is sometimes true and sometimes wrong.
It is therefore wrong to speak of a way of givenness expressed by "here"
(s) "Here" is not an intention, "here" no intention Kaplan: "I": "rigid intension")
Evans: There are as many kinds of the givenness of "here" as there are places.
Difference: type/incident.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Frege, G. Field Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 89
Knowledge of Consistency/FregeVsDeflationism: (§95, Foundations of Arithmetic): We can only determine that a concept is consistent by first producing something that falls under it. (p.106). FieldVsFrege: this is obviously not literally correct: E.g. we can see that the concept of a "winged horse" is consistent without producing such a horse. But you can weaken the argument: then it acknowledges that there is knowledge of possibility that does not arise from a knowledge of actuality, but from the reflection of the logical form of the concepts.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Frege, G. Husserl Vs Frege, G.
 
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Dummett I 47
In any case, it is clear that according to Husserl, a full-bodied expression owes its meaning to an accompanying consciousness act. Reference / FregeVsHusserl: Frege s principle states that the reference of an expression is that which is common to all other expressions where it is established that their substitution does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs instead of the original expression.
Dummett I 48
reference / HusserlVsFrege: H. on the other hand tends to the view that the reference is the same as the object to which the predicate is applied. He is certainly not equating the reference of a predicate and a concept, but: Husserl used meaning and sense synonymously.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Frege, G. Kaplan Vs Frege, G.
 
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Frank I 484
sing Term/Frege: erschöpft sich nicht darin, für einen Gegenstand zu stehen, sondern hat immer auch eine besondere Weise des Gegebenseins. ("Sinn", Intension). Indexwörter/indexikalisch/Perry/VsFrege/KaplanVsFrege: dieses Modell ist auf Kennzeichnungen und Namen zugeschnitten und scheitert bei Bezugnahmen der ersten Person.
EvansVsPerry/EvansVsKaplan: 1. es gibt keinen Grund, Frege zu unterstellen, der Gegenstand eines sing Term sei stets dadurch gegeben, dass eine bestimmte Kennzeichnung auf ihn zutrifft,
2. die Besonderheiten der indexikalische Referenz sind gerade durch eine Theorie der damit verbundenen nicht deskriptiven Weisen der Gegebenheit aufzudecken.
D. Kaplan
Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Frege, G. Kripke Vs Frege, G.
 
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Cresswell II 151
Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions).
((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.)
Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter!
Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects.
Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect.
Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "Φωσφόρος" instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres".
Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre.

Stalnaker I 172
Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning
Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent.
a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified,
b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language.
I 174
Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states.
Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given.
StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues.
a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names
b) what circumstances lead to those semantics.
Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language.
Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time.
a) why a name has these referents and
b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content).
Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: Kripke (1972) (S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edition, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769, Dordrecht, 1972) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways.
a) as meaning
b) as the way how the reference is determined.
By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings.
I 192
Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics")
Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics?
Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language.
Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values.
Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain.
Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it.
Similar to Kripke:
Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies.
KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things.
Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words.
I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to:
Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language.
E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if
Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker")
Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents.

Tugendhat I 440
KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Frege, G. Lewis Vs Frege, G.
 
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Schwarz I 228
Predicate/Characteristic/SchwarzVsLewis/VsFrege: The assumption that for each predicate a name can be clearly allocated for a corresponding characteristic. But is nothing less than Frege's ominous axiom V(Frege 1893 1903,§20). RussellVsFrege: Russell's paradoxy. Some predicates, for example "_ is a characteristic that does not apply to itself" do not correspond to a characteristic. (>Heterology). Predicate/Characteristic/Lewis/Schwarz: In Lewis' metaphysics predicates as, for example, "_ is a class", "_ is a part of" and "is identical with _" do not correspond to anything that can be named with a singular term.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Frege, G. Mill Vs Frege, G.
 
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II 57
Names/Mill: Provide the listener with no knowledge about the object. If s_he may have learned something about Cologne earlier, it was not by the word Cologne.
II 58
By learning about how many objects a name can referre to we also learn nothing, but only if we know what it possibly connotes (attributes). On the same thing, we can also apply different names, whose meanings are not the same.
MillVsFrege: Therefore, the carrier is not the meaning.
II 59
Connotative name/Mill: Here there is an uncertainty.
II 61
Solution: to confer a fixed connotation to concrete names with specific predicates.

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998
Frege, G. Nagel Vs Frege, G.
 
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III 107
Psychology/Nagel: it is characteristic for psychological terms that we imagine they could be separated from the objective side effects! E.g. the question whether sugar tastes for other people like "this here" is a perfectly well-defined question! Even if it is unanswerable! ((s) NagelVsFrege/NagelVsSchlick/ >Cresswell II "Frege-Schlick view")).

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
Frege, G. Prior Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 50
Truth Value/PriorVsFrege: Problem: the term "truth value": was invented by him, but originally for mathematical contexts. Value: to be "greater than 0" is, strictly speaking, not the "value" of a function for a given argument.
The value for this argument is not a property of a number (e.g. to be > 0).
But a number!
The value of a function is different for different arguments and is not the whole collection (Frege: value curve!) of values.
Frege: sentences designate objects that are called truth and falsity. Namely in the same way as number names (numerals) and formulas contain the number names, designate numerals.
Which number is designated by a given function expression depends on which number is designated by the expression argument, and by nothing else.
Prior: if the analogy is to last, then whether truth or falsity is designated must depend on what is designated by the argument sentence ((s) the cited belief), and on nothing else ((s) i.e. it would always have to be believed that grass is green, simply because it is true - absurd.)
Prior: E.g. that it is not the case that the grass is pink, just like 2 is 1 > 0 (and also other things, such as is its own square!), according to Frege this is not simply supposed to be "true", but "the true thing".
That is to correspond to the fact that 2 1 is not only "> 0", but the number (blue) 1!
I 51
And that it is not the case that the grass is pink is "the true thing" (truth), precisely because the grass is pink is "the false thing". Analogy: "the false thing" as in: (1 + 1) 1 is the number 1, precisely because 1 + 1 is the number 2, because that grass is pink is the wrong thing just like (3 1) 1 is the number 1, because 3 1 is the number 2.
There are no different truths.
PriorVsFrege: all this follows if Frege's analogy is true. But of course it is false.
Truth and falsity are more like properties of what sentences designate. That is what Frege wanted to avoid.
But we have said above that sentences denote nothing.
Propositions/Prior: only have Pickwickian meaning! (WittgensteinVsBroad: (W II 94) there is not one "special" meaning apart from the "ordinary" meaning)
Prior: but we know enough to see that this is harmless.
We know what it means, that 1 is > 0, namely, since for each  and each  if exactly one thing t and no thing t, then s more things than s. Def "more than". (Special character)
I 51/52
Function/Sentence/Prior: it is a function of the sense of "grass is pink" to be expressed by the sentence "X believes that grass is pink".
Distinction without Difference/Prior: but that makes no difference!
That this is not the case, is exactly what makes the belief false. There is no thing that is designated with "grass is pink". (VsFrege: i.e. also not "the wrong thing", but that is not what Frege meant, either).
Truth functions and belief functions are functions of the same argument!(?).
Def Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property of "being the concept of truth or falsity."
Thoughts/PriorVsFrege: among the functions of his thought we have those that are related to each other, just as the functions of the true and false are related to each other and we can omit the latter as superfluous.
But the extensionalists have made the stone that we have jettisoned their milestone!
PriorVsFrege: Conclusion: sentences do not designate anything, not even "the true thing" or "teh false thing".
Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension".
I 53
PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as their extension. For truth values and classes are both logical constructions and very similar ones at that! And not "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects).

Names/Variables/Prior: there is a doctrine among American logicians that every bound variable stands for a name. PriorVs: that is too eccentric a criterion for names.
Ontology/Individual/Prior: in reality, combines the principle that only individuals are real with the view that the only way for us to grasp individuals linguistically is to treat them as applications of nouns.
And that their application is unique is something that can be expressed within the system, and not with Russell's logical proper names (this, or descriptions)
I 166
but with Lesniewski's functor "e" or "This __ is a __". Description/ Frege: for him, the expression "the such and such" itself an individual name (individual name, singular name).
PriorVsFrege: there are no individual names! Instead, the expression occurs as part of a longer functor that carries out the individuation.
This/Oxford: many there are not happy about Russell's logical proper names.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Frege, G. Putnam Vs Frege, G.
 
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V 48
Frege: the meaning ("sense") of an expression should be an extramental entity or an extramental notion that the mind could "capture" somehow. PutnamVsFrege: such a theory here is not useful in terms of intentions in our new sense.
1. there are meaning differences that missed the intention. So the understanding of an expression can not solely consist in the fact that one associates it with an intension.
2. We have no "sixth sense" that allows us to directly perceive extramental entities. The "detecting" of an intension must be somehow mediated by representations.


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Frege, G. Quine Vs Frege, G.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Quine I 425
VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them.
I 209
Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung".
QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object)
"a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object.
Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs).
I 264
according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ...
I 265
Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited.
I 266
Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function.

II 201
Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear.
II 202
"So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write:
"{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment).
(i.e.​​the inversion of "so that").
Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes!
We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality.
The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular.
II 203
It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory:
(1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx})
This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic!
III 98
Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates.
III 99
Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences.

Applying: Terms apply.
Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs.
III 100
Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person.
Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension.
QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes").
Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes.

VII 108
Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are.
Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities.
VII 109
Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII 71).
Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements.
Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language:
Names are one kind of expression and statements are another!
QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and
"p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements.
Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme.
"p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII 111)

VII 115
Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names.
IX 216
Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT!
Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again.
NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction.
Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands.

Ad 173 Note 18:
Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks).
XI 55
QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")".
QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy).
2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization
(Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7))
comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Frege, G. Russell Vs Frege, G.
 
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Bertrand Russell
Dummett I 59
RussellVs distinction sense / reference (meaning / reference) (RussellVsFrege) ---
Stepanians I 44
Proof/Frege/Stepanians: Frege requests with the demand for completeness and rigor much stronger requirements for evidence than his mathematical contemporaries. Mathematics/VsFrege: mathematicians were more interested in truth than in the epistemological status. Intuitively plausible transitions were sufficient.
---
Stepanians I 87
Explicit definition/Frege/Stepanians: must satisfy two conditions 1. Frege's adequacy criterion: Hume's principle must follow from it. The justification for this principle is that the basic laws of arithmetic have to be provable on the principle's basis.
2. the explicit definition must master the problem with recourse to concept scope, where the context definition fails: it must solve the Caesar-problem (see above).
---
I 88
VsFrege: his explicit definition of the number concept does not solve the Caesar problem, but shifts it only to concept scope. Solution: would it only be if the concept scope excluded from the outset that Caesar is such a one.
Solution/Frege: requires here simply that the knowledge of the concept scope excludes this.
Value-over-time/terminology: = concept scope.
---
I 88
Concept scope/Frege/StepaniansVsFrege/VsFrege/Stepanians: Frege's own view of concept scopes will prove to be contradictory (see Russell's paradox). ---
I 91
Concept scope/Frege/Stepanians: was a newly introduced logical object by Frege for solving the Caesar-problem. They were not present yet in the concept script. Frege must justify them. Additional axiom: "Basic Law V":
The scope of F = is the scope of G
bik
All Fs are G and vice versa.
Russell's paradox/antinomy/RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: Basic Law V allows the transition from a general statement via terms to a statement about objects that fall under F - the scope of F.
It is assumed that each term has a scope, even if it might be empty.
---
I 92
RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: shows that not all definable terms in Frege's theory have a scope: Concept scope/Frege/RussellVsFrege: since concept scopes are objects the question has to be allowed whether a concept scope falls under the concept whose extent/scope it is.
If so, it includes itself, otherwise not.
Example: the scope of the term cat is itself not a cat.
On the other hand:
Example: the scope of the term non-cat contains very well itself, since it is not a cat.
Contradiction: a concept scope which includes all concept scopes that do not contain themselves. If it contained itself, it should not to contain itself by definition, if it did not contain itself, it must include itself by definition.
---
I 96
Object/concept/Frege/Stepanians: we discover (in a purely logical way) objects on concepts as their scopes. ---
I 97
VsFrege/VsConcept scope/Stepanians: the idea of the concept scope is based on a linguistic deception (See Chapter 6 § 2). That was Frege's own diagnosis. ---
I 114
Sentence/declarative sentence/statement/designating/VsFrege/Stepanians: one has often accused Frege that a declarative sentence does not want to denote anything but wants to claim (a truth value as an object) something. FregeVsVs/Stepanians: sentences as names for truth values are actually about subsets, whereas these subsets make a contribution to the truth value of the sentence structure (complete sentence).
Sentence/assertion/declarative sentence/Frege: (later, function and concept, 22, footnote): the total sentence means F nothing.
Basic Laws/terminology/Frege: (later): in the basic laws he differentiates terminologically and graphically between sentential "truth value names" that contribute towards the determination of the truth value and "concept type sets" that mean F nothing, but claim something.
---
Horwich I 57
RussellVsFrege/Cartwright: Russell's analysis differs from Frege, by not using unsaturation. ---
Newen I 61
Meaning determination/meaning/Russell/Newen: Two modes are possible: a) syncategorematic: according to the occurrence in a sentence.
b) categorematic; independent from the occurrence in a sentence.
Relational principle of meaning: applies to categorematic expressions: the meaning is the object (or the property). They are defined by acquaintance.
---
I 62
RussellVsFrege: Thesis: simple expressions mean what they signify. Syncategorematic/meaning/Russell. E.g. "and", "or": indicating their meaning means indicating the meaning of sentences in which they occur. ((s)> Context, contextually).
Contextually/Russell/Newen: syncategorematic expressions: their meaning is indicated by their meaning in schemes (sentence scheme).
---
Quine II 103
Russell: classes, if there are any, must exist, properties at best must be in place (weaker). Quine: I think this is arbitrary. In Russell's analysis of the concept of meaning, its relative indifference reappears opposite the existence-term (subsistence): Frege: threefold distinction
a) expression,
b) what it means,
c) that to what it (if at all) refers to.
This is not natural for Russell.
RussellVsFrege: ~ the whole distinction between mean and designate is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where should we find the designating complex that supposedly refers to C?
QuineVsRussell: Russell's position seems sometimes to come from a confusion of terms with their meanings, sometimes from a confusion of the expression with its mention.

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Frege, G. Searle Vs Frege, G.
 
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John R. Searle
II 285
Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions.
II 286
Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege!
Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for.

II 301
The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation.
2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification.
3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress).
Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress..
II 303
Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words.

II 228
Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement.
III 229
Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not.
2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements.
Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation.

V 116
SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too).
V 117
Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself.
E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound!

V 144
SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition!
V 152
Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously
b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions.
Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Logic 2nd stage).

V 155
Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b).
Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms.
V 156
Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property!
V 172
Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression.
V 173
2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals.
4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals.
5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions.

V 256
Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions.
To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star.
They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Frege, G. Shoemaker Vs Frege, G.
 
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Stalnaker I 222
Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: this one will explain it with a relational structure. We have distinctive skills and are disposed to make certain judgments about similarity and difference. That means that we can combine certain kinds of experiences with others.
Discernment: is the intrapersonal criterion for the identity of qualia.
Inverted spectra/inverted qualia//symmetry/Stalnaker: Assuming (as does the thesis of the inverted spectra) that the relational structure is symmetrical (in some way).
Suppose we could permute types of qualitative experiences systematically, so that all
I 223
judgments about equality and diversity survived and thus generally the whole relational structure. Functionalism: will then determine the functional identity (because of the symmetry), with a qualitative contrast (because qualia were depicted with other qualia, which are distinguishable from them).
Pointe: if that is correct then no functionalist description of qualia could be correct.
Vs: you can deny this
1. by denying the symmetry. One can say that even if there is a certain symmetry in the structure of color experiences - in the distinctive skills and judgments about equality and diversity - the whole relational structure is much more complex. There are interactions of colors with others who are not preserved during permutations. bad solution/inverted spectra: to introduce additional characteristics such as e.g. red is hot, blue is cool, etc.
Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put those objections aside. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures.
Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intra personnel through distinctive capabilities, you should expect that he accepts the Frege/Schlick-view that means that there is no intra personnel counterpart.
Shoemaker: that would be too simple. Thesis: He wants to reconcile intra personnel comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach.
Although we cannot define certain qualitative states functionalistically but rather classes of qualitative states.
Classes of qualitative states: we define functionally the identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) equality and diversity. Thus we get equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those that are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations.
ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason why he resists the Frege/Schlick-view,
I 224
that he thinks that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there may be intra personnel inverted spectra. And he believes that through this there is an argument for intra personnel exchanged spectra that you cannot resist.

Shoem I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Frege, G. Strawson Vs Frege, G.
 
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Searle III 213
Fact/statement/Strawson: here there are not two independent entities, facts are what statements testify. They are not what statements are on statements. Facts: are not language-independent things in the world. They like "statement" and "true" contain even a certain type of discourse in itself.
Frege: Facts are simply true statements.(!) (Strawson and AustinVs).
E.g. there are not two separate types of events such as winning and victory. The victory consists precisely in winning.
III 214
StrawsonVsFrege: but it would be wrong to draw here an exact analogy (but not from Austin's reasons). Fact and statement are not identical, because they play different roles in our language! Facts act causally in a way that true statements do not.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Frege, G. Tugendhat Vs Frege, G.
 
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II 237
Ersetzbarkeit/Frege: er war der Meinung, dass mit dem Prinzip der Ersetzbarkeit bewiesen werden könne, dass die Wahrheitswerte der Sätze den Gegenständen der Namen entsprechen. TugenhatVsFrege: mit diesem Prinzip kann nur bewiesen werden, dass umgekehrt, die Gegenstände der Namen den Wahrheitswerten der Sätze entsprechen.
II 238
Satz/Eigennamen/Tugendhat: Namen und Sätze haben etwas gemeinsam: die Eigenschaft, eine Bedeutung zu haben.
II 243
Def indirect meaning/Frege: Name eines Satzes. Komplexe Sätze/Frege/Tugendhat: Wahrheitsfunktionen ihrer Teilsätze! Wo das nicht der Fall ist, treten Teilsätze als Namen (indirect meaning, Zitat) auf.
TugenhatVsFrege: der Gedanke, dass die Bedeutung eines Satzes (in technischem Sinn) nur der Wahrheitswert ist, ist verfehlt. Wenn ein Teilsatz nominalisiert wird, drückt er nach Frege nur einen Teil eines "Gedankens" aus.
II 244
Tugendhat: das truth-value potential eines solchen Satzes, (der nicht für sich selbst stehen kann) kann nicht in einem Wahrheitswert bestehen. (Weil die Ersetzung nicht durchgeführt werden kann). Bedeutung/Frege/Tugendhat: das zeigt einmal mehr, dass Freges Begriff der Bedeutung funktional ist: die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks differiert, je nachdem, ob er seinen selbständigen Gedanken oder nur einen Teil eines solchen ausdrückt.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Frege, G. Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G.
 
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Brandom I 919
TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. ---
Dummett I 32
Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs ---
I 35
WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege).
---
Dummett I 62
Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. ---
Dummett I 158
WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. ---
Wolf II 344
Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. ---
II 345
Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". ---
Simons I 342
Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context.
Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases.
Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection.
Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others!
---
Wittgenstein I 16
Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated.
According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones?
---
Wittgenstein I 45
Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. ---
I 46
Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself.
Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular.
---
Wittgenstein I 65ff
Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). ---
I 66
Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions.
---
Wittgenstein I 222
Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here).
Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red.
---
I 223
But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the
actual objects: elements of knowledge.
(> Improper/actual >sense data, >phenomenology)
---
II 73
Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character.
---
Wittgenstein VI 119
WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning.
WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference).
There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game.
---
Wittgenstein VI 172
Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). ---
Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,.
3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words.
3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing.
(WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name).
3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely.: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic).
---
IV 28
Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use.
---
Wittgenstein IV 40
Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning.
---
IV 47
Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes.
E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical.
4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it.
---
IV 47/48
So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers.
Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ...
General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular.
---
IV 49
Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names.
WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name.
---
IV 53
Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined.
Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "W" and the truth possibilities.
Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters
---
IV 54
"F" and "W" does not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true.
Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment line).
---
IV 59
Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning ---
IV 60
of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. ---
IV 62
Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori.
5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another.
((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.)
5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of,
---
IV 63
an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist.
5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current.
---
IV 70
Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. ---
Wittgenstein IV 101
Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. ---
IV 102
Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. ---
Wittgenstein II 343
Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number?

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Frege, G. Wright Vs Frege, G.
 
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EMD II 223
natürliche Sprache/Frege: ungenau, das ist ein Mangel, den es abzustellen gilt. Logik/Crispin WrightVsFrege: für vage Prädikate scheint es eine besondere Logik zu geben.
II 226
WrightVsFrege: es scheint so, als hinge der ganze Sprachgebrauch, um informativ zu sein vom erfolgreichen Gebrauch vager Prädikate ab.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Frege, G. Verschiedene Vs Frege, G. Dummett I 18
Sinn: Nach Frege hat der Ausdruck den Sinn einfach. Dem Verwender braucht sein Sinn nicht immer vorzuschweben. Für sich genommen ist der Sinn objektiv, daher kann er von mehr als einem Bewußtsein erfaßt werden. Hier wird gewöhnlich angemerkt VsFrege: daß die Objektivität des Sinns nicht ausreicht, um die Objektivität der Verständigung zu gewährleisten. Dazu müsse feststehen, welcher Sinn mit welchem Ausdruck verknüpft sei.
Dummett I 33
In letzter Zeit haben einige analytische Philosophen VsFrege den Vorwurf der überaus subjektiven Interpretation der Empfindungen gemacht.
Frege IV 21
Urteil/Frege/Patzig: ebenfalls undefinierbar und logisch einfach.
IV 22
Die Einführung eines Namens dafür ist nicht möglich. Funktion/Frege/Patzig: ebenfalls undefinierbar: da Begriffe eine besondere Klasse von Funktionen sind.
PatzigVsFrege: es kann unterschiedliche Gebiete geben, die jeweils Verschiedenes als Grundbegriff wählen. Das führt zu keinem Zirkel.
Es muß nicht "prinzipiell undefinierbare" Begriffe geben.
Def Tatsache/Frege: ein wahrer Gedanke.
PatzigVsFrege: überspannt, wenn nun der Begriff der Tatsache durch den des "wahren Gedankens" erklärt werden soll.
IV 27
Gedankengefüge/PatzigVsFrege: seine Ansicht, die sechs zweistelligen Gedankengefüge bildeten ein "abgeschlossenes Ganzes" findet heute keinen Anklang mehr. Man könnte statt 6 eher 16 einführen (>Post).





Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Frege, G. Schiffer Vs Frege, G.
 
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Stephen Schiffer
I XV
Belief/Schiffer: Is no relation to what is believed SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: Natural languages have no compositional meaning theories (m.th.).
propositional attitude/Schiffer: late: thesis: cannot be reduced or explained!
"No theory-theory"/Schiffer: all present philosophies of meaning and intentionality are based on false premises. Thesis: there cannot be any meaning theory.

I 144
SchifferVsCompositionality: We can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics. Otherwise the relation theory would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional meaning theory, because it would have to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding!
Schiffer: so far the arguments are not yet very stable. We still have work to do.

I 182
Compositionality/SchifferVsFrege/Problem: Intentional expressions like E.g. "is a picture of" E.g. "true" - adjectives like eg "large" E.g. "toys" (soldier). - E.g. adverbs - evaluative terms such as "should", "good", - E.g. pronouns and demonstrative pronouns - e.g. ordinary language quantifiers such as "everybody", "all", "some". Also counterfactual conditionals and modal expressions contain difficult ontological problems for a compositional semantics.
I 183
Solution/Schiffer: Maybe we should give up the idea that there is something to do to give the semantics of these expressions. 3. (most important point): Thesis: Natural languages need no compositional semantics at all.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Frege, G. Hintikka Vs Frege, G.
 
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Cresswell I 148
Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure.
CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa.
Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics).
I 149
HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29).
But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231).
I 161.
"is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true!
Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway.

Hintikka I 45
(A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge.
Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses >reified, intensional objects).
Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects".
Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics).
I 46
Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global.
Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds.
Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5).
Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc.
Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects.
Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts).
I 47
E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES).
I 48
Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent
Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege).
Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image:
(4) expression >sense >reference.
((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.)
Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified:
(5) Expression (>) sense (> reference)
Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque).
Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts.
E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the
identity of morning star and evening star, but the.
identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star".
I 49
Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity.
Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift" and "Grundgesetze") there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself.
(B)
Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege:
Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds.
new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds.
Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world.
I 50
(C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally.
E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not.
I 51
Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context.
E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear,
On the other hand:
E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet
Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal.
I 53
Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds.
On the other hand:
Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach.
Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments.
Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful.
Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context).
Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract.
I 54
Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses".
Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem.
Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x).
This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts.
Transition from "any" to "some".
E.g. epistemic context:
(10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w)
(11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x)
I 55
Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is.
EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references.
HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w.
Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds.
I 56
Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w)
to
(14) (Ex) George knows that S(x)
where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts.
Then we need an additional condition.
(15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x).
This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are.
Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George.
Thus, (15) is equivalent to
(16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x).
This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what).
Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity).
E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!)
 Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge)
I 57
Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist).
Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises.
Possible Worlds Semantics:
SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared.
Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds.
Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism).
I 58
World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals.
World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them.
Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity).
I 59
World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world.
Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify".

I 109
Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent).
I 110
HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis.
Wittgenstein I 71
Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto).
I 72
Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level.
HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Frege, G. Berka Vs Frege, G.
 
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Berka I 56
Anmerkung BerkaVsFrege: FregeVsSchröder: ((s) > Frege: "Die Null darf in einer Menge enthalten sein, aber nicht als Element")) Frege hat das Problem gar nicht in seiner Bedeutung auch für sein logizistisches Programm erkannt.

Berka I 387
Bezeichnen/Bedeutung/Frege: ("Sinn und Bedeutung") zweidimensionale Semantik: Identifiziert Bezeichnungs und Bedeutungsfunktion.
Frege: identifiziert Bezeichnen und Bedeuten wegen des universalen Charakters der Logik. Diese kann sich mit dem Inhalt konkreter Aussagen nicht befassen.
I 388
Für die Deduktion (Folgebeziehung) ist es hinreichend, wenn die Voraussetzungen wahr sind. BerkaVsFrege: durch diese Identifikation wird eine wichtige Abstraktionsstufe übergangen, die die Beziehung von Logik und Realität klären kann. Es wird nicht gefragt, warum eine Aussage wahr ist.

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Frege, G. Stalnaker Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 260
I/self/Frege: "Everyone is itself placed in a special and easy way. ... ~ Only the subject itself can detect such thoughts." StalnakerVsFrege: this is just an unfortunate slip.
Metaphysics/self/Stalnaker: I do not think that metaphysics can be so easily avoided. If the thought "I am TN" is adjustable wrong (even if a logical omniscient TN could capture it without knowing that it is true) why is its falsity not a metaphysical possibility?

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Frege, G. Chisholm Vs Frege, G.
 
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Chisholm II 179
Negation/Frege: Problem: negative facts: solution: simply postulate of two truth values, as well as of a function xi () which turns the truth into falsehood and everything else into the truth. WittgensteinVsFrege: The connecting element does not represent functions or anything else. Against the functional representation of the connections by Frege.
I 111
Descriptions/Chisholm: can they be non-significant? E.g. "Senator Baker would be another Jimmy Carter". Question: Do we use "Jimmy Carter" in a way here that refers to Jimmy Carter? Chisholm: Yes.
Proper names/Names/Frege: can sometimes be used as a concept word:
E.g. "Trieste is not Vienna".
ChisholmVsFrege: but this statement does not tell us that we must not expect to find in Trieste the kinds of things that are typical for Vienna? Then "Vienna" does not act as a concept word here.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Frege, G. Simons Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 102
Class/FregeVsSchröder: you have to distinguish: a) "logical" classes: = value process
I 103
b) "Specific" classes: a calculation of collective classes is only a calculation of part and whole. SimonsVsFrege: this turned ironically out to be much more vulnerable than Schröder's "manifolds".
Lesniewski: knew Frege's criticism.

I 290
Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name. SimonsVsFrege: of which one has recovered only lately. But there are also plural names (> plural designation, plural reference (> Black) see above). And empty name.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Frege, G. Verificationism Vs Frege, G.
 
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Field II 104
Verifikationstheorie/VsFrege/VsRussell/VsTractatus/VsRamsey/Bedeutung/Field: hier ist der Hauptbegriff nicht Wahrheitsbedingungen (WB) sondern Verifikations-Bedingungen (VB). (Vielleicht über Reize). Diese werden ohne daß-Sätze gegeben. WB/Rege/Russell/Field: einige Vertreter dieser Linie werden sagen, was beim Verifikationismus ausgelassen ist, sind nicht die WB, sondern propositionaler Inhalt.
Proposition/Verifikationismus/Field: kann der Verifikationist dann einfach als Klasse von VB bezeichnen. Für eine Äußerung drückt die entsprechende Proposition dann die Menge der VB aus, die sie hat. So mußten Propositionen im verifikationistischen Sinn nicht mit daß-Sätzen beschrieben werden.
Proposition/Inflationismus/Frege/Russell/Field: würde sagen, daß das keine richtigen Propositionen sind, weil diese WB einschließen müssen. InflationismusVsVerifikationismus.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Frege, G. Patzig Vs Frege, G.
 
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IV 20
Judgment/Frege/Patzig: also indefinable and logically simple.
IV 21
The introduction of a name for this is not possible. Function/Frege/Patzig: also indefinable: because concepts are a particular class of functions.
PatzigVsFrege: there may be different areas that each select different things as the fundamental concept. This does not lead to a circle.
There do not need to be concepts that are "indefinable by principle".
IV 22
Def Fact/Frege: a true thought. PatzigVsFrege: exaggerated if the concept of fact is now to be explained by that of the "true thought".
IV 27
Thought Structure/PatzigVsFrege: his view, the six two-digit thoughts structures formed a "complete whole" is no longer accepted today. You could rather introduce 16 instead of 6 (>Mail).
Frege, G. Burkhardt Vs Frege, G.
 
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Wolf II 341
BurkhardtVsFrege: seine Ansicht ist falsch, Eigennamen hätte sowohl Bedeutung als auch Sinn.
II 342
Namen/Burkhardt: unterscheiden sich von allen übrigen Wortarten dadurch, dass sie nur in der aktuellen Verwendung auf etwas referieren können. (parole). Wenn ich einen Namen höre, weiß ich schon, bevor ich weiß, auf wen er referiert, dass er sich auf ein Individuum bezieht.
II 343
Referenz/Strawson: nicht Ausdrücke referieren, sondern Menschen mit Hilfe von Sprachzeichen. Burkhardt: das gilt nicht von Eigennamen: bevor sie in der Sprechhandlung auf etwas verweisen können, muss ihre Beziehung zu dem Referenten bereits vorher konventionell festgelegt sein.
Namen/Benennen/Wittgenstein: (PI § 15): "Es wird sich oft nützlich erweisen, wenn wir uns beim Philosophieren sagen: Etwas benennen, das ist etwas Ähnliches, wie einem Ding ein Namenstäfelchen anheften". (> mere tags).
Namen/Burkhardt: so muss Freges Kontextprinzip (Frege-Prinzip) in Bezug auf Namen aufgegeben werden!.
II 343/344
Frege hatte deshalb guten Grund, den Gegenstand als die Bedeutung des Namens anzunehmen! (>"mere tag"). Namen/Strawson: haben keinen Beschreibungsgehalt.
BurkhardtVsStrawson: damit ist völlig unklar geworden, was er unter Konventionen verstehen will.
Bedeutung/Namen/Träger/Burkhardt: die Namenbedeutung besteht im Trägerbezug. Das sind die allgemeinen Referenzkonventionen.
Namen/Bedeutung/Kriterien/Wittgenstein/Searle/Frege/Russell: die Identitätskriterien im Sinne von Vorstellungen über den Träger sind wesentlich für die Bedeutung des Namens. (Lager).
Namen/Bedeutung/Existenz/WittgensteinVsFrege: Bsp "Nothung hat eine scharfe Schneide" hat auch dann Sinn, wenn Nothung zerschlagen ist.
II 345
Name nicht Träger: wenn Herr N.N. stirbt, ist nicht der Name gestorben. Sonst hätte es keinen Sinn zu sagen "Herr N.N. ist gestorben". Kriterien/Bedeutung/Alltagssprache/Burkhardt: die Alltagssprache gibt kein Kriterium bei philosophischen oder wissenschaftlichen Entscheidungen ab:
Die Alltagssprache entscheidet zwar, welche Bedeutung ein Wort hat, aber nicht, was Bedeutung ist!
Bedeutung/Namen/Burkhardt: drei Möglichkeiten:
1. Namen haben Bedeutung, dann ist das, gemäß der Konventionen der Träger
2. alle Namen haben dieselbe Bedeutung: nämlich ihre eindeutige Referenzfunktion! (Gebrauchstheorie).
3. Namen haben gar keine Bedeutung.
II 349
Sinn/Namen/Identität/BurkhardtVsFrege: dass Identitätsurteile informativ seien, dafür sei es notwendig, dass der Sinn auf beiden Seiten des Gleichheitszeichens verschieden ist, während der Referent identisch ist.
II 350
Burkhardt: die Aussage wäre aber auch dann informativ, wenn der Hörer mit keinem der beiden Namen eine Vorstellung verbände. So wird Sinn doppeldeutig. Dass unterschiedliche Vorstellung überhaupt bestehen, ist nur ein Sonderfall. So ist der Sinn etwas Sekundäres.
Deshalb kann auch der als subjektiv verstandene Sinn nicht zur Bedeutung gehören.

Burk I
A. Burkhardt
Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Frege, G. Waismann Vs Frege, G.
 
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Waismann I 77
Frege: Definition der Zahl in zwei Schritten a) wann sind zwei Mengen gleichzahlig.
b) Definition des Begriffs der "Anzahl": sie ist gleich, wenn jedem Element der einen ein Element der anderen Menge entspricht. Eineindeutige Relation.
Unter
Def "Zahl einer Menge"/Frege: versteht er die Menge aller mit ihr gleichzahligen Mengen. Bsp Die Zahl 5 ist die Gesamtheit aller Fünferklassen in der Welt.
VsFrege: wie sollen wir feststellen dass zwei Mengen gleichzahlig sind? Offenbar durch Aufweisung einer solchen Relation.
Bsp Wenn man dazu etwa Löffel auf Tassen verteilen muss, dann hat die Relation vorher also nicht bestanden.
Solange die Löffel nicht auf den Tassen lagen, waren die Mengen nicht gleichzahlig. Das entspricht aber nicht dem Sinn, in dem man das Wort gleichzahlig verwendet. Also geht es darum, ob man die Löffel an die Tassen legen kann.
Aber was bedeutet "kann"?
I 78
Dass gleich viele Exemplare vorhanden sind. Nicht die Zuordnung bestimmt die Gleichzahligkeit, sondern umgekehrt. Die vorgeschlagene Definition gibt zwar eine notwendige, aber keine hinreichende Bedingung für die Gleichzahligkeit und fasst den Ausdruck "gleichzahlig" zu eng.
Klasse: Liste ("Schulklasse") logisch oder Begriff (Säugetiere) empirisch. Bei zwei Listen ist es weder emopirisch noch logisch zu sagen, sie lassen sich einander zuordnen. Bsp
1.Sind in diesem Zimmer ebenso viele Personen wie im Nebenzimmer? Ein Experiment liefert die Antwort.
2. Sind 3x4 Tassen gleichzahlig mit 12 Löffeln? Man kann das durch Ziehen von Linien beantworten, was kein Experiment ist, sondern ein Vorgang in einem Kalkül.
Nach Frege sind zwei Mengen nicht gleichzahlig, wenn man die Relation nicht herstellt. Man hat zwar etwas definiert, aber nicht den Begriff "gleichzahlig". Man kann die Definition erweitern, indem man davon spricht, dass sie zugeordnet werden können. Aber das ist wieder nicht richtig. Denn sind die beiden Mengen durch ihre Eigenschaften gegeben, so ist es immer sinnvoll, ihr Zugeordnetsein zu behaupten, (das hat aber einen verschiedenen Sinn, je nach dem Kriterium, an dem man die Möglichkeit der Zuordnung erkennt: dass die beiden gleichzahlig sind, oder dass es Sinn haben soll, von einer Zuordnung zu sprechen!
Tatsächlich gebrauchen wir das Wort "gleichzahlig" nach verschiedenen Kriterien: von welchen Frege nur ein einziges hervorhebt und zum Paradigma macht. Bsp
1. Liegen auf dem Tisch 3 Tassen und 3 Löffel, so sieht man auf einen Blick die Zuordenbarkeit.
I 79
2. Ist die Anzahl nicht übersehbar, sie aber in eine übersichtliche Form geordnet, z.B. Quadrat oder Raute, springt wieder die Gleichzahligkeit ins Auge. 3.Anders ist der Fall, wenn wir etwas von zwei Fünfecken feststellen, dass sie dieselbe Anzahl von Diagonalen haben. Hier fassen wir die Gruppierung nicht mehr unmittelbar auf, es ist vielmehr ein Satz der Geometrie.
4. Gleichzahlig bei eineindeutiger Zuordenbarkeit
5.Das normalen Kriterium der Zahlengleichheit ist aber das Zählen, (das nicht als Abbildung zweier Mengen durch eine Beziehung aufgefasst werden darf.)
WaismannVsFrege: Diesen verschiedenen und biegsamen Gebrauch gibt Freges Definition nicht wieder.
I 80
Das führt zu seltsamen Konsequenzen: Nach Frege müssen zwei Mengen notwendig gleichzahlig sein oder nicht und zwar aus logischen Gründen.
Bsp Angenommen, der Sternenhimmel: Jemand sagt: "ich weiß zwar nicht wie viele ich gesehen habe, aber eine bestimmte Anzahl müssen es gewesen sein." Wie unterscheide ich diese Aussage von "Ich habe viele Sterne gesehen". ((Es geht um die Zahl der gesehenen, nicht der vorhandenen Sterne). Wenn ich noch einmal zurück könnte zu der Situation, könnte ich sie nachzählen. Aber das geht nicht.
Es gibt keine Methode, die Anzahl festzustellen, und damit verliert die Zahlangabe ihren Sinn.
Bsp’ Man könnte die Sache aber auch anders sehen: eine kleine Anzahl von Sternen kann man noch zählen, etwa 5. Hier haben wir eine neue Zahlenreihe: 1,2,3,4,5, viele.
Das ist eine Reihe, die manche primitive Völker wirklich gebrauchen. Sie ist durchaus nicht unkomplett. und wir sind nicht im Besitz einer kompletteren, sondern nur eine komplizierteren, neben der die primitive zu recht besteht.
Man kann auch in dieser Reihe addieren und multiplizieren und das in voller Strenge.
Angenommen, die Dinge der Welt würden wie Tropfen an uns verbeischweben, dann wäre diese Zahlenreihe durchaus angemessen.
Bsp Angenommen, wir sollten Dinge zählen, die während des Zählens wieder verschwinden oder andere entstehen. Solche Erfahrungen würde unsere Begriffsbildung in ganz andere Bahnen lenken. Vielleicht würden Worte wie "Viel", "wenig" evtl. verfeinert, an die Stelle unserer Zahlworte treten.
I 80/81
VsFrege: seine Definition geht an alldem vorbei. Nach ihr sind zwei Mengen logisch notwendig gleichzahlig, ohne Wissen, oder sie sind es nicht. Genauso hatte man vor Einstein argumentiert, zwei Ereignisse seine gleichzeitig, unabhängig von Beobachtung. Aber so ist es nicht, sondern der Sinn einer Aussage erschöpft sich in der Art ihrer Verifikation (auch Dummett)
Waismann: man muss also auf das Verfahren zur Feststellung der Gleichzahligkeit achten, und das ist viel komplizierter als Frege meinte.
Frege: zweiter Teil der Zahldefinition:
Def Zahl/Frege: ist eine Klasse von Klassen. ((s) Anderswo: so nicht von Frege! FregeVs!).
Bsp Dem Begriff "Apfel, der auf dem Tisch liegt, kommt die Zahl 3 zu". Oder: die Klasse der auf dem Tisch liegenden Äpfel ist ein Element der Klasse 3.
Das hat den großen Vorzug der Evidenz: dass nämlich die Zahl nicht von den Dingen, sondern von dem Begriff ausgesagt wird.
WaismannVsFrege: Aber wird das dem tatsächlichen Gebrauch der Zahlworte gerecht?
Bsp Im Befehl "3 Äpfel!" hat das Zahlwort gewiss keine andere Bedeutung, aber nach Frege kann dieser Befehl nicht mehr anch dem gleichen Schema gedeutet werden. Es besagt nicht: die Klasse der Äpfel, die zu holen ist, ist Element der Klasse 3.
Denn dies ist eine Aussage, und die kennt unsere Sprache nicht.
WaismannVsFrege: seine Definition knüpft den Zahlbegriff in unnötiger Weise an die Subjekt Prädikat Form unserer Sätze.
Tatsächlich ergibt sie die Bedeutung des Wortes "3" aus der Art seiner Verwendung (Wittgenstein).
RussellVsFrege Bsp Angenommen, es gäbe genau 9 Individuen auf der Welt. Dann könnten wir die Kardinalzahlen von 0 bis 9 definieren, aber die 10, als 9+1 definiert, wäre die Nullklasse.
Folglich werden die 10 und alle folgenden natürlichen Zahlen miteinander identisch sein, sämtlich = 0.
Um das zu vermeiden müsste ein zusätzliches Axiom eingeführt werden, das
Def "Unendlichkeitsaxiom"/Russell: besagt, dass es einen Typus gibt, dem unendlich viele Individuen angehören.
Das stellt eine Aussage über die Welt dar, und von der Wahrheit dieses Axioms hängt nun wesentlich der Aufbau der ganzen Arithmetik ab.
Jedermann wird nun begierig sein zu wissen, ob das Unendlichkeitsaxiom wahr ist. Wir müssen erwidern: wir wissen es nicht.
Es ist so beschaffen, dass es sich jeder Prüfung entzieht. Dann müssen wir aber zugestehen, dass seine Annahme keinen Sinn hat.
I 82
Es hilft auch nichts, dass man das "Unendlichkeitsaxiom" als Bedingung der Mathematik mitführt, denn so gewinnt man nicht die Mathematik, wie sie tatsächlich vorliegt: die Menge der Brüche ist überall dicht, aber nicht:
die Menge der Brüche ist überall dicht, wenn das Unendlichkeitsaxiom zutrifft.
Das wäre eine künstliche Umdeutung, nur dazu ersonnen, die Lehre aufrechtzuerhalten, dass die Zahlen aus wirklichen Klassen in der Welt aufgebaut sind
(VsFrege: aber nur bedingt, denn Frege spricht nicht von Klassen in der Welt).

Waismann I 85
Der Irrtum der Logik war, dass sie glaubte, die Arithmetik fest untermauert zu haben. Frege: "Die Grundsteine, in einem ewigen Grund befestigt, sind von unserem Denken zwar überflutbar, aber nicht verrückbar." WaismannVsFrege: allein der Ausdruck die Arithmetik "begründen" gibt uns ein falsches Bild,
I 86
als ob ihr Gebäude auf Grundwahrheiten errichtet sei, während sie ein Kalkül ist, der nur von gewissen Festsetzungen ausgeht, frei schwebend, wie das Sonnensystem, das auf nichts ruht. Wir können die Arithmetik nur beschreiben, d.h. ihre Regelln angeben, nicht begründen.

Waismann I 163
Die einzelnen Zahlbegriffe bilden eine Familie. Es gibt Familienähnlichkeiten. Frage: werden sie erfunden oder entdeckt? Wir lehnen die Auffassung ab, dass die Regeln aus der Bedeutung der Zeichen folgen. Betrachten wir Freges Argumente. (WaismannVsFrege)
II 164
1.Man kann Arithmetik als ein Spiel mit Zeichen ansehen, aber dann geht der eigentliche Sinn des ganzen verloren. Wenn ich Rechenregeln aufstelle, habe ich dann den "Sinn" des "=" mitgeteilt? Oder nur eine mechanische Anweisung zum Gebrauch des Zeichens gegeben? Doch wohl das letztere. Dann geht aber das Wichtigste der Arithmetik verloren, der Sinn, der sich in den Zeichen ausspricht. (VsHilbert)
Waismann: Gesetzt, es sei so, warum beschreiben wir dann nicht lieber gleich den geistigen Vorgang?
Ich werde aber mit einer Zeichenerklärung antworten und nicht mit einer Schilderung meines geistigen Zustands, wenn man mich fragt, was 1+ 1 = 2 bedeutet.
Wenn man sagt, ich weiß doch, was das Gleichheitszeichen bedeutet, z.B. in Addition, Quadratischen Gleichungen, usw. dann hat man mehrere Antworten gegeben.
Der berechtigte Kern von Freges Kritik: wenn man nur die formelhafte Seite der Arithmetik betrachtet und die Anwendung außer acht lässt, erhält man ein bloßes Spiel. Aber was hier fehlt, ist nicht der Vorgang des Verstehens, sondern die Deutung!
I 165
Bsp Wenn ich ein Kind außer den Formeln auch noch die Übersetzungen in die Wortsprache lehre, macht es dann bloß mechanischen Gebrauch? Sicher nicht. 2. Argument: Es ist also die Anwendung, die die Arithmetik von einem bloßen Spiel unterscheidet. Frege: "Ohne einen Gedankeninhalt wird auch eine Anwendung nicht möglich sein. WaismannVsFrege: Angenommen, man erfände ein Spiel, das genauso aussieht wie die Arithmetik, aber nur zum Vergnügen dient. Würde es keinen Gedanken mehr ausdrücken?
Warum kann man von einer Schachstellung keine Anwendung machen? Weil sie keine Gedanken ausdrückt."
WaismannVsFrege: Angenommen, man erfände ein Spiel, das genauso aussieht wie die Arithmetik, aber nur zum Vergnügen dient. Würde es keinen Gedanken mehr ausdrücken?
Schach: es ist voreilig zu sagen, dass eine Schachstellung keine Gedanken ausdrückt. Waismann bringt. Bsp Figuren stehen für Truppen. Das könnte aber gerade bedeuten, Die Figuren müssten erst zu Zeichen von etwas gemacht werden.
I 166
Erst wenn man bewiesen hat, dass es einen und nur einen Gegenstand von der Eigenschaft gibt, ist man berechtigt, ihn mit dem Eigennamen "Null" zu belegen. Die Null zu schaffen, ist unmöglich. >Zeichen. Ein Zeichen muss etwas bezeichnen, sonst ist es nur Druckerschwärze.
WaismannVsFrege: wir wollen das letztere weder bestreiten noch zugeben. Bloß welcher Sinn kommt dieser Behauptung zu? Dass Zahlen nicht dasselbe wie Zeichen sind die wir aufs Papier schreiben, ist klar. Sie werden erst durch den Gebrauch zu dem, was sie sind. Frege meint aber vielmehr: dass die Zahlen vorher schon irgendwie da sind, dass die Entdeckung der imaginären Zahlen ähnlich wie die eines fernen Erdteiles ist.
I 167
Bedeutung/Frege: um nicht Tintenkleckse zu sein, müssen die Zeichen eine Bedeutung haben. Und die existiert dann unabhängig von den Zeichen. WaismannVsFrege: die Bedeutung ist der Gebrauch, und über den gebieten wir.

Wa I
F. Waismann
Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996

Wa II
F. Waismann
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976
Frege, G. Meixner Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 170
Zahlen/Frege/Meixner: spezielle Eigenschaften, nämlich endliche Anzahl Eigenschaften von Eigenschaften (also Funktionen). Schreibweise von Meixner: F0 (soll 0 sein) sei die Abkürzung von "01[01 ist verschieden von 01]".
Def Gleichzahligkeit/Frege/Meixner: f ist eine mit der Eig g gleichzahlige Eig, = Def für mindestens eine zweistellige Relation R gilt:
1. jede Entität, die f hat, steht zu genau einer Entität die g hat, in der Relation R
2. Sind Entitäten, die f haben, verschieden, dann auch Entitäten mit g
3. Umkehrung von 1: jede Entität, die g hat.
Zahl/Meixner: man könnte also einwandfrei nichtzirkulär definieren:
x ist eine natürliche Zahl = Def x ist eine endliche Anzahleigenschaft.
I 171
Zahl/MeixnerVsFrege: dann könnte man vereinfachen: die für die Definition von 1 verwendete Standardeigenschaft 01[01 ist identisch mit F0] ist definitorisch dieselbe wie die Eigenschaft
01[01 ist identisch mit 0].
Dann kann man vereinfachen (was ein Zeichen dafür ist, dass Zahlen nicht auf ontologisch sicheren Füßen steht):

x ist eine natürliche zahl = Def x ist eine Standardeigenschaft für die Bestimmung endlicher Anzahl
dann: f ist 0 zahlig = Def f ist eine Eig, die gleichzahlig mit der Eig 0 ist.
Meixner: das ist einfacher, hat aber auch die sonderbare Konsequenz, dass jede natürliche Zahl durch alle ihre Vorgänger exemplifiziert wird.
I 172
FregeVsMeixner: Zahlen sind (gesättigte) Objekte, keine Eigenschaften. Jede Zahl wird durch unendlich viele Entitäten exemplifiziert. Zahl/Meixner: als Eigenschaft aufgefasst, sind sie typenlose Funktionen, d.h. sie lassen sich in kein Kästchen der Gestalt [

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Frege, G. Millikan Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 102
Relation of projection/language/Millikan: We begin by saying that at least a few words are coordinated with objects. Accordingly, true propositions correspond with facts in the world.
Problem: Incorrect sentences do not correspond to any facts. How can individual words that correspond very well to objects, be composed in a way that in the end the whole sentence does not correspond?
Ex "Theaetetus flies": "Theaetetus" corresponds to Theaitetus, "flies" corresponds to flying.
wrong solution: to say that it was up to the relation between the Theaetetus and the flying. Because the relation corresponds somewhat, this may be instantiated (Ex between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiiert. Everything corresponds to something - just not the whole sentence "Theaetetus flies".
Solution/Frege: he joined the singular term with "values" that were the objects in the world.
I 103
Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted thus similarly to names, as complex characters that marked truth or falsity in the end. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan (Millikan: better than Frege): complex aRb, whereas in the case of false sentences the correspondence with the world lacks.
Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another meaning of "corresponding"! Words should correspond with different things than sentences with the world. ((S) double difference: 1. aRb unlike 2. SLW!. It would have already made a difference, if aRb and SRW were opposed.).
((S) Sense/Wittgenstein/(S): corresponds to the possibility of derogations.)

I 190
real value/indexical adaptor/denotation/Millikan: Ex "the ___ N of ....". indexical adaptor: has to be a real value of "N" to be in the embedded clause "N ..." and a real value of "the" in the embedded sentence "the ...".
focused eigenfunction/eigenfunction: to be translated into an internal name, which identifies the individual N. This has the entire denotation if it is properly adapted.
intentional Icon: Ex "the ___m of..." thus includes two intentional icons or projections on facts. But these are different from the purpose of the sentence as a whole or a subset.
embedded sentence: does not only want to introduce the listener to a fact, but o show to which complex category belongs what corresponds to the subject in the independent sentence containing the embedded sentence.
Reference: that's how the reference of a designation is determined.
Sense / Millikan: now it is clear why I have called sense the rules. Because the various markings differ in terms of the rules, even if they have the same references.
Sense according to Frege/Millikan: this difference of rules is the difference in meaning.
Meaning/reference/MillikanVsFrege: but a reference has to take on only a meaning of a certain kind. Thus, there is something that has been previously discriminated before the meaning of the remainder of the sentence has been identified.
I 191
Reference/meaning/Millikan: but the having of meaning or of references are very similar types of "having".
I 274
Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson'S distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute but relative: Object/thing: Ex if my ring is made of gold, it can not be made of silver at the same time.
polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring. ((S) it could have been made of silver - the gold could have belonged to another subject.). Then gold is a property (as opposed to another) and my ring a substance.
But in relation to other substances the identity of gold seems to be like the identity of an individual.
Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or individual thing and property.
I 275
Description: not only predicates are variations in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be exchanged). Substance: if we consider gold as a property that does not prevent interpreting it also as a substance. As Aristotle said:
Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances that exist, that is, substances which are not properties of something else.
Substance/Millikan: is actually an epistemic category.
Substance/Millikan: Ex Gold, Ex Domestic Cat, Ex '69 Plymouth Valiant 100th.
Substance/category/Millikan: substances fall into categories defined by exclusive classes, in regard to which they are determined.
Ex gold and silver fall into the same category because they belong to the same exclusive classes: have a melting point, atomic weight, etc.
I 308
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Correspondence/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what conformity in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: correspondence is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow the sentence "Ouch!" He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by a lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree on a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in the nature (natural necessity).
I 309
Thesis: lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Frege, G. Newen Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 209
Physicalism/Identity Theory/New: because of the possibility that mental phenomena could be realized in different ways (functionalism) token physicalism was abandoned in favor of type physicalism. (VsToken Physicalism) Functionalism/Newen: Problem: we do not know what the possibly physical states have in common ((s) on a mental level). Mental Universals/Newen: are needed then. Bieri: Problem: either a theory about mental universals seems empirically implausible. Or it is empirically plausible, then it does not tell us what we want to know. (Bieri: Anal. Ph. d. Geistes, p. 41).
Functional State/Newen: similar to dispositions in that it can be characterized by hypothetical relations between initial situations and consequent states.
I 211
VsFunctionalism/Newen: qualia problem FunctionalismVsVs: zombie argument:
I 212
There need be no qualia to explain behavior. Mental Causation/Newen: is still an open question.

NS I 90
Descriptions/Theory/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: the objective is to overcome two problems: 1) identity statements: need to be informative 2) negative existential statements or statements with empty descriptions must be sensible. Names/Personal Names/Russell: Thesis: names are nothing but abbreviations for decriptions.
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1) There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion). 2) There is not more than one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) 3) Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content).
This is about three possible situations where the sentence may be wrong: a) nobody wrote Waverley, b) several persons did it, c) the author is not a Scot.
NS I 91
Identity/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: if the identity of Cicero with Tullius is necessary (as self-identity), how can the corresponding sentence be informative then? Solution/Russell: 1) There is at least one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 2) There is not more than one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 1*) There is at least one author of "De Oratore" 2*) There is not more than one author of "De Oratore" 3) whoever denounced Catiline is identical with the author of "De Oratore". Empty Names/Empty Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Solution: 1) There is at least one present king of France 2) There is not more than one present king of France 3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald. Thus the sentence makes sense, even though the first part of the statement is incorrect.
Negative Existential Statements/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: assigning a sensible content. It is not the case that 1) there is at least one flying horse 2) not more than one flying horse. Thus, the negative existence statement "The flying horse does not exist" makes sense and is true.
RussellVsFrege/RussellvsFregean Sense/Newen/Schrenk: this is to avoid that "sense" (the content) must be assumed as an abstract entity. Truth-Value Gaps/RussellVsFrege: they, too, are thus avoided. Point: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, however, now become general propositions about the world.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Frege, G. Stechow Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 29
Einstellung/propositionale Einst/Bedeutungsregel/Stechow: Bsp Caroline weiß, dass Fritz Alla kennt: dafür müssen wir nur annehmen, dass Propositionen Objekte von bestimmten Verben, den Einstellungsverben sind. [[ [VP weiß]]] = die Funktion f, so dass für eine beliebige Proposition p gilt: f(p) die
Funktion g ist, so dass für ein beliebiges Individuum x gilt:
g(x) = f(p)(x) = {s | x weiß p in s}
Dabei brauchen wir nicht zu fragen, was es bedeutet, dass jemand eine Proposition weiß. Wichtig ist, dass Propositionen Gegenstände sind, die gewusst werden können.
VsFrege: eine Semantik, die für Satzbedeutungen nur Wahrheitswerte anwendet, kann diese Verbbedeutung (> Einstellung, >prop Einst) nicht ausdrücken.

Stechow I 123
Bedeutung/Semantik/Linguistik/Stechow: damit haben wir vier Facetten der sprachlichen Bedeutung: Bedeutung* Intension – Extension – Präsupposition.
Als 5. wird noch der Charakter hinzukommen.
Präsupposition/Frege/Stechow: Ursprungsstelle, Originalstelle, 1892a): Bsp "Kepler starb im Elend" setzt voraus, dass der Name etwas bezeichnet. Aber diese Voraussetzung ist nicht Bestandteil des Gedankens, den der Satz ausdrückt.
bestimmter Artikel/Stechow: Standardwerk dazu: Russell 1905.
Präsupposition/Artikel/RussellVsFrege: Russell schlägt die Existenz und Einzigkeitspräsupposition mit zum Inhalt von "der". D.h. zum Beitrag, den das Wort zu den Wahrheitsbedingungen leistet.
Strawson: pro Russell.
Stechow: pro Frege.
A. von Stechow
I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik
www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006)
Frege, G. Wessel Vs Frege, G.
 
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I 27
Syntaktik/Syntax/Wessel: manche behaupten, in der Syntaktik würden "sinnfreie" Zeichen untersucht. (Klaus/Buhr, 1969) WesselVs: das ist eine verzerrte Vorstellung von Sprache: man kann Syntax, Semantik und Pragmatik gar nicht trennen: es gibt keine "sinnfreien Zeichen", weil ein physischer Gegenstand, der nichts bedeutet, eben kein Zeichen ist.
Semantik: die Bedeutung des Terminus "Tisch" kann nicht als besonderer Gegenstand angesprochen werden, den es gilt, irgendwo zu suchen.
WesselVsFrege: man kann ja nicht sagen: "Die Bedeutung des Terminus "Müller" geht spazieren"

I 157
Wahrheitswertlücken/Wessel: liegen vor, wenn der Gegenstand, dem Eigenschaften zu oder abgesprochen werden sollen, überhaupt nicht existiert. WesselVsFrege: ein Satz mit leerem Subjektterminus ist nicht bedeutungslos, er kann auch nicht wahr sein, aber er muss deswegen nicht ohne Wahrheitswert sein.

I 352
Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Unterscheidung Intension/Extension: hilft bei den Problemen nicht weiter. Allein der Hinweis, dass es sich um intensionale Kontexte handelt, reicht nicht.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Functionalism Newen Vs Functionalism
 
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I40
Def Even Speech/Frege/Newen: mentions a sentence and does not use it. This is made clear through quotation marks. Point: the truth value is not preserved if a sentence is replaced here by one with the same truth value: e.g. (1) "The earth is round" consists of 14 letters. True. (2) "The moon is smaller than the earth" consists of 14 letters. False. I 41 Mention/Meaning/Mentioning/Frege/Newen: the meaning of a sentence mentioned is the sentence in quotation marks itself. NewenVsFrege: does not develop any further theory of meaning for even speech, as well as proper names and concept words in even speech.

NS I 16
Ideal Language/Theory of Meaning/Frege/Newen/Schrenk: Frege belongs to the theory of ideal language. VsFrege: not every name expresses exactly one meaning when used. 17) Philosophy of the Ideal Language: pro Realism VsSubjectivism/VsLocke. NS I 18 Meaning Theory/Frege: must be separated from psychology.
NS I 27
Odd Sense/Frege: of the sentence "f(a)": is the notion that (a) Odd sense: the sense of "the notion that f(a)." Proper Names/Concept Words/Newen/Schrenk: there are no remarks in Frege for their odd sense. VsFrege/Newen/Schrenk: limits of his theory: contextual expressions (indicators, indicator words: e.g. "here", "now", "I" etc. cannot be treated (not determined). This is a consequence of his thesis that (complete) thoughts are context independent and that words each have a stable sense.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Geach, P. Quine Vs Geach, P.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
V 18
Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavior criteria. It shows in the conditioning of reactions.
V 18/19
Dispositions/Quine: habits resulting from conditioning.
V 89
Identity/Geach: (Reference and generality, p 39f.): Only makes sense with reference to a general term like e.g. "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this is certainly true for the beginning of language learning.
Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in pointing twice and saying, "This is the same as that." Then you could still ask "The same what?".
E.g. you could have been pointing once to the dog and merely to the ear the next time.
Solution: you can easily say that a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear.
QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get accustomed to the identity way of speech.
Identity/Quine: in a deeper sense still relative. (see below § 30)

V 129
Pronouns/Pronouns/Quine: are the archetype of variables in logic and mathematics. Everyday Language: here pronouns are an important part of relative clauses.
Relative Clause/Language Learning/Quine: E.g. "I bought Fido from a man who had found him."
Function: the relative clause makes it possible to separate the object of what the sentence says about it.
Relative Clause: becomes a general term if the pronoun for the name of the object is out in front: E.g. "which I bought from a man who had found him" is a general term!
This general term says the same thing of Fido as the original sentence.
Relative Clause/GeachVsQuine: (Reference and generality, p.115 122, also "Quines syntaktische Einsichten").
Relative Pronoun/Geach: instead, conceive it as meaning "and he": e.g. "I bought Fido from a man and he had found him." ((s) paratactic analysis).
Or with "when he" or "since he".
V 130
Geach calls this the "Latin prose theory". Def Latin Prose Theory/Geach: Thesis: it's wrong to consider "who had found him" as a terminus or independent grammatical entity at all.
Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Quine: E.g.
Everyone who owns a donkey beats it;
Some donkey owners do not beat them.
Problem: that would turn into nonsense:
Every donkey owner beats it
Some donkey owners do not beat it.
Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun "who" with "if he":
Every person, if he has a donkey, beats it.
Example (by Emmon Bach): ((s)> Brandom, Bach Peter's sentences)
A boy who fooled her kissed a girl that loved him.
Geach: here, you cannot consider "boy who fooled her" as a separate term, because then the floating pronoun "her" would have no reference, not even to "girl who loved him", because the floating pronoun "him" would then have no reference.
Solution/Geach:
A boy kissed a girl and she really loved him, but he only fooled her.
Quine: pro Geach.
((s) sequence of main clauses.)
V 131
Relative Clause/Bach Peter's Sentences/Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Geach/Quine: Geach focuses on the quantification (1) (Ex) (x is a man and I bought Fido of x and x had found Fido)
(2) (x) (y) (if x is a man and y is a donkey and x has y, then x beats y).
(3) (Ex) (Ey) (x is a man, and y is a a donkey and x has y and not (x beats y))
(4) (Ex) (Ey) (x was a boy and y was a girl and y kissed y and y really loved x, but x merely fooled y).
QuineVsGeach: the description of the correct grammar is one thing, a plausible description of a child's language learning is another. It would be nice if both matched, which is to be expected according to Hall, Bloomfield and Chomsky.
QuineVsGeach: before this is proven, I tend to a more dualistic view. Geach's Latin prose theory correctly describes the grammar, but not the learning process. Most examples of relative clauses correspond to the Fido example.
The child is torn between analogies,
V 132
which are in the end described properly by Geach. Relative Clause/Quantification/Language Learning/QuineVsGeach: a reformulation of the relative pronoun depending on circumstances in "and he" or "if", etc. is too complicated. In addition, the quantification would need to be learned before the relative clauses. Instead, the child comes to the quantification the other way round, through the relative clause.

Strawson I 198
QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: Singular terms can take the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: quantifiable, General Term: not quantifiable.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Gestalt Theory Schlick Vs Gestalt Theory
 
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Simons I 290
Ontological Dependence/oD/mereology/Simons: VsMereology: criticizing the existence of arbitrary sums. Instead, an individual should only be something that has a certain inner connection. arbitrary sums/Simons: they are algebraically ok and do not lead to contradictions.
Individuals / Simons: it is not clear what properties they hold on the "right side" of respectability (versus sums).
Problem: connection is a gradual thing, but being individual is not!
Gestalt/SimonsVsGestalt theory/VsWholeness/Simons: it has never clearly stated what this is to be.
Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name.
SimonsVsFrege: of which one has recovered late. But there are also plural names (> plural designation, plural reference (> Black) see above). And also empty names.
Simons I 324
Wholeness/Gestalt/SchlickVsGestalt theory/SchlickVsDriesch/Simons: (Schlick 1935): There is no ontological difference between wholenesses and sums. These are only differences in the presentation (representation) of the same object. "Micro-Reductionism"/Schlick: (per): (Simons: for today's tastes too extreme).
Schlick/Simons: yet never denies the usefulness of a holistic view.
Sum/SimonsVsSchlick: has in any case a precisely defined meaning.
stronger/weaker/Simons: e.g. the equivalence of various formulations collapses when the principles of the theory are weakened.

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Hilbert, D. Frege Vs Hilbert, D.
 
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Berka I 294
Consistency/Geometry/Hilbert: Proof through analogous relations between numbers. Concepts: if properties contradict each other, the concept does not exist. FregeVsHilbert: there is just nothing that falls under it. Real Numbers/Hilbert: here, the proof of consistency for the axioms is also the proof of existence of the continuum.

Thiel I 279
Hilbert: Used concepts like point, line, plane, "between", etc. in his Foundations of Geometry in 1899, but understood their sense in a hitherto unfamiliar way. They should not only enable the derivation of the usual sentences, but rather, in its entirety, specify the meaning of the concepts used in it in the first place!
I 280
Later this was called a "definition by postulates", "implicit definition" >Definition. The designations point, line, etc. were to be nothing more than a convenient aid for mathematical considerations.
FregeVsHilbert: clarifies the letter correspondence that his axioms are not statements, but rather statement forms. >Statement Form.
He denied that by their interaction the concepts occurring in them might be given a meaning. It was rather a (in Frege’s terminology) "second stage concept" that was defined, today we would say a "structure".
HilbertVsFrege: the point of the Hilbert’s proceeding is just that the meaning of "point", "line", etc. is left open.
Frege and Hilbert might well have been able to agree on this, but they did not.
Frege: Axiom should be in the classical sense a simple, sense-wise completely clear statement at the beginning of a system.
Hilbert: statement forms that combined define a discipline. From this the "sloppy" figure of speech developed E.g. "straight" in spherical geometry was then a great circle.

I 343
Formalism: 1) "older" formalism: second half of the 19th century, creators Hankel, Heine, Thomae, Stolz. "Formal arithmetic", "formal algebra". "Object of arithmetic are the signs on the paper itself, so that the existence of these numbers is not in question" (naive). Def "Permanence Principle": it had become customary to introduce new signs for numbers that had been added and to postulate then that the rules that applied to the numbers of the original are should also be valid for the extended area.
Vs: that would have to be regarded as illegitimate as long as the consistency is not shown. Otherwise, you could introduce a new number, and
E.g. simply postulate § + 1 = 2 und § + 2 = 1. This contradiction would show that these "new numbers" did not really exist. This explains Heine’s formulation that "existence is not in question". (> "tonk").
I 343/344
Thomae treated the problem as "rules of the game" in a somewhat more differentiated way. FregeVsThomae: he had not even precisely specified the basic rules of his game, namely the correlation to the rules, pieces and positions.
This criticism of Frege was already a precursor of Hilbert’S proof theory, in which also mere character strings are considered without regard their possible content for their production and transformation according to the given rules.
I 345
HilbertVsVs: Hilbert critics often overlook that, at least for Hilbert himself, the "finite core" should remain content-wise interpreted and only the "ideal", not finitely interpretable parts have no directly provable content. This important argument is of a methodical, not a philosophical nature. "Formalism" is the most commonly used expression for Hilbert’s program. Beyond that, the conception of formalism is also possible in a third sense: i.e. the conception of mathematics and logic as a system of action schemes for dealing with figures that are free of any content.
HilbertVsFrege and Dedekind: the objects of the number theory are the signs themselves. Motto: "In the beginning was the sign."
I 346
The designation formalism did not come from Hilbert or his school. Brouwer had hyped up the contrasts between his intuitionism and the formalism of Hilbert’s school to a landmark decision.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Brk I
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

T I
Chr. Thiel
Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995
Husserl, E. Dummett Vs Husserl, E.
 
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Dummett I 36
Husserl generalizes the concept of sense and meaning until he arrives at his concept of the noema, thus making the turn to language impossible. A generalization of Frege’s concept of sense is excluded.
DummettVsHusserl: Noema not linguistically deducible.
Husserl: An utterance as such is certainly not a consciousness act, but the fact that it actually has this specific meaning, goes back to an accompanying consciousness act: the "meaning-giving act."
I 55
DummettVsHusserl: it is difficult to spare him the accusation that he represents here a Humpty Dumpty-view. In no case the intention of the speaker that the word could be interpreted in a certain sense consists in the fact that he performs an internal act by which it is filled with meaning. Noema/DummettVsHusserl: His assertion that the slipping into idealism would be prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not readily evident. We cannot say that the subject perceives the object only indirectly, for it is mediated by the noema. Namely, there is no concept of direct perception which we could oppose to this.
I 104
DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to the "interpretation".
I 106
Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: are not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activities) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Husserl, E. Frege Vs Husserl, E.
 
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Dummett I 47
In any case, it is clear that a substantial utterance owes its meaning, according to Husserl, to an accompanying act of consciousness. Reference/FregeVsHusserl: Frege’s principle says that the
Def reference of an expression is that, which is common to all other expressions for which it is clear that their substitution with the original expression does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs.
I 48
Reference/HusserlVsFrege: in contrast, tends to the opinion that reference is the same as the object to which the predicate is applied. He certainly does not equate the reference of a predicate and a concept, but: Husserl uses meaning and sense synonymously.
Dummett I 96
Def Noema/Husserl: generalization of the concept of sense, is nothing more than the generalization of the idea of ​​meaning on the overall area of ​​acts. FregeVsHusserl: his concept of meaning, however, does not allow a generalization. Thoughts are different from everything else, because they allow the distinction t/f, and so do their components. All that fulfills the same purpose as the sense, i.e. everything that is a specific means for determining an object or a function is sense itself and forms part of various thoughts.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Kant, I. Frege Vs Kant, I.
 
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III 30
HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature!
III 30
Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious.
III 41
Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds
III 42
Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!.
III 43
A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity.
III 120
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
III 121
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts!.
IV 61
Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic.
I 119
FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:.
I 120
He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection.
I 121
The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts.
Stepanians I 34
Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics.
Stepanians I 34
pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view.
I 36
Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic.
Newen I21
Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical.
Quine X 93
Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory.
Tugendhat II 12
"Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable!

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Step I
Markus Stepanians
Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Stegmüller IV 388
Kontingenz/Leibniz: jedes Ding ist kontingent, weshalb es nicht so wäre, wenn ein anderes Ding anders wäre. Alle Dinge sind kausal verbunden. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit dieser Dinge, weshalb die Welt als Ganzes ebenfalls kontingent ist!
Welt/Leibniz: es mag durchaus sein, dass die Reihe der Ursachen unbegrenzt ist. Leibniz nimmt nicht notwendig einen zeitlichen Anfang an!
zureichender Grund/Leibniz: muss dann außerhalb der Welt liegen! Es muss etwas anderes sein als die Welt!
IV 389
Er muss ein notwendiges Wesen sein. VsLeibniz: 1. Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund braucht?
2. Kann es ein notwendiges Wesen geben, das einen zureichenden Grund in sich selbst hat?
Sollte die zweite Frage negativ beantwortet werden, hat die Gesamtheit keinen zureichenden Grund!
KantVsLeibniz: der kosmologische Beweis beruht implizit auf dem (widerlegten) ontologischen Beweis. (s.o. KantVsDescartes).
IV 390
Existenz/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: die Auffassung, der Begriff der Existenz gehe vollständig im Existenzquantor auf, ist umstritten! Existenz/Kontingenz/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: wir könnten notwendige Existenz als Negation von Kontingenz auffassen.
Problem: 1. Die Prämisse, die Welt als ganzes sei kontingent (es würde nicht existieren, wenn etwas anderes anders gewesen wäre), müsste fallengelassen werden: Selbst wenn jeder Teil der Welt kontingent ist, spricht nichts für die Annahme, dass die Welt als ganze nicht existieren würde, wenn nicht (sic?) etwas anderes anders wäre oder gewesen wäre.
Der Schluss von der Kontingenz jeden Teils auf die Kontingenz des Ganzen ist unzulässig.
2. Alternative: Kontingenz: etwas sei kontingent, wenn es auch nicht existieren könnte.
IV 392
Das muss man mit der obigen Bemerkung kombinieren, dass es nicht logisch unmöglich wäre, dass das behauptete notwendige Wesen auch nicht existieren könnte. Das aber ist unverständlich. zureichender Grund/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund haben muss? Bisher hat niemand eine Notwendigkeit a priori dafür zu zeigen vermocht. Das hätte auch keine Plausibilität:
1. Es ist richtig, dass wir immer nach Symmetrien suchen, aber es gibt keine Garantie, dass wir sie immer finden.
2. Wir halten uns immer innerhalb unserer Welt auf, Extrapolationen sind unzulässig!
Selbst wenn nun alles innerhalb der Welt einen zureichenden Grund hätte, hätten wir kein Recht, auf einen zureichend Grund außerhalb der Welt zu schließen.
Verbreitetes Argument: die Dinge müssen durch und durch verstehbar sein.
MackieVs: das stimmt überhaupt nicht!
IV 393
Wir haben keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass sich das Universum nach unseren intellektuellen Bedürfnissen richtet.

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Nonfactualism Searle Vs Nonfactualism
 
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John R. Searle
I 137
Fact: which fact in the world corresponds to your true statement: "I am now in pain"?
I 138
There appear to be at least two types of such facts. 1. at the moment certain unpleasant conscious sensations and 2. certain underlying neurophysiological processes.
Suppose we want to say, the pain was in fact "nothing but" the pattern of neuronal firing. Then we left out the essential characteristics of the pain. And simply because First Person features are something different than Third Person characteristics.
Know how/SearleVsNonfactualism: someone who had complete knowledge of the neurophysiology knew still not what pain is if he did not know what it is like to feel pain.
V 162
Nominalism/Searle: correct: the existence of particular entities of facts in the world and the existence of universals depend merely on the meaning of words. SearleVsNominalismus: incomprehensible: to deny such trivial truths as that there are properties such as the ones of Beeing-Red or Beeing-Centaur. From such assumptions no compulsion to further conclusions result besides that certain predicates are meaningful!
NominalismVsFrege: no "Third Reich".

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Properties Quine Vs Properties
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 215
We have seen that the appearance of abstract singular terms cannot be separated from that of abstract general terms ("virtue is rare"). Already a mass term has something of the hybrid appearance of the abstract singular term. E.g. "water" rather designates
1) a common characteristic of different puddles and glass filling levels than
2) a scattered part of the world that consists of those puddles.
I 216
Mass terms are archaic remnants from the first phase of language acquisition, preforms of abstract singular terms. The difference between the "red" that is said about apples and the "red" that is said of their outside has no meaning. "Red" becomes the name of a property that is not only lumps and drops of a homogeneous substance, but also in common with apples.
This abstract object can no longer be put aside as easily as the water property was put aside by giving 2) (common property) preference over 1) (dispersal).
I 217
Because even if we have learned to construe water as a distributed concrete object, we tend to additionally permitting an abstract object like "redness". This analogy then spreads beyond the the mass terms up to terms with strictly divided reference. Therefore, roundness and sphericity. Every general term leads to an abstract singular term.
The usefulness of abstract terms is mostly in the abbreviation of cross-references: E.g. "The same is true for Churchill", "Both plants have the following property in common". Only that in such cases the cross-reference merely refers to word structures. But we stubbornly tend to objectifying what has been said again by establishing a property instead of talking only of words.
QuineVsProperties: Many thoughtless people insist on the reality of properties for no other reason than that both plants (or Eisenhower and Churchill) "must admittedly have something in common"!
I 218
Properties: In as far as talk of properties has its origin in such abbreviated cross-references, the putative properties probably do not correspond to simple abstract terms, but to longer expressions. E.g. "being equipped with spikes in clusters of five." Properties: Cassirer: "Properties are remnants of the secondary deities of a disused faith".

X 94
Properties/Predicates/Propositions/Individuation/QuineVsFrege: also the conception of the first logician is untenable: properties behave just like propositions.
X 95
Properties/Quine: behave to predicates or open sentences like propositions to sentences. One cannot, just like with propositions, distinguish individual properties. Sets: can be distinguished due to the principle of extensionality.
Principle of Extensionality: two sets are identical if they have the same elements.
Open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine two different sets, but they can be based on two different properties.
Properties/Identity: for two properties to be identical, the corresponding open sentences must be synonymous. And that is not possible because of confusion.
Solution/Some Authors: Sets as values ​​of "F".
Quine: nevertheless, predicate schematic letters should not be regarded as quantifiable variables.
Predicate/Quine: predicates have properties as their "intentions" or meanings (or would have them if properties existed), and they have sets as their extensions. But they are neither the name of one nor of the other.
Intention: of a predicate: property
Extension: of a predicate: set.
Name: a predicate is never a name, neither of its intention (property) nor of its extension (set).
Variable/Quine: quantifiable variables, therefore, cannot take the place of predicates, but of names.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Quine, W.V.O. Strawson Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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NS I 149
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysicsVsRevisionist metaphysics. Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day doing and speaking.
Definition revisionists Metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This stands in contrast to the everyday's way of thinking.
StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is just about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language.
Ontology/language/Strawson: Thesis: pro-thing-property-ontology. This is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form.
---
NS I 150
Space/Time/Strawson: are tools to differentiate different cases. Transcendental/Kant: are arguments that relate to the conditions of possibility.
Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: his arguments are transcendental.
---
Strawson I 198
QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: singular expressions (singular term) can occur at the points of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: can be quantified, general term: not quantifiable.
StrawsonVsQuine: on closer inspection, these differences of approach seem far less significant.
Quine strongly distinguishes between types of non-linguistic objects on one side and the distinction between singular and general terms, on the other side. (Word/object).
In Quine "piety" and "wisdom" are singular expressions, namely names of abstract objects like the nouns "Socrates" and "earth" are the names of concrete objects.
Abstract Singular Term/Quine: E.g. "piety" (Universal).
The distinction between singular and general term is more important for Quine from the logical point of view.
The singular term gives the impression, and to name only one object, while the general term does not claimed at all, to name something, although it "may be true of many things."
StrawsonVsQuine: this is an unsatisfactory way of explaining that the word "philosopher" should be a general and not a singular term. We would not like to say that this expression is true of many things or people.
---
Strawson I 252
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: regardless of their captivating simplicity of this analysis, I believe that it will be unacceptable by the form in which it is created. The language terms, in which the analysis is drawn up, presuppose the existence of subject expressions of linguistic singular terms. Other consequence: we are invited, to see the expressions that replace the "Fs" and "Gs" in the quantified sentences as ordinary predicate expressions. That is allright.
---
I 253
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: but again these forms have only their place in normal language because singular terms, subject expressions occupy the place they have there. Circularity: because we cannot simultaneously regard Fs and Gs as predicate expressions and accept that they all resolve subject expressions totally in the form of quantified sentences.
Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: the argument is based on the linguistic forms that require in turn the use of these expressions.
StrawsonVsGadamer/StrawsonVsQuine: one could argue against that this is too narrow, one must proceed inventively. In the case one would have to say what a teaching really should say, which is, taken literally, unacceptable.
---
Strawson IV 69
StrawsonVsQuine: Suppose we want to manage without quantification over properties. Does it follow that the belief in objects would be justified, but not the belief in properties? ---
IV 70
Strawson: we can accept a different kind of existence. A secondary, although a usual sense of existence, which applies to properties and relations. ---
IV 71
Vs: E.g. a) "There is at least one property that has no machine, namely perfect efficiency". b) "no machine is completely efficient." In a) I quantify, in b) I do not.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Quine, W.V.O. Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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I 215
descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is."
I 216
Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand:
"The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning.
"Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential.
Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua."
MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context.
referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension.
Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used.
Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name?
Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy.
a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy.
I 217
b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat.
Quine:
In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach.
c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy.
Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b).
Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same.
d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy.
Now this is just wrong.
Question: but what about
e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of).
Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain.
I 218
She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens.
Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt.
Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ".
Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph).
referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential.
referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her).
MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent!
Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions.
Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally:
I 219
Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But:
Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity).
Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts.
Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you.

I 299
Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up.
I 300
Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances.
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted.
MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity).

I 309
Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment.
agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world.
agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s)> Nozick inegalitarian theory.). There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((S) yes - but not that they mean the same thing).
Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time.
Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time.

I 312
Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary
I 313
to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested.
Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine).
Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data.
I 314
Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data.
I 317
Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things.
Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A?
Millikan. No!
From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa.
Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees."
I 318
Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake.
Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real.
I 321
Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body."
Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Stegmüller Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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Stegmüller IV 390
Existenz/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: die Auffassung, der Begriff der Existenz gehe vollständig im existential quantifier auf, ist umstritten!

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Wessel Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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I 352
Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Unterscheidung Intension/Extension: hilft bei den Problemen nicht weiter. Allein der Hinweis, dass es sich um intensionale Kontexte handelt, reicht nicht. Extensionalitätsregel/Wessel: nach ihr können nur Vorkommen von sprachlichen Gebilden als Termini bzw. als Aussagen durch bedeutungsgleiche ersetzt werden, jedoch nicht beliebige graphische Teile.
Man kann deshalb nicht sagen, dass sie hier nur eingeschränkt gilt, denn sie ist überhaupt nicht anwendbar!
Zu der fälschlichen Auffassung kommt es, weil es in intensionalen Kontexten aufgrund ihrer Definitionen logische Regeln gelten, die der Extensionalitätsregel sehr ähnlich sind und die es, eventuell unter zusätzlichen Bedingungen gestatten, auch bloße Vorkommen von graphischen Teilen durch bestimmte Termini und Aussagen zu ersetzen.
I 353
Wessel: allgemein kann man das aber nicht sagen: Bsp "a sagte die Aussage A" diese Wendung wird in zwei unterschiedlichen Bedeutungen verwendet: bei der einen kommt es auf die genaue Wort und Buchstabenfolge an, bei der anderen nur auf die Information. (indirekte Rede).
Planeten Bsp/WesselVsQuine: dieser verwendet nicht die Beziehung der Bedeutungsgleichheit von Termini und die Ersetzbarkeit für bedeutungsgleiche Termini, sondern die Identitätssätze "Abendstern = Morgenstern" und die Ersetzbarkeitsregel für Identitäten.
Wessel: unsere Formulierung mit Bedeutungsgleichheit ist allgemeiner. Sie gilt aber auch für Identitäten.
Quine: unterscheidet nicht zwischen einem Vorkommen als Term und als bloß graphischem Teil!
Quine deutet die Sätze im Zusammenhang mit dem Planeten Bsp sämtlich als logische Modalitäten.
(Deshalb spricht Stegmüller von der Besonderheit der Kopula "ist" und zweifelt an der Möglichkeit einer Modallogik).
Modallogik/Quine/Wessel: die in den Aussagen von Quine vorkommenden Modalitäten können sowohl als alethische als auch epistemische Modalitäten gedeutet werden.
I 354
WesselVsQuine: dieser schließt aus einer falschen Prämisse: Ms(9 ‹ 7) > ~Wit(9 ‹ 7). (Ms wenn der Sachverhalt möglich ist, ~Wi: = nicht widerlegbar)
Morgenstern/Abendstern/einfach/zusammengesetzt/Wessel: man kann beide als einfache Termini ansehen, dann löst sich das Paradox auf: ta ‹_› tb bzw. a = b). (Der Morgenstern ist derselbe Gegenstand wie der Abendstern).
2. als zusammengesetzte Termini:
dann gilt: ~(ta ‹_› tb) bzw. ~(a = b). Sie sind dann nicht bedeutungsgleich.
WesselVsQuine: in diesem Fall ist eine von seinen Voraussetzungen falsch.
Quine ersetzt in seiner Konstruktion der Paradoxe Teile von Ausdrücken, die nicht als Termini, sondern nur als graphischer Teil vorkommen.
VsVs: der Einwand hat aber wenig Gewicht, da sich für modale Kontexte zusätzliche Ersetzbarkeitsregeln beweisen lassen.

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Realism Idealism Vs Realism
 
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Frank I 467
"ich denke"/Kant/Castaneda: setzt alles in indirekte Rede! Konsequenz: VsFrege: alle seine Bezugsgegenstände sind nach Kant nicht Teil der Semantik von sing Term!
((s) Eingebettete Sätze haben nach Frege keinen eigenen Bezugsgegenstand, sondern denotieren nur den Sinn eines Gegenstands.)
Umgekehrt können Freges Gegenstände nach Kant nur als transzendente Objekte fungieren. (IdealismusVsRealismus).

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Representation Castaneda Vs Representation
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 461
Guise Theory/CastanedaVsFrege/CastanedaVSRepresentations: (conception of "I" as a representation): (i) does not allow a semantic intermediary between a singularly referring expression and its referent (ii) it eludes psychological intermediaries between person and object (iii) removes the Fregean referent from the semantic order (iv) sets objects entities as referents, called individual guise, which are objectively almost analogous to Frege’s individual senses. (v) provides an analysis of Frege’s primary objects as systems of individual geguises. (vi) such systems are doxastic objects: they reach belief and thought, but not by singular reference, i.e. they are not the semantic endpoints. I 462 (vii) thought and beliefs only reach such doxastic objects by guises, as pictured systems of guises, and perhaps by general reference, i.e. by means of specific, non-substituting quantification.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Russell, B. Quine Vs Russell, B.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Chisholm II 75
Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion!
II 108
Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use.
Quine II 97
Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell!
QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense?

II 101
Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later as Principia Mathematica.)
Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological.
Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts.
For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality.
QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties.
II 102
RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention.
II 103/104
In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names.
Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent.
Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities.
QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle.
Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France".
Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening.
Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on
Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145)
II 105
Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence.
What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways
a) equated with the expression,
b) utterly rejected
c) elevated to the status of proper existence.

II 107
Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly.
What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language.
Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be.
Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data!

II 183 ff
Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true."
II 184
This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation.
Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values ​​of variables.
II 185
It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness.
XII 60
Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication.
XII 61
Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things.
Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches".
Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition.
Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted.
VII 80
Principia Mathematica/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic.
VII 81
QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM.
VII 93
QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived.
VII 93/94
Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x).

VII 122
Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences
b) properties.
Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables.

IX 15
QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes.
IX 93
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested)
Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers.
Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers.
Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers.
Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers

IX 181
Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB).
IX 182
Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}.
Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the
Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x).
Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought.
Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values ​​of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted.
An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose.
Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility:
Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e.
Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc.
IX 184
VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA.
IX 184/185
The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...)

IX 185
Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and
b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly:
a) attributes
b) open statements
As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF".
Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order.

X 95
Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path.
Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference.
Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties?
X 96
He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege.
QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Russell, B. Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B.
 
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Carnap VI 58
Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein.
(Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements).
E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal":
both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement).
"The class of humans is included in the class of mortals".
---
Tugendhat I 453
Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. ---
I 470
Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability.
Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities.
Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole.
Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals).
E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function.
---
Wittgenstein I 80
Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic.
This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class.
This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world.
---
I 81
1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects.
N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else:
---
I 82
The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality).
---
I 86
Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects.
---
I 94ff
This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45).
---
I 95
According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/use/tell/show).
---
Wittgenstein I 107
Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world.
They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data.
---
I 108
For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also:
Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world".
---
I 114
Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." ---
I 115
Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects."
Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul".
---
I 143
Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object."
---
I 144
Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. ---
I 286
Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. ---
I 287
And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images.
---
Wittgenstein II 35
Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally.
WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original.
---
Wittgenstein II 74
Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions.
2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal."
Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x).
---
II 75
But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. ---
II 79
Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear.
---
II 80
WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion sign. ---
II 100
Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning.
---
II 123
Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. ---
II 137
Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent.
All S are P: (x) gx > .fx
No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx
This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns.
---
II 152
WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles.
WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square."
Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"?
---
II 157
Particular/ED/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomismus.
---
Wittgenstein II 306
Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive.
Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such.
---
II 307
We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man.
Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things.
This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties.
A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property).
---
II 308
WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them.
That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name.
---
II 309
What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? ((s)> Geach: Huntington-Example). ---
II 311
Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Schröder, E. Frege Vs Schröder, E.
 
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I 116
Sign/FregeVsSchröder: with him you sometimes do not know if he thinks that the number is a sign and what its meaning is then, or whether seven is its meaning. From the fact that you can establish various signs, so that the same (sign) never returns, it does not follow that these signs also mean different things.
Simons I 102
Class/FregeVsSchröder: we have to distinguish: a) "logical" sets: = value progressions and I 103 b) "concrete" sets: a calculus of collective classes is only a calculus of part and whole. SimonsVsFrege: ironically, this turned out to be much more vulnerable as Schroeder’s "manifolds". Lesniewski: knew Frege’s criticism.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Sententialism Schiffer Vs Sententialism
 
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Stephen Schiffer
I 120
Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes.
I 120
And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98).
2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring".
Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!.
E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!.
I 123
DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f).
2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts.
I 137
Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist.
Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory.
I 157
Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221).
Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs:
If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And:
Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited.
Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true.
Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad.
I 158
We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychological theory.
(2) The justification for methodological physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine).
(3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible.
SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Skepticism Frege Vs Skepticism
 
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Davidson II 124
FregeVsSkepticism: the skeptic has no cure, because he cannot even assume for his next statement that his words still have the same meanings as before.
Dummett I 58
Skepticism: never sure whether sense corresponds to a relation -Frege: just a severe deficiency of our language, which must be eliminated.
IV 45
FregeVsSkepticism: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! - If everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imagination! - Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination.
IV 50
Imagination/Psychology/Skepticism/Frege: not everything is imagination, otherwise psychology would contain all the sciences. (s) VsFrege: That does not make it impossible for everything to be imagination at the end of the day. (reductio ad absurdum is not enough.)) -
IV 51
Perception/Frege: sensory perception necessarily requires sensation, and this is part of the inner world.
Frege IV 46
FregeVsSkepticism: interestingly, in his consideration the opposites turn into each other. (>"Dialectic"). E.g. a sensory physiologist as a naturalist is initially far from considering the things he is convinced to see and touch as his imagination.
IV 46
Stimulus/Frege: skepticism can easily refer to him: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! We are experiencing only one end of the process that protrudes into our consciousness! Perhaps other causes are at work? So everything dissolves into imagination, also the light beams. The empirical sensory physiologist thus undermines his own conditions. Everything requires a carrier, I have considered myself as the carrier of my imagination, but am I not myself an imagination?.
IV 47
Where is then the carrier of these imaginations? If everything is imagination: there is no carrier. Also, no imaginations are somehow distinguished. Now I experience the change into the opposite: FregeVsBerkeley: if everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imaginations! ((s) that introduces a new concept, which does not exist in Berkeley: that of the carrier). But there can be no experience without someone who experiences it. But then there is something that is not my imagination, and yet object of my contemplation. Could it be that this "I" as a carrier of my consciousness is only one part of this consciousness, while another part is perhaps a "moon image"? I.e. something else is taking place when I judge that I am looking at the moon? Then this first part would have a consciousness and a part of this consciousness would be I, etc. so regress. Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So that what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination. VsFrege: It could be argued E.g. that if I think that I don’t feel any pain at this moment, doesn’t something in my imagination correspond to the word "I"? Frege: That may be.
IV 48
I/Frege: the word "I" may be connected to a certain image in my consciousness. But then it is an image among other images, and I am its carrier as I am the carrier of other images. I have an image of me, but I’m not this image! There must be a sharp distinction between the content of my consciousness (my imagination) and the object of my thinking (objective thoughts). Now the path towards recognizing other people as an independent carriers of imagination is clear. Images may also be the common object of thought by people who do not have this image. Imagination may become object.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Structuralism Field Vs Structuralism
 
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II 328
Numbers/Structuralism/Field: it is sometimes expressed in a way that 2 is simply a point in a structure. (Resnik 1981, Shapiro 1989). Vagueness/Field: This view corresponds to the view that vagueness is in the world instead of in our language! ((s)> epistemic view).
FieldVs: it seems to work well not only for numbers like "2", but also for the expressions that we use to describe structures in which there are no symmetries.
Symmetry/Field: brings a problem into play here.
E.g. Brandom: √-1/Root -1/Complex Numbers/Field: Problem: every complex number other than 0 (Ex -1) has two roots. (actually BrandomVsFrege, BrandomVsLogicism).
"Number i": this term has introduced as a standard for one of the two, (-i is then of course the other one).
Problem: even if we assume that we have somehow defined which objects are the complex numbers, which subset of them are the real numbers, and which functions of them are addition and multiplication, then our use of these expressions still leaves undetermined to which of the two roots of -1 our expression "i" refers. ((s) Because of the symmetry, it is impossible to make out a difference).
Complex Numbers/Interior/Exterior/Theory/Field: within the theory of complex numbers there is no way to distinguish i and -i. There is no predicate A(x) that does not itself contain "i" and that is true of one but not of the other.
Complex Numbers/Field: Of course, the practical applications are no help in distinguishing them either!.
Problem: even if you say that "i" is simply a point in the system of complex numbers, the indeterminacy continues, because the complex number plane contains two structurally identical positions for the roots of -1, without distinguishing properties.
4) Incompleteness"/Mathematics/Numbers/Field: numbers are more or less incomplete objects: E.g. 2 has properties such as being the predecessor of 3 and being a prime, but no property that determines whether it is a quantity!.
FieldVsStructuralism: This fourth way of seeing it is certainly not the best way to capture the "structuralist insight".
II 332
Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical domains must not be indistinguishable.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Tradition Simons Vs Tradition
 
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I 291
Integrity/connection/individual/tradition/Simons: Thesis: Integrity belongs to the spatio-temporally continuous objects. SimonsVsTradition: microscopically all things are distributed and no longer connected(> microstrukture, MiSt).
Quine: this applies to all things that are not only of a single elementary particle. (1960,98)
Object/thing/object/philosophy/Simons: distributed objects are also called objects: e.g. galaxies, e.g. Indonesia.
Individual/Leibniz: must be atomic. (>Monads). (Simons: virtually all authors VsLeibniz).

I 306
Relational Accident/SimonsVsTradition: may very well exis: that means such that are based in more than one substrate: e.g. collision between two bodies. It could not have happened with other bodies (modal rigidity) and both bodies must exist at the time (temporal rigidity) even if one or both are destroyed in the accident. Also: E.g. weddings, divorces, football matches. This is nothing mysterious.

I 342
Proposition/connection/copula/tradition/Simons: the cohesion of the proposition delivered according to the tradition the copula: copula/VsTradition: occurs in the proposition only as a normal word like the others, so it cannot explain the cohesion.
Solution/Frege: unsaturated parts of a sentence.
Proposition/WittgensteinVsFrege: connection simply common juxtaposition of words (names). That means that there is not one part of the sentence which establishes the connection.
Unsaturatedness/Simons: perfectly matches the ontological dependence (undated): a part of a sentence cannot exist without certain others!

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Type Theory Wittgenstein Vs Type Theory
 
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II 439
Type Theory/TT/WittgensteinVsRussell: f(a) = U's coat is red
F(a) = U's coat has one of the colors of the rainbow
φ(f) = Red is a color of the rainbow
Question: Now, φ (F) has a meaning? ((s) This is not mentioned in this combination above).
Russell: would say that "a color of the rainbow has the property to be a rainbow color" has no meaning, so that "f(f)" generally has no meaning.
But if we now create a rule of grammar in order to exclude a replacement option (and exactly this does the theory of types, in order to avoid contradictions), then we must make the replacement rule dependendet exclusively on the characteristics of symbols.
Replacement rule: if we introduce "f(x)" we must not give "f (f)" a meaning.
E.g. Consider ~ f(f) = F(f) and the expression that is obtained by replacing "f" through "F": the property to not have oneself as a property that has itself in turn as a property. The root of the contradiction is that one considers a function to function of itself. ((s)> heterology).
From ~ f(f) = F(f) results the contradiction F(F) = ~ F(F).
Problem: arises when one declares a function to its function of itself.
---
II 440
"f" in "f(x)" cannot be used as an argument itself. But why should this not occur as that which one presupposes, is not a sentence? It is not true to say that here the principle of contradiction has been violated, because that could only be the case if one was talking about sentences.
Hardy said it would be unbearable to have real numbers of different orders.
See his discussion, after which a sequence of real numbers belongs to another order, because it is defined by reference to a entirety whose barrier it is itself.
An analog example is the maximum of a curve, which is defined as the highest points of all on this curve.
---
IV 68
Operation/Form Series/Type theory/TT/Tractatus: 5.252 only like this the progression from member to member in a form series (from type to type in Russell) is possible. WittgensteinVsRussell: in Principia Mathematica (PM), they have not given the possibility of this progression, but have made use of it repeatedly.
5.2521 The repeated application of an operation to its own result ((s)> recursion) I call its successive application ("O'O '=' a" is the result of a triple application of "O'ζ" to "a").
5.2522 the general term of a form series a, O 'a, O'O'a ... I write:
---
IV 69
"[a,x,O'x]". This expression in brackets is a variable.
1. member: beginning of the form series
2. member: The form of any member x of the series
3. member: Form of the immediate successor this x. (Successor: O').
---
IV 70
WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.4 "Logical objects" or "logical constants" in the sense of Russell do not exist. Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are not primitive signs, let alone that they do not signify any relations.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Verificationism Husserl Vs Verificationism
 
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Chisholm II 150
Äußerung/wahrmachen/Husserl: Unterschied: 1. Semantische Relation des Wahrmachens
2. Verifikation (beides muß nicht zusammenfallen: Wahrheit muß nicht evident sein > Behauptbarkeit)
3. Relation zu einem Ding "außerhalb", was immer es sein mag.
II 151
Bei Sätzen mit indexikalischen Wörtern (Index Wörtern) überlappen sich die drei.
Bedeutung/HusserlVsVerifikation/Husserl: Verifikation trägt nicht zur Bedeutung des Satzes bei, weil 2. und 3. auseinanderfallen. Einzige Ausnahme: indexikalische Phänomene! (VsFrege; VsDummett?). (6. Logische Untersuchung).
Bsp Jules versteht nur "Diese Krähe fliegt hoch", wenn Jim sie ihm zeigt.
Die Krähe, das Zeigen und das Fliegen instantiieren verschiedene Arten. Dabei sind die zwei Ebenen des Universalen und Partikularen strikt getrennt.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Representationalism Versus Brandom II 74
Other direction Frege (late): representation-independent reality - DummettVsFrege: Falsely: Property of sentences instead of transitions between them.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Intensionality Pro Quine2 XI 66
Frege; prt intensional Semantics. - QuineVsFrege.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Sense Austin, J.L.
 
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Graeser I 62
Sense / AustinVsFrege: thesis: mostly we use sentences not to report facts but to generally do something!.

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Thought Dummett, M.
 
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I 61
DummettVsFrege: that does not show that the theory is wrong, that the sense (thought, see above) is not a content of consciousness, but rather that its reasoning is not entirely accurate, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity.
I 62
Today is Frege s thesis regarding the "objective meaning" commonplace. No one would deny any more that the use of color terms is subject to generally applicable criteria and can be assessed.
Names Dummett, M.
 
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StalnI 172
Namen/Referenz/Sinn/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: These Namen haben ihre Referenten direkt, ohne Vermittlung eines zwischengeschalteten Sinns
Frege/Dummett/Searle: These zwischen dem Namen und seinem Referenten muß man den Sinn des Namens annehmen
a) weil der Gegenstand sonst gar nicht identifiziert werden kann, bzw. wir nicht erklären können, wie er identifiziert wird,
b) (DummettVsKripke) weil wir dann die Sprache nicht lernen können.
Knowledge Field, Hartry
 
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I 94
logisches Wissen/Frege: These Problem, woher ich weiß, dass es logisch möglich ist, daß die Axiome der Mengenlehre wahr sind: dadurch daß ich behaupte, ich wisse, dass es aktual die von den Axiomen behaupteten Entitäten gibt - FieldVsFrege: wenn diese Entitäten existierten, wie könnte man dann wissen, daß sie in dieser Relation zueinander stehen und nicht in einer anderen?
I 112
Zus. Wissen/Mathematik/Logik/Field: These alles mathematische Wissen, das nicht empirisch ist, ist rein logisch.
I 124
logisches Wissen/Field: These mathematisches Wissen ist logisches Wissen. logisches Wissen/Field: These ist für mich auch anfechtbar. These daher möchte ich einige Aussagen von "logisch gewusst" zu "logisch glaubhaft" verschieben.
Thought Frege, G.
 
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Dum I 89
Frege:These vom Vorrang des Gedankens vor der Sprache
Dum I 92
DummettVsFrege: Umgekehrt steht seine Theorie der Wahrnehmung im Widerspruch zu seiner These, der Mensch könne nur diejenigen Gedanken fassen, die er als den Sinn von Sätzen begreift. davon kann man zwei Lesarten nehmen. Stärkste Lesart: wir können nur in der Sprache denken,
schwächste: keiner von uns kann einen Gedanken haben, den er nicht zum Ausdruck bringen kann.
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 73
Frage/Befehl/Wunsch/Frege: These ein Wunschsatz, eine Frage oder ein Befehl enthält überhaupt keinen Gedanken!

F III
R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995
Qualia Frege, G.
 
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Staln I 220
Qualia / common sense / Shoemaker: Thesis: qualia are internal, intrinsic, locally but also comparable. VsFrege-Schlick-view. Qualia / Frege-Schlick-view / Shoemaker: Thesis: qualia are not comparable, because it is meaningless to assume that e.g. exchanged spectra represent anything communicable.
  Interpersonal comparisons of phenomenal experience are meaningless.
Index Words Frege, G.
 
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Newen / Schrenk I 27
Index words / VsFrege / Newen / Schrenk: limits of his theory: context-dependent expressions (indicators, indicator words: e.g. "here", "now", "I", etc.) can not be treated (not be determined). This is a consequence of his thesis that (full) thoughts are context independent and words have a stable sense.
Names Frege, G.
 
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Wolf I 13
Namen/FregeVsRussell: sing Term.
Newen/Schrenk I 101
Sinn/Namen/Frege: These der Sinn eines Namens wird durch die Kennzeichnung ausgedrückt. Das ist die sogenannte Kennzeichnungstheorie, eine einfache Variante der Beschreibungstheorie.
Staln I 172
Namen/Referenz/Sinn/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: These: Namen haben ihre Referenten direkt, ohne Vermittlung eines zwischengeschalteten Sinns
Frege/Dummett/Searle: These zwischen dem Namen und seinem Referenten muß man den Sinn des Namens annehmen
a) weil der Gegenstand sonst gar nicht identifiziert werden kann, bzw. wir nicht erklären können, wie er identifiziert wird,
b) (DummettVsKripke) weil wir dann die Sprache nicht lernen können.

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993
Vagueness Frege, G.
 
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EMD II 223
Vagueness / natural language / Frege: imprecise, which is a deficiency that needs to be turned off.  WrightVsFrege / (s): thesis some predicates have to be vague, to ever serve their purpose and thus ultimately to allow the natural language to fulfill its purpose.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Infinite Geach, P.
 
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I 166
infinity / GeachVsFrege: Thesis: Mathematical infinity is not as Frege thought an infinity of "objective things", but consists in the infinite possibilities of human language.
Idiolect Kripke, S.A.
 
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Cresswell II 151
Def "extreme Fregeanism" / KripkeVsFrege / KripkeVsRussell / Cresswell: the thesis that names in general belong to idiolects.   Problem: then the Pierre-Example is not about Pierre, but about the speaker who reports the case, and about his idiolect.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Names Lewis, D.
 
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Schw I 223
Namen/Kennzeichnung/Referenz/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975): für Namen und Artausdrücke gibt es keine allgemeinbekannte Beschreibung (Kennzeichnung), die festlegt, worauf der Ausdruck sich bezieht. Kennzeichnungen sind für die Referenz völlig irrelevant. Beschreibungstheorie/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: das wiederlegt nur die naive Kennzeichnungstheorie, nach der biographische Taten aufgelistet werden, die dem Referenten notwendig zukommen sollen.
Schw I 228
Namen/Prädikat/Eigenschaft/Lewis: These Namen können alles benennen: statt Prädikat "F" nehmen wir "F-heit" - Prädikate sind keine Namen und benennen nichts - Prädikat/(s): kein sing Term - SchwarzVsLewis/ RussellVsFrege: wenn man annimmt, daß jedem Prädikat ein Name für eine entsprechende Eigenschaft zugeordnet werden kann, folgt Russells Paradoxie.
Names Searle, J.R.
 
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Staln I 172
Namen/Referenz/Sinn/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: These Namen haben ihre Referenten direkt, ohne Vermittlung eines zwischengeschalteten Sinns
Frege/Dummett/Searle: These zwischen dem Namen und seinem Referenten muß man den Sinn des Namens annehmen
a) weil der Gegenstand sonst gar nicht identifiziert werden kann, bzw. wir nicht erklären können, wie er identifiziert wird,
b) (DummettVsKripke) weil wir dann die Sprache nicht lernen können.
Logic Wittgenstein, L.
 
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II 160
Logic / WittgensteinVsFrege: 1st, it is quite arbitrary, what we call the a sentence - therefore logic means for me something other than for Frege - 2nd VsFrege: all words are equally important - Frege: These "word", "sentence", "world "are more important -
VII 14
Tractatus / Logic / Tetens: the thesis of the Tractatus: no one can stand outside the logic.

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Vs Kripke Burkhardt, A.
 
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Wolf I 341
BurkhardtVsKripke: thesis: that names are rigid description expressions, indeed applies to the rule, but must be supplemented, contrary to his view in other cases by Frege’s sense-term. BurkhardtVsFrege: his view is false, proper names have both meaning and sense.

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993