Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 119 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Quine | I 286 Intensional abstraction means "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring". I 289 Class abstraction re-traced to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) - instead of: x^(..x..) - is not possible for intensional abstraction. I 295 Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties is opaque (E.g. of the planet). I 322 Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)". New is the irreducible two-digit Operator "0": "a0x(..x..)". Variables are the only thing that remains. The pronoun has primacy. IX 12ff Class Abstraction/Quine: class abstraction "{x:Fx}" refers to "the class of all objects x with Fx". In the eliminable combination that we have in mind "ε" appears only in front of a class abstraction term and class abstraction terms appear only after "ε". The whole combination "y ε {x: Fx}" is then reduced according to a law: Concretization Law/Quine: reduces "y ε {x: Fx}" to "Fy". Existence/Ontology: thus no indication remains that such a thing as the class {x:Fx} exists at all. Introduction: it would be a mistake, e.g. to write "*(Fx)" for "x = 1 and EyFy". Because it would be wrong to conclude "*(F0) *(F1)" from "F0 F1". Therefore we have to mistrust our definition 2.1 which has "Fx" in the definiendum, but does not have it in the definiens. IX 16 Relations Abstraction/Relation Abstraction/Quine: "{xy:Fxy}" is to represent the relationship of a certain x to a certain y such that Fxy. Relation/Correctness/Quine: parallel to the element relationship there is the concept of correctness for relations. Definition concretization law for relations/Quine: is also the definition correctness/relation: "z{xy: Fxy}w stands for "Fzw". IX 52 Function Abstraction/lambda operator/Quine: before terms one must generate terms (expressions). (Frege/Church: is here also valid of statements and thus a second time class abstraction, but both group statements are under terms and classes under functions (QuineVsFrege,QuineVsChurch). Definition lambda operator/Quine: if "...x..." contains x as a free variable, λx (...x...) is that function whose value is ...x... for each argument x - therefore λx(x²) the function "the "square of" - general: "λx(...x...)" stands for "{ : y = ...x...}" - identity: λx x{: y = x } = λ. - λx {z: Fxy} = {: y = {z: Fxz}} -. "λx a" stands for "{: y = a}". The equal sign now stands between variable and a class abstraction term. IX 181 Abstraction/Order/Quine: the order of the abstracting expression must not be less than that of the free variables. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ambiguity | Hintikka | II 48 Def systematic ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all of our expressions are systematically ambiguous; that is, they refer to different things depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect (intensional, opaque) contexts. >Intensionality, >Extensionality, >Context, >Opacity. II 50 Semantics of possible worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: here there is no > systematic ambiguity, i.e. the expressions mean intensionally the same as extensionally. E.g. to know what John knows is to know the worlds that are compatible with his belief, and to know which ones are not. >Possible world semantics. II 51 Extra-premise: for this, one must be sure that an expression in different worlds takes out the same individual. Context: what the relevant worlds are, depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here the case is clear. On the other hand: e.g. Herzl knew that Loris was a great poet. Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Atomism | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 25 Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Thesis: all logical forms can be constructed from the shapes of objects. Hintikka I 175 Logical Independence/Elementary Proposition/Atomism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (1931) Wittgenstein eventually abandons the quest for logical independence of elementary propositions. - It was a real failure. - Reason: color attributes (color predicates) are not independent - E.g. red exists in the degree q1r and red exists in the degree q2r, then it follows: if q2>q1, q1r follows from q2r. - Later Vs: does not work with impure and opaque colors either. I 176 Atomism/Middle Period/Wittgenstein/Waismann/Hintikka: new: atomic sentences are no longer individually compared with the world, but as a sentence systems. - ("Holistic"). - WittgensteinVsAtomism: middle period: - New: I apply the whole color scale at once. - That is the reason why a point cannot have more than one color. -> Measuring/Wittgenstein, More autors on measurements. - If I apply a set system to reality, then it is thereby said that only one fact can exist at a time. --- II 138 WittgensteinVsAtomism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: 2 errors: 1) assuming the infinite to be a number and assuming that there would be an infinite number of sentences. - 2) that there are statements that express degrees of qualities - atomism; requires, however, that if p and q are contradictory, they may be further analysed until t and ~t result. II 157 Atomism/Atom Sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in the analysis of atomic sentences you do not encounter "particulars", not unlike in chemical analysis. --- IV 14 Atomism/Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: if the world had no substance, ((s) = unchangeable objects), the atomic sentences would not be independent of each other. ad IV 36ff Tractatus/Atomism/Wittgenstein/(s): Atoms: undefined objects, quasi material things, (sounds), primitive signs - unclear whether thing (object) or immaterial, only components of the sentence are translated. - Thus, they are open to meaning theory which simultaneously derives from complex of objects, facts as well as connection of words, but (4.0312) the logic of the facts cannot be represented - the logical constants (and, or, not) do not represent. - Representative: sign for the object - internal properties: in the sentence different than the relations to the world (external). WittgensteinVsRussell, VsFrege: confusion mention/use: internal/external. >Mention, >Use, >Representation, >Logical constants, >Facts, >Signs. --- VII 122 Atomism/Atom Sentence/Truth Value/Truth Functions/Tr. fnc./Laws of Nature/LoN//Tractatus/Te Tens: the truth values of the atom sentences determine the truth of all remaining sentences with logical necessity, also those of the Laws of Nature - but then you should not say that something is only possible impossible or necessary by virtue of natural law or causality. - (6.37) - Laws of Nature are the truth functions of elementary propositions. - Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. >Truth values, >Truth functions. VII 124 Laws of Nature: are not the ultimum; that is logical space. >Laws of Nature. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Attribution | Perry | Frank I 451 f Proposition/propositional attitude/PerryVsFrege: The expressions in a report of what someone thinks, designate entities (not whole propositions) to which their antecedents refer. > Cresswell: structured meanings. John Perry (1983a): Castaneda on He and I, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda. Hackett (1983), 15-39 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Bivalence | Dummett | II 103 Principle of Bivalence/Truth/Dummett: PoB already presumes the concept of truth. - And that is transcendental in the case of undecidable sentences. - It goes beyond our ability to recognize what a manifestation would be. >Decidability. II 103f Undecidability/anti-realism/Dummett: (without bivalence) The meaning theory will then no longer be purely descriptive in relation to our actual practice. III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: Explanation of sense by truth conditions. - Tractatus: dito: "Under which circumstances...". >Truth conditions, >Circumstances. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: For that one must already know what the statement that P is true means. Vs: if they then say P is true means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what should be explained. VsRedundancy theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain the meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. >Redundancy theory. III (b) 74 Sense/Reference/Bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that in principle we can recognize it as true if it is true (e.g. >unicorns, >Goldbach’s conjecture). But Frege’s argument does not depend at all on bivalence. III (b) 76 Bivalence, however, works for elementary clauses: if here the semantic value is the extension, it is not necessary to be possible to decide whether the predicate is true or not - perhaps application cannot be effectively decided, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without allocating the semantic value (truth value) - therefore distinction between sense and semantic value. >Semantic Value. Cf. >Multi valued logic. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Classes | Frege | Simons I 102f Class/FregeVsSchröder: a) "Logical" classes: logical classes are value ranges. I 103 b) "Concrete" classes: a calculus of collective classes is just one calculus of a part and whole. VsFrege: >Russell’s paradox - is more vulnerable than Schröder’s "manifolds". >Calculus, >Parts/Wholes, >Value progression. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Classes | Wittgenstein | II 343 Number/Class/Frege/Russell/Wittgenstein: Frege's Definition: Class of classes. A number is the class of all equal classes. Intension/Class/Quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: the two believed they could handle the classes intensionally because they thought they could transform a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why were they so keen to define the number? >Numbers. II 354 Measuring: For example, numerical equality of classes or Calculating: e.g. equal number of roots of a 4th degree equation: one is a measurement, the other a calculation. >Measurements. Is there an experiment to determine if two classes have the same number? This may or may not be the case for classes that we cannot get a general view of. II 355 It is a damaging prejudice to believe that when using strokes we are dealing with an experiment. II 355 Classes/Assignment/Wittgenstein: Difference: Assignment in Russell's and in the usual sense: 1. by identity 2. how to assign cups and saucers by stacking. In the second case, it does not mean that they cannot be assigned in any other way. Could the same be said about Russell's assignment? No, here no other allocation could exist, if that is not given. What I want to draw attention to is not a natural phenomenon, but a matter of grammar. >Grammar. II 358 Allocation/Number Equality/Wittgenstein: the requirement that an actual allocation must be made to declare two classes equal in numbers is worrying. II 367 Classes/Wittgenstein: we must not forget that we do not always talk about the same phenomenon when we talk about two classes containing the same number of elements. >Elements, >Sets. How do you know if some pieces will disappear while they are being counted, or if others will not break? II 419 Classes/Power Equality/Number Equality/Class Equality/Wittgenstein: Question: whether the classes must actually be assigned to the paradigm to have the same number, or whether this only needs to be possible. What is the criterion of existence of the possibility of their assignment? II 431 Classes/Numbers/Wittgenstein: when it is said that you can just as well calculate with the classes as with the rational numbers, actually no substitution has taken place. The calculation is simply done with the rational numbers. II 436 Class/Method/Wittgenstein: we must distinguish between a class of coin tosses and a method (rule). >Method, >Rules. - E.g. irrational number: is defined by a method - it is a process - the square root of two is not an extension but a special rule to produce a fraction. IV 93 Classes/Sets/Tractatus: 6,031 The theory of classes is completely superfluous in mathematics. This is because the generality we need in mathematics is not the random one. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Clauses | Searle | V 120 Clause/subordinate sentence/SearleVsFrege/SearleVsTarski/Tarski: subordinate clauses are not names of sentences. Words in quotation marks are not names of words. Otherwise there is "regress". >Names of sentences, >Regress, >Clause/Frege, >Clause/Schiffer. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Compositionality | Brandom | I 504f Compositionality/Frege/Brandom: the same substitutional path that leads from the inference to the conceptual content of sentences also leads from the free-standing inferential content of composite sentences to the embedded content of embedded parts of sentences and on the other hand back to singular terms and predicates. >Singular terms, >Predicates, >Frege principle. I 505 Neutral between bottom-up and top-down. I 506 BrandomVsFrege: blurs the distinction between freestanding and embedded contents. >Subsetentials. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Compositionality | Gärdenfors | I 241 Compositionality/conceptual space/linguistics/Gärdenfors: how can conceptual spaces describe the mechanisms that act during the formation of composite meanings? (For compositionality Szabo 2004). (1) Compositionality/GärdenforsVsFrege: thesis: since the communicative context changes the meaning of the expressions involved, the linguistic expression is under defined in its meaning. Communication/Transformation/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the compilation of meanings often transforms these meanings. --- I 242 Direct composition/Gärdenfors: (non-Fregean): direct compositions are mappings between semantic areas (Holoyak & Thagard, 1996; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Gärdenfors, 2000). (2)(3)(4) Combination adjective-noun: e.g. blue rectangle: its meaning is defined as the Cartesian product of the blue region of the color space and the rectangle region of the shape space. A product of compact and convex amounts will in turn be compact and convex. The mapping functions are continuous. The function product is also continuous. N.B.: thus the fixed point properties remain in the composition. (See fixed point/Gärdenfors (I 97): certainty about the common focus on an object. Meaning/GärdenforsVsFrege: the meaning of the compound structure is no longer formed by the meaning of the components but by the areas and functions. These can be located as regions in the product space (e.g., of color and size). It is assumed that the areas involved are separable. But in practice, they are not completely separate: some pre-processing must take place before the areas can be combined. --- I 244 Head/Modification/Gärdenfors: the analysis with head and modifier will usually not work because our knowledge about the respective areas will change the representation of the modifier: e.g. white wine is not white, e.g. a large squirrel is not a big animal. ((s)> syncategorematic expressions in Analytical Philosophy). Solution/Gärdenfors: we need contrast classes. E.g. adjectives such as "large" need contrast classes, which introduce yet another property. Then we can assume compact convex regions of metric spaces for the head and modifier, as well as a radial (continuous) projection between the spaces. (C. Berge, Topological Spaces, Mineola, NY, 1997). (5) Problem: e.g. Lion > Stone Lion: here, not all areas can be equally attributed, e.g. habitat, behavior, etc. --- I 246 Metaphorical composition: even if the head and modifier have no common dimensions, one can create an image between the two by using convexity and compactness. For example, a bumpy road and a bumpy relationship share the geometrical quality of a dimension: a) the length b) the time. --- I 247 Dimension: its diversity is sometimes seen as an obstacle: cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1980).(6) > Metaphors/Gärdenfors. --- I 249 Noun verb combination/Gärdenfors: in my analysis a force pattern can be applied to different situations. E.g. the engine is running - the clock is running. --- I 250 Thesis about noun-verb combinations: the meaning of the verb is modified by the patient, but not by the agent. E.g. (From Keenan, 1984, p.20)(7): a) Oscar cut the lawn. The machine cut the lawn. b) Oscar cut the dress. The sharp stone cut the dress. Gärdenfors: the meaning of "cut" varies greatly between the pairs, but not so strong within the pairs. This shows that the meaning is not modified by the agent. 1. Szabo, Z. (2004). Compositionality. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compositionality 2. Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1996). Mental leaps. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Fauconnier, G., & Turner, R. (1998). Conceptual integration networks. Cognitive Science, 22, 133–187. 4. Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Berge, C. (1997). Topological spaces. Mineola, NY: Dover. 6. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 7. Keenan, E. J. (1984). Semantic correlates of the ergative/absolutive distinction. Linguistics, 22, 197–223. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Compositionality | Pinker | I 151 Compositionality/PinkerVsFrege: The question of compositionality must also consider the type of connection. >Syntax, >Grammar. I 153 Different: baby saw chicken/chicken saw baby - this shows that the building blocks are not separated. >Surface structure, >Deep structure. I 154f Neural networks/thinking: active/passive, units. Baby eats: does not say what - snail is eaten does not say by whom. Wrong solution: relevance. >Relevance. Correct solution: representation. >Representation. For this there is an aditional layer of units. Similar to Mentalese. >Mentalese/language of thought. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Compositionality | Schiffer | I XVIII SchifferVsCompositionality: we must reject it because we must also reject the theory of relation (without which we cannot have the compositionality). >Frege principle, >Relation theory/Schiffer. Understanding/Schiffer: understanding must be explained otherwise: Solution: Schiffer thesis: conceptual role in neuronal lingua mentis without compositionality. >Conceptual role, >Lingua mentis, >Language of Thought. I 183 SchifferVsCompositionality: verbs for propositional attitudes can hardly be put into a compositional semantics. In addition e.g. "is a picture of", "true", "big", "toy"(soldier) - adverbs, evaluative terms like "should", "good", pronouns and demonstrative pronouns "everyone", "all" are problematic. Also counterfactual conditional and modal expressions represent a problem for compositional semantics. >Counterfactual conditionals, >Adverbs, >Adjectives. I 183 Compositional truth theoretical semantics/Schiffer: attributes truth conditions to sentences. >Truth conditions. I 184 Compositionality/SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural language does not need any compositional semantics for understanding. >Understanding. For new sentences, we are not confronted with new words and even only with known constructions. Pro Frege: meaning theory must determine compositional mechanisms, but this does not lead to the fact that the meaning theory must be truth-theoretical (must determine truth conditions). >Meaning theory, >Truth-conditional semantics. I 208 SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: E.g. "and": the everyday linguistic meaning is not captured by the truth value table. >Truth table. Compositional semantics would require that there is a non-logical axiom for each non-logical expression. - This is not possible. Propositions by E. Harveys spoken language receive their representational character via the connection with mental representation. >Mental representation. Therefore Mentalese does not need compositional semantics. >Mentalese, >Language of thought. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Concepts | Carnap | VI 5 Concept/Object/Carnap. also properties, relations etc. are all objects - to each concept belongs an object - but it dos not "fall under" it - term u object are the same functionalization of the term., >Object, >Objects(material things). VI 242 Concept/Object/CarnapVsFrege: the border between concept and object is sometimes fluent. - Question: if something is a real object or rather a conceptual summary (e.g. furniture, coal inventory in Central Europe). - Relation: it is controversial whether e.g. distance is something real. >Semantic ascent, >Ontology. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Concepts | Geach | I 26ff Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept. I 220 Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). >Description level, >Level/Order, >Senseless, >Object. >Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...". What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human being is timeless". I 226 Concept/Frege/Geach: Frege has a purely extensional view - therefore he deals not with the "sense of the name", but the reference of the predicate. ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.) >Extension. But: Extension/Frege/Geach: = object Concept/Frege: not an object! Reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated. >Saturated/unsaturated/Frege. "Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name. >Name/Frege. I 228f Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise" ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise". Sentence/Geach: sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity". - Sentences about concepts need a quantifier. >Quantifier, >Quantification, >Sentence/Geach. I 230 Concept/Geach: a concept cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. >Predicate/Geach, >Predicate/Frege. VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x". >Names/Geach. Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'." I 234 Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction between concept and object is unnecessary! >Concept/Quine, >Object/Quine. GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it. >Element relation/Quine, >Class/Quine. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Content | Brandom | I 139ff Content/Brandom: any content is derived from the content of possible judgments. >Judgments. I 145 Semantic content: role in the determination of accuracies practice - basis: inferential relations - those who have content are subject to standards - Frege: Concepts from judgments. I 150f Content/Brandom: must not presume concepts and semantic content - there is a reaction without content: E.g. iron rusts in wet conditions - solution: inferential role - e.g. measurements: an instrument has no concepts. >Semantic content, >Conceptual content, >Inferential role. I 316 Circumstances/Content/Brandom: what the interpreter considers to be the circumstances is an essential feature of the empirical content. I 479 Content/Brandom: must specify the circumstances in the context under which a person is entitled to a definition - content by accuracy of inferences: three problems: 1) functional links do not only exist intra-linguistically, but also with the world - 2) Sentences often have significant portions expressing no parts which do not expres propositions - 3) Representational vocabulary is also used in analysis (> reference/Brandom). I 530 Content/Brandom: of an expression is determined by the set of SMSICs that regulate the substitution inferences (richness) - new vocabulary must be joined with the old vocabulary by SMSICs. >SMSICs. I 566 Content/Brandom (of sentences): the explicit expression of the relations between sentences, which are partly constitutive for sentences to be full of content, can be considered the content of sentences - the contents that are transmitted to the sentences through practices of community, are systematically intertwined with each other in a way that they can be considered to be products of those contents which are connected to the subsentential expressions. >Subsententials. I 658 Content/Brandom: assertions are expressed, therefore sentences are full of propositional content - subsentential expressions are indirectly full of inferential content thanks to their significance through substitution - unrepeatable Tokenings are embedded in substitutional inferences and thus indirectly inferentially contentful thanks to their connection to other Tokenings in a recurrent structure (inheritance). I 664 Content: there must be at least one context in which the addition of an assertion has nontrivial consequences. --- II 13 Content/Brandom: is explained by the act and not vice versa. >Actions. II 35 Content/Brandom: non-inferential circumstances: (perception circumstances) are a crucial element of the content of a concept such as red - further content approves the inference from the circumstances to the consequences of using it appropriately, regardless of whether those circumstances are themselves specified in narrowly defined inferential concepts. --- I 698 Content/Action/Brandom: states and actions, as premises and conclusions, obtain content by being embedded in consequences and inferences (instead of representation). I 662 Definition content/equality/Frege : "Two judgements have the same content if and only if the conclusions that can be drawn from one in connection with various others, always also follow from the other in connection with the same other judgements". BrandomVsFrege: this is a universal quantification via auxiliary hypotheses - such a requirement would erase the differences, because such a quantity could always be found: according to Frege, any two judgements have the same consequences if they are connected with a contradiction. >Implication paradox. I 731 Narrow/Content/BrandomVs: (depends only on the individual): coherent history barely possible which only considers one individual - furthermore, the stories of similar individuals should be the same - but different context always possible. >wide/narrow content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Content | Field | I 253 Modality/Possibility//Physics/Field: a prefixed modal operator would change the content of a physical law. - ((s) This goes beyond the purely logical case p > Mp). >Modal operator. I 254 Content/Field/(s): content is not preserved, although arbitrary conflicting conclusions may be believed as well. - Requirement: separation into two components, one of which remains fixed. - E.g. physics/mathematics. >Method, cf. >Invariants, >Covariance. II 107 Belief state/Contents/Deflationism/Truth Conditions/Field: if belief can be described as the state of acceptance of the sentence "snow is white", it can be described: a) as belief state that snow is white and b) as a state with the truth conditions that snow is white. >Truth conditions. N.B.: the connection of that-sentences with truth conditions is loosened. - (VsFrege, VsRussell). >That-clauses. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Context/Context Dependence | Hintikka | II 108 Context Dependency/context/compositionality/Frege principle/Hintikka: problem: context dependency violates the Frege principle. ((s) The meaning of a sentence can change then, although no component changes.) >Frege principle. Any/every/he/a/Hintikka: bad solution: it is not a good solution to analyze (16) (16) (Ex) George knows, that (w = x) as (20) John does not believe Mary likes him. Problem: (16) says that it is compatible with John's beliefs that Mary does not love one while (20) is compatible with the fact that John does not believe Mary likes him (John). This is then compatible with the fallacy of (17). (17) ~John believes, that (Ex)(x is a boy & Mary likes x) II 109 Any/context dependency/context/Hintikka: what we need is an explanation of how the interpretation of "any x" depends on the context. II 109 Frege principle/compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside to the inside, we can allow that the Frege principle is violated (i.e. the semantic role of the constituents in the interior is context-dependent). II 110 HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: thesis: meanings (meaning entities) should not be produced step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be used as rules of semantic analysis. >Syntax, >Semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Copula | Geach | I 221 Copula/Geach: if you understand concept and object correctly, you do not need the copula. >Concept/Geach, >Concept/Frege, >Object, >Object/Frege. Instead, you can use "falls under". - (In ancient times it was also handled like this). >Ancient philosophy. "is": ((s) "is a" suggests false identity (at most partial identity, i.e. classification). >"Is", >Identity, >Identification, >Classification. Frege late: VsFrege early: nor "falls under". "is a"/Frege: does not mean "belongs to a class"! "Is a..."/Geach: is no logical relation between an x and an object (class) called "human." >Prediation/Geach, >Predication, >Attribution. Complex Expression/Geach: "A person is wise" is a complex expression that needs to be split (analyzed): into "person" and ".... is wise". Accordingly, Frege's remark "the concept of man" (which is not supposed to be a concept) is to be divided: E.g., "The concept of man is realized" does not assert of a particular object that it is realized. To say that a certain object, e.g. Caesar, is realized does not lead to falsity (as Frege believed) but is nonsense. (GeachVsFrege). >Senseless, >Truth value gap. The sentence splits into "Man" and "The concept ... is realized". The latter is a paraphrase of "something is a...". Sentences that cannot be analyzed in this innocent way must be considered meaningless. >Sentences/Geach, cf. >Saturated/unsaturated/Frege. E.g., "The concept of man is timeless". |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Correctness | Millikan | I 308 Truth/correctness/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine, a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how is learning, speaking in unison, supposed to facilitate the prediction? >Learning, >Prediction, >Judgment, >Stimulus. Consensus/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both do not take into account what consistency in judgments actually is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, it does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: Consensus means saying the same about the same. Discrepancy: can only occur if sentences have a subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine even goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" As a sentence. He claims the difference between the word and the sentence affects only the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proved by the absence of evidence, but by positive facts (see above). >Sentence, >Negation, >Fact. Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree with a sentence and its negation at the same time, lies in nature (natural necessity). >Contradiction. I 309 Thesis: the lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. Consensus/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they ignore the importance of consistency in the judgment. Consensus: this is not about the fact that two people come together, but that they come together with the world. Consensus/discrepancy/Millikan: are not two equivalent possibilities ((s) >inegalitarian theories/Nozick). There are much more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if a whole pattern (system) of matching judgments appears, mapping the same area (e.g. color), the probability that each participant maps an area outside in the world is vast. E.g. just because my judgments about the timing almost always coincide with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to sort my memories correctly into the time sequence. Objectivity/Time/Perspective/Media/Communication/Millikan: Thesis: the medium that other people form with their utterances is for me the most accessible perspective I can have in terms of time. >Objectivity. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Description Theory | Dummett | III (b) 68 Def " Theory of descriptions"/Kripke: According to Kripke the wrong theory that every name has the same meaning as a particular description. Dummett: In fact, Frege's view that it is essential that a name can have the same meaning as a particular description. >Recognition. III (c) 135 Attribution/Frege: Attribution of pure object knowledge without further identification of the meaning is incomprehensible. An object must somehow be given. There can be no "mere knowledge of reference". Description theory/Kripke/RussellVsFrege/Dummett: This theory is tendentiously attributed to Frege. ((s) Ultimately the view that names are "hidden descriptions", but this is not explicitely claimed by Frege). Frege is concerned with the fact that reference without meaning (meaning) is not possible. III (c) 151 Description Theory/Names/Dummett: The theory derives its considerable plausibility from the fact that someone who does not know a proper name can be made familiar with it by a verbal explanation. Modified version of the theory of descriptions: two characteristics: 1st: There is usually more than one legitimate introduction of a proper noun. The ways of givenness together offer more than is necessary for introduction. 2nd: Several solutions are available in advance for each conflict. This can be expressed in such a way that a weighted majority of sentences containing the name must prove to be true. >Way of givenness. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Descriptions | Russell | Cresswell I 117 Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental objects. Geach I 61 Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer. Newen I 90 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) - 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scott (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity. Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided. I 92 N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world. >Fregean sense, >Truth value gap. Russell I VIII E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott. I 46 Descriptions/Russell: are always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features. >Function/Russell. I 96 Description/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot define (ix)(jx) only its use - (> ?concept=Definitions">definition, definability). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flor III 122 Descriptions/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.) >Incomplete symbol, >Names. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Descriptions | Tugendhat | I 348 Descriptions/Frege (also Husserl): descriptions more fundamental than names - for finding the reference of names. MillVsFrege: Names more fundamental. >Names/Mill. VsMill: mysterious: "enclosed to the object itself". Solution/Mill: not to the object but to the idea of object. >Imagination. I 378 Frege: names are abbreviations for descriptions. >Abbreviated descriptions. I 396 Description/properties/Identification/Tugendhat: doubtful whether descriptions can really pick out an object. "Original" property: E.g. "the highest mountain", "the second highest mountain," and so on. Problem: there can also be two mountains of the same height, at one point there can be multiple or none so-and-so. Tugendhat: there must be added something else, ostension, name or location. E.g. someone who is lead in front of the highest mountain, does not need to know that it is the highest. - ((s) "This mountain" is not a property.) >Knowledge, >Identification, >haecceitism, cf. >Two lost wanderers. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Designation | Quine | II 61 Naming: is a name or singular term. Designate: a predicate designates. Naming and designating are referring. They do not express meaning. VIII 27 Syncategorematic expressions such as "on" do not designate anything. Likewise, we can assume that words such as "unicorn" do not designate anything; neither something abstract nor something concrete. The same applies to "-ness" or punctuation marks. The mere ability to appear in a sentence does not make a string a name. Nominalism: interprets all words as syncategorematic! Ad XI 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: sentences do not designate! Therefore no names can be formed by them (by quotation marks). XI 173 Substitutional Quantification/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: Substitutional Quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: this is precisely what we use to disguise ontology by not getting out of the language. XI 132 Sense/designate/singular term/Quine/Lauener: it does not need a name to make sense. Example: unicorn. There is a difference between sense,meaning and reference. XII 73 Distinguishability/real numbers/Quine: N.B.: any two real numbers are always distinguishable, even if not every real number can be named! ((s) Not enough names). Because it is always x < y or y < x but never x < x. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Equations | Wittgenstein | II 97 A priori/Wittgenstein: expressions that look a priori must be explained. Just as the same expression can be theorem or hypothesis, the same expression can also be equation or hypothesis. We have to distinguish. >a priori,>Identity, >Explanation. An equation is necessary. It is a rule of grammar and therefore arbitrary (sic). Error: since it is true that mathematics is a priori, it was believed that there must also be metaphysics a priori. Equation/Hypothesis/Wittgenstein: 2 + 2 = 4 is a hypothesis in physical space and requires verification. It cannot happen in the field of vision. Four drops of rainwater in two groups of two can only be seen as four drops, while in the physical world they can converge to form one large drop. II 354 WittgensteinVsRussell: but how do we know that they are assigned to each other? One cannot know this and therefore one cannot know whether they are assigned the same number, unless one carries out the assignment, that is, you write them down. II 354 Moreover, Russell's equal signs can be eliminated, and in this case the equations cannot be written down at all. >Equal sign. Difference: Measuring: e.g. numerical equality of classes or Calculating: e.g. equal number of roots of a 4th degree equation: one is a measurement, the other a calculation. Is there an experiment to determine if two classes have the same number? This may or may not be the case for classes that cannot be overlooked. II 355 It is a damaging prejudice to believe that when using strokes we are dealing with an experiment. II 409 Def Fundamental Theorem of Algebra/Wittgenstein: according to which each equation has a solution is completely different from the theorem of multiplication: 26x13=419. It seems to be an isolated theorem which has no similarity to the latter. When we ask whether every algebraic equation has a root, the question has hardly any content. II 424 If we keep doing the math, it is a matter of physics. The mathematical question refers to the whole equation, not to one side! Identity/Meaning/Sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 The essence of the equation is not that the sides have different meanings but the same meaning. >Intensions, >Meaning. The actual essence is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions that the equal sign connects have the same meaning, as this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. VI 118 Equation/Math/Wittgenstein/Schulte: equations are pseudo-propositions. They do not express thoughts but indicate a point of view - from which you look at the terms in the equation. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Existential Generalization | Hintikka | II 42 Existential Generalization/EG/HintikkaVsParsons, Terence: Parsons' criterion of the existential generalization is wrong, because it can fail for reasons that have nothing to do with non-existence. Cf. >Non-existence. E.g. (1) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll. From this one cannot infer, even though Caroll existed, and this was known by the Queen that (2) (Ex) Queen Victoria knew that Lewis Carroll is x. And therefore: (3) Someone is so that Queen Victoria knew that he was Lewis Carroll. (2) and (3) says the same as: (4) Queen Victoria knew who Lewis Carroll is. But this is not entailed by (1). Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the equivalence of (2) - (3) with (4) is, however, quite independent of whether the quantifiers go only about existent or non-existent objects. The reason for the failure of the existential generalization is not a failure of the unambiguousness. Unambiguity, however, fails because in various situations, which are compatible with the knowledge of the queen, the name Lewis Carroll can be applied to different people. Therefore, not only a single specific object can function as the value of "x". Therefore, the existential generalization does not apply in (1) and yet it can be understood that it obliges the one who utters it to the existence of Lewis Carroll. Therefore, Parsons' criterion fails. II 54 Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: the existential generalization entitles us to move from one sentence S (b) to a singular term "b" to the existence statement (Ex) S (x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts. Transition from "any" to "some". (Existential Generalization) E.g. epistemic context: (10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w) (11) (tentatively concluding) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x) II 55 Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails because (11) has the strength of (12). (12) George IV knew who w is. >Predication, >Identification/Hintikka, >Identity/Frege, >Identity/Hintikka. Existential Generalization/failures/solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that we are dealing with ideas of speakers in intensional (opaque) contexts. >Opacity. HintikkaVsFrege: problem: then (11) would in any case follow from (10) ((s) and that is just not desired). For one would have to assume that there is in any case any meaning under which George IV imagines an individual w. Problem: "w" picks out different individuals in different worlds. II 56 Semantics of Possible Worlds/solution/Hintikka: e.g. suppose (13) George knows that S (w) to (14) (Ex) George knows that S (x) Whereby S (w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts. Then we need an additional condition (15) (Ex) in all relevant worlds (w = x) But this is not a well-formed expression in our notation. We must say what the relevant worlds are. Def relevant world/Hintikka: all worlds which are compatible with the knowledge of George are relevant. Thus, (15) is the same with (16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x). This is the additional premise. That is, George knows who is w (knowing-that, knwing-who, knowing-what). >Knowledge, >Knowledge how. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Externalism | Davidson | Glüer II 185 Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: Externalism is about correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory. Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: Externalism is about complete sentences and interpretation. Reference of single words/Davidson: is a theoretical construct - ((s) derived from whole sentences). I (a) 8 Def Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content. DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief. Externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro). I (d) 72 Externalism/Davidson: pro this variant: Externalism stems from twin earth examples, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore it is no threat of the first person authority. Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts. I (d) 74 Externalism/Burge: two forms: a) social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual. Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content. DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error. Frank I 626ff Externalism/Davidson: It does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 663 Externalism/first person/authority: If thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then: VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended. VsDescartes: inner states are not certain. Burge: False use of terms: There is the possibility to not know one's own thoughts. DavidsonVsBurge: Beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: Intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning. I 663-667 Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": is only observing internal states. Burge: External factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments". - E.g., wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself e.g. "I have arthrite in the bones".) >Arthrite/shmarthrite. DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person him- or herself. I 676 Mind/tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: If there were a stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave its way out? - Anyway, the "objects" do not interest him, but their cousins, the propositions. But the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Features | Gärdenfors | I 47 Feature/Feature Analysis/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: in the tradition of Fregean logic and Tarski's theory of truth, a different approach has emerged than the one I have pursued: the assumption that a set of features of a concept is necessary and sufficient to determine meaning. --- I 48 For this purpose see Jackendoff, 1983, p. 112(1); Goddard and Wierzbicka, 1994.(2) In particular Katz and Fodor (1963) (3), R. Lakoff (1971)(4), Schank, (1975) (5), Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976)(6). Group: GärdenforsVsFeature Analysis. Concept features/GärdenforsVsKatz/GärdenforsVsLakoff, R./GärdenforsVsFodor/GärdenforsVsFrege: Experimental results speak rahter for dimensional representations that are based on similarities than on representations of features. (See Rosch, 1978, Prototype theory).(7) Prototype theory/Rosch: thesis: objects are more or less typical examples of a category and there is a graduated containment in categories. 1. Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Goddard, C., & Wierzbicka, A. (1994). Semantic and lexical universals: Theory and empirical findings. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 3. Fodor, J. A., & Katz, J. J. (1963). The structure of a semantic theory. Language, 39, 170–210. 4. Lakoff, R. (1971). IFs, ANDs, and BUTs: about conjunction. In C. Fillmore & D. T. Langendoen (Eds.), Studies in linguistic semantics (pp. 114–149). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 5. Schank, R. C. (1975). Conceptual information processing. New York: Elsevier Science. 6. Miller, G. A., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1976). Language and perception. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 7. Rosch, E. (1978). Prototype classification and logical classification: The two systems. In E. Scholnik (Ed.), New trends in cognitive representation: Challenges to Piaget’s theory (pp. 73–86). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Formalism | d’Abro | A. d'Abro Die Kontroversen über das Wesen der Mathematik 1939 in Kursbuch 8 Mathematik 1967 33 Formalism: the formalist sees arithmetic and logic as complementary. A certain agreement between the two doctrines results from the impossibility of defining the number and, in particular, the whole number (VsFrege). The formalists, however, assert an indirect possibility on the basis of axioms. >Formalism/Frege, cf. >Formalism/Heyting. 50 Intuitionism/formalism/d'Abro: The intuitionist is a rigorist, insofar as he considers definitions and proofs accepted by the formalist to be inadequate. It should be admitted that they are not given by logic, but by intuition. E.g. Zermelo's (formalist) proof that the continuum is an ordered set. I.e., the points can be placed one after the other, with a successor for each point. >Intuitionism. PoincaréVsZermelo: he invented a typical argument: the pragmatist rejected Zermelo's proof because it would take too much time to carry it out, and the number of operations to be performed would be even greater than Aleph0, not to be expressed with a finite number of words. The pragmatist will conclude that the theorem is pointless. Camps: Formalists: Cantor, Hilbert, Zermelo, Russell - Intuitionists: Poincaré, Weyl >G. Cantor, >D. Hilbert, >E. Zermelo, >B. Russell, >H. Poincaré. 53 According to Weyl, the concept of the irrational number must either be abandoned, or thoroughly modified. >Irrational numbers. Brouwer: when dealing with infinite quantities, the law of the excluded middle does not apply. >Excluded MIddle. The intuitionists assert with Poincaré that antinomies without any infinity are lopish. Poincaré: The antinomies of certain logicians are simply circular. >Paradoxes, >Circularity. 54 Formalism/d'Abro: E.g. d'Abro sees no obstacle to define x in the following way: (a) x has this and this relation to all members of type G. 55 (b) x is a term of G. For an intuitionist, according to Poincaré, such a definition is circular. For example, controversy about definitions that cannot be expressed in a finite number of words. It is refused by the intuitionists. >Definitions, >Definability. 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8... This series, according to the intuitionists, is capable of being expressed in a finite number of words, since a rule can be formulated. It should be noted that the difference is theoretical and not practically important, a proof that e.g. could be formulated in a trillion words would be acceptable. |
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| Formalism | Thiel | I 20 Formalism/Thiel: Carries out, so to speak, the "linguistic turn" in mathematics. It is now asked what the object of the mathematician's work is. Rules for actions. Symbols are replaced by others. The formalist does not ask for the "meaning". Mathematics: Theory of formalisms or formal systems. >Formalism. In addition to this "calculus-theoretical variant" of formalism, there is the "structure-theoretical variant". (>Hilbert). Different formal systems can be interpreted as valid from exactly the same mathematical object domains. We can call this their "description" by the formal systems. >Mathematical entities. I 279 Formalism/Geometry/Hilbert/Thiel: In 1899 Hilbert had used terms such as point, straight line, plane, "between", etc. in his foundations of geometry, but had understood their meaning in a previously unfamiliar way. It should not only enable the derivation of the usual sentences, but in its entirety should also determine the meaning of the terms used in them. I 280 Later this was called "definition by postulates", "implicit definition". >Definitions, >Definability, The terms point, straight line, etc. should at most be a convenient aid for mathematical understanding. FregeVsHilbert: clarifies in his correspondence that his axioms are not statements but forms of statements. >Statement form. He contested the fact that their combination gave meaning to the terms appearing in them. Rather a (in Frege's terminology) "second level term" is defined, today one would also say a "structure". HilbertVsFrege: N.B.: Hilbert's approach is precisely that the meaning of "point", "straight line" etc. is left open. Frege and Hilbert could have agreed on it, but did not. Axioms/Frege/Thiel: an axiom should be a simple statement at the beginning of a system. Axioms/Hilbert: forms of statement that together define a discipline. This has developed into the "sloppy" way of speaking, e.g. "straight line" in sphere geometry is a great circle. Thiel I 342 Intuitionism and formalism are often presented as alternatives to logicism. The three differ so strongly that a comparison is even difficult. I 343 Formalism/Thiel: 1. "older" formalism: second half 19th century creators Hankel, Heine, Thomae, Stolz. "formal arithmetic," "formal algebra". "The subject of arithmetic are the signs on the paper itself, so that the existence of these numbers is not in question" (naively). Def "principle of permanence": it had become customary to introduce new signs for additional numbers and then to postulate that the rules valid for the numbers of the initial range should also be valid for the extended range. Vs: this should be considered illegitimate as long as the consistency is not shown. Otherwise a new figure could be introduced, and one could simply postulate e.g. § + 1 = 2 and § + 2 = 1. This contradiction would show that the "new numbers" do not really exist. This explains Heine's formulation that the "existence is not at all in question". I 343/'344 Thomae treated the problem as "rules of the game" in a more differentiated way. FregeVsThomae: he did not even specify the basic rules of his game, namely the correspondences to the rules, figures, and positions. This criticism of Frege was already a forerunner of Hilbert's theory of proof, in which mere series of signs are also considered with disregard for their possible content on their creation and transformation according to given rules. I 345 HilbertVsVs: Critics of Hilbert often overlook the fact that, at least for Hilbert himself, the "finite core" should remain interpreted in terms of content and only the "ideal" parts that cannot be interpreted in a finite way have no content that can be directly displayed. This note is methodical, not philosophical. For Hilbert's program, "formalism" is also the most frequently used term. Beyond that, the concept of formalism has a third sense: namely, the concept of mathematics and logic as a system of schemes of action for dealing with figures free of any content. HilbertVsFrege and Dedekind: the objects of number theory are the signs themselves. Motto: "In the beginning was the sign." I 346 The term formalism did not originate from Hilbert or his school. Brouwer had stylized the contrasts between his intuitionism and the formalism of the Hilbert School into a fundamental decision. Brouwer: his revision of the classical set and function concept brings another "Species of Mathematics". Instead of the function as assignment of function values to arguments of the function, sequences of election actions of a fictitious "ideal mathematician" who chooses a natural number at every point of the infinitely conceived process take place, whereby this number may be limited by the most different determinations for the election action, although in the individual case the election action is not predictable. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Formalism | Wittgenstein | VI 119 Formalism/Substitute/Sign/Symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege: Frege: characters are either mere blackening or signs of something - then what they represent, is their meaning - Wittgenstein: false alternative - E.g. chess pieces: represent nothing. Solution: use like in the game instead of representation of something. - ((s) Use is more than mere blackening of the paper and less than representation of an object). Wittgenstein: formalism is not entirely unjustified. >Blackening of the paper, >Mathematics, >Representation, >Rules; cf. >FregeVsHilbert. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Formalization | Wolfram | Brockman I 275 Formalization/language/Wolfram: In the late 1600s, Gottfried Leibniz, John Wilkins, and others were concerned with what they called philosophical languages—that is, complete, universal, symbolic representations of things in the world. >G. W. Leibniz, >Formal language, >Ideal language, cf. >Formal speech, >Understanding, >Logical Formulas, >Formulas. It’s interesting to see how a philosophical language of today would differ from a philosophical language of the mid-1600s. It’s a measure of our progress. In mathematics, for example: Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica in 1910 was the biggest show off effort. There were previous attempts by Gottlob Frege and Giuseppe Peano that were a little more modest in their presentation. >G. Frege, >B. Russell. WolframVsRussell/WolframVsFrege/WolframVsPeano/WolframVsLeibniz: Ultimately, they were wrong in what they thought they should formalize: They thought they should formalize some process of mathematical proof, which turns out not to be what most people care about. >Proofs, >Provability, >Systems, >Computer languages, >Computer programming. Wolfram, Stephen (2015) „Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Civilization” (edited live interview), in: Brockman, John (ed.) 2019. Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI. New York: Penguin Press. |
Brockman I John Brockman Possible Minds: Twenty-Five Ways of Looking at AI New York 2019 |
| Identity | Frege | Frege II 65 Identity/Frege: e.g. a = b: the meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". >judgment, >epistemological value, >non-trivial identity. Dummett III 70f Identity/VsFrege/Dummett: (informative/uninformative) example a = b: some: in order to understand this, you need to know: if it is true - that it is true. Important argument: then it does not provide information. FregeVs: there is no need to know if two expressions designate the same object if you understand the expressions. ((s) You can also know the "general" reference.) - ((s) The intentions may just be different.) >Way of givenness, >Intension. Frege II 40 Identity/statement/assertion of identity/identity statement/Frege: E.g. a = b: does not say anything about signs, but about objects. Otherwise, no insight would be expressed by this, because signs are arbitrary anyway. So it is not about "a" and "b" meaning the same thing. That would be a statement about signs. ((s) Instead: that they are different modes of givenness of the same object (the manner of givenness/(s): is not the sign). II 65 Identity/Frege: a = b: the meaning of "a" is the same as that of "b". But the sense of "b" is different from that of "a". Identity/Frege: identity has the same meaning but a different sense. Notion: therefore, the thought expressed by "a = a" is different from that expressed by "a = b". >Thoughts, >Equal sign, >Copula. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Identity | Geach | I 218 Identity/GeachVsFrege: identity is not a relation - "Is an A" does not mean "has identity with A" - (whereby "A" is a name). VsFrege: (in Frege, basic principles of artihmetics) instead of "There are just as many Fs as Gs": "Either any given object F iff it is a G, or there is a relation that is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs". But this must not be an identity. I 226 Identity/Geach: only objects can be strictly identical. - In terms, there is only analogous identity: if they are coextensive. >Coextensive. I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: Identity is relative. - If someone says "x is identical to y", this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same as y". - (Weird, that Frege did not represent this). >Identity/Quine. Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single schema. (1) l- Fa (x)(Fx u x = a) - everyday-language: whatever is true of something which is identical with an object y is true of a and vice versa. From this we derive the law of self-identity: "l-a = a". Because we take "Fx" for "x unequal a", then schema (1) gives us: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx(y unequal a u x = a) - this,of course, gives "l-a = a" I 240 Identity/Geach: if we demand strict identity, regardless of the theory in which we move, we get into the semantic paradoxes such as Grelling's or Richard's >Grelling's paradox. Solution: relative identity on theory or language, indissibility/"indiscernibility"/Quine -> Partial identity. 1. Frege, G. (1893). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle. --- Tugendhat I 37 Identity/Dummett/Geach: "=" can only be used with reference to objects. >Equal sign. Habermas IV 158 Identity/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects.(1) (See also Criteria/Henrich, HenrichVsGeach). E.g. Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. Also see >Identity/Henrich. 1.P.Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973 |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Identity | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 22 Definition sense of the sentence/Tractatus: (4.2:) it is agreement and disagreement with the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of facts. >Facts, >States of affairs. Hintikka: it follows that the identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be said linguistically. (6.2322) I 140 Note Hintikka: ... for Wittgenstein this is about the dispensability of the identity concept. He could also have said that this term already exists in the other elementary propositions. --- Wittgenstein I 364 Experience/perception/identity/Wittgenstein: the comparison between experiences in terms of their identity does not belong to the primary but to the secondary language games. >Language games. In a certain secondary language game, the relationship can partially be influenced by the possible documentary evidence. >Evidence. --- Wittgenstein II 338 Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. We have to differentiate this use of the equal sign from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. >Rules. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. One can remove the identity sign. --- II 338/339 Identity/logical form/sentence/Wittgenstein: in my writing neither (Ex, y) x = y, nor (Ex) x = x is a set. If there is a thing, then why to express this by a statement about a thing? What tempts us to believe it is a fundamental truth that a thing is identical with itself? Thus, I did not yet met the sentence of identity. II 416 WittgensteinVsRussell: he was just trying to get next to the list another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. II 418 Identity/substitution/equal sign/Wittgenstein: E.g. "a = a": here the equal sign has a special meaning - because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. - Equal sign: its use is limited to cases in which a bound variable exists. --- IV 103 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essence of the equation is not that the sides have different sense but the same meaning. - But that this can be already seen at the two sides. >Equations. --- VI 179 Identity/Wittgenstein/Schulte: in overlapping silhouettes the question is meaningless, which is A or B after the separation. VI 183 Pain/identity/criteria/Wittgenstein/Schulte: which criterion for identity? Well, simply, the one who is sitting there, or any description. >Criteria. But for my pain? There is no criterion! >Pain. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Idiolect | Cresswell | II 151 Def "extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell (he ascribes this setting to both of them): thesis that names in general belong to idiolects. >Names. Problem: then the Pierre-Example is not about Pierre, but about the reporter of the case, and his idiolect! >Pierre example. ((s) Pierre example: Pierre thinks Londres is beautiful, but has heard London is ugly.) |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Imagination | Avramides | I 141 WittgensteinVsFrege: Wittgenstein goes even further than Frege and does not allow private imaginations. - There is nothing undetectable beyond communication. >Imagination/Wittgenstein, >Private language/Wittgenstein, >Beetle-example/Wittgenstein. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Imagination | Dummett | I 117 DummettVsSaussure: This representation of the communication process is obviously untenable. It imitates the equation of idea and concept by the British empiricists. (Vs) Concepts are represented as mental images (ideas). I 117ff DummettVsFrege: (consciousness subjective - thoughts objective): Dummett: categorial difference: mental images (ideas)/thoughts. I 127 DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated because they are used only in a certain way - by this determination they can be communicated. >Thoughts/Frege. >Objectivity. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Indeterminacy | Buridan | Geach I 149 Indeterminacy/reference/Frege: "to refer to something indeterminate" is often rather: to refer indefinitely to something definite. Geach: in (4), (7), or (9) it is not a definite reference and also not an indication. (?). In Buridan the "appellatio" is highly obscure to a "ratio", but that is Frege's "odd meaning" too! (GeachVsFrege). Suppositio confusa/Buridan: respectively the first sentences of the following pairs Suppositio determinata: respectively the second: (10) To see, I need an eye (11) There is an eye that I need to see with it (12) There was always a living man (13) There is a man who has always been alive --- Geach I 150 This can easily be clarified in modern logic with quantifiers. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Index Words | Perry | Frank I 22 PerryVsFrege: "today" is not a completing or "saturating" sense, absolutely no sense, but a reference object - meaning remains, reference varies. >Indexicality, >Meaning, >Reference, >Sense, >Contextuality. Frank I 393f Index words/Perry: without pointing component. Demonstratives: with pointing component. >Demonstratives. Meaning of index-words: their role - similar to the method for the determination of the object. >Roles, >Verification, >Identification, >Individuation. I 394f Today/Meaning: constant, truth value with index word "today it's nice" is not constant, so the meaning is changing - if understanding is knowing the truth value. >Truth value, >Understanding, cf. >Truth conditions, >Understanding/Dummett. Perry: the role (determination process) changes, the meaning is constant. - Then the meaning cannot be a part of the thought. >Meaning, >Thoughts. What the speaker believes is irrelevant to the meaning of the index word. >Beliefs, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 419 Index words/Perry: true-false exam does not help. - E.g. Two lost wanderers: that the Mt. Tallac is higher than Jack's Peak, is affirmed by all. ((s) This presupposes that the two do not stand side by side in sight.) Perry:There is no mountain, everyone believes it is Mt. Tallac, no customer from which all believe that he has made the mess (sugar trail). No Professor, who does not feel guilty (because he does not know what time it is). What people have in common here is not what they believe. >Wanderers example, >Sugar trail example. I 394 ff Sense/Perry: is oft of understood as a term. - Then question: is the meaning of index words to be equated with an individual-concept or a general term? >Singular terms, >General terms. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Index Words | Searle | II 285 Index words/I/Frege: "I" calls for a public and a private sense, e.g. tomorrow, when we talk of today, we have to say "yesterday". SearleVsFrege: that seems to be indexically de re. SearleVsFrege: Frege did not notice the self-referentiality of these expressions (unlike e.g. >Morning Star/Evening Star), >I, Ego, Self, >Indexicality, >Self-identification, >Self-reference. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Individuation | Gärdenfors | I 177 Individuation/Thoughts/Sentence/GärdenforsVsFrege/Gärdenfors: thoughts cannot be sentences, because sentences cannot be identified language-independent. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Thoughts, >Thinking, >Language dependence. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Infinity | Geach | I 166 Infinite(infinity/GeachVsFrege: mathematical infinity is not, as Frege thought, an infinity of "objective objects", but consists in the infinitely many possibilities of the human language -> Operationalism. Cf. See the discussion >Are there infinitely many possible sentences in a natura language?/Researchgate. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Intensions | Putnam | V 47 Sense/Frege: the sense is an extra-mental entity ("old" intension). The thought content, which is detected is, on the other hand, a new intension. PutnamVsFrege: there are meaning differences that escape the intension, i.e. understanding not only by linking with intension. VsFrege: detecting follows only by representation, not from the 6th sense. Representation is determined by the environment (twin earth). >Twin earth/Putnam. V 48f Bracketing/Husserl: bracketing means the talk about what is going on in someone's head, without a condition relating to actual nature of the objects. Twin earth: e.g. the "belief that a glass of water is in front of him (namely for the believer himself, in full non-bracketed sense). >More authors on twin earth. V 49 "Notional world"/Dennett: the "notional world" is a set of bracketed beliefs of a subject. The reference of course is the actual substance (twin earth). Intension/tradition: the notional world determines the intension. PutnamVs: this is wrong, therefore we have no uniform concept of meaning anymore. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Intensions | Wittgenstein | II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. >Set theory. II 416 Intension/extension/Mathematics/Wittgenstein: in everyday language intension and extension are not interchangeable - E.g. I hate the man in the chair - I hate Mr. Schmitz - on the other hand in mathematics: here, there is no difference between "the roots of the equation x² + 2x + 1 = 0 and "2"- in contrast difference: counting bodies ((s) extension, also writing down) is something different than to determine them with a law ((s) intension) - Wittgenstein: law and extension are completely different - ((s) >Physics). >Equations, >Mathematics. --- III 136-139 Elementary PropositionVsIntension - (protection of formal logic) - intension/meaning/Tractatus/Flor: irrelevant - it is always about extension. >Extension, >Meaning, >Propositions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Introduction | Strawson | I 187 Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing. Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing. >Terms. I 188 VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech. - One can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates is not. >Assertion, >Predicates/Geach, >Predicates/Strawson, >Predication/Geach. I 192 But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating. I 193 Assertive mode primary. I 194 Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode). I 196 StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Unsaturated. I 232ff Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular. >Particulars/Strawson. I 234 Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement. I 235 For universals nothing corresponding. I 236 But no facts about the world but about the language - ((s) no truthmaker.) I 238 When universals are introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed. I 239 Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease". >Description, >Intension. I 239f Universal/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight (2) have no factual weight. I 241 Subject/predicate/thing/particular/universal: 3. Criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) Predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself. I 242 E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact. I 242 General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions. I 254ff Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition. >Quantification. New/Strawson: other sense of introducing: introduction of a practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also E1: introduces particular, E2: classes of particulars. Then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universals) which can be introduced. - Where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal? I 258 Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1. I 263 Both theories are independend, but connectable. I 259 Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur. E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2 Problem: What is at the end of the chain? >Feature-universals. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Is | Cresswell | I 161 "is"/ Frege/Russell: "is" is ambiguous in everyday language-. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983)(1): this is not true. Cresswell: ditto, but the normal semantics is not committed to Frege-Russell anyway. >Everyday language, >Frege/Russell view. 1. Hintikka J., Kulas J. (1983) AnyProblems — No Problems. In: The Game of Language. Synthese Language Library (Texts and Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy), vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9847-2_4 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Knowledge | Field | I 83 Knowledge/Logic/Field: logical knowledge: when logic is confined to the if-then form: then we have no knowledge about what does not follow. >Implication, >Conditional, >Logic. Solution: differentiated deflationism: two parts: (i) Knowledge, which mathematical statement follows from other mathematical statements. (ii) additional knowledge about the consistency of mathematical statements (and other fundamental). ((s) Knowledge about consistency is no conclusion of something). ((s) Consistency/(s): is itself not a conclusion.) Field: E.g. knowledge about all models is not a logical knowledge. Syntactically: E.g. "There is a derivative of B from A": is not a logical knowledge, but knowledge about existence. >Syntax. Deflationism: both is logical knowledge. VsDeflationism: the fundamental is metalogical. >Deflationism. I 88 Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. >Consistency, >Axioms, >Levels (Order). FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. Cf. >Truth/Kripke. Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. >Logical truth. Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical, because we find no contradiction. >Empiricism, >Contradictions, >Description levels, >Induction. I 93 Knowledge/Possibility/Field: there is knowledge of possibility that is not only based on knowledge of necessity. - Only by thinking about the logical form. Problem: E.g.: "There are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 apples": every statement of the same logical form as this is also a logical truth. - (But in terms of content, it is wrong). >Content. Then one no longer had to rely on the actuality. >Actuality, >Actualism, >Possible worlds, >Actual world. Then it would be categorical knowledge. E.g. apples/Field: here we have stronger reason to believe in the possibility than in the actuality. Field: but there are infinitely many physical entities: namely, space-time regions. >Spacetime points, >Infinity. I 94 Logical Knowledge/Frege: Problem, whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. >Platonism. FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another? |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Limits | Carnap | VI 242 Concept/object/CarnapVsFrege: the border between concept and object is sometimes fluent. Question: if something is a real object or rather a conceptual summary (e.g. furniture, coal inventory in Central Europe). Relation: it is controversial whether e.g. distance is something real. >Objects, >Concepts, >Description levels. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Logic | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 138 Frege/logic/Hintikka: his logic is considered as the theory of complex sentences - Wittgenstein in contrast: easiest parts of the world - eliminate logical constants - They do not represent. >Logical constants, >Representation. I 205 Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no other author than Wittgenstein has ever had the thought, in the logic it had ultimately no more explanation than what is given to us in experience through the simple objects - all phenomenology is just logic. - HusserlVs - Husserl: possibilities are motivated by background beliefs. --- II 160 Logic/WittgensteinVsFrege: 1. It is rather arbitrary, what we call a sentence - therefore logic means something else in my opinion than in Frege's. 2. VsFrege: All words are equally important - Frege: thesis: "Word", "sentence", "world" are more important. >Sentences, >Words, >World, >Symbols. II 238 Logic/arbitrary/Wittgenstein: the rules of logic are insofar arbitrary that they can be eliminated for greater expressiveness - E.g. sentence of the excluded third (SaD) is invalid - at least "contradiction" is used in different meanings - as well as double negation -. Some authors: "the application is different." WittgensteinVs: one cannot talk independently of a sign from its use. - ((S) Then it is another sign - against see below. >Signs, >Use. II 328 The sentence of the excluded third is universal. II 327 Logic/Wittgenstein: it is not a science, but a calculus - in it you can make inventions, but no discoveries. II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: one cannot construct a logic for all cases - because one cannot abstract both applications from the application. --- VI 85 Logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Schulte: not we express with the signs what we want - but in the logic the nature of the nature-necessary sign states itself - (6,124). VI 89 Logic/border/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic is not given a limit through the use of the language, of course - it is, so to speak, the common framework of "my" and "your" language. VI 118 Logic/Wittgenstein: say/show: logic says nothing, it shows something about necessity - grammatical sentences (about the language) thus fall out of the language game -> training: no speakable rules but blind following. TrainingVsExplanation, instead: Description - (> tell/show: Explanation/Wittgenstein). --- IV 101 Logic/Tractatus: (6.1264) each sentence of logic is a, in characters expressed, modus ponens - (And this cannot be expressed by one sentence). - (> Show/tell: > Ostension/Wittgenstein). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Logical Knowledge | Field | I 88 Logical knowledge/Field/(s): knowledge about the fact that something is logically true (e.g. that the axioms are consistent), but not the axioms themselves. >Axioms. FieldVsKripke: we then introduce a non-Kripkean concept of logical truth, according to which some non-trivial assertions about possibility are part of the logic. - Then the consistency of axioms becomes a logical truth. >Truth/Kripke. Induction/Field: extra-logical means: empirical - because we find no contradiction. I 94 Logical Knowledge/Frege: Problem: whereby do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of quantum theory are true: by asserting that I know that there are actually entities asserted by the axioms. >Quantum theory. FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, how could one know then that they are in this relationship and not in another? I 113 Pure Logical Knowledge/Field: must be knowledge that makes no existence assumptions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mathematics | Waismann | I 84 Mathematics/Waismann: in our view, mathematics is not tautological, nor is it a mere branch of logic. It rests only on its own determinations. The belief that mathematics is more securely founded by logic is a misunderstanding. 2 + 2 = 4 does not correspond to a tautology, but to an instruction. It is much closer to an empirical proposition than a tautology. It is just a rule, similar to chess, which is obeyed or transgressed. This would not be possible in the case of a tautology, for what is it to obey or transgress a tautology? The opinion that the entire mathematics is based on Peano's 5 axioms can no longer be maintained today. Mathematics is a multiplicity of systems. The theorems of arithmetic are neither true nor false, but are compatible or incompatible with certain determinations. >Theorems, >Proofs, >Provability. Thus a certain dualism is overcome: I 85 It was believed that only the natural numbers were eternal, irrefutable truths, or they expressed them, whereas the rational and real numbers were mere conventions. (Kronecker). WaismannVsKronecker: that is a half measure, and the whole development of arithmetic shows which way we have to go: the possibility of a number series 1,2,3,4,5,... - many have already been mentioned. E.g. if we think that a distance is divided into parts by points, then it makes sense to say that the distance has 2,3,4... parts, but not: "the distance has a part." One would rather like to count here: 0,2,3,4... and this corresponds to the sentence series: "The distance is undivided", "the distance is divided into two parts", ... etc. i.e. we do not count here according to the scheme we use, and yet this is an everyday case. ((s) linguistic overvaluation of "consists of." Solution: 1 = fake part.) But not only the number series, but also the operations we might think of as changed: Suppose, we should carry out additions with many millions of digits. The results of two computers will not match then. Is the concept of probability introduced into arithmetics here? Or a new calculation is introduced. The error of logic was that it thought it had firmly underpinned the arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are, however, flooded by our thinking, but they are not movable." WaismannVsFrege: already the expression "justifying" the arithmetic gives us a false picture,... I 86 ...as if its building was built on ground truths, while it is a calculus, which proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system, which rests on nothing. We can only describe the arithmetic, i.e. specify their rules, but not justify it. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Meaning | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Negation | Austin | I 236 Negation/AustinVsFrege: relates directly to the world and is not limited to statements about the world. >Correspondence theory. Vs: (Frege, Tugendhat I 66): Negation/Frege: negation refers to the propositional content, not to the sentence. >Reference, >Propositional content. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Negation | Frege | Chisholm II 181 ff Negation/Frege/Simons: negative facts pose a problem here. Solution: we simply take two truth values (true/false) and a function that swaps the two. WittgensteinVsFrege: a connection should not be represented as a function. Operator N: forms a conjugate's negation from a sentence: the asserted (the used variables) are false. Notation: x^: all values of x. Negation/Simons: negation only has the smallest range: atomic sentences. Operator N: always negates the disjunction, never the conjunction, because of Wittgenstein’s need for atoms. Ontology: only complexes and the verbs E! and N. Frege IV 61 Negation/denial/judgment/FregeVsKant: Kant speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. That is quite unnecessary. Even a negative judgment is a simple judgment. >Judgment, >Sentence, >Thought. IV 64 Negation/denial/Frege: negation is not equal to the judgments. It is not an "opposite pole" to the judgments. IV 69 Description/subordinate clause/name/Frege: E.g. "The negation of the notion that 3 is greater than 5" - this expression refers to a specific individual thing. This individual thing is a notion. The definite article turns the entire expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name. IV passim Thought/Frege: to every idea belongs its negation as an independent second idea. Thoughts are not made up, but grasped. Their truth is not their being thought. They are timeless, precisely because they must always carry a determination of time with them. Thus, "today" becomes "yesterday" and "I" become "He" (two thoughts). By replacing "horse" with "mare" the thought does not change, only the coloring. Tugendhat II 66f Negation/Frege: negation is not a property and does not always come with the sign of negation. E.g. "Christ is immortal" is not negative per se. The negation sign applies only to the propositional content. Proof: negation in sub clauses: only the whole sentence is asserted. In the clause (non-asserting) the "not" belongs to the propositional content from the outset. Tugendhat II 12 Proposition/Frege/Tugendhat: negation always refers to the propositional content, not to the assertion. >Proposition, >Propositional content. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Nominalism | Searle | V 162 Nominalism/Searle: correct: the existence of particular entities of facts in the world and the existence of universals depend merely on the meaning of words. >Universal, cf. >Sortal. SearleVsNominalismus: it is incomprehensible to deny such trivial truths as that there are properties such as the ones of beeing-red or beeing-centaur. From such assumptions no compulsion to further conclusions result besides that certain predicates are meaningful! NominalismVsFrege: there is no "third realm". >Third realm/Frege. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Now | Perry | Frank I 22 Now/PerryVsFrege: "today" is not a completing or "saturating" sense, absolutely no sense, but a reference object - meaning remains, reference varies. >Indexicality, >Index words, >Meaning, >Reference, >Sense, >Contextuality. Frank I 394f Today/Meaning: is constant; however, the truth value of index word "today it is beautiful": is not constant, so the meaning is changing. - If understanding is knowing the truth value. >Truth value, >Context, >Understanding, >Truth conditions, cf. >Understanding/Dummett. Perry: the role (the determination method) changes, the meaning remains constant. Then, the meaning cannot be a part of the thought. >Meaning, >Thoughts. What the speaker thinks is irrelevant to the meaning of the index word. >Beliefs, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Numbers | Black | II 125 Numerals/numbers/names/Black: numerals are unlike names for physical objects: E.g. "two people came in" here "two", is an adverb. - It can be transformed into "another and another". - That s not possible for "red". >Adverbs, >Proper names. BlackVsFrege: that shows that numbers are no special objects. BlackVsPlatonism. >Platonism. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Numbers | Field | I 153 Numbers/Frege/Crispin Wright: Frege suggests that the fact that our arithmetical language has these qualities is sufficient to establish natural numbers as a sortal concept whose instances, if they have some, are the objects. WrightVsFrege: but the objects do not have to exist. Problem: Frege thus demands that empirical concerns are irrelevant. - Then there is also no possibility of an error. >Numbers/Frege, >Existence/Frege. II 214 Numbers/BenacerrafVsReduction/Benacerraf/Field: there may be several correlations so that one cannot speak of "the" referent of number words. >Paul Benacerraf. Solution/Field: we have to extend "partially denoted" also to sequences of terms. >Denotation, >Partial denotation, >Generalization/Field. Then "straight", "prim", etc. become base-dependent predicates whose basis is the sequence of the numbers. - Then one can get mathematical truth (> truth preservation, truth transfer). - E.g. "The number two is Caesar" is neither true nor false. (without truth value). >Senseless. II 326 Def Natural numbers/Zermelo/Benacerraf/Field: 0 is the empty set and every natural number > 0 is the set that is the only element which includes the set which is n-1. Def Natural numbers/von Neumann/Benacerraf/Field: Every natural number n is the set that has the sets as elements which are the predecessors of n as elements. Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelos or von Neumann's approach "presents" the things "correctly" - there is no fact which decides whether numbers are sets. That is what I call the Definition Structural Insight: it makes no difference what the objects of a mathematical theory are, if they are only in a right relationship with each other. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Numbers | Geach | I, 215ff Numbers/Geach: numbers do not name anything. Not: E.g.: "There are two Daimon and Phobos". How often a concept is realized is not a feature of the term. ((s) GeachVsMeixner). Unity/Multiplicity/Geach: cannot be attributed to an object. >Unity and Multiplicity. Solution/Frege: Numbers are attributed to the terms under which the objects fall. >Numbers/Frege, >Concept/Frege, >Object/Frege. Numbers/Geach: in mathematics sometimes as objects with properties E.g. Divisibility. Geach: then we need an identity criterion. >Identity criterion. Frege: Equality in numbers: "There is a one-to-one correspondence of Fs and Gs". - N.B.: this does not mean that the Fs or the Gs refer to a single object - a class. Solution: Relation instead of class - E.g. Frege: One puts next to each plate a knife: no class but a relation. >Equality, >Classes, >Sets, >Relation. --- I 220 Numbers/Frege: Self-critique: Classes must not be used to explain what numbers are, otherwise contradiction: "one and the same object is both, the class of the M's and the class of the G's, although an object (this object, e.g. number(!)) can be an M without being a G. " - (+) - >Sets/Frege, >Classes/Frege. This shows that the original concept of a class contained contradictions. Numbers can be objects (with properties such as divisibility), classes cannot. - Not contradictory: "one and the same object: the number (not class!) of the F's and the number of K's". I 221f Numbers/GeachVsFrege: Number is not "number of objects". - With this he rejects his own concerns to say that "the object of a number belongs to a class" (wrong). "The number of the A's" is to mean: "the number of the class of all A's" (wrong). Solution/Geach: (as Frege elsewhere): the empty place in "the number of ..." and "how many ...are there?" Can only be filled with a keyword in the plural, not with the name of an object or a list of objects. - A conceptual word instead of a class. I 225 Numbers/Classes/Geach: Numbers are not classes of classes. If we connect a number (falsely) to a class a, we actually combine it with the property expressed by "___ is an element of a". This is not trivial because when we associate a number with a property, the property is usually not expressed in that form. I 225 Numbers/Classes/Geach: false: "The number of F's is 0" - correct: "The class of F's is 0". Class as number are equally specified by the mention of a property. >Mention. I 235 Numbers/Frege/Geach: not classes of classes (Frege does not say this either). - The error stems from the idea that one could start with concrete objects and then group them into groups and supergroups. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Numbers | Wittgenstein | II 32 Number/Wittgenstein: not a concept, but a logical form. II 283 Numbers/cardinal/Wittgenstein: that there are infinitely many cardinals, is a rule that one sets up. II 343 Number/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege: a number is a property of a property. - Problem: E.g. for blue-eyed men in the room. - Then the five would be a property of a property - to be a blue-eyed man in the room - e.g. to express that Hans and Paul are two, they would then have a property in common, which not exactly belongs to the other. - ((s) each would have the property to be different from the other.) - Solution/Frege: the property of being Hans or Paul. II 344 Number/Wittgenstein: are not merely signs. - One can have two items of the form three, but only one number. - ((s) WittgensteinVsFormalism). >Formalism. II 360 Number/Definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: numerical equality is a prerequisite for a clear correspondence. - Therefore, Russell's definition of the number is useless. - ((s) Because it is circular reasoning if you want to define number via illustration). II 361 Definition/Wittgenstein: instead of a definition of "number" we must figure out the rules of usage. >Rules, >Use. II 415 Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is a property that is common to all triads. - ((s) Frege: classes of classes - does Frege not mean objects with classes (instead of properties)?). II 416 Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. - E.g. Extension: it would be a tautology to say, ABC is three. - In contrast, meaingful: to say, in this room are three people. >Functions, >Extensions, >Sets. --- IV 93 Definition number/numbers/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 6,021 - the number is the exponent of an operation. Waismann I 66 Def Natural numbers/Wittgenstein: those to which induction can be applied in proofs. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Object | Wittgenstein | Dummett I 34 Object/Wittgenstein: assumes that we only recognize an object, if we are able to think a thought about this object. Dummett I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. >">Private language. --- Hintikka I 51 Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one of the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus includes the notion that what he calls "objects" does not includes any relations and properties. - Wittgenstein verbally: "to the objects also belong the relations". >Relations. I 55 Indestructibility of objects/Hintikka: - ""Red" cannot be destroyed." I 57 Individuals: Relationships with zero argument places (Tractatus 5.554). >Individuals. I 85 Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation - Everything that is, can only be described by names, another provision is not possible - neither it is nor that it is not - so the language is an interweaving of names. I 99 Object/property/possession/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: E.g. possession is not essential for an object - not even for E.g. my hand - not even for my visual space. It is only subjectively perceived - because the objective space is constructed on its base. - ((s)> extrinsic property). - (PB VII 71, 99f) - so it may be useful to give a hand during repeated use a name. >Names. I 106 Object/acquaintance/Fraud/error/Russell/Moore/Hintikka: thesis: because one can be fooled, the objects of acquaintance are not the same as the physical objects - ("Illusion Argument"). >Acquaintance. I 181 Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: even the simplest objects Wittgenstein's are structured. - ((s) (see above) They have a logical form, formed by their possible occurrences in states of affairs.) >States of affairs. I 223 Object/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (average period): improper items: color spots in the visual field, tones etc. - actual objects: elements of knowledge. >Knowledge. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Objectivity | Frege | I 59 Objectivity/Frege: objectivity is independent of our perception, imagination, etc. but not of our reason. Otherwise it would be like trying to judge without judging. >Judgment, >Reason, >Imagination, >Subjectivity. Graeser I 35f Def Objectivity/reality/Frege/Graeser: ... this fixed is called objective by Frege and distinguishes it from what is real. Truth/GraeserVsFrege: Problem: circularity: Frege now comes in a position to say that the laws of being true are themselves true, and to explain what makes them true. >Reality. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Objects of Belief | Hintikka | II 45 (A) Objects of Knowledge/objects of belief/Frege/Hintikka: Frege was concerned about which objects we must adopt in order to understand the logical behavior of the language when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege's objects of knowledge are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: I am concerned first with the individuals we are talking about in epistemic contexts, and secondly, I am concerned about whether we can call them "objects of knowledge". Semantics of possible worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: we can opppose Frege's approach with the semantics of possible worlds (Hintikka pro semantics of possible worlds). II 46 Idea: the application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the expression is misleading because it is too global. >Possible worlds. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knowing person b is a scenario. We can also call it b's worlds of knowledge. Set of all worlds/Hintikka: the set of all worlds can be called illegitimate. Objects of Knowledge/Hintikka: objects of knowledge can be objects, persons, artefacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for any entities (Frege's thesis). These can be taken as Frege's objects of knowledge. Identity/substitutability/substitutability in identity/terminology/Frege/Hintikka: substitutability in identity is the thesis of the substitutability of the identity ((s) only applies restrictedly in intensional (opaque) contexts). >Opacity. II 47 (...) E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this, one cannot infer that Ramses knew that morning star = evening star (although morning star = evening star). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguishes two types of context: Direct context/Frege/Hintikka: the direct context is extensional and transparent. Indirect context/Frege/Hintikka: the indirect context is intensional and opaque. For example, contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "extensional", "opaque" etc. are not words used by Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his picture: (4) Expression > Meaning > Reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege, the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here the picture is modified: (5) expression (>) meaning (> reference). II 49 (B) Objects of Knowledge/Possible Worlds Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that compels us to consider certain possibilities. This is what we call possible world. New: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) next to the referents, but we consider the same referents in different worlds. Morning Star/evening star/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now take out the same object, namely the planet in the actual world. >Possible worlds, >Possible world semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Ontology | Castaneda | Frank I 459ff Ontology / Guise Theory/ Castaneda with Kant, VsFrege: Vstranscendental objects with infinitely many properties / reference to all objects only from within experience and language - Davidson pro Frege: infinitely many properties - Castaneda: however, Frege s objects are suitable for general reference (derived; primarily for individuals) Frege:the object is transcendent, there is no semantic control. >Experience, >Language, >Language and thought, >World/thought, >Guise theory. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Opacity | Hintikka | II 57 Opacity/Frege/identity/opaque context/Hintikka: Frege was involved in the failure of the (substitutability in identity) ((s) that is, that the individuals may have different names) and not in the failure of the existential generalization. ((s) That is, the individuals may not exist.) >Existential generalization, >Substitution, >Substitutability. Hintikka: therefore we need different additional premises. Semantics of possible worlds: Substitutability in identity: here, for substitutability in identity, we need only the assumption that we can compare the referents of two different terms in every world. Existential generalization: here we must compare the reference of one and the same term in all worlds. Frege/Hintikka: it seems now that Frege could still be defended in a different way: namely, that we now quantify via world lines (as entities). ((s) This would meet Frege's Platonism.) II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: world lines are somehow "real". Are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"? HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world-bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". To use world lines is not to reify. Solution/Hintikka: we need world lines because without them it would not even make sense to ask whether a resident of a possible world is the same as that of another possible world ((s) cross-world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use the world line instead of Frege's "way of giving". HintikkaVsFrege: his mistake was to reify the "way of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, we do not have to ask in this context "about what do we have to quantify"? >Quantification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Particulars | Brandom | II 162 Particulars/Frege: cannot be explained without the notion of singular terms. >Singular terms. II 163 QuineVsFrege: yes they can, because they "intend" to refer. >Reference. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Picture Theory | Millikan | I 102 Mapping Relation/Language/Millikan: we begin by coordinating at least some words with objects. Correspondingly, true sentences correspond with facts in the world. Problem: wrong sentences do not correspond to any fact. Question: How can words which correspond individually to objects very well be composed that at the end the whole sentence does not correspond? E.g. "Theaitetos flies": "Theaitetos" corresponds to "Theaitetos", "flies" corresponds to "fly". Wrong solution: to say that the problem would be in the relation between Theaitetos and the flying. For the relation corresponds already with something, this can be instantiated (e.g. between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiated. Everything corresponds with something - but not the entire sentence "Theaitetos flies". Solution/Frege: he combined singular terms with "values" which were the objects in the world. >World/Thinking/Millikan, >Predication. I 103 Sentence/Frege/Millikan: Frege interpreted it in the same way as names, as complex signs, which at the end described the true or the wrong. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant!") >Sentence/Frege. Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan: (Millikan: better than Frege): Complex aRb, whereby in the case of wrong sentences the correspondence with the world is missing. Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another sense of "corresponds"! That is, words should correspond to things differently than sentences with the world. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Picture Theory | Wittgenstein | Danto I 70/71 Image Theory/Picture Theory/Wittgenstein/Danto: thesis: the world has the same shape as the language. - Without that the world itself would be somehow linguistically in its structure i.e. more of a reflection. --- Hintikka I 67 Picture theory/Image theory/Facts/Object/Early Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when the sentence is a linguistic counterpart of the matter... I 68 ...then that connection is no relation, but the existence of a relation. - ((s) The relation of the state of affairs is the existence of the subject matter. - This is Wittgenstein's position before the Tractatus. - WittgensteinVs: Vs later - Russell: pro. I 127 Image/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Bild/Abbild/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: comes from Frege - is also found in Tarski again. I 131 Hintikka: thesis: the - image - theory? is in reality an anticipation of the first condition Tarski truth theory. I 132 WittgensteinVsTarski: a truth theory is inexpressible. I 132f ARb/Expressions/Representation/Image Theory/Image theory/Complex/Wittgenstein/Hintikka : not a character (E.g. - R) represents something - but the linguistic relationship attached to it - the linguistic relation is not a class of pairs of individuals (Frege value pattern) - but a real relationship - WittgensteinVsFrege - TarskiVsWittgenstein/CarnapVsWittgenstein/(s): extensional semantics. - Item/WittgensteinVsFrege: Elements of possible facts - then the relation that the - - R always corresponds to a special relation. >Correspondence theory. I 134/35 Image theory/Theory of reflection/(Abbild, Widerspiegelung)/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no image relation, but isomorphism - (truth conditions) no theory of language, but the truth. >Truth, >Truth conditions. I 135 Can be described as theory but not expressed. (structural equivalence, isomorphism). I 141 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: only simple sentences are images - not complex sentences - these would only be recipes for the construction of images - if you would permit this, you would have no argument for the special status of some sentences: - namely to be true. I 161 Image theory/Theory of reflection/Reflection/Tractatus/Hintikka: Image unequal reflection - illustration: require that some of the connections allowed to play some of the possible configurations of objects - but it does not follow that the reflection must be complete - i.e. not each link must speak of a possible issue - Name: no image of the object - but it can reflect it - Sentence: Image - logic: reflection of reality (Widerspiegelung, Abbild). >Reflection, >Picture. I 183 Wittgenstein/Early/Middle/late/Plant/Hintikka: Image Theory: was abandoned 1929 - Hintikka: he has never represented a perfect picture theory - later than 1929: Vs the thesis that language functions according to strict rules - Hintikka: that he might never have represented - 1934/35: new: language games. WittgensteinVsTractatus: VsReflection, VsWiderspiegelung. I 184 Language/Medium Wittgenstein 1929: physical language instead of phenomenological language - ((s) > Phenomenology/Quine) - but it is always the ordinary language. >Ordinary language. --- III 144 Language/Thought/World/Reality/Image Theory/Theory of Reflection/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the actual relationship between language (thinking) and reality cannot be a part of reality itself - because the image B, which should reflect the ratio between A and S, would then be identical with A - hence the sentence can only schow its sense, it cannot express it. >World, >Reality, >Thought. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Possible World Semantics | Hintikka | II 43 Semantics of Possible Worlds/possible world semantics/non-existent objects/non-existence/possibility/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds should assume possible individuals as inhabitants not only of possible worlds, but even of the actual world. II 50 Semantics of Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: here there is no >systematic ambiguity, i.e. the expressions mean intensionally the same as extensionally. >Intensions, >Extensions. E.g. to know what John knows is to know the worlds that are compatible with his belief, and to know which ones are not. II 51 Extra premise: for this, one must be sure that an expression in different worlds picks out the same individual. Context: what the relevant worlds are, depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here the case is clear. On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew that Loris was a great poet. Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the difference of my approach to that of Frege is that I consider the problems locally, while Frege regards them globally. Fregean sense (= way of being given)/Hintikka: the Fregean sense must be regarded as defined for all possible worlds. >Fregean sense, >Way of givenness. On the other hand: Hintikka: if the Fregean sense is constructed as a meaning function, it must be regarded in my approach only as defined for the relevant alternatives. Frege: Frege uses the concept of the identity of the senses implicitly. And as a function of meaning the identity is only given if the mathematical function applies for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of the totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: precisely the semantics of possible worlds helps to dispense with the totality of all possible worlds ((s) and to only consider the relevant alternatives, defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: the Fregean sense was constructed as a quasi-object (object of setting, propositional object, thought object, object of belief), because they were assumed as entities in the actual world, however abstract they were. II 54 Meaning Function/HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Object of Knowledge/object of thought/Frege/Hintikka: Frege has never considered the problem, unlike e.g. Quine. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. II 57 Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: in order to be a solution, the meaning function must be a constant function, that is, it must pick out the same individuals in all the worlds. II 205 Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds needs no conception of possible worlds as complete cosmological worlds, but only "small worlds", rather like event progress or situations, I also speak of "scenarios". >Situations. Possible World/Hintikka: the expression possible world is misleading, if one considers them as complete worlds. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Predicates | Lewis | Schwarz I 121 Predicate/Lewis/Schwarz: singles out properties - which ones depends on possible worlds. --- Schwarz I 228 Names/Predicate/Property/Lewis: Thesis: names can name anything: instead of predicate "F" we take "F-ness" predicates are not names and designate nothing. Predicate/(s): Not singular terms. >Singular term, >Name/Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis/RussellVsFrege: assuming that each predicate can be assigned a name for a corresponding property, Russell’s paradox follows -> heterology: no property corresponds to some predicates such as E.g. "is a property that does not apply to itself". Also, nothing that can be named with a singular term corresponds to predicates such as E.g. "is a class" E.g. "is part of" and E.g. "identical with". ((s) Predicates can always be invented, whether the world contains adequate properties is an empirical question.) |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Predicates | Searle | V 152f Predicate expressions do not mean properties. Predicates: predicates must not be indicative (predicates are not necessarily demonstrative). >Properties. V 152f Predicate/SearleVsFrege: Frege tries to represent two irreconcilable positions: a) to extend the distinction sense/meaning to predicates and b) to explain the functional difference between indicative and predicative expressions. Searle: Frege must assume that predicates have a meaning, because he needs that for arithmetics: he also needs quantification of properties. Solution existence/property/Frege's successor: if two people have the same property, then there is something that they have in common. SearleVs: implication is not reference. >Implication, >reference. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Proper Names | Burkhardt | Wolf II 337 Namen/Kripke: haben keinen Fregeschen Sinn (Bedeutung) - BurkhardtVsKripke: der muß aber manchmal ergänzt werden II 341 Namen/BurkhardtVsFrege: seine Ansicht ist falsch, Eigennamen hätte sowohl Bedeutung als auch Sinn - BurkhardtVsStrawson: wenn Namen keinerlei Bezeichnung, was soll dann Konvention sein? Namen/Wittgenstein: doch "mere tags" - Burckhardt: dann muß das Kontextprinzip für Namen aufgegeben werden II 345 Bedeutung/Namen/Burkhardt: drei Möglichkeiten: 1. Namen haben Bedeutung, dann ist das, gemäß der Konventionen der Träger - 2. alle Namen haben dieselbe Bedeutung: nämlich ihre eindeutige Referenzfunktion! (Gebrauchstheorie) - 3. Namen haben gar keine Bedeutung II 358 Namen/Burkhardt: können auch appellative Funktion haben: Bsp "Einstein ist der Kopernikus des 20. Jahrh." - Vorstellungen über Eigenschaften - These so läßt sich die Bedeutung doch in Referent und Sinn aufteilen. So ist alles Subjektive getilgt - die eine oder die andere Seite kann dominieren, der Sinn kann an die Stelle des Referenten treten |
Burk I A. Burkhardt Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Proper Names | Dummett | III (b) 64 Names/Davidson: we can only know that "Valencia" refers to Valencia. DummettVsDavidson: Davidson confuses awareness of the reference with knowledge - the fact that the word has a reference object (at all). Names/DummettVsDavidson: the subject must understand the meaning of the name: not that the name refers to something, but what it refers to. >Reference, >Meaning. III (b) 87f Names/Kripke: meaning is not "the one who is generally thought to be the author of Waverley". Dummett: knowing that (sentence is true): e.g. a child hears "postal strike in Milan" - but does not understand the proposition. - What is necessary for a proposition? - Certainly not knowledge about Ambrosius - Sentence: knowing-that "someone named Gustav Freytag was a lecturer in Wroclaw. - proposition, propositional knowledge: precisely the one who wrote Debit and Credit was a lecturer in Wroclaw - (description). III (b) 87f Names/Dummett: Standard explanation: Language use in community - actual baptism irrelevant, just like speaker, snatches of conversation - different: if only snatches of conversation, I must track speakers. Goedel: the concept of knowing-of-Gödel that he... has more substance than the concept of knowledge that "Goedel" is the name of the person who... E.g. Goliath: confusion of the names, not the person - E.g. Obadiah (author, only action ((s) quasi "anonymous"): here a confusion of persons, not the names, is possible. III (b) 92 DummettVsCausal theory: just a theory about the sense of names, not one that replaces the sense with something else - it provides no explanation of the function of names in general. >Causal theory of names. III (b) 93 E.g. hurricanes, constellations etc.- it is hard to prove that we named them wrongly - Causal theory does not explain the mechanisms of naming. III (c) 151 Dummett per description theory: verbal explanations of unfamiliar names help. >Descriptions, >Description theory. Wolf II 354 Meaning/Names/DummettVsFrege: (E.g. > |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Proper Names | Frege | I 54 Proper name/Frege: for a proper name the extension is presumed. Otherwise, the negation would be: "Kepler did not die in misery or the name is meaningless". >Extension. II 69 The "meaning" of a name is never a concept (predicate), but always only an object. >Concept, >Object, >Predicate. II 72f Proper name/Frege: a proper name (saturated) can never be a predicate (but part of a predicate). Names/understanding/Frege: understanding a name means to know what object it denotes. Problem: are names without a carriers (e.g. unicorn). Problem: e.g. different names with the same carrier. >Unicorn-example, >Non-existence. Husted V 99/100 The fact that a name stands for an object is a consequence rather than part of the fact that it has a certain sense. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, Chisholm II 144f Names/Frege: "mixed proper name": contains linguistic and non-linguistic parts: the circumstances. Circumstances: are part of the meaning of an expression. >Circumstances. ChisholmVsFrege: he neglects ostension. Dummett III 68f Names/FregeVsRussell: names may well have the same sense as a specific description - what is actually considered to be a representation of an object: Valencia from the air, from the ground, within a specific buildind, or on the map? Recognition: necessary: is the awareness that the object falls under the concept that determines the proper identity criterion (here: "city"). This is the ability for recognition instead of the method of picking out ("red": is recognition, not a method for red). >Recognition. Frege II 69 Name/Frege: a name can never be a predicate - but certainly part of a predicate. >Predicate. Stalnaker I 183 Names/proper names/Frege/Stalnaker: for him there is a mental representation, i.e. we only have ideas about something that presents itself to us in a certain way. ((s) This can be reconciled with Donnellan’s attributive use). >Attributive/referential. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Proper Names | Mill | Wolf I 43 ff Names/Mill: what is more appropriate: to conceive the name as something for an object or for an idea of the object? MillVsHobbes: "Perception" is too metaphysical. Wolf I 43 Definition Name/Hobbes: "an arbitrarily chosen word, which serves as a characteristic to awaken in our mind a thought which resembles a thought which one had before, and which, expressed to others, serves them as a sign of a thought which the speaker had earlier in his mind." Names/Hobbes: names are not signs of things themselves. One only thinks of the stone. Wolf I 44 MillVsHobbes: the word sun names the name of the sun and not our idea of the sun. ((s) The idea or imagination could change). Mill: because the names not only share our ideas, but also teach the listener about our belief and this is a belief about the thing itself and not about the idea! E.g. "The sun is the cause of daylight". This is not to say that the idea of the sun produces the idea of daylight. Names/Mill: different types: some words are only parts of names: E.g. from, to, often, truly, as well as pronouns like myself, to him, "John's", even adjectives. These words express nothing which can be affirmed or denied. Exception: e.g. "'heavy' is an adjective": here "heavy" is a complete name. Name of this sound sequence. >mention / >use. Wolf I 47 Names/Mill: through their mediation we are able to state general sentences. They, themselves, can also be divided into >general terms (e.g. "human") and >singular terms (e.g. Maria). (> Zink). "John" can only be affirmed by a single person (at least in the same sense). Wolf I 49 Name/concrete/abstract/Mill: e.g. "white" is at the same time the name of an object and of many objects (concrete). "Whiteness" is the name of an attribute. "Age": is the name of an attribute. (abstract, generalization). Originates from Locke and Condillac. Wolf I 50 "Attribute" is itself the common name of many attributes. Name/abstract/singular term/Mill: however, if an attribute does not allow degree differences or type differences, it is not a general term but a singular term: E.g. visibility, tangibility, equality, rectangularity, milk white. No multiplicity of attributes, but a specific attribute. Wolf I 51 Names/Mill: names always include some attribute in themselves, but they are not the name of this attribute! The attribute itself has its own, abstract name (singular term), for example, "The whiteness". Wolf I 53 Names/Mill: names are not co-denotating, not connotative: they denote the individuals without any attributes.I 54 E.g. originally, Dartmouth may be located at the mouth of the Dart, but John is not named like this because it was part of the meaning that the father might have had the same name. In addition, the mouth of the river may have shifted without changing the name of the city. Proper names adhere to the things themselves (labels) and do not fall away if attributes of the object fall away. Although only God may have the appropriate attributes, it is still a common name and does not belong here anywa Wolf I 55 Co-denotating names/Mill: these names are identifications: e.g. "the only son of Johann Müller". Also identifies attributes. Wolf I 56 So whenever names have any meaning, the meaning is in what they co-denotate and not in what they denotate (the bearer). Non-denotating (normal) names have no meaning. Wolf I 57 Names/Mill: names do not give the listener any knowledge of the subject. If perhaps he had already learned something about Cologne before, it was not through the word Cologne. Wolf I 58 By knowing of how many objects the name can be, which it all denotates, we learn nothing, but only when we learn what it may co-denotate (attributes). On the same thing, we may also employ different names whose meaning is not the same. MillVsFrege: Therefore the bearer (of the name) is not the meaning. Wolf I 59 Co-denotating names/Mill: here there is an uncertainty. Wolf I 61 Solution: to give a fixed co-denotation for concrete names with occurring predicates. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Proper Names | Searle | II 288 Names/Searle: names presuppose any other representation. They have no explicit intentional content.< >Intentional content. II 291 ff Names: SearleVsKripke: VsCausal Theory: Kripke exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception. He overweights parasitic cases and presupposes an omniscient observer. Meteorology baptizes future events. >Causal theory of proper names. II 291 ff Names/Mill: names have no connotation, only denotation. Frege: the meaning of a name is detected by description. >Descriptions, >Connotation. II 292 Names/SearleVsKripke: a causal chain can only be detected intentionally: by speaker's intention. The causal chain is not pure, self-descriptive. Baptism itself cannot be causal, otherwise a successful reference is explained by successful reference (circular). >Speaker intention. II 311 Names/meaning/reference/Searle: e.g. Goedel/Schmidt: intentional content determines reference: "discoverer, no matter what his name is". We speak of the person who has been recognized by his contemporaries. >Description/Kripke. E.g. swapped spots: identification: "the spot that causes the experience". Variant: forgotten: "the one I was formerly able to identify as A." Wolf II 168 Names/Searle: the meaning stays ambigious, half of the descriptions could be true. We cannot determine in advance what characteristics apply to Aristotle (Strawson ditto). >Bundle theory. Zink: but then we would say that we do not know the name. Solution/Zink: localisation. >Zink. Searle V 145 Names/SearleVsMill: it is wrong, that proper names would be "meaningless characters" that they were "denotative" but not "connotative". >Names/Mill. V 145 There can be no facts about an independently identified object by facts - otherwise one is approaching traditional substance. Identification/SearleVsTractatus: objects cannot be identified, regardless of facts. V 245 Names/SearleVsRussell: if they should not contain any description, we must unfortunately assume substances. From the supposed distinction between names and descriptions the metaphysical distinction is derived between object and properties. Tractatus: the name means the object, the object is its meaning. - SearleVsWittgenstein. V 247 Names/Mill: names have no sense. FregeVsMill: e.g. then Mt. Everest would be = Gaurisankar. This is not more informative than Everest = Everest. FregeVs, SearleVs - Searle: names do not describe properties of objects. Identity Everest = Tschomolungma provided no other information. V 256 Names/SearleVsFrege: names are not entirely clear, e.g. morning star/evening star are actually on the border to description. SearleVsKripke: names are not rigid, otherwise they are like logical equivalents. Searle: names are there, because it is necessary, to seperate the indicative from the predicative function. >Predication, >Ostension. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Proper Names | Wittgenstein | Wolf II 14 Bundle theory/names: proposed by Wittgenstein and Searle > Essential properties; >Bundle theory/Kripke. Wolf II 150 Names/Wittgenstein: I use the name N with no fixed meaning - Philosophical Investigations §79. --- Hintikka I 302/303 Name/Object/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: as long as the links between language and the world are unanalyzed name-relations, the possible connections of the symbols are determined only by their own nature - by their own nature - name-relations are conventional - but the nature of the signs states itself - if we transform signs into variables, they are only dependent on the nature of the sentence -> logical form.- Meaningless connections must be prohibited by the convention - they are not excluded by the symbols themselves - so that the reflection is maintained - late : VsReflection - late: VsName-Relation. Hintikka I 22 Names/existence/border/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in a logically formed language all names must denote something. But one cannot specify how many objects there are. >Denotation, >Ontology. I 51 Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: to the widespread misconceptions about the Tractatus counts the notion that what he calls "objects" does not include any relations and properties. Hintikka: the terminological counterpart of this error is: names are logically singular terms, so that predicates (including symbols for relations) cannot fall within that definition (falsely). I 60ff Signs/relation/name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: not the complex sign "aRb" says that it is in a certain relation to b, but that "a" stands in a certain relation to "b", says aRb. (3,1432) (quotation marks sic) - But Wittgenstein wants something else: The number of names that appear in the elementary proposition must be the same, according to Tractatus as the number of objects in the situation illustrated by the sentence. But about which situation it is, is not determined, however, solely by the name of a and b. Copi: (wrongly) thinks that Wittgenstein through the phrase "in certain respects" basically abstracts from relation-signs and performs an existential generalization. (HintikkaVsCopi). >Existential generalization. I 71 Names/existence/Wittgenstein: "I want to call 'name' only what cannot stand in the connection "X exists". And so one cannot say "Red exists" because, if red did not exist, it could not be talked about it. >Existence statements. Names/existence/Wittgenstein: the existence of an object is seen from the fact that its name is used in the language. For the logical rules of inference is then a well-formed language to be presupposed that the individual constants are not unrelated. >Individual constants. I 85 Object/name/language/Socrates/Theaetetus/Hintikka: for the original elements of which everything is composed, there is no explanation. Everything that actually exists, can only be described with names, another determination is not possible. Neither it is, nor it is not. So the language is also an interweaving of names. I 127 Elementary proposition: does not consist of a series of names for individual things that are held together by additional links, but it consists of a series of "names" for objects that belong to different but matching logic types. I 149 Picture Theory/Image Theory/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Names are points, sentences, arrows, they have sense. The sense is determined by the two poles of true and false." >Sense. --- II 84 Name/Meaning/Wittgenstein: the meaning of the words "Professor Moore" is not the owner - 1. the importance does not go for a walk - 2. the same words also appear in a sentence like E.g. "Professor Moore does not exist" - meaning is set within the language - by explanations. II 88 Number/Wittgenstein: the numbers in a pattern book are the names of the patterns. II 365 Name/object/Wittgenstein: between the two there is no real relationship. >Object. --- VI 71 Name/elementary proposition/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the names of the elementary proposition are fundamentally different from the nature of proper names. They are primitive signs that cannot be defined closer by any definition - but they can be explained by explanations - explanations are sentences that contain primitive signs - unlike a code elementary propositions do not obey appointment rules. VI 172 Names/WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: late: the owner is not the meaning of the name. --- IV 22 Name/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the name means the object. (3.203). >Proper names. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Properties | Searle | I 153 Fulfilment conditions/Searle: properties of objects are fulfilment conditons of my experiences, therefore they are difficult to distinguish from the properties of the experiences (but these are always perspective). >Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Perspective/Searle. II 105/6 Properties: looking intelligent is in a way independent of intelligence, to look red is not independent from being red. V 155 Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essentially predictive: one can just as well refer to them by singular nominal expressions. >Predicate, >Attribution, >Singular term, >Predication. V 153 Reference/implication/property/SearleVs: from the fact that my statement implies the existence of a property, it does not follow that I referred to a property with the statement. >Implication. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Perry | Frank I 451f Proposition / propositional stance / PerryVsFrege: the expressions embedded in a report of what someone thinks, designate entities (not whole propositions) to which their antecedents relate. > Cresswell: structured meanings, >Propositions, >Designation, >Objects, >Indexicality, >Index words, >Identification, >Belief Objects, >Thought Objects, >Reference. John Perry (1983a): Castaneda on He and I, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda. Hackett (1983), 15-39 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Castaneda | Frank I 323 Propositions/Tradition: (not represented by anyone in pure form, not even by Frege): ideal convergence of the elements of thought, speech, reality and communication. >Convergence, >Communication, >Thought objects, >Belief objects, >Content, >G. Frege. Propositions that are primarily defined as carriers of timeless truth values, fundamental support of linguistic meaning as constituents of reality and as publicly accessible contents of communication. >Propositions, >Communication, >Truth values. Advantage: that leaves no gap between the content of thought, and that to which it is directed - for reality arise. >Reference, >Reality, >World/Thinking. CastanedaVs: this does not apply to indexical sentences. >Indexicality, >Index Words. Individuation: of indexical sentences: in the speech act, not by meaning. >Individuation. I 340ff Proposition/Tradition: (Frege, Moore): 1) psychological units, 2) ontological, 3) ontologically objective (intersubjective) 4) metaphysical units 5) logical units 6) semantic 7) linguistic units of communication. CastanedaVs: there are discrepancies between 1 - 7 in the case of diachronic flow of experiences in the changing world. VsTradition: fails with indexical reference with "I", "here", "now". Problem: E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen in my liver": understanding is possible without knowledge of the truth value. >Understanding, >Truth value, >Truth conditions. Therefore meaning unequal truth value (VsFrege) - what is meant by the formation of a sentence is not some objective feature or thing in the world that is accessible to everyone. >Meaning, >Meaning/Frege, >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Perry | Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- I 409f Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. >Indexicality, >Index words. New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. >Opacity, >Substitutability. Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. Cf. >He/He himself. Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re". - Then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". >de re. Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. >Quantification. Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). >Sugar trail example. --- I 455f Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots). - Nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. Solution/Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. >Extra-Sense/Castaneda. Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul. VsExtra-sense: an extra-sense does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states. People understand sentences but do not form beliefs. >Understanding, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge. List of extra senses for everyone: too long. Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language. Rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I" is doing this". Problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough. >Reference, >Sense. The same meaning cannot perform different references. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Searle | II 274 E.g. Heimson/Perry/Searle: tightening: Heimson was Humes doppelganger on the twin earth, ecxcept for the micro-structure. The sentence has in both cases the same Fregean sense but the propositions must be different because they have different truth values. So the Fregean sense is not enough to determine which proposition is expressed. It cannot explain the indexicality. Kaplan: therefore we have a different theory of propositions: "direct reference", "singular propositions": here the proposition is not the intentional content in the head of the speaker, but it has to contain the real object. SearleVs: see self-reference. V 144 SearleVsFrege: Frege missed the distinction between sense and proposition. Proposition/Searle: circumstances are necessary in addition to the terms. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Proxy | Wittgenstein | VI 119 Formalism/Proxy/Sign/Symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege: Frege: characters are either mere blackening or a sign of something. Then this is what they represent, their meaning. Wittgenstein: false alternative. - E.g. Pieces: represented nothing. Solution: use like in the game instead of representation of something. ((s) use is more than mere blackening and less than representation of an object - Wittgenstein: Formalism is not entirely unjustified. >Formalism. Hintikka I 52 Terminology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Tractatus: thing: particular, name, linguistic proxy for particulars. (Very suitable proxy). I 138 et seqq. Frege/Logic/Sentence/Hintikka: in the Tractatus there is a break with Frege's tradition: Frege's logic is regarded as the theory of complex sentences. >Complex, >Compositionality. Wittgenstein examines the simplest components of the world and their linguistic proxies. >Atomism. II 66 Thinking/Substitute/Wittgenstein: is there not a proxy "in mind"? This thought is errorneous and causes a lot of damage; it divides thinking into two separate parts, the organic (essential) and the non-organic. There is no mental process that cannot be symbolized. We are only interested in what can be symbolized. >Symbols. Thinking/Thought/Wittgenstein: the thought is autonomous. Example "Schmidt is sitting on the bench". You would think three things are in his mind, as a proxy. There's something true about that, too. But what guarantee would we have that they represent anything at all? What is given in my thinking is present and essential! Everything else (which is represented) is irrelevant. That is why thinking is complete in itself. And what is not given in my thinking cannot be essential for it! The thought does not point beyond itself, we believe that only because of the way in which we use symbols. II 84 Meaning/Wittgenstein: is defined within the language by explanations. >Explanation, >Meaning. The expression "the meaning of" is misleading, as it suggests "proxy for" or "substitute". >Substitution. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Qualia | Shoemaker | Stalnaker I 220 Qualia/common sense/Shoemaker: Thesis: Qualia are internal, intrinsic, but also locally comparable. >Intrinsicness, >Internalism, >Localization, >Comparability. VsFrege-Schlick view. > StalnakerVsShoemaker: per "old-fashioned" Frege-Schlick view. >Inverted spectra. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Qualia | Stalnaker | I 222 Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: functionalism will explain qualia with a relational structure. >Functionalism. Problem: if we could have a permutation so that the relational general structure remained - then no functionalist theory could be right. >Inverted spectra, >Permutation. I 223 Vs: this can be disputed:the relations are more complex, for example, there are relations of colors among each other - that would mean denying symmetry. >Colour. Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: bad solution: a bad solution would be to introduce additional characteristics, e.g. blue is cool - we only need the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. >Symmetries. Functionalism: functionalism identifies qualia intra-personnally through distinguishability. Shoemaker: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons with qualia. >Sydney Shoemaker. Interpersonal/Wittgenstein: interpersonal arises from the possibility to change intra-personnally. Bad solution/swapped spectra: It is not a good solution to introduce additional characteristics like red is hot, blue is cool etc. >Metaphors. Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put aside such objections. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. Qualia/Functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intrapersonally via distinguishing capacities, one should expect it to accept the Frege/Schlick view, i.e., that there is no interpersonal counterpart to it. >Moritz Schlick. Shoemaker: That would be too simple. Thesis: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach. While we cannot define certain qualitative states in functionalist terms, we can define classes of qualitative states. Classes of qualitative states: We functionally define identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) sameness and dissimilarity. >Identity conditions. Thus we obtain equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those which are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations. >Equivalence classes. ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason he resists the Frege/Schlick view is... I 224 ...the view that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there can be intrapersonally interchanged spectra. And he believes that from there there is an argument for interpersonal swapped spectra that cannot be resisted. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Reference | Dummett | I 41 Frege: first reference, then "sense". Trend today: for singular terms: Meaning = Reference - DummettVs: absurd in complex terms (>descriptions). I 47 Reference: words - not sentences or parts of sentences (Dummett: feeling for the language). Def reference of an expression: is that which is common to all other expressions where it is clear that their substitution instead of the original expression does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs. I 48 Frege: theory of reference prevails over theory of "sense". - "Sense" determines the reference - Husserl: Reference = "sense". Use gives meaning - sense gives reference (Frege) - meaning not equivalent to reference: e.g. unicorn RussellVs distinction sense/reference; >meaning, >reference > Fregean sense. (RussellVsFrege). II 128 Reference/Frege/Dummett: does not show everything that the speaker knows when he understands an expression > sense. - Knowledge of reference is not sufficient for meaning. E.g. identity a = a is uninformative - Dummett: the same goes for every atomic sentence. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Reference | Frege | Husted V 101 Reference/Frege: when sense was the same as meaning (reference), a sentence could not tell anything what a person who knows the name does not already know. Dummett III 113 Reference/singular term/Frege: in Frege's truth theories all singular terms have a guaranteed reference, and always a reference object! So are sentences with "unicorn": they are not wrong but without truth value. RussellVsFrege: sentences with "unicorn" are always wrong. >Unicorn example, >Existence, >Non-existence, >Truth values, >Truth value gaps, >Truth theories, >Singular terms, |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Reference | Russell | Dummett I 59 RussellVsDistinction Sense/Reference: (meaning/reference). (RussellVsFrege). Cf. > Newen I 92 Name/identifier/Russell: are non-referring. Reference/Russell: only logically proper names ("this", etc.) >Names, >Logical proper names, >Description. McGinn I 178 Reference/Russell/McGinn: possible only by acquaintance - like Gareth Evans. The distinguishing knowledge is the basis of the reference. "Knowledge of." |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Relation-Theory | Burge | Shiffer I 7 Relation Theory/Belief/Burge: (Burge 1980): Propositions about propositional attitudes have the form of a relational propositional-attitude predicate with singular arguments for at least one person and something believed. This is a semantic value of the grammatical object of the verb of the propositional attitude. SchifferVsRelation Theory/SchifferVsFrege/(s): makes mentalistic assumptions, "inner entities". Cf. >Objects of thought, >Objects of Belief, >Mentalism. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Sensations | Wittgenstein | Rorty I 128 Wittgenstein: sensations would have some half of an existence between nothingness and something, they would "fell out" of the world like the beetle in the box. >Beetle example. Wittgenstein: sensation "not something, but also not nothing. The result was that a nothing would do the same services as the something about what cannot be stated." (Philosophical Investigations § 304.) RortyVsWittgenstein: confusion of the concept of incorrigibility with the notion of incommunicability. >Incorrigibility. --- Rorty VI 147 Sensation/Wittgenstein: Feeling alone (without language) is not enough. --- Dummett I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, for the subject itself unrecognizable. >Private Language, >Beetle example. --- Wittgenstein VI 118 Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: a sentence about the sensations, because it completely remains at the level of linguistics, is outside the true/false dimension. VI 199f Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: has no object. >Object. VI 200 Expression: is not description (but more direct). >Description. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Sense | Castaneda | Frank I 325 Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: the denotation within intention in propositional contexts is not Fregean meaning, but Fregean sense. >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning, >Denotation, >Intention, >Propositional attitudes. Reversal of Frege: the world reference can only be explained by the objects being explained as systems of Fregean senses. Then "sense "and "reference" get entirely new meanings. >Sense, >Reference. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 Frank I 400ff Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: Guise Theory: (of designs): Vs distinction sense/meaning. >Guise-Theory. From this also follows: VsFrege: indirect speech does not lose its reference - expressions always denote the same thing, namely guises (designs). VsPerry: that also makes his distinction of designating and expressing unnecessary. I 432ff Extra-Sense/Castaneda: E.g. Ivan believes that he* is required on the phone - here is (Ivan) Ivan referencce) and ego(Ivan) its special meaning i - in an assertion of speaker a "I" expresses ego(a). PerryVsCastaneda: this explanation leads to a gap in the theory of reports of beliefs - anyone who can believe anything of Ivan, can believe the corresponding proposition of Ivan that "i" is required on the phone - KretzmannVs: still private, not even God could grasp extra-sense - PerryVs: misunderstanding, "he*" cannot be replaced by description without Index - but that does not mean that the proposition "he himself is in the hospital" can be known by none other - "i"/PerryVsCastaneda: different psychological role for Ivan and Sheila still has to be explained - that Ivan but not Scheila is the reference is not enough - Ivan must also believe that he* is i, but that is initially nothing more than that i is i! - And Sheila also believes that - in addition: information that it is about their own extra-sense. Problem: the extra-sense does not help if Ivan does not know that he was appointed Editor. - Facts about the language are no solution. I 459ff Sense/Frege: psychological mediator role. - CastanedaVs, PerryVs. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sense | Dummett | II (b) 72ff Sense/Dummett: The sense is a property of a single sentence, not of the full use of language. I 122 Sense/Capture/DummettVsFrege: The thought is not presented directly to the consciousness - rather grasping the sense: set of skills. I 123 The fact that the glasses are in the other jacket cannot be content of consciousness. I 124 Such examples (glasses) lead to an opposite direction according to which language is explained by thoughts that are considered to be language-independent, and not vice versa (> DummettVsEvans). - Saussure s conception of language as a code will avoid such a declaration - VsFrege: sense of the word is not the same as a part of the thought. EvansVsCompositionality. III (a) 25 Sense/Dummett: from division of states of affairs: 1) where the statement could be misused. 2) where it could be not misused. ad 1) Statement: false - conditional: false - atomic sentence or without truth value. ad 2): statement: true, Conditional: true or without truth value, atomic sentence: true. III (a) 28 Sense/Dummett: entirely determined by one knowing when it has an designated truth value and when a non-designated - finer distinctions only needed in complex sentences with operators. >Truth value/Dummett. III (b) 74 Sense/Dummett: not only through verification method, but understanding what circumstances must be realized. >Circumstances. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Sense | Mates | I 99 Sense/meaning/Frege / Mates: Sense and meaning should not be confused because the compositionality applies to both ((s) seperately) : e.g. (1) morning star and evening star are the same (2) morning star and morning star are the same. (1) and (2) do not have the same meaning - E.g. a = a is not the same sense as a = b. >Identity, >Identity/Frege. N.B.: nevertheless m.s. and e.s. have the same meaning (reference). >Reference, >Meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. Meaning/Frege: meaning of a statement: the truth value (object). >Truth values. Sense of a statement/Frege: thought, content, proposition. ((s) decisive place in the literature). >Thought, >Content, >Proposition. Truth value/MatesVsFrege: Truth values do not exist. - Vet Mates per Frege, without Frege's metaphysics. The sense (manner of presentation) uniquely determines the meaning (reference). >Way of givenness, cf. >Intension, >Extension. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Sentence Meaning | Stechow | 30 ~ VsFrege: a semantics that applies only truth values for sentence meanings cannot exporess this verb meaning. >attitude, >propositional attitudes. 110 ff Sentence meaning/Stechow: in connection with (existence-) presupposition: now partial function of situations to truth values. >Truth values, >Situations, >Presuppositions. So the sentence meaning is no longer sets of possible worlds. ((s) no longer defined if the domain of objects does not exist). >Possible worlds. Presupposition: limiting the scope (domain restriction). Def plug: "says", "believes": blocks the forwarding of presuppositions to the top - no limitation. Cf. >That-clauses, >Opacity. Filter: "if", "and": block presuppositions. Hole: specific words let presuppositions in the embedding sentence by. |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Sentences | Frege | II 48 Truth Value/Frege: a truth value cannot be part of a thought any more than the sun, because it is not a sense but an object (truth value = object). II 51 Sentence/Frege/(s): a sentence consists of sense components, not of objects. (>FregeVsRussell) Subordinate clauses that begin with "that" (>that-sentence, >opaque contexts, >propositional attitudes) have a thought as meaning, not a truth value. II 74 Sentence: the idea itself does not yet determine what is to be regarded as the subject (>Ramsey). We must never forget that different sentences can express the same idea. Neither is it impossible that the same thought appears in a decomposition as a singular one, in another one as a particular one, and in a third one as general one. II 77 Sentence: the three proper names: "the number 2", "the concept prime number", "the relation of the falling of an object under a concept" behave as brittle to each other as the first two alone: no matter how we group them together, we do not get a sentence. >Propositions, >Clauses, >Truth conditions. I 7 Sentence/Frege: a sentence does not represent a proposition (only a that-sentence does that, a subset) but for a truth value. There is a sentence for each proposition that expresses it and that states the truth conditions. Vs: there is a problem with sentences without truth value (neither true nor false, not an object, etc.). Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Sentence/Frege: except for the idea (what can be true/false) there are two other aspects: a) "content" b) "imagination". >Content, >Imagination. Tugendhat II 243 Oblique Meaning/German Original: "odd"/Frege: the oblique meaning is the name of a sentence. Complex sentences: have truth functions of their subsets - where that is not the case, subsets appear as names (oblique ("odd") meaning, Quote). Nominalized Subset/Frege: a nominalized subset is only part of a thought. TugendhatVsFrege: such a subset cannot be replaced, so the truth-value potential cannot consist in its truth value. Tugendhat II 245 Sentence/Frege/Tugendhat: since all sentences are derived from the subject-predicate form, subsets must sometimes be nominalized. Exception: causal and conditional clauses. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Sentences | Gärdenfors | I 176 Sentences/Semantics/Gärdenfors: we should not analyze sentences or sentence meanings with propositions as sets of sentences, because sentence meaning is too context-dependent. Between sentences and propositions there is therefore no semantic mapping. Solution/Gärdenfors: sentences should be analyzed with Conceptual Spaces. --- I 177 At first, it is not so obvious why we should express ourselves in sentences. GärdenforsVsFrege: his answer to the fact that thoughts are sentences is not enough because one does not know how thoughts could be identified in a language-independent manner. Solution/Gärdenfors: Thesis: sentences express events. In addition, we should focus on utterances instead of sentences. Utterances are parts of communication. The sentence meaning can be changed here. Attention: also plays a role in how events are represented. There are other aspects: see Croft & Wood (2000(1), Chapter 3); Langacker (2008(2), chapter 3): perspective, categorization. Event/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the construction of an event contains at least one vector (force vector or result vector) and an object. --- I 178 Sentence/Gärdenfors: Thesis on sentences: a (declarative) sentence typically expresses the construction of an event. Conclusion/(s): Gärdenfors assumes changing instead of rigid meanings because he considers sentences within communications in which the meanings can change. His approach with vectors in conceptual spaces contributes to this dynamic situation rather than propositions, which are in a rigid relation to sentences. Therefore, he also rejects mapping relationships such as semantic mapping. 1. Croft, W., & Wood, E. J. (2000). Construal operations in linguistics and artificial intelligence. In. L. Albertazzi (ed.) Meaning and cognition: A multidisciplinary approach (pp. 51-78). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 2. Langacker (2008): Langacker, R. W. Cognitive grammar: A basic introduction. Oxford |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Sentences | Prior | I 6 Sentences/Prior: sentences are different from what we want to say with them - as well as what we think is different from what we think about. >Sentences, >Propositions, >"About", >Intentionality, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 13 Sentences/Prior: not about propositions - e.g. "The sentence S is only seemingly about propositions" is itself only seemingly about propositions." (solution: it is a sentence about the sentence) - E.g. "the proposition that the sun is hot, is true" about the sun. >Predication. I 19 Sentences/Prior: sentences denote nothing, just names. >Designation, >Proper names, >Sentences. Sentence: no relation between two names but between name and predicate that is expressed by the clause - expressing instead denoting. >Expressions, >Predicates. Instead of "fear +" that -sentence": "fear that" + sentence. Left hand side: predicate - rightright hand side: connection. >That, >That sentences. I 52f Sentence/PriorVsFrege: sentences denote nothing, not even "truth". >Truth value/Frege, >Meaning/Frege, >Fregean meaning. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Sentences | Quine | I 252f "Purely indicative" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - An expression in quotation marks is not purely indicative - ambiguous reference. - Every truth function is denotation-transparent. I 332 Sentence = Universal! - Value of the variables: Proposition (object) - remains intact even after the elimination of the singular term. - The proposition resists a change of the truth value. - The proposition remains nameless in "x0p". I 337 Sentence: is not the class of its expressions, otherwise non-expressed sentenceswould be = zero class (all would have the same meaning). - A sentence is not a property of expressions either. - Solution: sentence as a consequence: class of pairs. - Partial sign: class of expression incidents. I 336 Words describe - sentences do not (no singular term)! - Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term is formed by bracketing the sentence. (not a proposition!) - Proposition here: completion of the correct sentence to a timeless sentence - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing. --- Prior I 35 Sentence/Quine: is not an object - Then also no quantification, no bound variables for it - PriorVsQuine: unproblematic: E.g. "J. believes p": J. does not believe anything, this ultimately stands for a sentence. --- Quine VII (f) 109ff Sentence/QuineVsFrege: sentences must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" not as variables, accept the entities as entities named through expressions as values. --- X 31 Sentence/Quine: we speak only of sentences if we want to generalize - (and we cannot do that through objects). X 35 Semantic ascent/Quine: this mention of sentences is only a technical necessity that arises when we want to generalize in one dimension, which cannot be grasped by a variable. --- XII 39 Sentence/Proposition/Propositional attitude/Translation/ChurchVsQuine: if sentence bears the meaning instead Proposition, then problem: E.g. Edwin believes the German sentence S - English Translation: a) leave sentence, b) reproduce in indirect speech in English: then both are not equivalent - "QuineVsVs: admitted, but unclear concept of everyday language equivalence. Quine: still not accepts linguistic forms as objects of propositional attitude: too artificial. >Propositional attitudes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Sentences | Strawson | I 196 StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence stick together only by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated. >Reference/Ramsey, >Particularization/Ramsey, >"unsaturated"/Frege. I 214 Connection/relation/Strawson: a) stating tie: (s) "is a .." b) stating tie: "is in relation to ..", "is an example for.." Two-digit terms themselves are not again designations of relations. >Relations. Stating relations between things are not themselves relation. I 216 1. Kind or sample tie/Strawson: a) Fido is a dog, an animal, a terrier b) Fido, Coco and Rover are dogs. 2. a) characterizing tie: E.g. Socrates is wise, is agile, argues b) Socrates , Plato, Aristotle, are all wise, all die 3. attributive tie: Summary of particulars due to the characterizing tie. E.g. smiling, praying - each of them symmetrical form: "x stands in characterizing tie to y. Asymmetrical: "x is characterized by y" - then y is a dependent element. I 219 Categorical criterion of the subject-predicate distinction: "x is asserted bonded as non-relational to y" i.e. that universals can be predicted by particulars, but not particulars of universals. - But also universals can be predicated by universals. >Universals/Strawson. I 221 New: distinction between fact types instead of word types. --- IV 53 Sentence/Strawson: the general form of the sentence is: "It behaves so and so". |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Singular Terms | Frege | Brandom II 173 Singular terms/Frege, later: sentences are singular terms. Predicates: predicates are the frame. DummettVsFrege: Frege disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in language games. BrandomVsDummett: as if Frege had no idea of Fregean force. >Assertive force, >Theory of force/Dummett. Dummett III 113 Reference/singular term/Frege: in truth theories of the Frege-type all singular terms have a guaranteed reference, always a reference object. Therefore sentences with "unicorn" are not wrong but without a truth value (truth value gap). RussellVsFrege: sentences with "unicorn" are always wrong. >Unicorn example, >Reference, >Truth value. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Singular Terms | Strawson | Substitutions/Strawson/(s): of singular terms: reversible of predicates: not reversible. ((s) For this asymmetry cf. >Singular terms/Brandom, >Predicates/Brandom.) I 198 Singular Term/QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsRamsey: a singular term can occur at the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions not. Singular term: is quantifiable, General Term: is not quantifiable. >Singular terms/Quine, >General terms/Quine. StrawsonVsQuine: this distinction ist not so important. I 198 Singular Term/Quine: abstract singular terms: E.g. "piety", "wisdom": names of abstract objects - no general terms. Names of concrete objects: e.g. "Earth". On the other hand general term: E.g "philosopher". >Abstraction/Quine. StrawsonVsQuine: no good explanation: we would not like to say that this would be true of many things. Solution/Quine: in reality we make the distinction between singular term and predicates. General term/Quine: the location which is taken by them, has no own status. Decisive: predicates cannot be quantified. >Quantification/Quine, >Schematic letters/Quine. I 203 "a philosopher"/Quine: no singular term. --- IV 63 QuineVs singular Term: eliminable. StrawsonVsQuine. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Speech Act Theory | Davidson | Dummett I 26ff DavidsonVsFrege/DavidsonVsSearle: the theory of force is unnecessary - description of speech acts are not necessary either. - (a concept of truth is required). >Theory of force, >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Substance | Millikan | I 109 Substance/properties/Millikan: Thesis: "substance" and "properties" are categories that are cut off relative to each other and relative to the operation of the negation. They do not mutually exclude one another. Properties/Millikan: are varied elements of facts, receptive to negation. Substances/Millikan: are also variable, but relative to other transformations. >Terminology/Millikan, >Properties/Millikan. I 254 Substances/property/Millikan: substance and property are determined in relation to one another. Definition Substance/Millikan: substance is what it is and the same as it is relative to a set of property domains from which it necessarily has a property, while other properties are excluded in the property domain. E.g. substance category/Millikan: corresponds to a set of substances. The identities are relations to the same opposite-predicate domains. E.g. gold, like other elements of the category of chemical elements, has an atomic number, a valence, a melting point, a color. But it does not have size, shape, mother, birthday, gesture. Def property/Millikan: (corresponding to substance) is what it is and the same as it is relative to a domain of opposites and to a set of elements of substance categories whose elements necessarily have a property from this domain and all other properties are excluded. Grasping/property/Millikan: to grasp a property is to distinguish it from others, or to grasp the opposite parts relative to which the property is the same as that which it is. I 255 Senseless/Millikan: thus we can recognize expressions as meaningless as e.g. "Gold is great". >Sense/Millikan. I 274 Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson's distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute, but relative: Object/thing: For example, if my ring is made of gold, it cannot be made of silver at the same time. Polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring ((s) it could also have been silver - the gold could have belonged to another object.). Then gold is a property (unlike another) and my ring is a substance. But relative to other substances, the identity of gold seems like the identity of an individual. Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or particular and property. >Particulars/Strawson, >Ontology/Millikan. I 275 Variant: not only predicates are variants in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be replaced). Substance: when we consider gold as a property, it does not prevent us from understanding it as a substance. As Aristotle said: Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances which exist; that is, substances that are not properties of something else. Substance/Millikan: a substance is actually an epistemic category. Substance/Millikan: e.g. gold, e.g. domestic cat, e.g. 69s Plymouth Valiant 100. Substance/Category/Millikan: substances fall into categories, defined by the exclusivity classes with regard to which they are intended. E.g. Gold and silver fall into this category because they belong to the same exclusivity classes: having a melting point, atomic weight, etc. I 276 Imperfect Substances/Millikan: imperfect substances have only approximate properties. e.g. a domestic cat has a weight between 7 and 14 pounds. Perfect substance/Millikan: a perfect substance can also have time-bound properties: E.g. Johnny sits at t1, but not at t2 E.g. water has a melting point at 0 degrees, in an atmospheric pressure, but not at 10 atmospheres! E.g. Johnny has then however once and for all the property, to sit to t1. I 277 Complete concept/Millikan: to have a complete concept, one needs time concepts. Accessibility: complete concepts for durable objects are not as accessible as concepts for substances such as e.g. domestic cat or e.g. gold. I 281 Summary/substance/property/identity/self-identity/Millikan: Perfect Secondary Substance: e.g. gold: has an identity that is formally the same as that of an individual in relation to its properties. Imperfect secondary substance: e.g. 69s Plymouth (contradiction to above) e.g. domestic cat: have a kind of identity that is formally analogous to the identity of perfect substances. For example, in accordance with laws in situ, instead of under all natural conditions. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Terminology | Castaneda | Frank I 325 Guise Theory/Castaneda: "Theory of ontological formations". Draws ontological consequences from the semantic discovery that private references have uneliminable meaning (non-substitutability) and from the intensionality conditions - not between thinking and the world, but primarily reference of thinking - because the private must no longer be excluded from the object area - furhtermore to thinking and world can remain typically propositionally structured. (VsLewis/VsChisholm). I 337f "Doxastic Accusative"/Castaneda: avoids facts as objects - thinking episodes are individuated by their accusatives - accusative: an attribute, not a thing. I 386ff Doxastic Accusatives/Castaneda: Problem: pure universals are too far away, particularized properties or propositions are too big - Solution: Guise theory of formations: middle road: particularized properties, particularized to very thin, finite individuals. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 I 463ff Guise/CastanedaVsFrege: consubstantiation: sameness of Oedipus' father and Oedipus' predecessor on the throne - VsFrege: every singular term, denotes an object in each use - no varying denotation - designs one-dimensional, not like Frege: two-dimensional: purpose and object. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Thinking | Dummett | I 93 ff DummettVsFrege: his theory of perception contradicts his thesis that every human can only grasp those thoughts which he understands as the sense of sentences. There are two interpretations. I 105 Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activity). - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl's noema. I 137 f Thinking: Strongest interpretation: we can only think in language - Weakest interpretation: none of us can have a thought that we cannot express. Cf. >Psychological theories on language and thought, >Animal language. I 141 DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not >idiolect, but common language prevails. III (e) 209 Language/thinking/Wittgenstein/Dummett: the role of language as a vehicle of thought is subordinate to its role as a tool of communication. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Thoughts | Dummett | I 19 Frege: The thought not the same as sense of the sentence. - Creatures with identical thoughts without linguistic manifestation are possible. I 32 f Frege/thought: According to Frege the thought (the content of the act of thinking) is not part of the stream of consciousness. Frege: capturing the thought ismental act. - The thought is not content of consciousness - consciousness is subjective - the thought is objective. - WittgensteinVsFrege. Frege: Thoughts are objective, ideas are not. - If it were otherwise, we could never disagree. I 194 ff Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: Thoughts are not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activities). >Animal language. - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl's noema. I 120 A thought cannot be detected otherwise than as a complex. Evans: "generality condition": "This rose smells sweet" - no one who is unable to have other thoughts regarding this rose can have the thought or who does not understand what smelling sweet is. (Dummett pro). I 89 Grasp: does not determine the truth value, but the truth conditions. >Truth conditions. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Thoughts | Perry | Frank I 395f Thought is not the same as content: it may be that I now believe that it is a nice day today, but tomorrow do not think that it was nice yesterday, another thought, same content. - Then the thought is not the informational content. >Content, >Informational Content, >Information. Frank I 396 Meaning/idea/PerryVsFrege: We must separate sharply meaning and thoughts. >Thoughts, >Thoughts/Frege, >Sense. The thought is not a mental entity, but corresponds to the informational content. >Thought content, cf. >Thought objects. The meaning corresponds to the role of words. >Conceptual role, >Words, >Word meaning. The same role creates another de re proposition in any context. >Sentences, >Propositions, >Context, >de re. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Truth | Brandom | I 182ff Truth/Frege/Brandom: indefinable - The accuracy of inferences is not explained by something more fundamental, the power of the judgment is not explained by the fact that it would explicitly say of a sentence that it is true - Inference: there are erroneous conclusions because of irrelevance. I 224 Truth/Brandom: the distinction between true and false sentences is related to the objectives for which one wants to use the language. Philosophical semantics: has to do with practice - "horse" only means something in one practice. >Meaning, >Practise, >Semantics. I 226 Grice: contents through intention. >Intentions, >Content. I 410 Truth/Reference/Brandom: the expressive function of "true" and "refers to" is incompatible with the explanatory function that is assigned to those expressions in the traditional theories. I 412 Once the expressive role is properly understood, representation can no longer be accepted as a basic concept. I ~ 463 Truth/Reference/Brandom: with a purely linguistic approach you can make assertions about extra-linguistic referential relations - truth is not to be a relation between executions and object - new: anaphorically indirect descriptions - word-word relation. I 461ff Truth/Brandom: is no relation - truth is no property, grammatical misunderstandings, philosophical fictions. Instead: anaphoric analysis - "true" has merely superficial predicate form. BrandomVsFrege: false search for "common proposition" of true sentences. Solution: expressive power of "true" decides whether allocation is justified. I 468 Truth/Brandom: "is true" is a pro-sentence forming operator, not a predicate, truth is not a property. >Prosentential theory. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Truth | Dummett | II 83 Truth/Dummett: truth comes from the act of asserting. - Closely related: correctness: saying something true means to say something correct. II 87ff Truth/Dummett: truth is an objective property of what a speaker says - and this is independent of the knowledge of the speaker or his utterance reasons - Truth is explainable by the more primitive notion of correctness. - (Correctness of sentences about the future, question, command). II 115 Truth/Dummett: truth is still necessary for deductive inferences - def valid/Dummett: an inference that contains truth. I 26ff Correspondence Theory/coherence Theory: meaning comes before truth. Davidson: Truth comes before meaning (truth conditions are defined later by the theory). - Dummett both together! Use/truth/Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes concept of truth superfluous > meaning before truth. III (a) 8/9 Truth/Dummett: better: winning the game. - Therefore is necessary: in addition to declare that the goal is winning, not losing! - Part of the concept of truth is the stated goal to only make true statements. DummettVsFrege: The aim of the truth must be established before claiming, otherwise one could express the same thought, but deny it. III (a) 29 Truth/Dummett: in reality it is mostly about the distinction between designated /non-designated truth values. >Truth conditions/Dummett. III (a) 40 Truth/meaning/Dummett: "It is true that p if ... iff" is not sufficient - Use: Each conditional must be given a specific meaning. - We must be able to already understand "If P, then it is true that P" III (a) 45 Truth/Dummett: that by which a statement is true is that by which it can be recognized as true. Putnam II 214 Truth/Dummett: = Justification. - Dummett believes in final verification. PutnamVsDummett: merely idealized verification is possible. - The assertibility conditions for any sentence are not manageable. >Assertibility conditions/Searle, >Assertibility conditions/Soames. We get to know the meaning conditions by acquiring a practice; that is not an algorithm, they cannot be formalized - hence rationality cannot be formalized either. >Rationality/Putnam. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Truth Conditions | Dummett | II 72 Truth Conditions/Dummett: Truth conditions are assumed to be given. - But only for each type of speech act. - A theory of >force must then distinguish between question, command, etc. Being able to specify truth conditions = being able to paraphrase the sentence, not just adding the predicate "true"! - The truth conditions themselves may not presume understanding of the sentence precisely then when the sentence is to be explained. - ((s) But you have to know what the sentence means, if you want to judge whether the fact is given, or whether a paraphrase is correct). II 95 Truth Conditions/Dummett: E.g. observation of what it means for a tree to be bigger. - Observation of skills: cannot figure out in principle in what exactly the ability consists (the truth conditions for the attribution of skills are needed). II 100 Truth Conditions/Dummett: you cannot know them if you cannot tell when they are satisfied. --- III (a) 17 Sense/Frege: An explanation of sense has to be given by truth conditions. - Tractatus/Wittgenstein: dito: Under which circumstances is a sentence true... >Sense, cf. >Fregean sense. DummettVsFrege/DummettVsWittgenstein: for this one must already know what the statement that "P is true" means. Vs: if that means that P is true, it means the same as asserting P. VsVs: then you must already know what sense it makes to assert P! But that is exactly what was to be explained. >Meaning. VsRedundancy Theory: we must either supplement it (not merely explain meaning by assertion and vice versa) or abandon the bivalence. III (c) 122 Thinking-to-be-true/Dummett: the conditions for this are specified by the truth theory! Problem: the truth conditions are not always recognizable, even if met. Solution: to think that something is true requires only knowledge of the truth conditions, not knowing whether they are fulfilled. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Truth Tables | Wittgenstein | II 73 Truth panel/Truth Table/Truth-panel/Truth-Table/WittgensteinVsRussell: no explanation, since it could also apply to other sentences. >Explanations. II 322 Truth table/truth value table/WittgensteinVsFrege: he did not recognize that this table can be seen again as a symbol for the function, although it looks as if it would say something about the function. - ((s) As a symbol it is arbitrary and thus no explanation but only set next to it). >Symbols. II 327 True/false/truth value/Truth Table/truth panel/Wittgenstein: the calculus with true/false (truth value) is boring and useless. - Just as the calculus by Russell. - Only justification: the true/false-calculus provides a translation of Russell's calculus. - Calculus: has only then value when it brings clarity over another. >Calculus. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Truth Values | Prior | I 51 Truth/"the true"/Frege: all phrases denote "truth": because there are no different truths for different sentences, so as it is always the same truth that various accounts are true. Analogy: sentences denote the truth, as number names name numbers. >Truth value/Frege, >Meaning/Frege, >Fregean meaning. PriorVsFrege: false analogy: does not work with propositional attitude: "X believes that p" does not have to be wrong if p is false. >Propositions. ((s) while different argument values provide other function values, one can attribute to the other any belief-attitudes (also false) without prejudging with it, if he can believe it (i.e. whether the compound sentence gets wrong).) I 63 Truth value/Prior: so we make up the term "truth value" for what we describe as identical if the condition (0) is true: (0) Eφy i.e. "If φ then y and if y then φ". Notation Lesniewski: E = equivalence). Because the truth value is the description of the identical, truht value itself is not the "signified" (VsFrege). >Designation/Prior, >Designation, >Sentences. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Truth Values | Tugendhat | II 233ff Def Truth value potential/Tugendhat: two names that denote the same object, have the same truth value potential. Solution for the conflict: Frege: subsets, quotes: names of sentences- Searle: sentences are never names. Tugendhat then truth value potential quasi transmission of the characteristics of sentences to names. II 237 Truth Value/sentence/object/Frege: by substitutability it is proved that the truth values of sentences correspond to the object of the names - TugendhatVsFrege: it can be proved only in reverse that the objects of the names correspond to the truth values. II 243 Odd meaning/Frege: name of a sentence. >Odd Meaning, >Names of sentences. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Truthconditional Semantics | Strawson | Graeser I 123 Truthconditional Semantics/StrawsonVsWittgenstein/StrawsonVsDavidson/StrawsonVsFrege: Problem: the language include phrases or expressions that have no truth conditions. >Truth-conditional semantics. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Ultimate Justification | Waismann | I 50 Ultimate justification/foundation/Mathematics/Waismann: The question of the last anchorage has not been solved with these researches, but merely pushed back further. A justification is unsuitable with the help of arithmetic; we have already reached the last clues of the arithmetic deduction. But such a possibility seems to arise when one looks beyond arithmetic: this leads to the third standpoint. >Foundation. Arithmetic/Waismann: is based on logic. In doing so, one makes strong use of terms of the set theory, or the class calculus. The assertion that mathematics is only a >"part of logic" includes two theses, which are not always clearly separated: A) The basic concepts of arithmetic can be traced back to purely logical ones by definition B) The principles of arithmetic can be deduced from evidence from purely logical propositions. >Logic, >Proof, >Empiricism. I 51 It looks like the sets of logic are tautologies. (Wittgenstein in 1921 introduced the concept of tautology). >Tautology. WaismannVsFrege: Frege was completely lacking the insight that the whole logic becomes meaningless, because he did not understand the nature of logic at all. In Frege's opinion, logic should be a descriptive science, such as mechanics. And to the question of what it describes, he replied: the relations between ideal objects, such as "and", "or", "if", etc. Platonic conception of a realm of uncreated structures. >Platonism, >G. Frege. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Understanding | Wittgenstein | Danto I 63 Definition understanding/Wittgenstein: understanding of truth conditions. To what refers the subject when his sentence is true. One does not need to know that the sentence is true, only what would be the case if it would be. Usually it takes more than understanding alone to know whether a sentence is actually true. >Truth conditions, >Facts, >Reality. --- Dummett I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding is no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody hearing (like Frege). >Pain. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. >Experience. --- Hintikka I 373 Understanding/Wittgenstein: is not a feeling-word. - Also propositional attitudes are no feelings. >Propositional attitudes, >Sensations. --- Wittgenstein II 46 Understanding/Wittgenstein: actually a translation. >Translation. II 300 Color/Understanding/Wittgenstein: to understand the word "yellow" it is not necessary that something yellow exists. - There also must not be anything, that's a foot long, because the measure is so long. >Colour. II 301 It depends on the language game, if one says, one must have been able to see green to determine: "this is not green." --- Wittgenstein VI 223 Understanding/understanding/Wittgenstein/Schulte: (Philosophical Investigations § 242): this includes not only accordance with the definitions, but also with the judgments. >Definitions, >Judgments. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Variables | Prior | I 30 Number variables/Prior: variables are no names. E.g. if exactly 3 things φ and exactly 4 things ψ, then more things are φ than ψ. Then "3" is no name but an inseparable part of the verb operator "Exactly 3 things __". >Names, >Operators, >Predication, >Is, >Equality, >Equations, >Sets, >Set theory. I 33 Bound variables/Quine: bound variables can only stand for names. So for things, not for sentences. >Bound variables, cf. >Names of sentences, >Quantification, >Objects. QuineVsFrege: names are not for sentences, only for things. - E.g. "For a φ, φx" is the only way to read this, that there is at least one thing, so that x "does" this thing. >Sentences, >"Stand for", >Names/Frege, >Sentences/Frege. Quine himself does not do that but he has "ε" for "is element of". >Element relation, >Is, >Predication. I 35 Bound variable/name/Prior: E.g. open sentence "x is red-haired": what is x? >Open sentences/propositional functions. It depends on how we stand for" understanding: a) x is for a name, such as "Peter" (Substitute) b) or object Peter PriorVsQuine: bound variables can also stand for sentences: "J. believes that p" (anything), then stands for a sentence. ad I 93 (external): Sentence variable/Wittgenstein: Tractatus: The term presupposes forms of all sentences in which it can occur - Tractatus 3.312: It is therefore represented by the general form of the sentences which it characterizes - Wittgenstein: namely in this form the expression will be constant and everything else can be variable - sentence variable: Aristotle's innovation "a" for a whole sentence. I 148 Bound variables/Prior: bound variables represent logical proper names. "For an x: 1. x φ-s, 2. nothing else than x φ-s and 3. it is not the case that x ψ-s". I 164f Bound variable/PriorVs some American logicians: not any bound variable stands for a name. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Verbs | Croft | Gärdenfors I 181 Verbs/Croft/Gärdenfors: Croft (2001) Thesis: The role of verbs is described by Croft as a predication. GärdenforsVsCroft/GärdenforsVsFrege: the concept of predication is too abstract (it can be traced back to Frege) and does not describe the communicative role of verbs. Moreover, verbs are not adequately characterized by predication, since adjectives also predicate. |
Croft I William Croft Radical Construction Grammar: Syntactic Theory in Typological Perspective Oxford 2001 Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Verbs | Gärdenfors | Gärdenfors I 181 Verbs/Croft/Gärdenfors: Croft (2001)(1) Thesis: the role of verbs is described by Croft as a predication. GärdenforsVsCroft/GärdenforsVsFrege: the concept of predication is too abstract (it goes back to Frege) and does not describe the communicative role of verbs. Moreover, verbs are not adequately characterized by predication, since adjectives also predicate. --- I 182 Verbs/Gärdenfors: have two roles: 1. Describe what has happened or should happen 2. Describe how it happens or should happen. Thesis on verbs: a verb either refers to the force vector or the result vector - but not to both. --- I 183 Meaning of verbs: a verb cannot mean something. Solution/Kiparsky: Kiparsky (1997)(2) Thesis: a verb expresses at most a semantic role, e.g. a topic,... --- I 184 ...a direction, a path. Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2010, p. 25)(3) extend this idea by associating semantic roles with argument and modifier position in an event schema. The verb can then only appear as either an argument or a modifier. --- I 198 Verbs/Gärdenfors: semantic thesis: verbs refer to convex regions of vectors defined by a single semantic domain. Adjectives, however, refer to convex regions of a single domain. 1. Croft, W. (2001). Radical construction grammar: Syntactic theory in typological perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Kiparsky, P. (1997). Remarks on denominal verbs. In A. Alsina, J. Bresnan, & P. Sells (Eds.), Complex predicates (pp. 473–499). Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information. 3. Rappaport Hovav, M., & Levin, B. (2010). Reflections on manner/result complementarity. In M. Rappaport Hovav, D. Doron, & I. Sichel (Eds.), Lexical semantics, syntax, and event structure (pp. 21–38). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity | Fraassen Vs Analyticity | EMD II 133 How-Question/Frege/Dummett: belongs to epistemology and not to theory of meaning. Sense/DummettVsFrege: this seems obvious at first glance. But if the meaning is not related to the method of verification, why does Frege not allow two analytically equivalent sentences to have the same sense? EMD II 134 Analyticity/FregeVsQuine/Dummett: He had a well-developed theory of analyticity. Whereas, if two analytically equivalent sentences may differ in sense, there is no criterion for identity. FregeVs/Dummett: Of course, if the concession were granted (which one?), it could not be maintained that the senses of sentences (the thoughts) are objects of beliefs. I.e. the sense is the reference of the propositional attitudes. DummettVsFrege: but this thesis itself requires the assumption that sense is connected to the way of knowing how or to the belief reasons. Question: Can we say that the sense only determines the object, i.e. the "what", or also the "how" or "why" it is believed? Problem: At first glance, the two are too closely interlinked to be seen individually. Why should two things A and B not have the same sense? The only possibility seems to be that X can believe (or know) one thing without believing (or knowing) the other (opaque context). What makes this at all possible is that the reasons of the expressions may be different. It follows that a difference in the reasons of expression includes a difference in the belief objects. II 135 DummettVsFrege: his fault is to have failed to insist that the theory of meaning must explain what manifests the recognition of the speaker. II 136 Theory of Meaning/MT/Verification/DummettVsFrege: a verificationist theory of meaning explains meanings in terms of the actual ability to recognize the truth of propositions. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Analyticity | Quine Vs Analyticity | Danto I 239 QuineVsAnalyticity: we do not anticipate at which time we have to change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no clue. Lanz in Metz I 272 The lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and science are on one and the same continuum. McDowell I 158 QuineVsFirst Dogma: (distinction analytic/synthetic) against the notion that the truth of a synthetic sentence depended on two things: the meaning and the world. ((s) you cannot have meaning before you have the world). Quine, however, preserves duality: Apparently, the truth depends both on the language and on extra-linguistic facts. McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we simply cannot distinguish them sentence by sentence. Quine IV 407 QuineVsAnalyticity: reflects a failed notion of scientific theories and their reference to experience. There is no strict separation analytic/synthetic. "Roots of Reference": if you consistently proceed empirically, you gain an epistemologically harmless notion of analyticity. Analytic/Kant: does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! II 407/408 Analytic/Quine: Kant should rather have said that a statement is analytic if it is true because of meanings and regardless of of facts. This explicitly draws a connection between analyticity and meaning. QuineVsAnalyticity: considerable difficulties exist with sentences like: Ex "No bachelor is married", "cats are animals." Obviously, these are not logical truths, their negation would be no formal objection. (IV 410) Ex Quine: "I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic or not. This is not because of the ambiguity of "green" and "extended", but because of the ambiguity of "analytical". Artificial languages: semantic rules for determining analyticity are only interesting if we already understand analyticity. False notion: the idea that with the truth of a statement it is generally possible to distinguish between a linguistic and a fact component. The whole difficulty is perhaps only a symptom of a false notion of the relationship between language and the world. V 113 Logic/Frege/Carnap: the laws of logic apply because of language. I.e. its sentences are analytic. QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of meaning has not been given empirical meaning. Thus neither this linguistic theory of logic. Solution/Quine: through our observation of language learning: we learn truth functions by finding connections between dispositions. Alternation/Language Learning: the law that an alternation is implied by each of its components is learned with the word "or" itself. Something similar applies to the other laws. (>logical particles >logical constants). Analyticity/Analytical/Language Learning/Quine: Ex we learn "bachelor" by learning that our parents agreed under precisely the circumstances under which they agreed to "unmarried man". QuineVsAnalyticity: Important Argument: there are even disagreements about logical truths: Ex between classical logicians and intuitionists. Maybe we think that some truths are analytic and others are not? Law of the Excluded Middle/SaD/Language Learning/Quine: the law of the excluded middle rejected by intuitionism is not linked in such a way with learning "or"! It is rather due to the blind spot of alternation. Important Argument: perhaps the law of the excluded middle (Quine "law") which is true only in our point of view should only be seen as synthetic. V 116 Analytic/Analyticity/Quine: the analytic propositions are a subclass of stimulus analytic propositions agreeing to which is a disposition of any speaker of a language community. QuineVsCarnap: but even now we do not have such strict contrast to the synthetic propositions. Solution/Quine: Thesis: sentences that have been learned by many first are closer to analyticity than sentences that have only been learned by a few. The analytic propositions are those which are learned by all like that. These extreme cases, however, do not differ significantly from the neighboring ones. One cannot always specify which ones they are. >Two Dogmas/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Austin, John L. | Schiffer Vs Austin, John L. | I 266 Austin: the expression : "the meaning of a word" is almost always a dangerous nonsense. (1961, 24, also Wittgenstein 1953 Ryle 1957) so all VsFrege. DavidsonVsSchiffer/DavidsonVsAustin/DavidsonVsWittgenstein : speaks of an entity that is designated by the "that" as in for example "that snow is white". (Davidson 1968). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Berkeley, G. | Frege Vs Berkeley, G. | IV 47 FregeVsBerkeley: if everything is imagination, there is no bearer. If there is no bearer, there are no imaginations either. But there can be no experience without someone who experiences it. But then there is something that is not my imagination, and yet the object of my contemplation. Could it be that this "I" as a bearer of my consciousness is just one part of this consciousness, while another part may be a "moon image"? I.e. that something else is taking place while I judge that I’m looking at the moon? Then this first part would have a consciousness and a part of this consciousness would be I in turn, so regress. Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the bearer of my imagination. So that what I say something about is not necessarily my imagination. VsFrege: It could be argued, E.g. when I think that I feel no pain at this moment, doesn’t something in my imagination correspond to the word "I"? Frege: That may be. IV 48 I/Frege: the word "I" may be connected to a certain image in my consciousness. But then it is an image among other images, and I am its bearer just as I am the bearer of other ideas. I have an image of me, but I’m not this image! There must be a sharp distinction between the content of my consciousness (my imagination) and the object of my thinking (objective thoughts). Now the path is clear to recognize other people as an independent bearers of their imagination. Even imaginations may be the common object of thought by people who do not have these images. Imagination may become object. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Black, Max | Dummett Vs Black, Max | III (a) 7 Truth Value/Tr.val./BlackVsFrege: if two seentences are materially equivalent, they have the same truth value. Problem: according to Frege certain sentences would have a meaning that they would not have according to normal conception: E.g. "If oysters are inedible, then the wrong thing". DummettVsBlack: if sentences stand for truth value, but there are also expressions (not sentences) for Truth Value, then this is a grammatical problem, not a logical one. Truth Value/Grammar/Dummett: we can easily transform it from a noun into an adjective: "make true". |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Bundle Theory | Newen Vs Bundle Theory | New I 233 Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?). Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems: 1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined 2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name. Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato". Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly. Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description. I 234 Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke: (meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value. I 235 E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato". Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory: E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"." Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name. KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is I 236 the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object. A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.) Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable. Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)". Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning) Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object. Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense. Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names). Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition. I 237 ((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Carnap, R. | Newen Vs Carnap, R. | New I 115 Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network): Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places. Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations. I 116 If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account. Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism. Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations. VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations. I 117 VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example 1) statements about our own consciousness 2) statements about the world of physical objects 3) about the consciousness of others 4) about intellectual and cultural objects. Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment. I 118 The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory. Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories. Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects. Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color. I 119 Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red. Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction. VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution: I 120 (From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc. Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C. Problem: Carnap neglected GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle. NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial. I 121 Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world. NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen. NS I 30 CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems: 1) problem of empty names. a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence b) how can various empty names be distinguished? 2) Problem: Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true. NS I 101 Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory. NS I 102 Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege. VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic. Solution: Searle: bundle theory. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 |
| Compositionality | Schiffer Vs Compositionality | I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fully-developed natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Descartes, R. | Kant Vs Descartes, R. | Danto I 179 KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking. Kant I 73 Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing. Field I 80 KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral. But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle! For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.) Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise. Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence. Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here). Stegmüller IV 362 Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis. 2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed. 3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim). IV 364 VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic. 4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula). MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it? Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege. IV 365 MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this. Strawson V 22 "Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them. V 23 StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system! V 103 KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis. Strawson V 140 Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim. KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity. V 143 KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject. V 145 Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Description Theory | Searle Vs Description Theory | Searle V 236 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: the expression obtained by a translation is according to this interpretation by no means an analysis of the original expression, but merely an analogy. Sense/Frege: Question: what is the relationship between an indicative expression and its meaning? Answer: the sense of an indicative expression is "the manner of presentation." RussellVsFrege: for him there is no relationship between certain descriptions and their meanings! For him, a proposition that includes a description is the hidden form of a proposition that asserts the existence of an object. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Dummett, M. | Brandom Vs Dummett, M. | I 202 BrandomVsDummett: if he see the problematic aspect of the concept "boche" in that it causes a non-conservative extension of the remaining language, it is not right. The non-conservativity merely shows that the concept has a substantial content which was not already included in other concepts. E.g. Temperature: was introduced with certain criteria, with the introduction of new measurement methods, the complex inferential definition developed that determines the significance of today (> Measuring). Introduction: it is not to be asked if the conclusions were already accepted, but whether this conclusion is one that should be accepted! The problem with "boche" and "nigger" is not the novelty, but the unwanted conclusions. Brandom II 173 But there are other ways of justification than showing that we’ve already been on them determined implicitly, even before the term was introduced. Background of material inferential practices. Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: this disregards the specific nature of the sentences of being able to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregian power). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Dummett, M. | Tugendhat Vs Dummett, M. | I 253 Meaning/assertion/Dummett/Tugendhat: Example Game: assertion action, assertion and counter assertion, "yes"/"no" corresponds to "true"/"false" one wins, one loses. This schema should be the basis of every utterance of every assertoric sentence! I 254 The speaker gives a guarantee, which is doubted by the listener. (Searle quite similar, see above). I 255 New: it is said vice versa: if the expression is used, which then are the conditions under which it is correct. This presupposes: 1. That the conditions in which the expression is used are indifferent to the correctness of the use. 2. That the conditions on which the correctness depends are those the fulfilment of which is guaranteed by the use of the expression itself. What the expression guarantees is that the conditions of its correctness (truth) are fulfilled! The equivalence "p equi that p is true" is based on the fact that the person who claims something has always asserted its correctness. I 256 Speaker: Conditions and presence together guaranteed. Listener: separates both and questions it separately. (Asymmetry). I 256/257 TugendhatVsDummett/TugendhatVsSearle: unsatisfactory: 1. Nothing has yet been said about what the truth conditions of an assertion or proposition are. One possibility would be to say that the truth conditions of a proposition are indicated by a proposition. Of course, this presupposes that for the explanation of a proposition there is always already another proposition available. Meta Language. (TugendhatVs). The explanation must lie in a usage rule. It is not enough to show that the first sentence is used as the second, it is necessary to show under which conditions the one sentence is used. 2. Every assumption of a guarantee presupposes the use of an assertoric proposition, which is a pseudo explanation. II 231 TugendhatVsDummett: "Meaning" in Frege should not be translated with "Reference"! II 232 Justified only where Frege considers sentences as proper names! II 247 Reference/Tugendhat: through my criticism of translation, meaning = reference, I have not questioned the primacy of truth over objects. DummettVsTugendhat: it is not enough to explain the meaning of names merely as truth-value potential: 1. The meaning could then be understood as a mere equivalence set of expressions. TugendhatVsDummett: correct with sentences and predicates, with names one does not have to be content with it. DummettVsTugendhat: 2. That two names "a" and "b" have the same meaning, if they have the same truth-value potential, applies only to extensional predicates. But with which criterion can extensional ones be distinguished from intensional predicates? It presupposed that we had a criterion for the equality of meanings of names, which is not first determined by Leibniz's law. II 248 Leibniz's Law/Dummett: cannot be understood as a definition of "=", but is based on the fact that when we predetermine something from an object, the truth value of the assertion must be independent of the way it is given! TugendhatVsDummett: not so with Frege: Dummett himself points out that he understood Leibniz's law as definition of "=". Tugendhat: we cannot explain what we mean by identity with the law. Tugendhat pro Dummett. TugendhatVsDummett: with sentences as equivalence classes one has not lost touch with the world: it is only about very specific equivalence sets, which of course are determined by the nature of the world. Dummett: sentences do not equal names! (VsFrege). II 249 Reference/Dummett: semantic role. Tugendhat: this is exactly the same as my "truth-value potential". ((s) Cf. > semantic value, >semantic role). II 250 Reference/Frege: he never spoke of reference Predicate/Frege: he never said that the meanings of predicates must be understood as "quasi-objects". Dummett/Tugendhat: the justified core of Dummett's criticism: it does not yet follow from the truth-value potential that the meaning of a name is an object. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Dummett, M. | Wittgenstein Vs Dummett, M. | Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett / WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement is indicated by the description of its truth conditions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Dummett, M. | Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M. | II 1 "Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking. StalnakerVsDummett. II 2 The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking. Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto) Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here. Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes. II 74 Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker: K: I will be killed P: I take precautions Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary. 1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that. Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid. Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed. Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps. StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional). a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from II 75 2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion. That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)). Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this: A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B So: C v D. Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails. I 174 Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out. Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions. a) what is the semantics e.g. for names b) what facts cause that this is our semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language. ((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker). I 179 Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F. Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description). That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind. I 180 Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition. singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it). StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true. Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Eliminativism | Shoemaker Vs Eliminativism | Stalnaker I 227 Utility theory/utility/scale/calibration/von Neumann/Morgenstern/Stalnaker: E.g. someone prefers duck before salmon and salmon before oatmeal A > B > C. Refinement of the scale: one asks the person whether he prefers to have B or prefers to have a 50/50 lottery ticket for A v C. Does he select B, it means that B moves closer to the left on his scale, closer to A. This can be repeated for the things at stake in the lottery and thus ever further refinements can be concluded. General: preferences between the lottery tickets define numerical values for the utility But the scale is a conventional: every linear transformation of this scale provides an equivalent, that represents the same facts about the subjective preferences. Question: does it make sense to compare preferences interpersonally? I 228 Utility/Stalnaker: but here it is not about felt pleasure (as a "quality experience"). The numeric values do not represent facts about relations between people. Analogy/Stalnaker: the position VsInterpersonal comparisons is analogous to the question whether grams would be greater or smaller than kilometers. Pointe: that we cannot say this is not because there were facts that were hidden from us. qualitative/intentional/Stalnaker: if we oppose intentional to phenomenal (qualitative) states, it is clear that utility belongs to the intentional side. Utility/analogy/Stalnaker: the question whether one can compare utility interpersonally is complicated and interesting. It is also about whether it is more likely that apply it to social groups. I 229 Utility theory/von Neumann/Morgenstern//Stalnaker: should not be regarded as eliminativistical. According to it there are really facts about the preferences of those represented by the numbers but because the zero point and the units are arbitrary, interpersonal compare have no sense. StalnakerVsShomaker: I am afraid he takes the side of common sense VsFrege because he assumes that Frege is an eliminativist. ShoemakerVsEliminativism. Qualia/secondary qualities/Shoemaker: thesis: we need qualia for facts about our experiences and for secondary qualities. StalnakerVsShoemaker: a purely relational approach is capable of this as well. RelationismVsQualia. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Fraassen, B. van | Carnap Vs Fraassen, B. van | VI 242 Concept/Object/CarnapVsFrege: the border between concept and object is sometimes fluent. - Question: if something is a real object or rather a conceptual summary (e.g. furniture, coal inventory in Central Europe). - Relation: it is controversial whether E.g. distance is something real. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Frege, G. | Austin Vs Frege, G. | I 236 Negation/AustinVsFrege: affirmation and negation are on exactly the same level in the sense that there can be no language that does not contain conventions for both, and that both refer equally direct to the world and not to statements about the world. However, there can of course be a language that does not contain a means to fulfill the functions of ’true’ and ’false’. (Tugendhat I 66 Frege: propositional content). |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Frege, G. | Black Vs Frege, G. | II 124 Numbers/BlackVsPlato/BlackVsFrege: false Platonism: imagining them as "extraordinary" or "special", "eternal" objects. II 125 Grammatically, however, the names of numbers (numerals) differ in important aspects from the name of physical objects. E.g. "Two people came in": Here "two" is public. Adverb. This can be transformed into "one and one: "a man came in and then another." This is not possible in the case of "red". (> Paraphrase). BlackVsFrege: These grammatical facts show that numbers are no "special kinds of objects". Frege: the great Frege, however, made no elementary mistake by accepting it anyeay, but he was never really satisfied with it. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Brandom Vs Frege, G. | I 506 BrandomVsFrege: he blurs the distinction between free-standing and embedded contents. (Brandom also allows sub-sentential level). I 592 BrandomVsFrege: his call for all truth values to be clarified results in disastrous consequences in his late work Basic Laws of Arithmetic. I 662 Def Content/Frege: "Two judgments have the same content iff the inferences that can be drawn in conjunction with several other ones always also follow from the others in connection with the same other judgments." I 807/808 BrandomVsFrege: That’s an all-quantification via auxiliary hypotheses: it is not enough to have one set of other judgments that lead to the same set of consequences. Such a requirement would erase the differences, because such a set can always be found: according to Frege, any two sentences have the same consequences if they are connected to a contradiction. Dual aspect: what constitutes evidence as evidence of an auxiliary hypothesis depends on the available auxiliary hypotheses (Holism). Names: Fregean Line: the speaker connects a property (or conjunction of properties) with each name, which determines its reference as the only one. BrandomVsFrege: it is hard to see why this should be Fregean. For Frege, properties are part of the "meaning", not of the "sense" - they are not immediately detectable. And how would this analysis be extended to predicates in Frege’s view? They are surely not to be determined by property sets. Brandom: the conceptual contents expressed by proper names differ from conventionally conceived Fregean sense in that their individuation is not epistemically transparent. We can be in the dark as to whether two Tokenings belong to the same anaphoric chain or not. In this sense, we do not always know what we say and think. Frege IV 85 (> Knowledge). Frege speaks about grasping, not about seeing! Frege: "Someone" refers to nothing. - "He" refers to nothing. (BrandomVsFrege: anaphora!). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Frege, G. | Dummett Vs Frege, G. | Brandom II 74 Frege (late): representation of independent reality DummettVsFrege: Falsely: property of sentences instead of transitions between them. Brandom II 173 Frege, late: sentences are singular terms! Predicates: frames. (DummettVsFrege: the disregards the specific nature of the sentences to be moves in the language game BrandomVsDummett:. As if Frege had no idea about Fregean force). Dummett I 15 Frege’s basic idea: Extraction of the concept (in the sense of the definition of 1890) by decomposition of a complete thought. (Begriffsschrift)(1). I 51 DummettVsFrege: It is questionable, however, whether this term can be explained without referring to the concept of the sentence. One must, for example, not only identify a proper noun in a sentence, but also be able to replace it in this position. How to explain the "occurrence" of the meaning of a name in a thought without relying on the form of its linguistic expression, is not clear. Frege: The meaning of every partial expression should be the contribution of this subexpression for determining this condition. DummettVsFrege: So we must know, contrary to Frege’s official theory, what it means that a proposition is true, before we can know what it means that it expresses a thought; before we can know what it means that an expression makes sense, we need to know what it means that it has a reference. Tradition: It used to be argued: as long as the meaning is the way of givenness of the reference object, there can, if no object is present, be no corresponding way of givenness and therefore no meaning (Evans, McDowell). DummettVsFrege: The difficulty is triggered by the fact that Frege strictly equates the semantic value of a singular term and the object to which it is intended to refer. The slogan "Without semantic value no meaning" is impressive, but it can only be accepted at the price of admitting that a singular term without reference still has a semantic value which then presumably consists in the mere fact of the absence of a reference. Husserl has no doubts in this regard. He generalizes the concept of meaning and transfers it from expressing acts to all acts of consciousness. For this generalized term Husserl uses the term "noema". DummettVsFrege: That does not show that the thesis the meaning (thought, see above) was not a content of consciousness is wrong, but rather that its reasoning, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity do not quite apply. Dummett I 61 DummettVsFrege: For an incommunicable meaning which refers to a private sentiment, would, contrary to the sensation itself, not belong to the content of consciousness. DummettVsFrege: Independence from sensation is necessary for objectivity: E.g. color words, opaque surface, a color-blind person recognizes by this that others see the color. I 63. Frege: "Red" does not only refer to a physical property, but to a perceptible property (it appears as red to perople with normal vision). If we explained "appears red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do this the other way around. DummettVsFrege: The modified version by Frege is unsatisfactory, because it gives the word "red" a uniform reference, but attributes a different meaning to it, depending on the speaker. I 64 Intension/Frege: "parallel to the straight line" different from "same direction as the straight line", DummettVs: Here, one must know the concept of direction or not "whatever value" other sense than "value curve" DummettVs: Here, the concept of value curve must be known or not. special case of the Basic Law V from which Russell antinomy arises. I 79 Meaning: Contradictory in Frege: on the one hand priority of thought over language, on the other hand, it is not further explained. I 90 ++ - Language/Thinking/Perception I 93 + - DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to "interpretation". I 104 - Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activity) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. I 106 Frege: Grasping of the Thought: directly through the consciousness, but not content of the consciousness - DummettVs: contradictory: Grasping is an ability, therefore background (both episodically and dispositionally) I 122 - DummettVs Equating the literal meaning with the thought module. I 124 + DummettVsFrege: all thoughts and ideas can be communicated! Because they only appear in a particular way - by this determination they are communicable I 128. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Frege, G. | Evans Vs Frege, G. | Frank I 485 I/Here/Now/This/Index Words/Evans: are closely related. One and the same explanation pattern applies with three properties: 1) Criteria-free identification: in a certain sense there is even no identification at all! But this can be understood a a "broader sense of identification". Problem: possible misunderstanding: identification criterion of singular term is the Fregean sense. A "criteria-less sense" would then appear as a conceptual contradiction. Solution/Evans: Fregean sense: should be understood as the particular way to think of an object designated by an expression. 2) Limited Accessibility: "I" is not accessible to anyone at any time. Fra I 486 You have to be at the place in question in order to truthfully say "here". The behavior of "I", "this", etc. corresponds to this. I/Thoughts/Understanding/EvansVsFrege: it’s probably impossible for me to "grasp" other people’s "I" thoughts, but that does not mean it is impossible to understand them! Communication/Evans: It is not absolutely necessary to think the thoughts of others in exactly the same form as they do themselves in order to understand them. Limited Accessibility/VsEvans: Question: Is it not possible to have "here" thoughts, no matter where you are? EvansVsVs: misunderstanding: Fregean thoughts are carriers of un-relativized, absolute truth values. Thus it is impossible that one and the same idea is sometimes true and sometimes wrong. It is therefore wrong to speak of a way of givenness expressed by "here" (s) "Here" is not an intention, "here" no intention Kaplan: "I": "rigid intension") Evans: There are as many kinds of the givenness of "here" as there are places. Difference: type/token. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Field Vs Frege, G. | I 89 Knowledge of Consistency/FregeVsDeflationism: (Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, §95): We can only determine that a concept is consistent by first producing something that falls under it. (Frege, p. 106). FieldVsFrege: this is obviously not literally correct: E.g. we can see that the concept of a "winged horse" is consistent without producing such a horse. But you can weaken the argument: then it acknowledges that there is knowledge of possibility that does not arise from a knowledge of actuality, but from the reflection of the logical form of the concepts. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Husserl Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 47 Meaning/Husserl: in any case, it is clear that according to Husserl, a full-bodied expression owes its meaning to an accompanying consciousness act. Reference/FregeVsHusserl: Frege's principle states that the reference of an expression is that which is common to all other expressions where it is established that their substitution does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs instead of the original expression. Dummett I 48 Reference/HusserlVsFrege: Husserl on the other hand tends to the view that the reference is the same as the object to which the predicate is applied. He is certainly not equating the reference of a predicate and a concept, however, Husserl used meaning and sense synonymously. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Frege, G. | Kaplan Vs Frege, G. | Frank I 484 Singular Term/Frege: is not limited to standing for an object, but always has a special way of being given. ("sense", intension). Index words/indexical/Perry/VsFrege/KaplanVsFrege: this model is tailored to descriptions and names and fails with references to the first person. EvansVsPerry/EvansVsKaplan: 1. there is no reason to suggest that Frege said that the object of a singular term is always given by the fact that a certain description applies to it, 2. the peculiarities of the indexical reference are to be uncovered precisely by a theory of the non-descriptive ways of the given connected with it. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Kripke Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell II 151 Pierre-E.g../Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1979) Cresswell: if de re interpreted, is the belief about London. Description Theory/Cresswell: For this, the example is not a problem ((s) Londres and London are different for Pierre because of different descriptions). ((s) causal theory/(s): the case is a problem for them because they have to assume that the meaning of the name is the carrier and must therefore be the same carrier and therefore contradictory predicates are attributed.) Description Theory/Cresswell: Here the description is relative to Pierre, but it is not his private matter! Def "Extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell: (he attributes this disposition to these two): Thesis: that name in general belong to idiolects. Problem: Then the Pierre-E.g. is not about Pierre but about the speaker, who is reporting this case, and his idiolect. Cresswell: Unfortunately it is not so simple: e.g. an ancient Greek could have been arrived from the ancient to us. He is initially going to use "Φωσφόρος" instead of "Phosphorus". His disposition towards it will as different from ours, as the Pierre-example demonstrates the different dispositions of "London" and "Londres". Ambiguity/Cresswell: is caused here because a name can stand for numerous descriptions. The latter allow in most cases that "London" can be translated as "Londres". The only case in which it does not work is the example of Pierre. Stalnaker I 172 Name/reference/meaning/sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names are directly addressing the referent without the mediation of an intermediary meaning Frege/Dummett/Searle: Thesis: The meaning of the name must be adopted in-between the name and his referent. a) otherwise the object cannot be identified or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke)since we cannot learn the language. I 174 Reference/meaning/Searle/Stalnaker: When a statement does not possess a descriptive content, it cannot be linked to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: .. the object must be singled out somehow. Stalnaker: in both cases, it comes to skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both seem to be of the opinion that a satisfactory fundamental semantics (see above that as a fact an expression has its semantic value)cannot be given. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: Both, however, do not state this since they do not separate those two issues. a) what is the semantics, e.g. for names b) what circumstances lead to those semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them, we can no longer rule out the possibility that each language could be a language spoken by us. Then the community could very well speak a Mill’s language. Frege’s language/Meaning/Reference/Denotation/Stalnaker: We would need them if these questions were not separate, e.g. if we needed to explain those at the same time. a) why a name has these referents and b) what the speaker communicates with his statement (which information, content). Meaning/ KripkeVsFrege: Kripke (1972) (S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edition, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769, Dordrecht, 1972) The latter should be criticized for using "meaning" in two different ways. a) as meaning b) as the way how the reference is determined. By identifying the two, he assumes that both are created by specific descriptions.that both are given by specific markings. I 192 Causal chain/Historic chain/Semantics/Metasemantics/Presemantics/Kaplan/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1989a, 574 ("pre-semantics") Question: Are causal chains a part of semantics or a part of metasemantics? Semantics: states, which semantic values hold the expressions of a language. Metasemantics: what circumstances determine the semantic values. Presemantics/Kaplan: concerns those who believe that a name signifies something laying at the other end of a historical chain. Semantics/Kaplan: gives us rather the meaning than explaining how to find it. Similar to Kripke: Reference/Meaning/Kripke/Stalnaker: Kripke distinguishes between what the reference fixes (the causal chain) and it signifies. KripkeVsFrege: he has mixed up those two things. Name/Kaplan/Stalnaker: he asks whether names are like index words. I/Kaplan/Stalnaker: Is a rigid designator: The truth conditions (WB) of what is said (propositional content) depend on the actual referent. Contrary to: Meaning/I/Stalnaker: One indicates the significance by stating how the referent is determined in the context. That would belong to a theory of e.g. the English language. E.g. "I refer to the speaker" . Who knows this will be taken for someone who knwos the significance of"I", even if Important Argument: he does not know who was the speaker at a particular occasion.((s) Difference between significance/reference > "whoever was the speaker") Def Character/Kaplan: = significance. Function of possible contexts of use for referents. Tugendhat I 440 KripkeVsFrege: Primacy of descriptions not anymore(TugendhatVs). Kripke/Tugendhat: Actually, he is not particularly interested in the definition of the proper name but in the rigid designator. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Frege, G. | Lewis Vs Frege, G. | Schwarz I 228 Predicate/Characteristic/SchwarzVsLewis/VsFrege: The assumption that for each predicate a name can be clearly allocated for a corresponding characteristic. But is nothing less than Frege's ominous axiom V(Frege 1893-1903(1),§20). RussellVsFrege: Russell's paradoxy. Some predicates, for example "_ is a characteristic that does not apply to itself" do not correspond to a characteristic. (>Heterology). Predicate/Characteristic/Lewis/Schwarz: In Lewis' metaphysics predicates as, for example, "_ is a class", "_ is a part of" and "is identical with _" do not correspond to anything that can be named with a singular term. 1. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Mill Vs Frege, G. | II 57 Names/Mill: Provide the listener with no knowledge about the object. If s_he may have learned something about Cologne earlier, it was not by the word Cologne. II 58 By learning about how many objects a name can referre to we also learn nothing, but only if we know what it possibly connotes (attributes). On the same thing, we can also apply different names, whose meanings are not the same. MillVsFrege: Therefore, the carrier is not the meaning. II 59 Connotative name/Mill: Here there is an uncertainty. II 61 Solution: to confer a fixed connotation to concrete names with specific predicates. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 |
| Frege, G. | Nagel Vs Frege, G. | III 107 Psychology/Nagel: it is characteristic for psychological terms that we imagine they could be separated from the objective side effects! E.g. the question whether sugar tastes for other people like "this here" is a perfectly well-defined question! Even if it is unanswerable! ((s) NagelVsFrege/NagelVsSchlick/ >Cresswell II "Frege-Schlick view")). |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Frege, G. | Prior Vs Frege, G. | I 50 Truth Value/PriorVsFrege: Problem: the term "truth value": was invented by him, but originally for mathematical contexts. Value: to be "greater than 0" is, strictly speaking, not the "value" of a function for a given argument. The value for this argument is not a property of a number (e.g. to be > 0). But a number! The value of a function is different for different arguments and is not the whole collection (Frege: value curve!) of values. Frege: sentences designate objects that are called truth and falsity. Namely in the same way as number names (numerals) and formulas contain the number names, designate numerals. Which number is designated by a given function expression depends on which number is designated by the expression argument, and by nothing else. Prior: if the analogy is to last, then whether truth or falsity is designated must depend on what is designated by the argument sentence ((s) the cited belief), and on nothing else ((s) i.e. it would always have to be believed that grass is green, simply because it is true - absurd.) Prior: E.g. that it is not the case that the grass is pink, just like 2-1 > 0 (and also other things, such as is its own square!), according to Frege this is not simply supposed to be "true", but "the true thing". That is to correspond to the fact that 2-1 is not only "> 0", but the number 1! I 51 And that it is not the case that the grass is pink is "the true thing" (truth), precisely because the grass is pink is "the false thing". Analogy: "the false thing" as in: (1 + 1) 1 is the number 1, precisely because 1 + 1 is the number 2, because that grass is pink is the wrong thing just like (3-1) 1 is the number 1, because 3-1 is the number 2. There are no different truths. PriorVsFrege: all this follows if Frege's analogy is true. But of course it is false. Truth and falsity are more like properties of what sentences designate. That is what Frege wanted to avoid. But we have said above that sentences denote nothing. Propositions/Prior: only have Pickwickian meaning! (WittgensteinVsBroad: (Wittgenstein II 94): There is not one "special" meaning apart from the "ordinary" meaning) Prior: but we know enough to see that this is harmless. We know what it means, that 1 is > 0, namely, since for each φ and each ψ if exactly one thing φs and no thing ψs, then more things are φ-ing than are ψ-ing. Def "more than". I 51/52 Function/Sentence/Prior: it is a function of the sense of "grass is pink" to be expressed by the sentence "X believes that grass is pink". Distinction without Difference/Prior: but that makes no difference! That this is not the case, is exactly what makes the belief false. There is no thing that is designated with "grass is pink". (VsFrege: i.e. also not "the wrong thing", but that is not what Frege meant, either). Truth functions and belief functions are functions of the same argument!(?). Def Proposition/(Thoughts?)/Church: have the property of "being the concept of truth or falsity." Thoughts/PriorVsFrege: among the functions of his thought we have those that are related to each other, just as the functions of the true and false are related to each other and we can omit the latter as superfluous. But the extensionalists have made the stone that we have jettisoned their milestone! PriorVsFrege: Conclusion: sentences do not designate anything, not even "the true thing" or "the false thing". Extensionalism/Prior: Thesis: sentences have truth values as their "extension". I 53 PriorVs: they have that as little as predicates have classes as their extension. For truth values and classes are both logical constructions and very similar ones at that! And not "objects". (PriorVsPlatonism, VsExistence of classes and truth values as objects). Names/Variables/Prior: there is a doctrine among American logicians that every bound variable stands for a name. PriorVs: that is too eccentric a criterion for names. Ontology/Individual/Prior: in reality, combines the principle that only individuals are real with the view that the only way for us to grasp individuals linguistically is to treat them as applications of nouns. And that their application is unique is something that can be expressed within the system, and not with Russell's logical proper names (this, or descriptions) I 166 but with Lesniewski's functor "e" or "This __ is a __". Description/ Frege: for him, the expression "the such and such" itself an individual name (individual name, singular name). PriorVsFrege: there are no individual names! Instead, the expression occurs as part of a longer functor that carries out the individuation. This/Oxford: many there are not happy about Russell's logical proper names. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Frege, G. | Putnam Vs Frege, G. | V 48 Frege: the meaning ("sense") of an expression should be an extramental entity or an extramental notion that the mind could "capture" somehow. PutnamVsFrege: such a theory here is not useful in terms of intentions in our new sense. >Intensions/Putnam. 1. there are meaning differences that missed the intention. So the understanding of an expression can not solely consist in the fact that one associates it with an intension. 2. We have no "sixth sense" that allows us to directly perceive extramental entities. The "detecting" of an intension must be somehow mediated by representations. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Frege, G. | Quine Vs Frege, G. | Quine I 425 VsFrege: tendency to object orientation. Tendency to align sentences to names and then take the objects to name them. I 209 Identity/Aristotle/Quine. Aristotle, on the contrary, had things right: "Whatever is predicated by one should always be predicated by the other" QuineVsFrege: Frege also wrong in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung". QuineVsKorzybski: repeated doubling: Korzybski "1 = 1" must be wrong, because the left and right side of the equation spatially different! (Confusion of character and object) "a = b": To say a = b is not the same, because the first letter of the alphabet cannot be the second: confusion between the sign and the object. Equation/Quine: most mathematicians would like to consider equations as if they correlated numbers that are somehow the same, but different. Whitehead once defended this view: 2 + 3 and 3 + 2 are not identical, the different sequence leads to different thought processes (QuineVs). I 264 according to Russell "Propositional Attitudes": believes, says, strives to, that, argues, is surprised, feares, wishes, etc. ... I 265 Propositional attitudes create opaque contexts into which quantification is not allowed. (>) It is not permissible to replace a singular term by an equally descriptive term, without stretching the truth value here. Nor a general term by an equally comprehensive one. Also cross-references out of opaque contexts are prohibited. I 266 Frege: in a structure with a propositional attitude a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class nor an individual, but it works as "name of a thought" or name of a property or as an "individual term". QuineVsFrege: I will not take any of these steps. I do not forbid the disruption of substitutability, but only see it as an indication of a non-designating function. II 201 Frege emphasized the "unsaturated" nature of the predicates and functions: they must be supplemented with arguments. (Objections to premature objectification of classes or properties). QuineVsFrege: Frege did not realize that general terms can schematized without reifying classes or properties. At that time, the distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables was still unclear. II 202 "So that" is ontologically harmless. Despite the sad story of the confusion of the general terms and class names, I propose to take the notation of the harmless relative clause from set theory and to write: "{x:Fx} and "ε" for the harmless copula "is a" (containment). (i.e.the inversion of "so that"). Then we simply deny that we are using it to refer to classes! We slim down properties, they become classes due to the well-known advantages of extensionality. The quantification over classes began with a confusion of the general with the singular. II 203 It was later realized that not every general term could be allocated its own class, because of the paradoxes. The relative clauses (written as term abstracts "{x: Fx}") or so-that sentences could continue to act in the property of general terms without restrictions, but some of them could not be allowed to exercise a dual function as a class name, while others could. What is crucial is which set theory is to be used. When specifying a quantified expression a variable may not be replaced by an abstraction such as: "x} Fx". Such a move would require a premise of the form (1), and that would be a higher form of logic, namely set theory: (1) (Ey)(y = {x:Fx}) This premise tells us that there is such a class. And at this point, mathematics goes beyond logic! III 98 Term/Terminology/Quine: "Terms", here as a general absolute terms, in part III single-digit predicates. III 99 Terms are never sentences. Term: is new in part II, because only here we are beginning to disassemble sentences. Applying: Terms apply. Centaur/Unicorn/Quine: "Centaur" applies to any centaur and to nothing else, i.e. it applies to nothing, since there are no centaurs. III 100 Applying/Quine: Problem: "evil" does not apply to the quality of malice, nor to the class of evil people, but only to each individual evil person. Term/Extension/Quine: Terms have extensions, but a term is not the denotation of its extension. QuineVsFrege: one sentence is not the denotation of its truth value. ((s) Frege: "means" - not "denotes"). Quine: advantage. then we do not need to assume any abstract classes. VII (f) 108 Variables/Quine: "F", etc.: not bindable! They are only pseudo-predicates, vacancies in the sentence diagram. "p", "q", etc.: represent whole statements, they are sometimes regarded as if they needed entities whose names these statements are. Proposition: these entities are sometimes called propositions. These are rather hypothetical abstract entities. VII (f) 109 Frege: alternatively: his statements always denote one or the other of exactly two entities: "the true one" or "the false one". The truth values. (Frege: statements: name of truth values) Quine pro Frege: better suited to distinguish the indistinguishable. (see above: maxim, truth values indistinguishable in the propositional calculus (see above VII (d) 71). Propositions/Quine: if they are necessary, they should rather be viewed as names for statements. Everyday Language/Quine: it is best if we return to everyday language: Names are one kind of expression and statements are another! QuineVsFrege: sentences (statements) must not be regarded as names and "p", "q" is not as variables that assume entities as values that are entities denoted by statements. Reason: "p", "q", etc. are not bound variables! Ex "[(p>q). ~p]> ~p" is not a sentence, but a scheme. "p", "q", etc.: no variables in the sense that they could be replaced by values! (VII (f) 111) VII (f) 115 Name/QuineVsFrege: there is no reason to treat statements as names of truth values, or even as names. IX 216 Induction/Fregean Numbers: these are, other than those of Zermelo and of von Neumann, immune against the trouble with the induction (at least in the TT), and we have to work with them anyway in NF. New Foundations/NF: But NF is essentially abolishing the TT! Problem: the abolition of TT invites some unstratified formulas. Thus, the trouble with induction can occur again. NFVsFrege: is, on the other hand, freed from the trouble with the finite nature which the Fregean arithmetic touched in the TT. There, a UA was needed to ensure the uniqueness of the subtraction. Subtraction/NF: here there is no problem of ambiguity, because NF has infinite classes - especially θ - without ad-hoc demands. Ad 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: do not denote! Therefore, they can form no names (by quotation marks). XI 55 QuineVsFrege/Existence Generalisation/Modal/Necessary/Lauener: Solution/FregeVsQuine: this is a fallacy, because in odd contexts a displacement between meaning and sense takes place. Here names do not refer to their object, but to their normal sense. The substitution principle remains valid, if we use a synonymous phrase for ")". QuineVsFrege: 1) We do not know when names are synonymous. (Synonymy). 2) in formulas like e.g. "(9>7) and N(9>7)" "9" is both within and outside the modal operaotor. So that by existential generalization (Ex)((9>7) and N(9>7)) comes out and that's incomprehensible. Because the variable x cannot stand for the same thing in the matrix both times. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Russell Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 59 RussellVs distinction sense / reference (meaning / reference) (RussellVsFrege) --- Stepanians I 44 Proof/Frege/Stepanians: Frege requests with the demand for completeness and rigor much stronger requirements for evidence than his mathematical contemporaries. Mathematics/VsFrege: mathematicians were more interested in truth than in the epistemological status. Intuitively plausible transitions were sufficient. --- Stepanians I 87 Explicit definition/Frege/Stepanians: must satisfy two conditions 1. Frege's adequacy criterion: Hume's principle must follow from it. The justification for this principle is that the basic laws of arithmetic have to be provable on the principle's basis. 2. the explicit definition must master the problem with recourse to concept scope, where the context definition fails: it must solve the Caesar-problem (see above). --- I 88 VsFrege: his explicit definition of the number concept does not solve the Caesar problem, but shifts it only to concept scope. Solution: would it only be if the concept scope excluded from the outset that Caesar is such a one. Solution/Frege: requires here simply that the knowledge of the concept scope excludes this. Value-over-time/terminology: = concept scope. I 88 Concept scope/Frege/StepaniansVsFrege/VsFrege/Stepanians: Frege's own view of concept scopes will prove to be contradictory (see Russell's paradox). I 91 Concept scope/Frege/Stepanians: was a newly introduced logical object by Frege for solving the Caesar-problem. They were not present yet in the concept script. Frege must justify them. Additional axiom: "Basic Law V": The scope of F = is the scope of G bik All Fs are G and vice versa. Russell's paradox/antinomy/RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: Basic Law V allows the transition from a general statement via terms to a statement about objects that fall under F - the scope of F. It is assumed that each term has a scope, even if it might be empty. I 92 RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: shows that not all definable terms in Frege's theory have a scope: Concept scope/Frege/RussellVsFrege: since concept scopes are objects the question has to be allowed whether a concept scope falls under the concept whose extent/scope it is. If so, it includes itself, otherwise not. Example: the scope of the term cat is itself not a cat. On the other hand: Example: the scope of the term non-cat contains very well itself, since it is not a cat. Contradiction: a concept scope which includes all concept scopes that do not contain themselves. If it contained itself, it should not to contain itself by definition, if it did not contain itself, it must include itself by definition. I 96 Object/concept/Frege/Stepanians: we discover (in a purely logical way) objects on concepts as their scopes. I 97 VsFrege/VsConcept scope/Stepanians: the idea of the concept scope is based on a linguistic deception (See Chapter 6 § 2). That was Frege's own diagnosis. I 114 Sentence/declarative sentence/statement/designating/VsFrege/Stepanians: one has often accused Frege that a declarative sentence does not want to denote anything but wants to claim (a truth value as an object) something. FregeVsVs/Stepanians: sentences as names for truth values are actually about subsets, whereas these subsets make a contribution to the truth value of the sentence structure (complete sentence). Sentence/assertion/declarative sentence/Frege: (later, function and concept, 22, footnote): the total sentence means F nothing. Basic Laws/terminology/Frege: (later): in the basic laws he differentiates terminologically and graphically between sentential "truth value names" that contribute towards the determination of the truth value and "concept type sets" that mean F nothing, but claim something. --- Horwich I 57 RussellVsFrege/Cartwright: Russell's analysis differs from Frege, by not using unsaturation. (1) 1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Newen I 61 Meaning determination/meaning/Russell/Newen: Two modes are possible: a) syncategorematic: according to the occurrence in a sentence. b) categorematic; independent from the occurrence in a sentence. Relational principle of meaning: applies to categorematic expressions: the meaning is the object (or the property). They are defined by acquaintance. --- I 62 RussellVsFrege: Thesis: simple expressions mean what they signify. Syncategorematic/meaning/Russell. E.g. "and", "or": indicating their meaning means indicating the meaning of sentences in which they occur. ((s)> Context, contextually). Contextually/Russell/Newen: syncategorematic expressions: their meaning is indicated by their meaning in schemes (sentence scheme). --- Quine II 103 Russell: classes, if there are any, must exist, properties at best must be in place (weaker). Quine: I think this is arbitrary. In Russell's analysis of the concept of meaning, its relative indifference reappears opposite the existence-term (subsistence): Frege: threefold distinction a) expression, b) what it means, c) that to what it (if at all) refers to. This is not natural for Russell. RussellVsFrege: ~ the whole distinction between mean and designate is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where should we find the designating complex that supposedly refers to C? QuineVsRussell: Russell's position seems sometimes to come from a confusion of terms with their meanings, sometimes from a confusion of the expression with its mention. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Searle Vs Frege, G. | II 285 Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions. II 286 Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege! Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for. II 301 The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation. 2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification. 3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress). Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress.. II 303 Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words. II 228 Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement. III 229 Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not. 2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements. Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation. V 116 SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too). V 117 Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself. E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound! V 144 SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition! V 152 Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions. Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Second order logic). V 155 Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b). Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms. V 156 Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property! V 172 Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression. V 173 2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals. 4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals. 5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions. V 256 Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions. To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star. They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Shoemaker Vs Frege, G. | Stalnaker I 222 Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: this one will explain it with a relational structure. We have distinctive skills and are disposed to make certain judgments about similarity and difference. That means that we can combine certain kinds of experiences with others. Discernment: is the intrapersonal criterion for the identity of qualia. Inverted spectra/inverted qualia//symmetry/Stalnaker: Assuming (as does the thesis of the inverted spectra) that the relational structure is symmetrical (in some way). Suppose we could permute types of qualitative experiences systematically, so that all I 223 judgments about equality and diversity survived and thus generally the whole relational structure. Functionalism: will then determine the functional identity (because of the symmetry), with a qualitative contrast (because qualia were depicted with other qualia, which are distinguishable from them). Pointe: if that is correct then no functionalist description of qualia could be correct. Vs: you can deny this 1. by denying the symmetry. One can say that even if there is a certain symmetry in the structure of color experiences - in the distinctive skills and judgments about equality and diversity - the whole relational structure is much more complex. There are interactions of colors with others who are not preserved during permutations. bad solution/inverted spectra: to introduce additional characteristics such as e.g. red is hot, blue is cool, etc. Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put those objections aside. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intra personnel through distinctive capabilities, you should expect that he accepts the Frege/Schlick-view that means that there is no intra personnel counterpart. Shoemaker: that would be too simple. Thesis: He wants to reconcile intra personnel comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach. Although we cannot define certain qualitative states functionalistically but rather classes of qualitative states. Classes of qualitative states: we define functionally the identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) equality and diversity. Thus we get equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those that are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations. ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason why he resists the Frege/Schlick-view, I 224 that he thinks that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there may be intra personnel inverted spectra. And he believes that through this there is an argument for intra personnel exchanged spectra that you cannot resist. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Frege, G. | Strawson Vs Frege, G. | Searle III 213 Fact/statement/Strawson: here there are not two independent entities, facts are what statements testify. They are not what statements are on statements. Facts: are not language-independent things in the world. They like "statement" and "true" contain even a certain type of discourse in itself. Frege: Facts are simply true statements.(!) (Strawson and AustinVs). E.g. there are not two separate types of events such as winning and victory. The victory consists precisely in winning. III 214 StrawsonVsFrege: but it would be wrong to draw here an exact analogy (but not from Austin's reasons). Fact and statement are not identical, because they play different roles in our language! Facts act causally in a way that true statements do not. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Tugendhat Vs Frege, G. | II 237 Replaceability/Frege: he was of the opinion that the principle of replaceability could prove that the truth values of the sentences correspond to the objects of the names. TugendhatVsFrege: with this principle it can only be proved that conversely, the objects of the names correspond to the truth values of the propositions. II 238 Sentence/Proprietary Name/Tugendhat: names and sentences have something in common: the ability to have a meaning. II 243 Def indirect meaning/Frege: name of a sentence. Complex Sentences/Frege/Tugendhat: Truth functions of their subordinate clauses! Where this is not the case, partial sentences appear as names (indirect meaning, quotation). TugendhatVsFrege: the thought that the meaning of a sentence (in a technical sense) is only the truth value is mistaken. When a clause is nominalized, it expresses, according to Frege, only a part of a "thought". II 244 Tugendhat: the truth-value potential of such a proposition (which cannot stand for itself) cannot consist in a truth value. (Because the replacement cannot be performed). Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: this shows once again that Frege's concept of meaning is functional: the meaning of an expression differs depending on whether he expresses his independent thought or only part of it. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Frege, G. | Wittgenstein Vs Frege, G. | Brandom I 919 TractatusVsFrege: nothing can be considered an assertion, if not previously logical vocabulary is available, already the simplest assertion assumes the entire logic. --- Dummett I 32 Frege capturing of thought: psychic act - thought not the content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, unknowable for the subject itself. WittgensteinVsFrege: Understanding no psychic process, - real mental process: pain, melody (like Frege). Dummett I 62 Wittgenstein's criticism of the thought of a private ostensive definition states implicitly that color words can have no, corresponding with the Fregean assumption, subjective, incommunicable sense. (WittgensteinVsFrege, color words). But Frege represents anyway an objective sense of color words, provided that it is about understanding. Dummett I 158 WittgensteinVsDummett/WittgensteinVsFrege: rejects the view that the meaning of a statement must be indicated by description of their truth conditions. Wittgenstein: Understanding not abruptly, no inner experience, not the same consequences. --- Wolf II 344 Names/meaning/existence/WittgensteinVsFrege: E.g. "Nothung has a sharp blade" also has sense if Nothung is smashed. II 345 Name not referent: if Mr N.N. dies, the name is not dead. Otherwise it would make no sense to say "Mr. N.N. died". --- Simons I 342 Sentence/context/copula/tradition/Simons: the context of the sentence provided the copula according to the traditional view: Copula/VsTradition: only accours as a normal word like the others in the sentence, so it cannot explain the context. Solution/Frege: unsaturated phrases. Sentence/WittgensteinVsFrege/Simons: context only simply common standing-next-to-each-other of words (names). That is, there is not one part of the sentence, which establishes the connection. Unsaturation/Simons: this perfectly matches the ontological dependence (oA): a phrase cannot exist without certain others! --- Wittgenstein I 16 Semantics/Wittgenstein/Frege/Hintikka: 1. main thesis of this chapter: Wittgenstein's attitude to inexpressibility of semantics is very similar to that of Frege. Wittgenstein represents in his early work as well as in the late work a clear and sweeping view of the nature of the relationship between language and the world. As Frege he believes they cannot be expressed verbally. Earlier WittgensteinVsFrege: by indirect use this view could be communicated. According to the thesis of language as a universal medium (SUM) it cannot be expressed in particular, what would be the case if the semantic relationships between language and the world would be different from the given ones? Wittgenstein I 45 Term/Frege/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: that a concept is essentially predicative, cannot be expressed by Frege linguistically, because he claims that the expression 'the term X' does not refer to a concept, but to an object. I 46 Term/Frege/RussellVsFrege/Hintikka: that is enough to show that the Fregean theory cannot be true: The theory consists of sentences, which, according to their own theory cannot be sentences, and if they cannot be sentences, they also cannot be true ". (RussellVsFrege) WittgensteinVsFrege/late: return to Russell's stricter standards unlike Frege and early Wittgenstein himself. Wittgenstein late: greatly emphasizes the purely descriptive. In Tractatus he had not hesitated to go beyond the vernacular. I 65ff Saturated/unsaturated/Frege/Tractatus/WittgensteinVsFrege: in Frege's distinction lurks a hidden contradiction. Both recognize the context principle. (Always full sentence critical for meaning). I 66 Frege: unsaturated entities (functions) need supplementing. The context principle states, however, neither saturated nor unsaturated symbols have independent meaning outside of sentences. So both need to be supplemented, so the difference is idle. The usual equation of the objects of Tractatus with individuals (i.e. saturated entities) is not only missed, but diametrically wrong. It is less misleading, to regard them all as functions I 222 Example number/number attribution/WittgensteinVsFrege/Hintikka: Figures do not require that the counted entities belong to a general area of all quantifiers. "Not even a certain universality is essential to the specified number. E.g. 'three equally big circles at equal distances' It will certainly not be: (Ex, y, z)xe circular and red, ye circular and red, etc ..." The objects Wittgenstein observes here, are apparently phenomenological objects. His arguments tend to show here that they are not only unable to be reproduced in the logical notation, but also that they are not real objects of knowledge in reality. ((s) that is not VsFrege here). Wittgenstein: Of course, you could write like this: There are three circles, which have the property of being red. I 223 But here the difference comes to light between inauthentic objects: color spots in the visual field, tones, etc., and the actual objects: elements of knowledge. (> Improper/actual, >sense data, >phenomenology). --- II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsFrege: his explanation only works if his symbols can be substituted by the words. The negation is more complicated than that negation character. --- Wittgenstein VI 119 WittgensteinVsFrege/Schulte: he has not seen what is authorized on formalism that the symbols of mathematics are not the characters, but have no meaning. Frege: alternative: either mere ink strokes or characters of something. Then what they represent, is their meaning. WittgensteinVsFrege: that this alternative is not correct, shows chess: here we are not dealing with the wooden figures, and yet the figures represent nothing, they have no Fregean meaning (reference). There is simply a third one: the characters can be used as in the game. Wittgenstein VI 172 Name/Wittgenstein/Schulte: meaning is not the referent. (VsFrege). --- Sentence/character/Tractatus 3.14 .. the punctuation is a fact,. 3.141 The sentence is not a mixture of words. 3.143 ... that the punctuation is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of expression of writing. (WittgensteinVsFrege: so it was possible that Frege called the sentence a compound name). 3.1432 Not: "The complex character 'aRb' says that a stands in the relation R to b, but: that "a" is in a certain relation to "b", says aRb ((s) So conversely: reality leads to the use of characters). (quotes sic). --- Wittgenstein IV 28 Mention/use/character/symbol/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: their Begriffsschrift(1) does not yet exclude such errors. 3.326 In order to recognize the symbol through the character, you have to pay attention to the meaningful use. Wittgenstein IV 40 Sentence/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: the verb of the sentence is not "is true" or "is wrong", but the verb has already to include that, what is true. 4.064 The sentence must have a meaning. The affirmation does not give the sentence its meaning. IV 47 Formal concepts/Tractatus: (4.1272) E.g. "complex", "fact", "function", "number". WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: they are presented in the Begriffsschrift by variables, not represented by functions or classes. E.g. Expressions like "1 is a number" or "there is only one zero" or E.g. "2 + 2 = 4 at three o'clock" are nonsensical. 4.12721 the formal concept is already given with an object, which falls under it. IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as basic concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: you cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as basic ideas, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. Successor/Begriffsschrift/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 4.1273 E.g. b is successor of a: aRb, (Ex): aRx.xRb, (Ex,y): aRx.xRy.yRb ... General/something general/general public/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell: the general term of a form-series can only be expressed by a variable, because the term "term of this form-series" is a formal term. Both have overlooked: the way, how they want to express general sentences, is circular. IV 49 Elementary proposition/atomism/Tractatus: 4.211 a character of an elementary proposition is that no elementary proposition can contradict it. The elementary proposition consists of names, it is a concatenation of names. WittgensteinVsFrege: it itself is not a name. IV 53 Truth conditions/truth/sentence/phrase/Tractatus: 4.431 of the sentence is an expression of its truth-conditions. (pro Frege). WittgensteinVsFrege: false explanation of the concept of truth: would "the truth" and "the false" really be objects and the arguments in ~p etc., then according to Frege the meaning of "~ p" is not at all determined. Punctuation/Tractatus: 4.44 the character that is created by the assignment of each mark "true" and the truth possibilities. Object/sentence/Tractatus: 4.441 it is clear that the complex of characters IV 54 Ttrue" and "false" do not correspond to an object. There are no "logical objects". Judgment line/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 4.442 the judgment line is logically quite meaningless. It indicates only that the authors in question consider the sentence to be true. Wittgenstein pro redundancy theory/Tractatus: (4.442), a sentence cannot say of itself that it is true. (VsFrege: VsJudgment stroke). IV 59 Meaning/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: (5.02) the confusion of argument and index is based on Frege's theory of meaning IV 60 of the sentences and functions. For Frege the sentences of logic were names, whose arguments the indices of these names. IV 62 Concluding/conclusion/result relation/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 5.132 the "Final Acts" that should justify the conclusions for the two, are senseless and would be superfluous. 5.133 All concluding happens a priori. 5.134 one cannot conclude an elementary proposition from another. ((s) Concluding: from sentences, not situations.) 5.135 In no way can be concluded from the existence of any situation to the existence of, IV 63 an entirely different situation. Causality: 5.136 a causal nexus which justifies such a conclusion, does not exist. 5.1361 The events of the future, cannot be concluded from the current. IV 70 Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are no primitive signs, let alone that they signify any relations. IV 101 Evidence/criterion/logic/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.1271 strange that such an exact thinker like Frege appealed to the obviousness as a criterion of the logical sentence. IV 102 Identity/meaning/sense/WittgensteinVsFrege/Tractatus: 6.232 the essential of the equation is not that the sides have a different sense but the same meaning, but the essential is that the equation is not necessary to show that the two expressions, that are connected by the equal sign, have the same meaning, since this can be seen from the two expressions themselves. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 --- Wittgenstein II 343 Intension/classes/quantities/Frege/Russell/WittgensteinVsRussell/WittgensteinVsFrege: both believed they could deal with the classes intensionally because they thought they could turn a list into a property, a function. (WittgensteinVs). Why wanted both so much to define the number? |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Wright Vs Frege, G. | II 223 Natural Language/Frege: inaccurate, this is a deficiency that must be remedied. Logic/Crispin WrightVsFrege: for vague predicates there seems to be a special logic. II 226 WrightVsFrege: it seems that all language use in order to be informative depends on the successful use of vague predicates. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Frege, G. | Verschiedene Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 18 Sense: according to Frege, the expression simply has the sense. The user does not always have to imagine his sense. In itself, sense is objective, so it can be grasped by more than one consciousness. It is usually noted here that VsFrege: that the objectivity of sense is not sufficient to guarantee the objectivity of communication. To this end, it must be established which sense is linked to which expression. Dummett I 33 Recently some analytical philosophers VsFrege have reproached the highly subjective interpretation of sensations. Frege IV 21 Judgement/Frege/Patzig: also indefinable and logically simple. IV 22 The introduction of a name for it is not possible. Function/Frege/Patzig: also undefinable: since terms are a special class of functions. PatzigVsFrege: there can be different areas that choose different basic terms. This does not lead to a circle. There does not have to be "in principle undefinable" terms. Def Fact/Frege: a true thought. PatzigVsFrege: overstretched, if now the concept of the fact is to be explained by that of the "true thought". IV 27 Thought Structure/PatzigVsFrege: his view that the six two-digit thought structures formed a "closed whole" no longer appeals today. One could rather introduce 16 instead of 6 (>Post). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Frege, G. | Schiffer Vs Frege, G. | I XV Belief/Schiffer: Is no relation to what is believed SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: Natural languages have no compositional meaning theories (m.th.). propositional attitude/Schiffer: late: thesis: cannot be reduced or explained! "No theory-theory"/Schiffer: all present philosophies of meaning and intentionality are based on false premises. Thesis: there cannot be any meaning theory. I 144 SchifferVsCompositionality: We can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics. Otherwise the relation theory would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional meaning theory, because it would have to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! Schiffer: so far the arguments are not yet very stable. We still have work to do. I 182 Compositionality/SchifferVsFrege/Problem: Intentional expressions like E.g. "is a picture of" E.g. "true" - adjectives like eg "large" E.g. "toys" (soldier). - E.g. adverbs - evaluative terms such as "should", "good", - E.g. pronouns and demonstrative pronouns - e.g. ordinary language quantifiers such as "everybody", "all", "some". Also counterfactual conditionals and modal expressions contain difficult ontological problems for a compositional semantics. I 183 Solution/Schiffer: Maybe we should give up the idea that there is something to do to give the semantics of these expressions. 3. (most important point): Thesis: Natural languages need no compositional semantics at all. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Hintikka Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell I 148 Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure. CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa. Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics). I 149 HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29). But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231). I 161. "is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true! Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway. Hintikka II 45 (A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects". Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics). II 46 Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds. Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5). Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects. Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts). II 47 E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image: (4) expression >sense >reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified: (5) Expression (>) sense (> reference) Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts. E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the identity of morning star and evening star, but the. identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star". II 49 Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity. Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "Grundgesetze"(2)) there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself. (B) Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds. new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds. Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world. II 50 (C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally. E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not. II 51 Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear, On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds. On the other hand: Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach. Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract. II 54 Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem. Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts. Transition from "any" to "some". E.g. epistemic context: (10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w) (11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x) II 55 Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is. EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references. HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w. Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. II 56 Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w) to (14) (Ex) George knows that S(x) where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts. Then we need an additional condition. (15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x). This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are. Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George. Thus, (15) is equivalent to (16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x). This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what). Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity). E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!) Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge) II 57 Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist). Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises. Possible Worlds Semantics: SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared. Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds. Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism). II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them. Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify". II 109 Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent). II 110 HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 2. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle Wittgenstein I 71 Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto). I 72 Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level. HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Frege, G. | Berka Vs Frege, G. | Berka I 56 Anmerkung BerkaVsFrege: FregeVsSchröder: ((s) > Frege: "Die Null darf in einer Menge enthalten sein, aber nicht als Element")) Frege hat das Problem gar nicht in seiner Bedeutung auch für sein logizistisches Programm erkannt. Berka I 387 Bezeichnen/Bedeutung/Frege: ("Sinn und Bedeutung") zweidimensionale Semantik: Identifiziert Bezeichnungs und Bedeutungsfunktion. Frege: identifiziert Bezeichnen und Bedeuten wegen des universalen Charakters der Logik. Diese kann sich mit dem Inhalt konkreter Aussagen nicht befassen. I 388 Für die Deduktion (Folgebeziehung) ist es hinreichend, wenn die Voraussetzungen wahr sind. BerkaVsFrege: durch diese Identifikation wird eine wichtige Abstraktionsstufe übergangen, die die Beziehung von Logik und Realität klären kann. Es wird nicht gefragt, warum eine Aussage wahr ist. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Frege, G. | Stalnaker Vs Frege, G. | I 260 I/self/Frege: "Everyone is itself placed in a special and easy way. ... ~ Only the subject itself can detect such thoughts." StalnakerVsFrege: this is just an unfortunate slip. Metaphysics/self/Stalnaker: I do not think that metaphysics can be so easily avoided. If the thought "I am TN" is adjustable wrong (even if a logical omniscient TN could capture it without knowing that it is true) why is its falsity not a metaphysical possibility? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Frege, G. | Chisholm Vs Frege, G. | Chisholm II 179 Negation/Frege: Problem: negative facts: solution: simply postulate of two truth values, as well as of a function xi () which turns the truth into falsehood and everything else into the truth. WittgensteinVsFrege: The connecting element does not represent functions or anything else. Against the functional representation of the connections by Frege. I 111 Descriptions/Chisholm: can they be non-significant? E.g. "Senator Baker would be another Jimmy Carter". Question: Do we use "Jimmy Carter" in a way here that refers to Jimmy Carter? Chisholm: Yes. Proper names/Names/Frege: can sometimes be used as a concept word: E.g. "Trieste is not Vienna". ChisholmVsFrege: but this statement does not tell us that we must not expect to find in Trieste the kinds of things that are typical for Vienna? Then "Vienna" does not act as a concept word here. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Frege, G. | Simons Vs Frege, G. | I 102 Class/FregeVsSchröder: you have to distinguish between: a) "logical" classes: = value process and I 103 b) "specific" classes: a calculation of collective classes is only a calculation of part and whole. SimonsVsFrege: this turned ironically out to be much more vulnerable than Schröder's "manifolds". Lesniewski: Lesniewski knew Frege's criticism. I 290 Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name is an individual. SimonsVsFrege: of this deefinition one has recovered only lately. But there are also plural names (> Plural Designation, Plural Reference (> Black) see above). See also Empty Names. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Frege, G. | Verificationism Vs Frege, G. | Field II 104 Verifikationstheorie/VsFrege/VsRussell/VsTractatus/VsRamsey/Bedeutung/Field: hier ist der Hauptbegriff nicht Wahrheitsbedingungen (WB) sondern Verifikations-Bedingungen (VB). (Vielleicht über Reize). Diese werden ohne daß-Sätze gegeben. WB/Rege/Russell/Field: einige Vertreter dieser Linie werden sagen, was beim Verifikationismus ausgelassen ist, sind nicht die WB, sondern propositionaler Inhalt. Proposition/Verifikationismus/Field: kann der Verifikationist dann einfach als Klasse von VB bezeichnen. Für eine Äußerung drückt die entsprechende Proposition dann die Menge der VB aus, die sie hat. So mußten Propositionen im verifikationistischen Sinn nicht mit daß-Sätzen beschrieben werden. Proposition/Inflationismus/Frege/Russell/Field: würde sagen, daß das keine richtigen Propositionen sind, weil diese WB einschließen müssen. InflationismusVsVerifikationismus. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Frege, G. | Patzig Vs Frege, G. | IV 20 Judgment/Frege/Patzig: also indefinable and logically simple. IV 21 The introduction of a name for this is not possible. Function/Frege/Patzig: also indefinable: because concepts are a particular class of functions. PatzigVsFrege: there may be different areas that each select different things as the fundamental concept. This does not lead to a circle. There do not need to be concepts that are "indefinable by principle". IV 22 Def Fact/Frege: a true thought. PatzigVsFrege: exaggerated if the concept of fact is now to be explained by that of the "true thought". IV 27 Thought Structure/PatzigVsFrege: his view, the six two-digit thoughts structures formed a "complete whole" is no longer accepted today. You could rather introduce 16 instead of 6 (>Mail). |
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| Frege, G. | Burkhardt Vs Frege, G. | Wolf II 341 BurkhardtVsFrege: seine Ansicht ist falsch, Eigennamen hätte sowohl Bedeutung als auch Sinn. II 342 Namen/Burkhardt: unterscheiden sich von allen übrigen Wortarten dadurch, dass sie nur in der aktuellen Verwendung auf etwas referieren können. (parole). Wenn ich einen Namen höre, weiß ich schon, bevor ich weiß, auf wen er referiert, dass er sich auf ein Individuum bezieht. II 343 Referenz/Strawson: nicht Ausdrücke referieren, sondern Menschen mit Hilfe von Sprachzeichen. Burkhardt: das gilt nicht von Eigennamen: bevor sie in der Sprechhandlung auf etwas verweisen können, muss ihre Beziehung zu dem Referenten bereits vorher konventionell festgelegt sein. Namen/Benennen/Wittgenstein: (PI § 15): "Es wird sich oft nützlich erweisen, wenn wir uns beim Philosophieren sagen: Etwas benennen, das ist etwas Ähnliches, wie einem Ding ein Namenstäfelchen anheften". (> mere tags). Namen/Burkhardt: so muss Freges Kontextprinzip (Frege-Prinzip) in Bezug auf Namen aufgegeben werden!. II 343/344 Frege hatte deshalb guten Grund, den Gegenstand als die Bedeutung des Namens anzunehmen! (>"mere tag"). Namen/Strawson: haben keinen Beschreibungsgehalt. BurkhardtVsStrawson: damit ist völlig unklar geworden, was er unter Konventionen verstehen will. Bedeutung/Namen/Träger/Burkhardt: die Namenbedeutung besteht im Trägerbezug. Das sind die allgemeinen Referenzkonventionen. Namen/Bedeutung/Kriterien/Wittgenstein/Searle/Frege/Russell: die Identitätskriterien im Sinne von Vorstellungen über den Träger sind wesentlich für die Bedeutung des Namens. (Lager). Namen/Bedeutung/Existenz/WittgensteinVsFrege: Bsp "Nothung hat eine scharfe Schneide" hat auch dann Sinn, wenn Nothung zerschlagen ist. II 345 Name nicht Träger: wenn Herr N.N. stirbt, ist nicht der Name gestorben. Sonst hätte es keinen Sinn zu sagen "Herr N.N. ist gestorben". Kriterien/Bedeutung/Alltagssprache/Burkhardt: die Alltagssprache gibt kein Kriterium bei philosophischen oder wissenschaftlichen Entscheidungen ab: Die Alltagssprache entscheidet zwar, welche Bedeutung ein Wort hat, aber nicht, was Bedeutung ist! Bedeutung/Namen/Burkhardt: drei Möglichkeiten: 1. Namen haben Bedeutung, dann ist das, gemäß der Konventionen der Träger 2. alle Namen haben dieselbe Bedeutung: nämlich ihre eindeutige Referenzfunktion! (Gebrauchstheorie). 3. Namen haben gar keine Bedeutung. II 349 Sinn/Namen/Identität/BurkhardtVsFrege: dass Identitätsurteile informativ seien, dafür sei es notwendig, dass der Sinn auf beiden Seiten des Gleichheitszeichens verschieden ist, während der Referent identisch ist. II 350 Burkhardt: die Aussage wäre aber auch dann informativ, wenn der Hörer mit keinem der beiden Namen eine Vorstellung verbände. So wird Sinn doppeldeutig. Dass unterschiedliche Vorstellung überhaupt bestehen, ist nur ein Sonderfall. So ist der Sinn etwas Sekundäres. Deshalb kann auch der als subjektiv verstandene Sinn nicht zur Bedeutung gehören. |
Burk I A. Burkhardt Politik, Sprache und Glaubwürdigkeit. Linguistik des politischen Skandals Göttingen 2003 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Frege, G. | Waismann Vs Frege, G. | Waismann I 77 Frege: Definition of the number in two steps a) when two sets are equal. b) Definition of the term "number": it is equal if each element of one set corresponds to one element of the other set. Unique relation. Under Def "Number of a Set"/Frege: he understands the set of all sets equal to it. Example: the number 5 is the totality of all classes of five in the world. VsFrege: how shall we determine that two sets are equal? Apparently by showing such a relation. For example, if you have to distribute spoons on cups, then the relation did not exist before. As long as the spoons were not on the cups, the sets were not equal. However, this does not correspond to the sense in which the word equal is used. So it is about whether you can put the spoons on the cups. But what does "can" mean? I 78 That the same number of copies are available. Not the assignment determines the equivalence, but vice versa. The proposed definition gives a necessary, but not sufficient condition for equal numbers and defines the expression "equal number" too narrowly. Class: List ("school class") logical or term (mammals) empirical. With two lists it is neither emopirical nor logical to say that they can be assigned to each other. Example 1. Are there as many people in this room as in the next room? An experiment provides the answer. 2. Are 3x4 cups equal to 12 spoons? You can answer this by drawing lines, which is not an experiment, but a process in a calculus. According to Frege, two sets are not equal if the relation is not established. You have defined something, but not the term "equal numbered". You can extend the definition by saying that they can be assigned. But again this is not correct. For if the two sets are given by their properties, it always makes sense to assert their "being-assignment", (but this has a different meaning, depending on the criterion by which one recognizes the possibility of assignment: that the two are equal, or that it should make sense to speak of an assignment! In fact, we use the word "equal" according to different criteria: of which Frege emphasizes only one and makes it a paradigm. Example 1. If there are 3 cups and 3 spoons on the table, you can see at a glance how they can be assigned. I 79 2. If the number cannot be overlooked, but it is arranged in a clear form, e.g. square or diamond, the equal numbers are obvious again. 3. The case is different, if we notice something of two pentagons, that they have the same number of diagonals. Here we no longer understand the grouping directly, it is rather a theorem of geometry. 4. Equal numbers with unambiguous assignability 5. The normal criterion of equality of numbers is counting (which must not be understood as the representation of two sets by a relation). WaismannVsFrege: Frege's definition does not reflect this different and flexible use. I 80 This leads to strange consequences: According to Frege, two sets must necessarily be equal or not for logical reasons. For example, suppose the starlit sky: Someone says: "I don't know how many I've seen, but it must have been a certain number". How do I distinguish this statement from "I have seen many stars"? (It is about the number of stars seen, not the number of stars present). If I could go back to the situation, I could recount it. But that is not possible. There is no way to determine the number, and thus the number loses its meaning. For example, you could also see things differently: you can still count a small number of stars, about 5. Here we have a new series of numbers: 1,2,3,4,5, many. This is a series that some primitive peoples really use. It is not at all incomplete, and we are not in possession of a more complete one, but only a more complicated one, beside which the primitive one rightly exists. You can also add and multiply in this row and do so with full rigor. Assuming that the things of the world would float like drops to us, then this series of numbers would be quite appropriate. For example, suppose we should count things that disappear again during counting or others emerge. Such experiences would steer our concept formation in completely different ways. Perhaps words such as "much", "little", etc. would take the place of our number words. I 80/81 VsFrege: his definition misses all that. According to it, two sets are logically necessary and equal in number, without knowledge, or they are not. In the same way, Einstein had argued that two events are simultaneous, independent of observation. But this is not the case, but the sense of a statement is exhausted in the way of its verification (also Dummett) Waismann: So you have to pay attention to the procedure for establishing equality in numbers, and that's much more complicated than Frege said. Frege: second part of the definition of numbers: Def Number/Frege: is a class of classes. ((s) Elsewhere: so not by Frege! FregeVs!). Example: the term "apple lying on the table comes to the number 3". Or: the class of apples lying on the table is an element of class 3. This has the great advantage of evidence: namely that the number is not expressed by things, but by the term. WaismannVsFrege: But does this do justice to the actual use of the number words? Example: in the command "3 apples!" the number word certainly has no other meaning, but after Frege this command can no longer be interpreted according to the same scheme. It does not mean that the class of apples to be fetched is an element of class 3. Because this is a statement, and our language does not know it. WaismannVsFrege: its definition ties the concept of numbers unnecessarily to the subject predicate form of our sentences. In fact, it results the meaning of the word "3" from the way it is used (Wittgenstein). RussellVsFrege: E.g. assuming there were exactly 9 individuals in the world. Then we could define the cardinal numbers from 0 to 9, but the 10, defined as 9+1, would be the zero class. Consequently, the 10 and all subsequent natural numbers will be identical, all = 0. To avoid this, an additional axiom would have to be introduced, the Def "infinity axiom"/Russell: means that there is a type to which infinitely many individuals belong. This is a statement about the world, and the structure of all arithmetic depends essentially on the truth of this axiom. Everyone will now be eager to know if the infinity axiom is true. We must reply: we do not know. It is constructed in a way that it eludes any examination. But then we must admit that its acceptance has no meaning. I 82 Nor does it help that one takes the "axiom of infinity" as a condition of mathematics, because in this way one does not win mathematics as it actually exists: The set of fractions is dense everywhere, but not: The set of fractions is dense everywhere if the infinity axiom applies. That would be an artificial reinterpretation, only conceived to uphold the doctrine that numbers are made up of real classes in the world (VsFrege: but only conditionally, because Frege does not speak of classes in the world). Waismann I 85 The error of logic was that it believed it had firmly underpinned arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are floodable by our thinking, but not movable." WaismannVsFrege: only the expression "justify" the arithmetic gives us a wrong picture, I 86 as if its building were built on basic truths, while she is a calculus that proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system that rests on nothing. We can only describe arithmetic, i.e. give its rules, not justify them. Waismann I 163 The individual numerical terms form a family. There are family similarities. Question: are they invented or discovered? We reject the notion that the rules follow from the meaning of the signs. Let us look at Frege's arguments. (WaismannVsFrege) II 164 1. Arithmetic can be seen as a game with signs, but then the real meaning of the whole is lost. If I set up calculation rules, did I then communicate the "sense" of the "="? Or just a mechanical instruction to use the sign? But probably the latter. But then the most important thing of arithmetic is lost, the meaning that is expressed in the signs. (VsHilbert) Waismann: Assuming this is the case, why do we not describe the mental process right away? But I will answer with an explanation of the signs and not with a description of my mental state, if one asks me what 1+1 = 2 means. If one says, I know what the sign of equality means, e.g. in addition, square equations, etc. then one has given several answers. The justified core of Frege's critique: if one considers only the formulaic side of arithmetic and disregards the application, one gets a mere game. But what is missing here is not the process of understanding, but interpretation! I 165 For example, if I teach a child not only the formulas but also the translations into the word-language, does it only make mechanical use? Certainly not. 2. Argument: So it is the application that distinguishes arithmetic from a mere game. Frege: "Without a content of thought an application will not be possible either. WaismannVsFrege: Suppose you found a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is for pleasure only. Would it not express a thought anymore? Why cannot one make use of a chess position? Because it does not express thoughts. WaismannVsFrege: Let us say you find a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is just for fun. Would it notexpress a thought anymore? Chess: it is premature to say that a chess position does not express thoughts. Waismann brings. For example figures stand for troops. But that could just mean that the pieces first have to be turned into signs of something. I 166 Only if one has proved that there is one and only one object of the property, one is entitled to occupy it with the proper name "zero". It is impossible to create zero. A >sign must designate something, otherwise it is only printer's ink. WaismannVsFrege: we do not want to deny or admit the latter. But what is the point of this assertion? It is clear that numbers are not the same as signs we write on paper. They only become what they are through use. But Frege rather means: that the numbers are already there somehow before, that the discovery of the imaginary numbers is similar to that of a distant continent. I 167 Meaning/Frege: in order not to be ink blotches, the characters must have a meaning. And this exists independently of the characters. WaismannVsFrege: the meaning is the use, and what we command. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Frege, G. | Meixner Vs Frege, G. | I 170 Numbers/Frege/Meixner: special properties, i.e. finite number of properties of properties (i.e. functions). Notation of Meixner: F0 (should be 0) is the abbreviation of "01[01 is different from 01]". Def Equivalence/Frege/Meixner: f is a property equal to the property g, = Def is valid for at least one two-digit relation R: 1. each entity which has f stands for exactly one entity which has g, in the relation R 2. are entities that have f different, then also entities with g 3. inversion of 1: any entity having g. Number/Meixner: one could therefore define non-circularly: x is a natural number = Def x is a finite number property. I 171 Number/MeixnerVsFrege: then you could simplify: the default property used for the definition of 1 λ01[01 is identical to F0] is definitorically the same as the property λ01[01 is identical with 0]. Then you can simplify (which is a sign that numbers do not stand on ontologically safe feet): x is a natural number = Def x is a standard property for determining finite numbers then: f is 0 = Def f is a property that is equal to the property 0. Meixner: this is simpler, but also has the strange consequence that each natural number is exemplified by all its predecessors. I 172 FregeVsMeixner: Numbers are (saturated) objects, not properties. Each number is exemplified by an infinite number of entities. Number/Meixner: understood as property, they are untyped functions, i.e. they cannot be placed in any box of the form [] |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Frege, G. | Millikan Vs Frege, G. | I 102 Relation of projection/language/Millikan: We begin by saying that at least a few words are coordinated with objects. Accordingly, true propositions correspond with facts in the world. Problem: Incorrect sentences do not correspond to any facts. How can individual words that correspond very well to objects, be composed in a way that in the end the whole sentence does not correspond? Ex "Theaetetus flies": "Theaetetus" corresponds to Theaitetus, "flies" corresponds to flying. wrong solution: to say that it was up to the relation between the Theaetetus and the flying. Because the relation corresponds somewhat, this may be instantiated (Ex between Theaitetos and walking) or uninstantiiert. Everything corresponds to something - just not the whole sentence "Theaetetus flies". Solution/Frege: he joined the singular term with "values" that were the objects in the world. I 103 Sentence/Frege/Millikan: he interpreted thus similarly to names, as complex characters that marked truth or falsity in the end. (Millikan pro Frege: "elegant") Solution/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsFrege/Millikan (Millikan: better than Frege): complex aRb, whereas in the case of false sentences the correspondence with the world lacks. Correspondence/Wittgenstein/Millikan: but that is another meaning of "corresponding"! Words should correspond with different things than sentences with the world. ((S) double difference: 1. aRb unlike 2. SLW!. It would have already made a difference, if aRb and SRW were opposed.). ((S) Sense/Wittgenstein/(S): corresponds to the possibility of derogations.) I 190 real value/indexical adaptor/denotation/Millikan: Ex "the ___ N of ....". indexical adaptor: has to be a real value of "N" to be in the embedded clause "N ..." and a real value of "the" in the embedded sentence "the ...". focused eigenfunction/eigenfunction: to be translated into an internal name, which identifies the individual N. This has the entire denotation if it is properly adapted. intentional Icon: Ex "the ___m of..." thus includes two intentional icons or projections on facts. But these are different from the purpose of the sentence as a whole or a subset. embedded sentence: does not only want to introduce the listener to a fact, but o show to which complex category belongs what corresponds to the subject in the independent sentence containing the embedded sentence. Reference: that's how the reference of a designation is determined. Sense / Millikan: now it is clear why I have called sense the rules. Because the various markings differ in terms of the rules, even if they have the same references. Sense according to Frege/Millikan: this difference of rules is the difference in meaning. Meaning/reference/MillikanVsFrege: but a reference has to take on only a meaning of a certain kind. Thus, there is something that has been previously discriminated before the meaning of the remainder of the sentence has been identified. I 191 Reference/meaning/Millikan: but the having of meaning or of references are very similar types of "having". I 274 Property/object/predicate/substance/individual/ontology/Millikan: Strawson'S distinction between "monogamous" and "non-monogamous" entities is not absolute but relative: Object/thing: Ex if my ring is made of gold, it can not be made of silver at the same time. polygamous: Gold is relative to my ring. ((S) it could have been made of silver - the gold could have belonged to another subject.). Then gold is a property (as opposed to another) and my ring a substance. But in relation to other substances the identity of gold seems to be like the identity of an individual. Ontology/MillikanVsFrege/MillikanVsRussell: we must drop the rigid distinction between concept and object or individual thing and property. I 275 Description: not only predicates are variations in world states, but also substances or individuals (they can be exchanged). Substance: if we consider gold as a property that does not prevent interpreting it also as a substance. As Aristotle said: Individuals/Aristotle/Millikan: are merely primary substances, not the only substances that exist, that is, substances which are not properties of something else. Substance/Millikan: is actually an epistemic category. Substance/Millikan: Ex Gold, Ex Domestic Cat, Ex '69 Plymouth Valiant 100th. Substance/category/Millikan: substances fall into categories defined by exclusive classes, in regard to which they are determined. Ex gold and silver fall into the same category because they belong to the same exclusive classes: have a melting point, atomic weight, etc. I 308 Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: For Quine a criterion for correct thinking seems to be that the relation to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Correspondence/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what conformity in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If one does not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: correspondence is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow the sentence "Ouch!" He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by a lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree on a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in the nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Newen Vs Frege, G. | I 209 Physicalism/Identity Theory/New: because of the possibility that mental phenomena could be realized in different ways (functionalism) token physicalism was abandoned in favor of type physicalism. (VsToken Physicalism) Functionalism/Newen: Problem: we do not know what the possibly physical states have in common ((s) on a mental level). Mental Universals/Newen: are needed then. Bieri: Problem: either a theory about mental universals seems empirically implausible. Or it is empirically plausible, then it does not tell us what we want to know. (Bieri: Anal. Ph. d. Geistes, p. 41). Functional State/Newen: similar to dispositions in that it can be characterized by hypothetical relations between initial situations and consequent states. I 211 VsFunctionalism/Newen: qualia problem FunctionalismVsVs: zombie argument: I 212 There need be no qualia to explain behavior. Mental Causation/Newen: is still an open question. NS I 90 Descriptions/Theory/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: the objective is to overcome two problems: 1) identity statements: need to be informative 2) negative existential statements or statements with empty descriptions must be sensible. Names/Personal Names/Russell: Thesis: names are nothing but abbreviations for decriptions. Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1) There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion). 2) There is not more than one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) 3) Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scot (statement content). This is about three possible situations where the sentence may be wrong: a) nobody wrote Waverley, b) several persons did it, c) the author is not a Scot. NS I 91 Identity/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: if the identity of Cicero with Tullius is necessary (as self-identity), how can the corresponding sentence be informative then? Solution/Russell: 1) There is at least one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 2) There is not more than one Roman consul who denounced Catiline 1*) There is at least one author of "De Oratore" 2*) There is not more than one author of "De Oratore" 3) whoever denounced Catiline is identical with the author of "De Oratore". Empty Names/Empty Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Solution: 1) There is at least one present king of France 2) There is not more than one present king of France 3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald. Thus the sentence makes sense, even though the first part of the statement is incorrect. Negative Existential Statements/Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: assigning a sensible content. It is not the case that 1) there is at least one flying horse 2) not more than one flying horse. Thus, the negative existence statement "The flying horse does not exist" makes sense and is true. RussellVsFrege/RussellvsFregean Sense/Newen/Schrenk: this is to avoid that "sense" (the content) must be assumed as an abstract entity. Truth-Value Gaps/RussellVsFrege: they, too, are thus avoided. Point: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, however, now become general propositions about the world. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Frege, G. | Stechow Vs Frege, G. | I 29 Attitude/Propositional Attitude/Meaning Rule/Stechow: For example Caroline knows that Fritz knows Alla: for this we only have to assume that propositions are objects of certain verbs, the attitude verbs. [[ [VP knows]]]] = the function f, so that for any proposition p applies: f(p) the function is g, so that x applies to any individual: g(x) = f(p)(x) = {s | x knows p in s} We do not need to ask what it means to know a proposition. It is important that propositions are objects that can be known. VsFrege: a semantics that uses only truth values for sentence meanings cannot express this verbal meaning (> attitude, >propositional attitudes). Stechow I 123 Meaning/Semantics/Linguistics/Stechow: with this we have four facets of linguistic meaning: Meaning* Intension - Extension - Presupposition. The character will be added as the 5th. Presupposition/Frege/Stechow: place of origin, original place, 1892a): Example "Kepler died in misery" assumes that the name designates something. But this condition is not part of the thought expressed in the sentence. Certain Article/Stechow: standard work about it: Russell 1905. Presupposition/Article/RussellVsFrege: Russell proposes the existence and uniqueness presupposition to the content of "the". I.e. to the contribution that the word makes to the truth conditions. Strawson: pro Russell. Stechow: pro Frege. |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Frege, G. | Wessel Vs Frege, G. | I 27 Syntactics/Syntax/Wessel: some claim that syntactics examines "meaningless" signs. (Klaus/Buhr, 1969) WesselVs: this is a distorted idea of language: one cannot separate syntax, semantics and pragmatics at all: there are no "meaningless signs", because a physical object that means nothing is not a sign. Semantics: the meaning of the term "table" cannot be addressed as a special object to look for somewhere. WesselVsFrege: one cannot say: "The meaning of the term "Müller" goes for a walk". I 157 Truth Value Gaps/Wessel: exist when the object to which properties are to be assigned or denied does not exist at all. WesselVsFrege: a sentence with an empty subject term is not meaningless, it can also not be true, but therefore it does not have to be without truth value. I 352 Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Differentiation Intension/Extension: does not help with the problems. Just the hint that these are intensional contexts is not enough. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Functionalism | Newen Vs Functionalism | I40 Def Even Speech/Frege/Newen: mentions a sentence and does not use it. This is made clear through quotation marks. Point: the truth value is not preserved if a sentence is replaced here by one with the same truth value: e.g. (1) "The earth is round" consists of 14 letters. True. (2) "The moon is smaller than the earth" consists of 14 letters. False. I 41 Mention/Meaning/Mentioning/Frege/Newen: the meaning of a sentence mentioned is the sentence in quotation marks itself. NewenVsFrege: does not develop any further theory of meaning for even speech, as well as proper names and concept words in even speech. NS I 16 Ideal Language/Theory of Meaning/Frege/Newen/Schrenk: Frege belongs to the theory of ideal language. VsFrege: not every name expresses exactly one meaning when used. 17) Philosophy of the Ideal Language: pro Realism VsSubjectivism/VsLocke. NS I 18 Meaning Theory/Frege: must be separated from psychology. NS I 27 Odd Sense/Frege: of the sentence "f(a)": is the notion that (a) Odd sense: the sense of "the notion that f(a)." Proper Names/Concept Words/Newen/Schrenk: there are no remarks in Frege for their odd sense. VsFrege/Newen/Schrenk: limits of his theory: contextual expressions (indicators, indicator words: e.g. "here", "now", "I" etc. cannot be treated (not determined). This is a consequence of his thesis that (complete) thoughts are context independent and that words each have a stable sense. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Geach, P. | Quine Vs Geach, P. | V 18 Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavior criteria. It shows in the conditioning of reactions. V 18/19 Dispositions/Quine: habits resulting from conditioning. V 89 Identity/Geach: (Reference and generality, p 39f.): Only makes sense with reference to a general term like e.g. "the same dog". QuineVsGeach: this is certainly true for the beginning of language learning. Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in pointing twice and saying, "This is the same as that." Then you could still ask "The same what?". E.g. you could have been pointing once to the dog and merely to the ear the next time. Solution: you can easily say that a is identical with b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear. QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get accustomed to the identity way of speech. Identity/Quine: in a deeper sense still relative. (see below § 30) V 129 Pronouns/Pronouns/Quine: are the archetype of variables in logic and mathematics. Everyday Language: here pronouns are an important part of relative clauses. Relative Clause/Language Learning/Quine: E.g. "I bought Fido from a man who had found him." Function: the relative clause makes it possible to separate the object of what the sentence says about it. Relative Clause: becomes a general term if the pronoun for the name of the object is out in front: E.g. "which I bought from a man who had found him" is a general term! This general term says the same thing of Fido as the original sentence. Relative Clause/GeachVsQuine: (Reference and generality, p.115 122, also "Quines syntaktische Einsichten"). Relative Pronoun/Geach: instead, conceive it as meaning "and he": e.g. "I bought Fido from a man and he had found him." ((s) paratactic analysis). Or with "when he" or "since he". V 130 Geach calls this the "Latin prose theory". Def Latin Prose Theory/Geach: Thesis: it's wrong to consider "who had found him" as a terminus or independent grammatical entity at all. Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Quine: E.g. Everyone who owns a donkey beats it; Some donkey owners do not beat them. Problem: that would turn into nonsense: Every donkey owner beats it Some donkey owners do not beat it. Solution/Geach: analysis of the relative pronoun "who" with "if he": Every person, if he has a donkey, beats it. Example (by Emmon Bach): ((s)> Brandom, Bach Peter's sentences) A boy who fooled her kissed a girl that loved him. Geach: here, you cannot consider "boy who fooled her" as a separate term, because then the floating pronoun "her" would have no reference, not even to "girl who loved him", because the floating pronoun "him" would then have no reference. Solution/Geach: A boy kissed a girl and she really loved him, but he only fooled her. Quine: pro Geach. ((s) sequence of main clauses.) V 131 Relative Clause/Bach Peter's Sentences/Donkey Sentence/Geach's Donkey/Geach/Quine: Geach focuses on the quantification (1) (Ex) (x is a man and I bought Fido of x and x had found Fido) (2) (x) (y) (if x is a man and y is a donkey and x has y, then x beats y). (3) (Ex) (Ey) (x is a man, and y is a a donkey and x has y and not (x beats y)) (4) (Ex) (Ey) (x was a boy and y was a girl and y kissed y and y really loved x, but x merely fooled y). QuineVsGeach: the description of the correct grammar is one thing, a plausible description of a child's language learning is another. It would be nice if both matched, which is to be expected according to Hall, Bloomfield and Chomsky. QuineVsGeach: before this is proven, I tend to a more dualistic view. Geach's Latin prose theory correctly describes the grammar, but not the learning process. Most examples of relative clauses correspond to the Fido example. The child is torn between analogies, V 132 which are in the end described properly by Geach. Relative Clause/Quantification/Language Learning/QuineVsGeach: a reformulation of the relative pronoun depending on circumstances in "and he" or "if", etc. is too complicated. In addition, the quantification would need to be learned before the relative clauses. Instead, the child comes to the quantification the other way round, through the relative clause. Strawson I 198 QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: Singular terms can take the places of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: quantifiable, General Term: not quantifiable. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Gestalt Theory | Schlick Vs Gestalt Theory | Simons I 290 Ontological Dependence/oD/mereology/Simons: VsMereology: criticizing the existence of arbitrary sums. Instead, an individual should only be something that has a certain inner connection. arbitrary sums/Simons: they are algebraically ok and do not lead to contradictions. Individuals / Simons: it is not clear what properties they hold on the "right side" of respectability (versus sums). Problem: connection is a gradual thing, but being individual is not! Gestalt/SimonsVsGestalt theory/VsWholeness/Simons: it has never clearly stated what this is to be. Individual/Frege/Simons: everything that is named by a name. SimonsVsFrege: of which one has recovered late. But there are also plural names (> plural designation, plural reference (> Black) see above). And also >empty names. Simons I 324 Wholeness/Gestalt/SchlickVsGestalt theory/SchlickVsDriesch/Simons: (Schlick 1935): There is no ontological difference between wholenesses and sums. These are only differences in the presentation (representation) of the same object. "Micro-Reductionism"/Schlick: (per): (Simons: for today's tastes too extreme). Schlick/Simons: yet never denies the usefulness of a holistic view. Sum/SimonsVsSchlick: has in any case a precisely defined meaning. stronger/weaker/Simons: e.g. the equivalence of various formulations collapses when the principles of the theory are weakened. ((s) >Strength of Theories). |
Schlick I Moritz Schlick "Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994 Schlick II M. Schlick General Theory of Knowledge 1985 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Hilbert | Frege Vs Hilbert | Berka I 294 Consistency/Geometry/Hilbert: Proof through analogous relations between numbers. Concepts: if properties contradict each other, the concept does not exist. FregeVsHilbert: there is just nothing that falls under it. Real Numbers/Hilbert: here, the proof of consistency for the axioms is also the proof of existence of the continuum.(1) 1. D. Hilbert, „Mathematische Probleme“ in: Ders. Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1935) Bd. III S. 290-329 (gekürzter Nachdruck v. S 299-301) Thiel I 279 Hilbert: Used concepts like point, line, plane, "between", etc. in his Foundations of Geometry in 1899, but understood their sense in a hitherto unfamiliar way. They should not only enable the derivation of the usual sentences, but rather, in its entirety, specify the meaning of the concepts used in it in the first place! Thiel I 280 Later this was called a "definition by postulates", "implicit definition" >Definition. The designations point, line, etc. were to be nothing more than a convenient aid for mathematical considerations. FregeVsHilbert: clarifies the letter correspondence that his axioms are not statements, but rather statement forms. >Statement Form. He denied that by their interaction the concepts occurring in them might be given a meaning. It was rather a (in Frege’s terminology) "second stage concept" that was defined, today we would say a "structure". HilbertVsFrege: the point of the Hilbert’s proceeding is just that the meaning of "point", "line", etc. is left open. Frege and Hilbert might well have been able to agree on this, but they did not. Frege: Axiom should be in the classical sense a simple, sense-wise completely clear statement at the beginning of a system. Hilbert: statement forms that combined define a discipline. From this the "sloppy" figure of speech developed E.g. "straight" in spherical geometry was then a great circle. Thiel I 343 Formalism: 1) "older" formalism: second half of the 19th century, creators Hankel, Heine, Thomae, Stolz. "Formal arithmetic", "formal algebra". "Object of arithmetic are the signs on the paper itself, so that the existence of these numbers is not in question" (naive). Def "Permanence Principle": it had become customary to introduce new signs for numbers that had been added and to postulate then that the rules that applied to the numbers of the original are should also be valid for the extended area. Vs: that would have to be regarded as illegitimate as long as the consistency is not shown. Otherwise, you could introduce a new number, and E.g. simply postulate § + 1 = 2 und § + 2 = 1. This contradiction would show that these "new numbers" did not really exist. This explains Heine’s formulation that "existence is not in question". (> "tonk"). Thiel I 343/344 Thomae treated the problem as "rules of the game" in a somewhat more differentiated way. FregeVsThomae: he had not even precisely specified the basic rules of his game, namely the correlation to the rules, pieces and positions. This criticism of Frege was already a precursor of Hilbert’S proof theory, in which also mere character strings are considered without regard their possible content for their production and transformation according to the given rules. Thiel I 345 HilbertVsVs: Hilbert critics often overlook that, at least for Hilbert himself, the "finite core" should remain content-wise interpreted and only the "ideal", not finitely interpretable parts have no directly provable content. This important argument is of a methodical, not a philosophical nature. "Formalism" is the most commonly used expression for Hilbert’s program. Beyond that, the conception of formalism is also possible in a third sense: i.e. the conception of mathematics and logic as a system of action schemes for dealing with figures that are free of any content. HilbertVsFrege and Dedekind: the objects of the number theory are the signs themselves. Motto: "In the beginning was the sign." Thiel I 346 The designation formalism did not come from Hilbert or his school. Brouwer had hyped up the contrasts between his intuitionism and the formalism of Hilbert’s school to a landmark decision. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Husserl, E. | Dummett Vs Husserl, E. | Dummett I 36 Husserl generalizes the concept of sense and meaning until he arrives at his concept of the noema, thus making the turn to language impossible. A generalization of Frege’s concept of sense is excluded. DummettVsHusserl: Noema not linguistically deducible. Husserl: An utterance as such is certainly not a consciousness act, but the fact that it actually has this specific meaning, goes back to an accompanying consciousness act: the "meaning-giving act." I 55 DummettVsHusserl: it is difficult to spare him the accusation that he represents here a Humpty Dumpty-view. In no case the intention of the speaker that the word could be interpreted in a certain sense consists in the fact that he performs an internal act by which it is filled with meaning. Noema/DummettVsHusserl: His assertion that the slipping into idealism would be prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not readily evident. We cannot say that the subject perceives the object only indirectly, for it is mediated by the noema. Namely, there is no concept of direct perception which we could oppose to this. I 104 DummettVsFrege, DummettVsHusserl: both go too far if they make the linguistic ideas expressed similar to the "interpretation". I 106 Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: are not necessarily linguistic: Proto thoughts (also animals) (linked to activities) - Proto thoughts instead of Husserl’s noema. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Husserl, E. | Frege Vs Husserl, E. | Dummett I 47 In any case, it is clear that a substantial utterance owes its meaning, according to Husserl, to an accompanying act of consciousness. Reference/FregeVsHusserl: Frege’s principle says that the Def reference of an expression is that, which is common to all other expressions for which it is clear that their substitution with the original expression does not affect the truth value of any sentence in which it occurs. I 48 Reference/HusserlVsFrege: in contrast, tends to the opinion that reference is the same as the object to which the predicate is applied. He certainly does not equate the reference of a predicate and a concept, but: Husserl uses meaning and sense synonymously. Dummett I 96 Def Noema/Husserl: generalization of the concept of sense, is nothing more than the generalization of the idea of meaning on the overall area of acts. FregeVsHusserl: his concept of meaning, however, does not allow a generalization. Thoughts are different from everything else, because they allow the distinction t/f, and so do their components. All that fulfills the same purpose as the sense, i.e. everything that is a specific means for determining an object or a function is sense itself and forms part of various thoughts. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Kant | Frege Vs Kant | I 30 HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature! I 30 Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious. I 41 Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds I 42 Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!. I 43 A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity. I 120 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 121 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. IV 61 Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic. I 119 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 120 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection. I 121 The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. Stepanians I 34 Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. Stepanians I 34 pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view. I 36 Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic. Newen I21 Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical. Quine X 93 Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory. Tugendhat II 12 "Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller IV 388 Contingency/Leibniz: every thing is contingent, which is why it would not be so if another thing were different. All things are causally connected. The world is the totality of these things, which is why the world as a whole is also contingent! World/Leibniz: it may well be that the series of causes is unlimited. Leibniz does not necessarily assume a temporal beginning! Sufficient Reason/Leibniz: must then lie outside the world! It must be something else than the world! IV 389 He must be a necessary being. VsLeibniz: 1. How do we know that everything needs a sufficient reason? 2. Can there be a necessary being that has a sufficient reason in itself? If the second question is answered negatively, the totality has no sufficient reason! KantVsLeibniz: the cosmological proof is implicitly based on the (refuted) ontological proof. (See KantVsDescartes). IV 390 Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existence quantifier is controversial! Existence/Contingency/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: we could understand necessary existence as negation of contingency. Problem: 1. the premise that the world as a whole is contingent (it would not exist if something else had been different) would have to be dropped: even if every part of the world is contingent, there is nothing to suggest that the world as a whole would not exist unless (sic?) something else was or would have been different. The conclusion from the contingency of each part to the contingency of the whole is inadmissible. Alternative 2: Contingency: something is contingent even if it could not exist. IV 392 This must be combined with the above remark that it would not be logically impossible that the claimed necessary being could not exist either. But this is incomprehensible. Sufficient Reason/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): how do we know that everything must have a sufficient reason? So far nobody has been able to show a necessity a priori for this. That would not have any plausibility either: 1. It is true that we are always looking for symmetries, but there is no guarantee that we will always find them. 2. We are always within our world, extrapolations are not allowed! Even if now everything within the world had a sufficient reason, we would have no right to conclude on a sufficient reason outside the world. Common argument: things must be comprehensible through and through. MackieVs: that is not true at all! IV 393 We have no reason to believe that the universe is oriented toward our intellectual needs. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Properties | Quine Vs Properties | I 215 We have seen that the appearance of abstract singular terms cannot be separated from that of abstract general terms ("virtue is rare"). Already a mass term has something of the hybrid appearance of the abstract singular term. E.g. "water" rather designates 1) a common characteristic of different puddles and glass filling levels than 2) a scattered part of the world that consists of those puddles. I 216 Mass terms are archaic remnants from the first phase of language acquisition, preforms of abstract singular terms. The difference between the "red" that is said about apples and the "red" that is said of their outside has no meaning. "Red" becomes the name of a property that is not only lumps and drops of a homogeneous substance, but also in common with apples. This abstract object can no longer be put aside as easily as the water property was put aside by giving 2) (common property) preference over 1) (dispersal). I 217 Because even if we have learned to construe water as a distributed concrete object, we tend to additionally permitting an abstract object like "redness". This analogy then spreads beyond the the mass terms up to terms with strictly divided reference. Therefore, roundness and sphericity. Every general term leads to an abstract singular term. The usefulness of abstract terms is mostly in the abbreviation of cross-references: E.g. "The same is true for Churchill", "Both plants have the following property in common". Only that in such cases the cross-reference merely refers to word structures. But we stubbornly tend to objectifying what has been said again by establishing a property instead of talking only of words. QuineVsProperties: Many thoughtless people insist on the reality of properties for no other reason than that both plants (or Eisenhower and Churchill) "must admittedly have something in common"! I 218 Properties: In as far as talk of properties has its origin in such abbreviated cross-references, the putative properties probably do not correspond to simple abstract terms, but to longer expressions. E.g. "being equipped with spikes in clusters of five." Properties: Cassirer: "Properties are remnants of the secondary deities of a disused faith". X 94 Properties/Predicates/Propositions/Individuation/QuineVsFrege: also the conception of the first logician is untenable: properties behave just like propositions. X 95 Properties/Quine: behave to predicates or open sentences like propositions to sentences. One cannot, just like with propositions, distinguish individual properties. Sets: can be distinguished due to the principle of extensionality. Principle of Extensionality: two sets are identical if they have the same elements. Open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine two different sets, but they can be based on two different properties. Properties/Identity: for two properties to be identical, the corresponding open sentences must be synonymous. And that is not possible because of confusion. Solution/Some Authors: Sets as values of "F". Quine: nevertheless, predicate schematic letters should not be regarded as quantifiable variables. Predicate/Quine: predicates have properties as their "intentions" or meanings (or would have them if properties existed), and they have sets as their extensions. But they are neither the name of one nor of the other. Intention: of a predicate: property Extension: of a predicate: set. Name: a predicate is never a name, neither of its intention (property) nor of its extension (set). Variable/Quine: quantifiable variables, therefore, cannot take the place of predicates, but of names. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Strawson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | NS I 149 Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: pro descriptive metaphysicsVsRevisionist metaphysics. Definition descriptive metaphysics/Strawson: detects which ontology suggests our every day doing and speaking. Definition revisionists Metaphysics/StrawsonVsQuine: a physicalist ontology. This stands in contrast to the everyday's way of thinking. StrawsonVsQuine: for Strawson it is just about the everyday language, not about the ontology of any language. Ontology/language/Strawson: Thesis: pro-thing-property-ontology. This is necessarily the most elementary. Because of the similarity to the subject-predicate form. --- NS I 150 Space/Time/Strawson: are tools to differentiate different cases. Transcendental/Kant: are arguments that relate to the conditions of possibility. Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: his arguments are transcendental. --- Strawson I 198 QuineVsGeach/QuineVsFrege: singular expressions (singular term) can occur at the points of quantifiable variables, general expressions cannot. Singular Term: can be quantified, general term: not quantifiable. StrawsonVsQuine: on closer inspection, these differences of approach seem far less significant. Quine strongly distinguishes between types of non-linguistic objects on one side and the distinction between singular and general terms, on the other side. (Word/object). In Quine "piety" and "wisdom" are singular expressions, namely names of abstract objects like the nouns "Socrates" and "earth" are the names of concrete objects. Abstract Singular Term/Quine: E.g. "piety" (Universal). The distinction between singular and general term is more important for Quine from the logical point of view. The singular term gives the impression, and to name only one object, while the general term does not claimed at all, to name something, although it "may be true of many things." StrawsonVsQuine: this is an unsatisfactory way of explaining that the word "philosopher" should be a general and not a singular term. We would not like to say that this expression is true of many things or people. --- Strawson I 252 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: regardless of their captivating simplicity of this analysis, I believe that it will be unacceptable by the form in which it is created. The language terms, in which the analysis is drawn up, presuppose the existence of subject expressions of linguistic singular terms. Other consequence: we are invited, to see the expressions that replace the "Fs" and "Gs" in the quantified sentences as ordinary predicate expressions. That is allright. --- I 253 Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: but again these forms have only their place in normal language because singular terms, subject expressions occupy the place they have there. Circularity: because we cannot simultaneously regard Fs and Gs as predicate expressions and accept that they all resolve subject expressions totally in the form of quantified sentences. Circle/StrawsonVsQuine: the argument is based on the linguistic forms that require in turn the use of these expressions. StrawsonVsGadamer/StrawsonVsQuine: one could argue against that this is too narrow, one must proceed inventively. In the case one would have to say what a teaching really should say, which is, taken literally, unacceptable. --- Strawson IV 69 StrawsonVsQuine: Suppose we want to manage without quantification over properties. Does it follow that the belief in objects would be justified, but not the belief in properties? --- IV 70 Strawson: we can accept a different kind of existence. A secondary, although a usual sense of existence, which applies to properties and relations. --- IV 71 Vs: E.g. a) "There is at least one property that has no machine, namely perfect efficiency". b) "no machine is completely efficient." In a) I quantify, in b) I do not. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stegmüller Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Stegmüller IV 390 Existence/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: the view that the concept of existence is completely absorbed in the existential quantifier is controversial! |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Wessel Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 352 Intension/WesselVsFrege/WesselVsQuine: Vs Differentiation Intension/Extension: does not help with the problems. Just the hint that these are intensional contexts is not enough. Extensionality Rule/Wessel: according to it, only occurrences of linguistic entities as terms or as statements can be replaced by identical meanings, but not arbitrary graphical parts. Therefore it cannot be said that it is only valid here to a limited extent, because it is not applicable at all! The wrong view is taken because in intensional contexts logical rules apply due to their definitions, which are very similar to the extensionality rule and which, possibly under additional conditions, also allow to replace mere occurrences of graphical parts by certain terms and statements. I 353 Wessel: but in general you cannot say that: Example "a said the statement A" this phrase is used in two different meanings: one is the exact word and letter sequence, the other only the information (indirect speech). Planet Example/WesselVsQuine: he does not use the relation of the meaning equality of terms and the substitutability for meaningful terms, but the identity propositions "evening star = morning star" and the substitutability rule for identities. Wessel: our formulation with equality of meaning is more general. But it also applies to identities. Quine: does not distinguish between an occurrence as a term and as a mere graphic part! Quine interprets all the propositions in connection with the planet example as logical modalities. (Therefore Stegmüller speaks of the peculiarity of the copula "is" and doubts the possibility of a modal logic). Modal Logic/Quine/Wessel: the modalities occurring in Quine's statements can be interpreted as both alethic and epistemic modalities. I 354 WesselVsQuine: this concludes from a wrong premise: Ms(9 ' 7) > ~Wit(9 ' 7). (Ms if the state of affairs is possible, ~Wi: = not refutable) Morning star/evening star/simple/composite/Wessel: one can regard both as simple terms, then the paradox dissolves: ta '_' tb or a = b). (The morning star is the same object as the evening star). 2. as compound terms: then it applies that: ~(ta '_' tb) or ~(a = b). They are then not identical in meaning. WesselVsQuine: in this case one of its prerequisites is wrong. Quine replaces in his construction the paradoxical parts of expressions, which do not occur as terms, but only as graphical parts. VsVs: but the objection has little weight, since additional rules of substitutability can be proven for modal contexts. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Realism | Idealism Vs Realism | Frank I 467 "I think"/Kant/Castaneda: "I think" puts everything into indirect speech! Consequence: VsFrege: according to Kant all his reference objects are not part of the semantics of singular terms! ((s) According to Frege, embedded sentences do not have a reference object of their own, but only denote the meaning of an object. Conversely, according to Kant, Frege's objects can only function as transcendent objects. (IdealismVsRealism). Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983), pp. 313-327. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Representation | Castaneda Vs Representation | Frank I 461 Guise Theory/CastanedaVsFrege/CastanedaVSRepresentations: (conception of "I" as a representation): (i) does not allow a semantic intermediary between a singularly referring expression and its referent (ii) it eludes psychological intermediaries between person and object (iii) removes the Fregean referent from the semantic order (iv) sets objects entities as referents, called individual guise, which are objectively almost analogous to Frege’s individual senses. (v) provides an analysis of Frege’s primary objects as systems of individual geguises. (vi) such systems are doxastic objects: they reach belief and thought, but not by singular reference, i.e. they are not the semantic endpoints. I 462 (vii) thought and beliefs only reach such doxastic objects by guises, as pictured systems of guises, and perhaps by general reference, i.e. by means of specific, non-substituting quantification. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Russell, B. | Quine Vs Russell, B. | Chisholm II 75 Predicates/Denote/Russell: denoting expressions: proper names stand for individual things and general expressions for universals. (Probleme d. Phil. p. 82f). In every sentence, at least one word refers to a universal. QuineVsRussell: confusion! II 108 Theory of Descriptions/VsRussell/Brandl: thus the whole theory is suspected of neglecting the fact that material objects can never be part of propositions. QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. Quine II 97 Pricipia mathematica, 1903: Here, Russell's ontology is rampant: every word refers to something. If a word is a proper name, then its object is a thing, otherwise it is a concept. He limits the term "existence" to things, but has a liberal conception of things which even includes times and points in empty space! Then there are, beyond the existent things, other entities: "numbers, the gods of Homer, relationships, fantasies, and four-dimensional space". The word "concept", used by Russell in this manner, has the connotation of "merely a concept". Caution: Gods and fantasies are as real as numbers for Russell! QuineVsRussell: this is an intolerably indiscriminate ontology. Example: Take impossible numbers, e.g. prime numbers that are divisible by 6. It must be wrong in a certain sense that they exist, and that is in a sense in which it is right that there are prime numbers! Do fantasies exist in this sense? II 101 Russell has a preference for the term "propositional function" against "class concept". In P.M. both expressions appear. Here: Def "Propositional Function": especially based on forms of notation, e.g. open sentences, while concepts are decidedly independent of notation. However, according to Meinong Russell's confidence is in concepts was diminished, and he prefers the more nominalistic sound of the expression "propositional function" which is now carries twice the load (later than Principia Mathematica.) Use/Mention/Quine: if we now tried to deal with the difference between use and mention as carelessly as Russell has managed to do sixty years ago, we can see how he might have felt that his theory of propositional functions was notation based, while a theory of types of real classes would be ontological. Quine: we who pay attention to use and mention can specify when Russell's so-called propositional functions as terms (more specific than properties and relations) must be construed as concepts, and when they may be construed as a mere open sentences or predicates: a) when he quantifies about them, he (unknowingly) reifies them as concepts. For this reason, nothing more be presumed for his elimination of classes than I have stated above: a derivation of the classes from properties or concepts by means of a context definition that is formulated such that it provides the missing extensionality. QuineVsRussell: thinks wrongly that his theory has eliminated classes more thoroughly from the world than in terms of a reduction to properties. II 102 RussellVsFrege: "~ the entire distinction between meaning and designating is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where are we to find the designating complex which supposedly designates C?" QuineVsRussell: Russell's position sometimes seems to stem from a confusion of the expression with its meaning, sometimes from the confusion of the expression with its mention. II 103/104 In other papers Russel used meaning usually in the sense of "referencing" (would correspond to Frege): "Napoleon" particular individual, "human" whole class of such individual things that have proper names. Russell rarely seems to look for an existing entity under any heading that would be such that we could call it the meaning that goes beyond the existing referent. Russell tends to let this entity melt into the expression itself, a tendency he has in general when it comes to existing entities. QuineVsRussell: for my taste, Russell is too wasteful with existing entities. Precisely because he does not differentiate enough, he lets insignificance and missed reference commingle. Theory of Descriptions: He cannot get rid of the "King of France" without first inventing the description theory: being meaningful would mean: have a meaning and the meaning is the reference. I.e. "King of France" without meaning, and "The King of France is bald" only had a meaning, because it is the short form of a sentence that does not contain the expression "King of France". Quine: actually unnecessary, but enlightening. Russell tends commingle existing entities and expressions. Also on the occasion of his remarks on Propositions: (P.M.): propositions are always expressions, but then he speaks in a manner that does not match this attitude of the "unity of the propositions" (p.50) and of the impossibility of infinite propositions (p.145) II 105 Russell: The proposition is nothing more than a symbol, even later, instead: Apparently, propositions are nothing..." the assumption that there are a huge number of false propositions running around in the real, natural world is outrageous." Quine: this revocation is astounding. What is now being offered to us instead of existence is nothingness. Basically Russell has ceased to speak of existence. What had once been regarded as existing is now accommodated in one of three ways a) equated with the expression, b) utterly rejected c) elevated to the status of proper existence. II 107 Russell/later: "All there is in the world I call a fact." QuineVsRussell: Russell's preference for an ontology of facts depends on his confusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise he would probably have finished the facts off quickly. What the reader of "Philosophy of logical atomism" notices would have deterred Russell himself, namely how much the analysis of facts is based on the analysis of language. Russell does not recognize the facts as fundamental in any case. Atomic facts are as atomic as facts can be. Atomic Facts/Quine: but they are composite objects! Russell's atoms are not atomic facts, but sense data! II 183 ff Russell: Pure mathematics is the class of all sentences of the form "p implies q" where p and q are sentences with one or more variables, and in both sets the same. "We never know what is being discussed, nor if what we say is true." II 184 This misinterpretation of mathematics was a response to non-Euclidean geometry. Numbers: how about elementary arithmetic? Pure numbers, etc. should be regarded as uninterpreted. Then the application to apples is an accumulation. Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I find this attitude completely wrong. The words "five" and "twelve" are nowhere uninterpreted, they are as much essential components of our interpreted language as apples. >Numbers. They denote two intangible objects, numbers that are the sizes of quantities of apples and the like. The "plus" in addition is also interpreted from start to finish, but it has nothing to do with the accumulation of things. Five plus twelve is: how many apples there are in two separate piles. However, without pouring them together. The numbers "five" and "twelve" differ from apples in that they do not denote a body, that has nothing to do with misinterpretation. The same could be said of "nation" or "species". The ordinary interpreted scientific speech is determined to abstract objects as it is determined to apples and bodies. All these things appear in our world system as values of variables. II 185 It even has nothing to do with purity (e.g. of the set theory). Purity is something other than uninterpretedness. XII 60 Expression/Numbers/Knowledge/Explication/Explanation/Quine: our knowledge of expressions is alone in their laws of interlinking. Therefore, every structure that fulfills these laws can be an explication. XII 61 Knowledge of numbers: consists alone in the laws of arithmetic. Then any lawful construction is an explication of the numbers. RussellVs: (early): Thesis: arithmetic laws are not sufficient for understanding numbers. We also need to know applications (use) or their embedding in the talk about other things. Number/Russell: is the key concept here: "there are n such and suches". Number/Definition/QuineVsRussell: we can define "there are n such and suches" without ever deciding what numbers are beyond their fulfillment of arithmetic addition. Application/Use/QuineVsRussell: wherever there is structure, the applications set in. E.g. expressions and Gödel numbers: even the mention of an inscription was no definitive proof that we are talking about expressions and not about Gödel numbers. We can always say that our ostension was shifted. VII (e) 80 Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Whitehead/Quine: shows that the whole of mathematics can be translated into logic. Only three concepts need to be clarified: Mathematics, translation and logic. VII (e) 81 QuineVsRussell: the concept of the propositional function is unclear and obscures the entire PM. VII (e) 93 QuineVsRussell: PM must be complemented by the axiom of infinity if certain mathematical principles are to be derived. VII (e) 93/94 Axiom of infinity: ensures the existence of a class with infinitely many elements. Quine: New Foundations instead makes do with the universal class: θ or x^ (x = x). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (f) 122 Propositional Functions/QuineVsRussell: ambiguous: a) open sentences b) properties. Russell no classes theory uses propositional functions as properties as value-bound variables. IX 15 QuineVsRussell: inexact terminology. "Propositional function", he used this expression both when referring to attributes (real properties) and when referring to statements or predicates. In truth, he only reduced the theory of classes to an unreduced theory of attributes. IX 93 Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: I differ in one point: for me, rational numbers are themselves real numbers, not so for Russell and Whitehead. Russell: rational numbers are pairwise disjoint for them like those of Peano. (See Chapter 17), while their real numbers are nested. ((s) pairwise disjoint, contrast: nested) Natural Numbers/Quine: for me as for most authors: no rational integers. Rational Numbers/Russell: accordingly, no rational real numbers. They are only "imitated" by the rational real numbers. Rational Numbers/QuineVsRussell: for me, however, the rational numbers are real numbers. This is because I have constructed the real numbers according to Russell's version b) without using the name and the designation of rational numbers. Therefore, I was able to retain name and designation for the rational real numbers IX 181 Type Theory/TT/QuineVsRussell: in the present form our theory is too weak to prove some sentences of classical mathematics. E.g. proof that every limited class of real numbers has a least upper boundary (LUB). IX 182 Suppose the real numbers were developed in Russell's theory similar to Section VI, however, attributes were now to take the place of classes and the alocation to attributes replaces the element relation to classes. LUB: (Capters 18, 19) of a limited class of real numbers: the class Uz or {x:Ey(x ε y ε z)}. Attribute: in parallel, we might thus expect that the LUB of a limited attribute φ of real numbers in Russell's system is equal to the Attribute Eψ(φψ u ψ^x). Problem: under Russell's order doctrine is this LUB ψ is of a higher order than that of the real numbers ψ which fall under the attribute φ whose LUB is sought. Boundary/LUB/QuineVsRussell: You need LUB for the entire classic technique of calculus, which is based on continuity. However, LUB have no value for these purposes if they are not available as values of the same variables whose value range already includes those numbers whose upper boundary is wanted. An upper boundary (i.e. LUB) of higher order cannot be the value of such variables, and thus misses its purpose. Solution/Russell: Axiom of Reducibility: Def Axiom of Reducibility/RA/Russell/Quine: every propositional function has the same extension as a certain predicative one. I.e. Ey∀x(ψ!x φx), Eψ∀x∀y[ψ!(x,y) φ(x,y)], etc. IX 184 VsConstruktivism/Construction/QuineVsRussell: we have seen Russell's constructivist approach to the real numbers fail (LUB, see above). He gave up on constructivism and took refuge in the RA. IX 184/185 The way he gave it up had something perverse to it: Axiom of Reducibility/QuineVsRussell: the RA implies that all the distinctions that gave rise to its creation are superfluous! (... + ...) IX 185 Propositional Function/PF/Attribute/Predicate/TT/QuineVsRussell: overlooked the following difference and its analogs: a) "propositional functions": as attributes (or intentional relations) and b) proposition functions: as expressions, i.e. predicates (and open statements: e.g. "x is mortal") Accordingly: a) attributes b) open statements As expressions they differ visibly in the order if the order is to be assessed on the basis of the indices of bound variables within the expression. For Russell everything is "AF". Since Russell failed to distinguish between formula and object (word/object, mention/use), he did not remember the trick of allowing that an expression of higher order refers straight to an attribute or a relation of lower order. X 95 Context Definition/Properties/Stage 2 Logic/Quine: if you prefer properties as sets, you can introduce quantification over properties, and then introduce quantification over sets through a schematic context definition. Russell: has taken this path. Quine: but the definition has to ensure that the principle of extensionality applies to sets, but not to properties. That is precisely the difference. Russell/QuineVsRussell: why did he want properties? X 96 He did not notice at which point the unproblematic talk of predicates capsized to speaking about properties. ((s) object language/meta language/mention/use). Propositional Function/PF: Russell took it over from Frege. QuineVsRussell: he sometimes used PF to refer to predicates, sometimes to properties. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Russell, B. | Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B. | Carnap VI 58 Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein. (Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements). E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal": both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement). "The class of humans is included in the class of mortals". --- Tugendhat I 453 Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. I 470 Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability. Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities. Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole. Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals). E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function. --- Wittgenstein I 80 Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic. This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class. This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world. I 81 1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects. N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else: I 82 The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality). I 86 Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects. I 94ff This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45). I 95 According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use). I 107 Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world. They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data. I 108 For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also: Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world". I 114 Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." I 115 Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects." Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul". I 143 Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object." I 144 Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. I 286 Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. I 287 And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images. --- Wittgenstein II 35 Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally. WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original. --- Wittgenstein II 74 Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions. 2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal." Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x). II 75 But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. II 79 Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear. II 80 WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke. II 100 Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning. II 123 Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. II 137 Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent. All S are P: (x) gx > .fx No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns. II 152 WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles. WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square." Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"? II 157 Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. Wittgenstein II 306 Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive. Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such. II 307 We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man. Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things. This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties. A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property). II 308 WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them. That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name. II 309 What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? II 311 Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Schröder, E. | Frege Vs Schröder, E. | I 116 Sign/FregeVsSchröder: with him you sometimes do not know if he thinks that the number is a sign and what its meaning is then, or whether seven is its meaning. From the fact that you can establish various signs, so that the same (sign) never returns, it does not follow that these signs also mean different things. Simons I 102 Class/FregeVsSchröder: we have to distinguish: a) "logical" sets: = value progressions and I 103 b) "concrete" sets: a calculus of collective classes is only a calculus of part and whole. SimonsVsFrege: ironically, this turned out to be much more vulnerable as Schroeder’s "manifolds". Lesniewski: knew Frege’s criticism. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Sententialism | Schiffer Vs Sententialism | I 120 Def classic sententialism/Schiffer: after him the meaning or the contents determine, which proposition one believes. I 120 And that is also the problem: DavidsonVsclassisc sententialism, VsSententionalism/VsSententialism/Schiffer: Problem: Ambiguity in one language and in several languages. 1. E.g. [Empedokles liept]: in English: he leaped (leaped, (in the Etna), in German: he loves). (Davidson 1968, 98). 2. E.g. Field: "visiting relatives can be boring". Problem: the truth conditions of belief are after the unrefined sententialism the same as those of the believed proposition. In ambiguous propositions this would then be several truth-conditions!. E.g. if there was a language in which "love is cruel" means that kangaroos are flying, then Henri must believe both!. I 123 DavidsonVsSententialism: 1.a) with a proposition as a reference object of the that-proposition, there would be a fixation on only one language. b) Because of the ambiguity then there could be several truth conditions in the same language. (1975, 165f). 2. (alsoVsFrege): A very different semantic role than normal is ascribed to the proposition: Frege and sententionalism construct "the earth moves" as a major part of a singular term, namely "that the earth moves." They both do that because of the lack of substitutability in intensional contexts. I 137 Meaning/Propositional attitude/Belief/SchifferVsSententialism: there can therefore exist no correct sententialistic theory of propositional attitude Because no man knows the content-determining characteristics. Therefore, it also no proper access to extensionalistic compositional semantics for natural languages can exist. Previously we had already seen that failed as a non-sententialistic theory. I 157 Belief/Belief systems/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine belief systems never are true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But: QuineVsBrentano: ~ no propositional attitudes belong in the canonical scheme, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (W+O 1960, p 221). Vssententialist dualism/SD/Schiffer: 1. QuineVs: If we accept the sD, we need to acknowledge with Brentano the "importance of an autonomous science of intention". Problem: this commonsense theory would then be cut off from the rest of science. And: Isolation/Science/Wright: (Wright 1984): to be isolated from the scientific means to be discredited. Theory/Quine: if it is discredited, their theoretical terms cannot be true of something and propositions such as "I think some dogs have fleas" cannot be true. Sententialist Dualism/Field: pro: (1972, 357): Physicalism is a successful hypothesis ... that would only force a large number of experiments to be ad. I 158 We bring Quine and Field as follows together: (1) "Believes", "wishes", "means" and so on are theoretical terms (TT) of a common sense psychological theory. (2) The justification for methodological physicalism (what Field wants) and the nature of the commonsense theory require that - should the theoretical terms physicalistically be irreducible - the folk psychology must be wrong. That means the terms are true of nothing (Quine). (3) Therefore, the sD must be wrong: belief systems cannot be both: true and irreducible. SchifferVs: is not convincing. I doubt both premises. Ad (2): there is no legitimate empirical hypothesis that requires that theoretical facts on physical facts are reducible. That would only be plausible if the TT would be defined by the theory itself that it introduces. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Skepticism | Frege Vs Skepticism | Davidson II 124 FregeVsSkepticism: the skeptic has no cure, because he cannot even assume for his next statement that his words still have the same meanings as before. Dummett I 58 Skepticism: never sure whether sense corresponds to a relation -Frege: just a severe deficiency of our language, which must be eliminated. IV 45 FregeVsSkepticism: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! - If everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imagination! - Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination. IV 50 Imagination/Psychology/Skepticism/Frege: not everything is imagination, otherwise psychology would contain all the sciences. (s) VsFrege: That does not make it impossible for everything to be imagination at the end of the day. (reductio ad absurdum is not enough.)) - IV 51 Perception/Frege: sensory perception necessarily requires sensation, and this is part of the inner world. Frege IV 46 FregeVsSkepticism: interestingly, in his consideration the opposites turn into each other. (>"Dialectic"). E.g. a sensory physiologist as a naturalist is initially far from considering the things he is convinced to see and touch as his imagination. IV 46 Stimulus/Frege: skepticism can easily refer to him: The stimulus of the optic nerve is not given to us directly, but just an assumption! We are experiencing only one end of the process that protrudes into our consciousness! Perhaps other causes are at work? So everything dissolves into imagination, also the light beams. The empirical sensory physiologist thus undermines his own conditions. Everything requires a carrier, I have considered myself as the carrier of my imagination, but am I not myself an imagination?. IV 47 Where is then the carrier of these imaginations? If everything is imagination: there is no carrier. Also, no imaginations are somehow distinguished. Now I experience the change into the opposite: FregeVsBerkeley: if everything is imagination, there is no carrier. But if there is no carrier, there are also no imaginations! ((s) that introduces a new concept, which does not exist in Berkeley: that of the carrier). But there can be no experience without someone who experiences it. But then there is something that is not my imagination, and yet object of my contemplation. Could it be that this "I" as a carrier of my consciousness is only one part of this consciousness, while another part is perhaps a "moon image"? I.e. something else is taking place when I judge that I am looking at the moon? Then this first part would have a consciousness and a part of this consciousness would be I, etc. so regress. Frege: I am not my imagination, I am the carrier of my imagination. So that what I’m saying something about is not necessarily my imagination. VsFrege: It could be argued E.g. that if I think that I don’t feel any pain at this moment, doesn’t something in my imagination correspond to the word "I"? Frege: That may be. IV 48 I/Frege: the word "I" may be connected to a certain image in my consciousness. But then it is an image among other images, and I am its carrier as I am the carrier of other images. I have an image of me, but I’m not this image! There must be a sharp distinction between the content of my consciousness (my imagination) and the object of my thinking (objective thoughts). Now the path towards recognizing other people as an independent carriers of imagination is clear. Images may also be the common object of thought by people who do not have this image. Imagination may become object. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Structuralism | Field Vs Structuralism | II 328 Numbers/Structuralism/Field: it is sometimes expressed in a way that 2 is simply a point in a structure. (Resnik 1981, Shapiro 1989). Vagueness/Field: This view corresponds to the view that vagueness is in the world instead of in our language! ((s)> epistemic view). FieldVs: it seems to work well not only for numbers like "2", but also for the expressions that we use to describe structures in which there are no symmetries. Symmetry/Field: brings a problem into play here. E.g. Brandom: √-1/Root -1/Complex Numbers/Field: Problem: every complex number other than 0 (Ex -1) has two roots. (actually BrandomVsFrege, BrandomVsLogicism). "Number i": this term has introduced as a standard for one of the two, (-i is then of course the other one). Problem: even if we assume that we have somehow defined which objects are the complex numbers, which subset of them are the real numbers, and which functions of them are addition and multiplication, then our use of these expressions still leaves undetermined to which of the two roots of -1 our expression "i" refers. ((s) Because of the symmetry, it is impossible to make out a difference). Complex Numbers/Interior/Exterior/Theory/Field: within the theory of complex numbers there is no way to distinguish i and -i. There is no predicate A(x) that does not itself contain "i" and that is true of one but not of the other. Complex Numbers/Field: Of course, the practical applications are no help in distinguishing them either!. Problem: even if you say that "i" is simply a point in the system of complex numbers, the indeterminacy continues, because the complex number plane contains two structurally identical positions for the roots of -1, without distinguishing properties. 4) Incompleteness"/Mathematics/Numbers/Field: numbers are more or less incomplete objects: E.g. 2 has properties such as being the predecessor of 3 and being a prime, but no property that determines whether it is a quantity!. FieldVsStructuralism: This fourth way of seeing it is certainly not the best way to capture the "structuralist insight". II 332 Platonism/Mathematics/VsStructuralism/Field: isomorphic mathematical domains must not be indistinguishable. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Tradition | Simons Vs Tradition | I 291 Integrity/connection/individual/tradition/Simons: thesis: integrity belongs to the spatio-temporally continuous objects. SimonsVsTradition: microscopically all things are distributed and no longer connected (> Microstructure, MiSt). Quine: this applies to all things that are not only of a single elementary particle (1960,98). Object/thing/philosophy/Simons: distributed objects are also called objects: e.g. galaxies, e.g. Indonesia. Individual/Leibniz: an individual must be atomic. (>Monads). (Simons: virtually all authors VsLeibniz). I 306 Relational Accident/SimonsVsTradition: a relational accident may very well exist. This applies to accidents that are based in more than one substrate: e.g. the collision between two bodies. It could not have happened with other bodies (modal rigidity) and both bodies must exist at the time (temporal rigidity) even if one or both are destroyed in the accident. Also: e.g. weddings, divorces, football matches. This is nothing mysterious. I 342 Proposition/connection/copula/tradition/Simons: the cohesion of the proposition is delivered according to the tradition of the copula: Copula/VsTradition: the copula occurs in the proposition only as a normal word like the others, so it cannot explain the cohesion. Solution/Frege: a solution is offered by the unsaturated parts of a sentence. Proposition/WittgensteinVsFrege: a connection simply is a common juxtaposition of words (names). That means that there is not one part of the sentence which establishes the connection. Unsaturatedness/Simons: unsaturatedness perfectly matches the ontological dependence (undated): a part of a sentence cannot exist without certain others! |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Type Theory | Wittgenstein Vs Type Theory | II 439 Type Theory/Theory of types/WittgensteinVsRussell: f(a) = U's coat is red F(a) = U's coat has one of the colors of the rainbow φ(f) = Red is a color of the rainbow Question: Now, φ (F) has a meaning? ((s) This is not mentioned in this combination above). Russell: would say that "a color of the rainbow has the property to be a rainbow color" has no meaning, so that "f(f)" generally has no meaning. But if we now create a rule of grammar in order to exclude a replacement option (and exactly this does the theory of types, in order to avoid contradictions), then we must make the replacement rule dependendet exclusively on the characteristics of symbols. Replacement rule: if we introduce "f(x)" we must not give "f (f)" a meaning. E.g. Consider ~ f(f) = F(f) and the expression that is obtained by replacing "f" through "F": the property to not have oneself as a property that has itself in turn as a property. The root of the contradiction is that one considers a function to function of itself. ((s)> heterology). From ~ f(f) = F(f) results the contradiction F(F) = ~ F(F). Problem: arises when one declares a function to its function of itself. II 440 "f" in "f(x)" cannot be used as an argument itself. But why should this not occur as that which one presupposes, is not a sentence? It is not true to say that here the principle of contradiction has been violated, because that could only be the case if one was talking about sentences. Hardy said it would be unbearable to have real numbers of different orders. See his discussion, after which a sequence of real numbers belongs to another order, because it is defined by reference to a entirety whose barrier it is itself. An analog example is the maximum of a curve, which is defined as the highest points of all on this curve. IV 68 Operation/Form Series/Type theory/TT/Tractatus: 5.252 only like this the progression from member to member in a form series (from type to type in Russell) is possible. WittgensteinVsRussell: in Principia Mathematica(1) (PM), they have not given the possibility of this progression, but have made use of it repeatedly. 5.2521 The repeated application of an operation to its own result ((s)> recursion) I call its successive application ("O'O '=' a" is the result of a triple application of "O'ζ" to "a"). 5.2522 the general term of a form series a, O 'a, O'O'a ... I write: IV 69 "[a,x,O'x]". This expression in brackets is a variable. 1. member: beginning of the form series 2. member: The form of any member x of the series 3. member: Form of the immediate successor this x. (Successor: O'). IV 70 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.4 "Logical objects" or "logical constants" in the sense of Russell do not exist. Primitive signs/WittgensteinVsFrege/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.42 The possibility of crosswise definition of the logical "primitive signs" of Frege and Russell (e.g. >, v) already shows that these are not primitive signs, let alone that they do not signify any relations. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Verificationism | Husserl Vs Verificationism | Chisholm II 150 Utterance/truthfulness/Husserl: there is a difference between: 1. the semantic relation of perception and 2. verification (both must not coincide: truth does not have to be evident. > Assertibility) and 3. the relation to a thing "outside", whatever it may be. II 151 In sentences with indexical words (index words), the three overlap. Meaning/HusserlVsVerification/Husserl: verification does not contribute to the meaning of the sentence, because 2. and 3. fall apart. The only exception: indexical phenomena (VsFrege; VsDummett; 6th logical examination). Example: Jules understands only "This crow flies high" when Jim shows it to him. The crow, showing and flying instantiate different kinds. However, the two levels of the universal and the particular are strictly separated. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Representationalism | Versus | Brandom II 74 Other direction Frege (late): representation-independent reality - DummettVsFrege: Falsely: Property of sentences instead of transitions between them. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Intensionality | Pro | Quine2 XI 66 Frege; prt intensional Semantics. - QuineVsFrege. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sense | Austin, J.L. | Graeser I 62 Sense / AustinVsFrege: thesis: mostly we use sentences not to report facts but to generally do something!. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Thought | Dummett, M. | I 61 DummettVsFrege: that does not show that the theory is wrong, that the sense (thought, see above) is not a content of consciousness, but rather that its reasoning is not entirely accurate, namely the communicability and consequent objectivity. I 62 Today is Frege s thesis regarding the "objective meaning" commonplace. No one would deny any more that the use of color terms is subject to generally applicable criteria and can be assessed. |
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| Names | Dummett, M. | StalnI 172 Names/Reference/Sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: thesis: names have their reference directly, without mediating an intermediate sense Frege/Dummett/Searle: thesis: between the name and its speaker one must assume the meaning of the name a) because otherwise the object cannot be identified at all, or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke) because then we cannot learn the language. |
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| Knowledge | Field, Hartry | I 94 Logical Knowledge/Frege: Thesis: Problem, how do I know that it is logically possible that the axioms of set theory are true: by claiming I know that there are actual entities claimed by the axioms - FieldVsFrege: if these entities existed, then how could one know that they are in this relation to each other and not in another? I 112 Zus. Knowledge/Mathematics/Logic/Field: All mathematical knowledge that is not empirical is purely logical. I 124 Logical Knowledge/Field: Thesis: mathematical knowledge is logical knowledge. Logical Knowledge/Field: Thesis: is also contestable for me. Thesis: therefore I would like to shift some statements from "logically known" to "logically believable". |
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| Thought | Frege, G. | Dum I 89 Frege: Thesis: of the primacy of thought over language. Dum I 92 DummettVsFrege: Conversely, his theory of perception contradicts his thesis that the human can only grasp those thoughts which he/she understands as the meaning of sentences. From this one can take two readings. Strongest reading: we can only think in language, weakest: none of us can have a thought that we cannot express. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 73 Question/Command/Wish/Frege: Thesis: a wish phrase, a question or a command contains no thoughts at all! |
SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
| Qualia | Frege, G. | Staln I 220 Qualia / common sense / Shoemaker: Thesis: qualia are internal, intrinsic, locally but also comparable. VsFrege-Schlick-view. Qualia / Frege-Schlick-view / Shoemaker: Thesis: qualia are not comparable, because it is meaningless to assume that e.g. exchanged spectra represent anything communicable. Interpersonal comparisons of phenomenal experience are meaningless. |
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| Index Words | Frege, G. | Newen / Schrenk I 27 Index words / VsFrege / Newen / Schrenk: limits of his theory: context-dependent expressions (indicators, indicator words: e.g. "here", "now", "I", etc.) can not be treated (not be determined). This is a consequence of his thesis that (full) thoughts are context independent and words have a stable sense. |
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| Names | Frege, G. | Wolf I 13 Names/FregeVsRussell: singular term. Newen/Schrenk I 101 Meaning/Name/Frege: Thesis: The meaning of a name is expressed by its identification. This is the so-called designation theory, a simple variant of the description theory. Staln I 172 Name/Reference/Sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: Thesis: Names have their reference directly, without mediation of an intermediate meaning. Frege/Dummett/Searle: thesis: between the name and its reference one must assume the sense of the name a) because otherwise the object cannot be identified at all, or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke) because then we cannot learn the language. |
K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Vagueness | Frege, G. | EMD II 223 Vagueness / natural language / Frege: imprecise, which is a deficiency that needs to be turned off. WrightVsFrege / (s): thesis some predicates have to be vague, to ever serve their purpose and thus ultimately to allow the natural language to fulfill its purpose. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Infinite | Geach, P. | I 166 infinity / GeachVsFrege: Thesis: Mathematical infinity is not as Frege thought an infinity of "objective things", but consists in the infinite possibilities of human language. |
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| Idiolect | Kripke, S.A. | Cresswell II 151 Def "extreme Fregeanism" / KripkeVsFrege / KripkeVsRussell / Cresswell: the thesis that names in general belong to idiolects. Problem: then the Pierre-Example is not about Pierre, but about the speaker who reports the case, and about his idiolect. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Names | Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 223 Names/Description/References/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975): for names and species expressions, there is no common description that defines what the expression refers to. Descriptions are completely irrelevant to the reference. Description Theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed that are necessarily attributed to the referent. Schwarz I 228 Names/Predicate/Property/Lewis: Thesis: Names can name everything: instead of predicate "F" we take "F-dom" - predicates are not names and name nothing - predicate(s): no singular term - SchwarzVsLewis/ RussellVsFrege: if you assume that each predicate can be assigned a name for a corresponding property, Russell's paradox follows. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Names | Searle, J.R. | Staln I 172 Names/Reference/Sense/Stalnaker: 1. Mill/KripkeVsFrege: thesis: names have their referents directly, without mediating an intermediate sense. Frege/Dummett/Searle: thesis: between the name and its referent one must assume the meaning of the name a) because otherwise the object cannot be identified at all, or we cannot explain how it is identified, b) (DummettVsKripke) because then we cannot learn the language. |
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| Wittgenstein | II 160 Logic / WittgensteinVsFrege: 1st, it is quite arbitrary, what we call the a sentence - therefore logic means for me something other than for Frege - 2nd VsFrege: all words are equally important - Frege: These "word", "sentence", "world "are more important - VII 14 Tractatus / Logic / Tetens: the thesis of the Tractatus: no one can stand outside the logic. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vs Kripke | Burkhardt, A. | Wolf I 341 BurkhardtVsKripke: thesis: that names are rigid description expressions, indeed applies to the rule, but must be supplemented, contrary to his view in other cases by Frege’s sense-term. BurkhardtVsFrege: his view is false, proper names have both meaning and sense. |
K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
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