|Nonfactualism: Nonfactualism is an expression for the assumption that there are no facts with regard to certain decision-making processes. For example, there is no fact that causes the sum of two and two to be four. Nonfactualism is interpreted very differently by different authors. Therefore, the expression is sometimes used polemically. See also truth makers, decidability, facts, truth, deflationism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: E.g. relativistic mass or net weight in the Special Relativity Theory: - no fact decides which hypothesis is to be assumed. - The laws are, however, in some cases easier to formulate, depending on the choice.
Fact/discourse without facts/Nonfactualism/Field: 1. Questions of vagueness (Sorites): E.g. there is no fact, to which "bare" precisely refers.
2. assessment questions/morality/ethics.
3. sentences with indicators/index words.
4. Subjunctive conditional/counterfactual conditional/co.co.
Nonfactualism/Factualism/Reference Framework/Relativity/Field: Nonfactualist: has a relativized T-predicate - but for him there is no "real" time order.
Deflationism: distinguishes nonfactualism/factualism on the basis of accepted sentences.
Problem: also the factualist could have a relativized concept by introducing it as a basic concept. - E.g. "cosmically privileged framework". - Then one can no longer distinguish factualism and nonfactualism.
Solution: to ask the factualist why his framework is privileged
a) if he speaks of scientific exceptions, it is distinguishable from nonfactualism
b) if unscientific, then indistinguishable.
Nonfactualism/ethics: does not have to say that the sentences have no truth values. - It can say that the truth value ascriptions do not have the factual status, as the assertions themselves.
Problem: if you only have the disquotation scheme, how should you state what is not entirely supported by facts?
Solution: everyday language: also contains an (implicit) fact operator.
FieldVs: the rules for this are unclear.
Nonfactualism/Ethics/non-deflationism/Gibbard/Field: (Gibbard 1990): admits that evaluations have a factual component - factual and nonfactual must be connected in one and the same analysis. - Sets of ordered pairs of possible worlds and standard systems, so that an utterance is true in this world according to this norm - possible world: is here a complete specification of factual information.
But it does not contain any "normative facts". - Complete norm: associates with each evaluative predicate a non-evaluative equivalent - E.g. "maximizes utility" -> utilitarianism. - Nonfactualism: Thesis: the real world contains no "normative facts".
N.B.: this non-existence is not a normative fact on its part. - Otherwise, error theory: Thesis: "It is a fact that there are no facts". - Then: E.g.: "We should do this and that, according to norm N": is itself not norm-dependent but factual.
Factualism/Field: does not postulate here a realm of facts, which the nonfactualist denies. - Everything that the factualist asserts can be expressed by the nonfactualist by "~ A v B" (negation and disjunction). ((s) Then there is no antecedent that is made false by the absence of facts and thus creates a trivially true consequence)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994