Dictionary of Arguments

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Nominalism: nominalism is the view that universals (for example, triangles, blackness) are merely artificial constructions from individual cases. The linguistic expressions are merely names for these constructs. See also universalism, conceptualism, general terms, categories, generalization, generality.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 132
Theory/Nominalism/strong/weak/stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: has more consequences - if mathematical entities (mE) are to be dispensed with, a Platonist theory can have no (physical) consequences which a nominalistic (only physical entities entities) does not have.
l 159
Equivalence/Platonism/Nominalism/Field: Question: in what sense are Platonist (e.g. "direction 1 = direction 2") and nominalistic statement (c1 is parallel to c2) equivalent? Problem: if there are no directions, the second cannot be a consequence of the first.
III 12
Nominalism/Field/N.B.: will not claim N* (without mathematical entities), but the stronger N.
III 34
Nominalism/Field: is compatible with the assumption of space-time points and empty regions -
Nominalism pro substantivalism.
III 36
Regions/Points/Field: Solution for the nominalists: individual calculus/Goodman: Regions as sums of points. - But then there are no empty regions. - The region then does not need to be connected or measurable.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-22
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