Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actuality | Millikan | I 11 Properties/Kind/Millikan: properties only exist in the actual world (our real world). MillikanVsNominalism. > |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Conceptualism | Tugendhat | I 72f Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject Theory (>objet theory): States of affairs are taken as objects. Conceptualism: concepts are taken as objects. Immaterial - but also VsImagination. Instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure). TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion. >Aristotle, >Being. I 91 VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings". I 184f Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis. >Predicates, >Reference. I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete imagination. >Nominalism, >Universals. ConceptualismVsNominalism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual. NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations. >Generality, >Ludwig Wittgenstein. I 189 VsConceptualism: object dispensable. >Conceptualism/Quine. Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning. I 204 Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color". >Imagination, >Colour. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Expressions | Quine | I 230 QuineVsGrammatical word classes/homonymy (one word functions as another): there are problems with the concepts of word and lexical identity. I 230 Ambiguity: the name Paul is not ambiguous and not a general term but a singular term with proliferation - ambiguity action/habit: are ice skaters, delivery (action, object). >Singular Terms/Quine. I 407f Term: is not without articles, pronouns, plural, predication, identity ("considering" is not a term). A term should be accepted because of usefulness (VsNominalism). --- XII 90 Presentation/proof/expression/QuineVsCarnap: the fact that a sentence can be expressed using logic, set-theoretic and observational terms does not mean that it can be proved with set-theoretic and logical means only (s) means of expression are not means of evidence.)- (> exterior/interior, >circularity). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Holism | Millikan | I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolism: Let's try to get around it. Then we will understand why, despite everything, we still know something about the world. Realism/Millikan: I remain close to Aristotelian realism. Properties/Kind/Millikan: properties exist only in the actual world (our real world). MillikanVsNominalism. > I 318 Holism/Theory/Observation/Term/Dependency/MillikanVsHolism/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe only by observing indirect effects is wrong. >Observation. In any case, we only observe effects of things, namely on our sensory organs. >Effects, >Causality. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the information acquisition without such intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here a mistake easily arises: this knowledge does not have to be used at all. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Learning | Quine | I 109 Learning: "Bachelor": is linked with words - "coin": is linked with object. -> Russell: acquaintance/description. I 150 When learning words we have to learn to send and receive (amplification process), we have not yet considered intelligent hearing. I 151 After all, the child responds to suggestive clues the very first time it hears new words, at this stage its learning becomes independent of operant behaviour. I 156 In the first learning phase vagueness plays an essential role. Distribution around central standard values of norm "More or less red" can be more fundamental for learning than the red norm. >Vagueness/Quine. I 404 Learning by stimuli > sense data - rather VsPhysicalism than VsNominalism. II 19 et seqq. What kind of items do we require? Body, for sure. Primary learning is done through Ostension. But under divergent circumstances. It must therefore be a versatile sentence that applies irrespective of the point of view. Summary under a single name. II 76 Conditioning/Quine: cannot be learned itself. IV 420 Learning: is the formation of a reliable hypothesis as to which behaviours in a group are regarded as approval or rejection. This provides an efficient method for researching the semantics of a foreign language. V 37 Learning/perception/similarity/perceptual similarity/Quine: different degrees of similarity must play a role in learning. N.B.: otherwise any increased response would be equally conditioned to any future episode, since they would all be equally similar. >Language Acquisition/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Natural Kinds | Millikan | I 11 Properties/Kind/Millikan: propoerties exist only in the actual world (our real world). MillikanVsNominalism. > I 328 Natural kinds/Putnam/Millikan: Thesis: at least in the case of natural kind-concepts, the intension does not determine the extension. Reason: it is possible that such concepts have identical intensions but different extensions. Meaning/Putnam: whatever has different extensions, must have different meanings. Therefore, meanings cannot be in the head. >Meanings ain't in the head/Putnam. I 329 Putnam/Millikan: his argumentation here is that of a realist. >Realism, >Internal realism. Meaning/Millikan: if meanings are not intensions, there must be something else that can determine the reference or the extension. >Intension, >Extension, >Reference. Natural kind/solution/Putnam: contrary to the appearance natural kind-concepts are indexical. And tradition has always had its difficulties with this. Extension/Putnam: Thesis: the extension of "water" and "gold" is determined by a relation between the expression token and the extension. MillikanVsPutnam: that is the reason why he mistakenly thinks that natural kind-concepts are indexical. No problem is solved, but only one is named. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Nominalism | Bigelow | I 97 Sets/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if he eliminated quantities, they would come in again through the rules of composition through the back door. >Sets, >Set theory, >Platonism. I 98 Example instead of refers to the set of rabbits he could say applies to all and only rabbits. "All and only"/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): is a nominalistic avoidance of sets. BigelowVsNominalism: one could say that this is just an abbreviation for "the crowd of all and only rabbits". To apply/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: "applies" needs to be discussed further before this paraphrase could prove anything ontologically. ((s) "applies to" = "true-of", >Satisfaction. ((s) BigelowVsQuine.) >Semantic ascent. Sets/Bigelow/Pargetter: whether you believe in them is one of those things. The semantics does not decide on this. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Nominalism | Leibniz | Holz I 27 LeibnizVsNominalism: a genus has not only nominal status: there must be something real common to all individuals assigned to this genus. Holz: thus Leibniz has moved away from the empiricist nominalist attitude. If the general (general concepts) were nothing else than a collection of particulars, a science would not be possible by evidence. >Concept/Leibniz, >Unity/Leibniz, >Particulars/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Nominalism | Millikan | I 250 Nominalism/Identification/Millikan: Thesis: Identifying involves a series of responses of the same kind to the world. >Identification, >Individuation, >Individual, >Properties/Millikan. E.g. to identify "red" means to use the expression repeatedly, or to have the corresponding inner reaction again as an identification-as-the-same-again. Identity/Sameness/Millikan: However, the nominalism believes, thesis: that many of the things that we identify in this way are not really self-identical! The sameness is constituted only by the act of identification. I 251 Nominalism/Millikan: is particularly skeptical with regard to the identity of properties and species, which leads to the riddle, which again occurs for the same word or the same mental reaction. Cf. >Universal, >Sortal. Repetition/Millikan: E.g. Sneezing is a reaction with the same noise on an equal stimulus, but nothing is identified here. E.g. adrenaline rush: the same reaction as within other people on the same stimulus: danger. But also no identification. Convention/Solution/Hobbes: Words are conventional, sneezing is not. MillikanVsNominalism: it has to somehow explain, what the difference is between representation and mere occurrence. Its definition of identification as repeated use of a word is circular. ((s) in order to be able to repeat the word with reason, the object must be identified before). How can the application of a word help to recognize an object? Learning/MillikanVsNominalism: how can repeating words help us learn about things? The repetition of an equal reaction on a later occasion is rather a sign that nothing has been learned. >Learning. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Nominalism | Quine | I 404 Learning by stimuli > sense data - VsPhysicalism rather than VsNominalism. I 407f Terms: Terms should be accepted because of usefulness (VsNominalism). I 462f Nominalism: cannot use relations, classes, etc. ("ancestor", "successor", "greater than", "as many" quantification) - but there are stages of renunciation. II 102 VsNominalism: Even if it were possible to reinterpret somehow ingeniously all speech about qualities through paraphrase in speech about similarity to individual things that exemplify these qualities, one universal would still remain: the relationship of similarity. II 221 QuineVsNominalism: tokens are not sufficient for proof theory - (Goodman ditto). VIII 24ff Nominalism/Quine: admits diseases as something that anyone can have, but not as an abstract entity - "Unicorn", "on": are syncategorematic expressions, they do not designate anything. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Nominalism | Rorty | II (f) 124 Def nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all creatures are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater measure to the true nature of an object than any other description. >de dicto, >de re, >Necessity, >Knowledge. NominalismVsPlato: nature cannot be dissected at its joints. Materialistic MetaphysicsVsNominalism: these are representatives of a "language-bound idealism". The materialists believe that Dalton and Mendeleev actually cut nature at its joints. (Kripke also). Wittgenstein merely mesmerized by words. >Materialism, >Wittgenstein. II (f) 125 Nominalism: protest against any kind of metaphysics. >Metaphysics. Hobbes mistakenly linked nominalism with materialism. Quine still links it to that. RortyVs: it is a contradiction to believe that words for the smallest particles of matter will dissect nature in a way in which is not possible with other words! >Naturalized epistemology. A contradiction-free nominalism must emphasize that the prediction success of such a vocabulary is irrelevant for the "ontological rank". NominalismVsHeidegger: Words like "physique" or "essence" are not "more essential" than words such as "Brussels sprouts" or "football" II (f) 126 Nominalism: (like Gadamer): as far as we understand anything at all, we understand it with the help of a description, and privileged descriptions do not exist! Nominalism: what the approach to something fixed, hidden is to the metaphysicists, is the invention of a discourse to the nominalists. >Discourse. Nominalism/RortyVsQuine: does not split the nature in a more secure way and does not create certainty about which is the true ontology - (Vs linking nominalism with materialism). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Nominalism | Saussure | I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 I 58 Nominalism/SaussureVsNominalism: based on the mistaken assumption that ready-made ideas exist even before the language. >World thinking, >Language and thought, >Ideas, >Universals, >Language. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Nominalism | Searle | V 162 Nominalism/Searle: correct: the existence of particular entities of facts in the world and the existence of universals depend merely on the meaning of words. >Universal, cf. >Sortal. SearleVsNominalismus: it is incomprehensible to deny such trivial truths as that there are properties such as the ones of beeing-red or beeing-centaur. From such assumptions no compulsion to further conclusions result besides that certain predicates are meaningful! NominalismVsFrege: there is no "third realm". >Third realm/Frege. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Nominalism | Wittgenstein | Wittgenstein Philosophische Untersuchungen 383 WittgensteinVsNominalism: makes the mistake of interpreting all words as a name. - So nominalism is not really describing their use. >Use, >Universals, >Realism, >Words, >Interpretation. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Platonism | Quine | XII 44 Platonic Idea/Quine: is not the same as a mental idea. >Ideas/Quine. XI 136 Mathematics/QuineVsHilbert/Lauener: is more than just syntax. Quine reluctantly professes Platonism. XI 155 CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: is a metaphysical pseudo discussion. Solution: it is about choosing a language. >Language/Quine. VII(f) 125 Conceptualism VsPlatonism/Quine: treats classes as constructions, not as discoveries. Problem: Poincaré's impredicative definition: Def Impredicative Definition/Poincaré/Quine: the specification of a class by a realm of objects within which this class is located. >Classes/Quine. VII (f) 126 Classes/Platonism/Quine: when classes are considered pre-existing, there is no objection to picking one of them by a move that presupposes their existence. Classes/Conceptualism/Quine: for him, however, classes only exist if they originate from an ordered origin. Of course, this should not be interpreted in terms of time. VII (f) 127 Platonism/Conceptualism/Quine: both allow universals and classes as irreducible. Conceptualism: allows fewer classes. But rests on a rather metaphorical reason: "Origin". >Conceptualism/Quine. V 126 Platonism/Quine: is opened by form words, not by color words! Reason: a union of color spots has the same color, but a union of spots of a certain shape does not necessarily have the same shape. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Properties | Millikan | I 11 Properties/Kind/Millikan: properties and kind exist only in the actual world (our real world). MillikanVsNominalism. >Nominalism. I 197 Property/Millikan: Thesis: A property is only a property by virtue of opposing properties - properties that they exclude or are incompatible with them. ((s)> disjunctive property). I 264 Identity/Sameness/Property/Millikan: how can we describe the identity of a property? 1. we consider only those properties that individuals can have. I 265 Leibniz Principle/Millikan: we turn around the Leibniz Principle by adding an operator for natural necessity. (F)(G){[NN(x)Fx equi Gx] equi F = G}. >Leibniz principle, >Indistinguishability. I 266 Properties/identity/Millikan: The traditional objection that properties are the same when all their instances are the same is divided into two arguments. 1. Objections from those who believe that properties correspond one-to-one to possible concepts: "Argument from the meaning"/argument from meaning/Armstrong: (Armstrong not pro): (Has often confused the problem of universals): If universals are to be meanings, and if a semantic criterion for the identity of predicates is accepted, then it follows that every predicate type corresponds to its own universal. ((s) This can be re-invented newly infinitely many times). Problem/Millikan/(s): already diversity of linguistic expressions entails difference in the corresponding properties. Inflationism/Deflationism/Millikan: Realists have interpreted this argument inflationistically, and nominalists have interpreted it deflationistically. >Deflationism. Millikan: for this, however, one has to equate meaning with intension - that is to say, to combine meaning with the concepts that one has of the things that are mapped with the expressions. Solution/Millikan: we differentiate meaning and intension, therefore, it can have different concepts for one and the same variant in re. Therefore, we can ignore this objection. For example, the concepts that Hubots and Rubots have (> Terminology/Millikan) of the "square" are different variants in nature, because they are governed by different intensions. This could be misunderstood in that way that for the ancient Hesperus and Phosphorus concepts there would have been concepts of different celestial bodies,... I 267 ...because they were ruled by different intensions. ((s) general problem: there are too many properties in such approaches). 2. Type of objections against the view that properties are the same when their instances coincide: that there are so many counterexamples. For example, even if it can be that every living creature with a heart is a living being with kidneys, it does not show that having the one property would be equal to having the other property. Solution: the instances must already coincide with natural necessity. For example, suppose there is only one single object in the world with a particular green color, and this object would also have a unique form. It would still not follow from this that the property of having this hue would be equal to the property of having this form. Certainly, there are also no principles of natural necessity that link these properties. Millikan: but not all the counter-arguments against the inverse Leibniz principle are so easy to invalidate. E.g. Properties for materials in general: e.g. properties that can have gold: a certain spectrum, electrical conductivity, melting point, atomic weight. Suppose each of these properties is only once applicable to gold and therefore identifies the material. N.B.: then each of these properties necessarily coexists with the others. Nevertheless, the properties are not identical! But how do we actually know that it is not one and the same property? How do we know that they are not like a form that is once touched and once seen? This is a question of epistemology, not of ontology. But it cannot be answered without making ontological assumptions. I 268 General Properties/Material/Millikan: in order e.g. that the particular conductivity of gold and the particular spectrum of gold could be one and the same property, the entire range of possible electrical conductivities would have to be mapped one-to-one to the entire range of possible spectra. That is, the particular conductivity could not be the same as this particular spectrum, if not other spectra coincided with other conductivities. Properties/Millikan: Thesis: Properties (one or more digits) that fall into the same domain are characteristics that are opposite to each other. Of course, one area can also contain a different area. For example, "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it, and "being two centimeters tall plus minus one millimeter" means "2.05 centimeters tall plus minus 1 millimeter" than excluding it. The assumption that two properties can only be the same when the complete opposite domains from which they come coincide, suggests that the identity of a property or a property domain is tied to the identity of a broader domain from which it comes and is thus tied to the identity of its opposites. Now we are comparing Leibniz's view with that of Aristotle: Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all simple properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God created only the best of possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable. Complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be propertes that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B". I 271 Properties/Millikan: properties are not loners like substances. Self-identity/property: a property is itself, by virtue of the natural necessary comparison to other properties. Representation/exemplification/Millikan: if an opposite is missing, no property is represented. E.g "Size is exemplified by John" has no opposite. The negation is not made true by the fact that size would have a property that would be contrary to being exemplified by John. "Being exemplified by John" says of substance John that it has that property. >Terminology/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Relation-Theory | Bigelow | I 55 Quantity/relational theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities are general relations between objects. They seem to be consequences of the intrinsic properties of objects. But one would not have to postulate an intrinsic relation "greater than", but only e.g. the size. >Quantity, >Sizes/Physics, >Relations, >Objects, >Intrinsic, >Properties. Greater than/relational property/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might wonder if there really is an intrinsic property to be that and that big. Cf. >Haecceitism. Relational property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might be tempted to assume that everything is based on relational properties, rather than vice versa. But we are not going to go into that here. Intrinsic property/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think that in the end they can be defended against relational properties as a basis. Nevertheless, we certainly need relational properties, e.g. for the order of events. These do not just stand in time. So we definitely need relations. Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: we definitely need relations. Because events never stand for themselves. >Events. I 56 Also for expressions such as "twice the size" etc. Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities cannot be based on properties alone, but need relations. For example, having this or that mass is then the property of being in relation to other massive objects. Participation/BigelowVsPlato: Plato has all things in a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the other hand, want relations between things among themselves. >Methexis, >Plato. BigelowVsPlato: we can then explain different kinds of differences between objects, namely that they have different relational properties that other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things can differ in different ways. I 57 Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can handle differences of differences well. Question: can it cope well with similarities? For example, explain what mass is at all? Problem: we need a relation between a common property and many relations to it. There are many implications (entailments) which are not yet explained. Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. in order to construct an (intrinsic) property at all, we must therefore specify the many possible relations it can have to particalur. Solution: one possibility: the sentence via the property of the 2nd level. 2. Problem: how can two things have more in common than two other things? Ad 1. Example Mass Common/Commonality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must then be a property of relations (of the many different relations that the individual objects have to "mass"). I 58 Solution: property of the 2nd level that is shared by all massive things. For example, "stand in mass relations". >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Similarity, >Identity. Entailment/N.b.: this common (2nd level property) explains the many relations of the entailment between massive objects and the common property of solidity. Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: our relational theory is still incomplete. Problem: to explain to what extent some mass-relations are closer (more similar) than others. Relations/common/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the relations have a common: a property of the 2nd level. Property 2. Level/difference/differentiation/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not explain how two things differ more than two other things. >Levels/order, >Description levels. It also does not explain how, for example, differences in masses relate to differences in volume. For example, compare the pairs "a, b" "c, d" "e, f" between which there are differences in thicknesses with regard to e.g. length. Then two of the couples will be more similar in important respects than two other pairs. I 59 Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relation of proportion. This is similar to Frege's approach to real numbers. Real numbers/Frege: as proportions between sizes (Bigelow/Pargetter corresponds to our quantities). >Real numbers, >Quantity/Bigelow. Bigelow/Pargetter: three fundamental components (1) Individuals (2) Relations between individuals (3) Relations of proportions between relations between individuals. Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: divide the relations between individuals into equivalence classes. >Proportions/Bigelow. Mass/Volume/Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.b. all masses are proportional to each other and all volumes are proportional to each other, but masses and volumes are not proportional to each other. Equivalence classes/Bigelow/Pargetter: arrange objects with the same D-ates into classes. So they explain how two things ((s) can be more similar in one respect, D-able) than in another. >Determinates/Determinables, >Equivalence classes. Level 1: Objects Level 2: Properties of things Level 3: Proportions between such properties. Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals that can introduce finer differences between equivalence classes of properties of the 2nd level. Different pairs of mass relations can be placed in the same proportion on level 3. E.g. (s) 2Kg/4kg is twice as heavy as 3Kg/6Kg. N.b.: with this we have groupings that are transverse to the equivalence classes of the mass relations, volumetric relations, velocity relations, etc. Equal/different/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B:: that explains why two relations can be equal and different at the same time. E.g. Assuming that one of the two relations is a mass relation (and stands in relation to other mass relations) the other is not a mass relation (and is not in relation to mass relations) and yet... I 60 ...both have something in common: they are "double" once in terms of mass, once in terms of volume. This is explained on level 3. Figures/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows the usefulness of numbers in the treatment of quantities. (BigelowVsField). >Hartry Field, >Numbers, >Mathematical Entities, >Ontology. Real numbers/Frege: Lit: Quine (1941(1), 1966(2)) in "Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic") Measure/Unit/Measuerment Unit/To Measure/Bigelow/Pargetter:"same mass as" would be a property of the 2nd level that a thing has to an arbitrary unit. >Measurement, >Equality. Form/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory of forms was not wrong, but incomplete. Objects have relations to paradigms (here: units of measurement). This is the same relation as that of participation in Plato. I 61 Level 3: the relations between some D-ates can be more complex than those between others. For mass, for example, we need real numbers, other terms are less clear. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are divided into different types, which leads to interval scales or ratio scales of measurement, for example. >Scales. Pain/Bigelow/Pargetter: we cannot compare the pain of different living beings. Level 3: not only explains a rich network of properties of the 2nd level and relations between objects,... I 62 ...but also explain patterns of entailments between them. NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations. >Nominalism. BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proven it here. But it is the only way to solve the problem of the same and the different (problem of the quantities with the 3 levels). >Realism/Bigelow, >Problem of quantities. Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to accept complex relational predicates as primitive. >Simplicity. Worse still, it will have to accept complex relations between them as primitive. 1. Quine, W.V.O. (1941). Whitehead and the rise of modern logic. In: The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (ed. P.A. Schilpp). pp.125-63. La Salle, Ill. Open Court. 2. Quine, W.V.O. (1966). Selected logic papers. New York: Random House. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chisholm, R.M. | Nominalism Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Frank I 260 Universals/VsChisholm/Heckmann: he represents an extreme Platonic universals realism. Thus he brings himself into a contradiction to both the moderate Aristotelian universals and to the ontological nominalism. I 261 Concepts/Nominalism/Chisholm/Heckmann: Chisholm is not only in contradiction to the ontological, but also to the conceptual nominalism: whatever does it mean "to have concepts"? Certainly knowing the importance of predicates. NominalismVsChisholm: but that's no approach to universalism of any kind, you are not acquainted with a universal that you think first and then express with a predicate. Rather, those who know the meaning of the predicate can use it in compliance with the rules. I 262 Nominalism/Utility Theory/VsChisholm: the meaning of predicates and sentences cannot be explicated mentalistically (by resorting to intentional performance) >(Humpty Dumpty Theory). MentalismVsNominalism/Chisholm: everything semantic has its origin in the mind. Direct Attribution/Attribution Theory/VsChisholm: E.g. an infant recognizes his mother, but not by first judging that it recognizes the mother and then attributing this state to himself. (Chisholm: must actually assume that the mother is only an indirect object of attribution). I 263 Consciousness/Chisholm: emerges from an act of direct consideration of a self-presenting property. VsChisholm: this ignores a fundamental trait of any type of consciousness or fails to make it understood: the self-disclosure of the self-translucency of consciousness. Consciousness should be acquainted and familiar with itself whenever it occurs, and that in a pre-reflective and irreflexive way. (Frank, >Sartre). E.g. I have direct knowledge of my pain, not only by reflection and subsequent direct attribution. (That would be of a higher level). Consciousness/HeckmannVsChisholm: there is a third between the self-presenting and self-presented: the self present: the which has always been disclosed, known and familiar by pre-attributive knowledge. (>Background). Roderick M. Chisholm (1981): The First Person. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality, Brighton 1981 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Holism | Millikan Vs Holism | I 10 Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning. I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism. properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world. MillikanVsNominalismus. I 13 MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed. For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories. Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid, I 14 most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not. I 67 conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction! I 68 I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other. MillikanVsHolismus. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However: Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels. I 298 Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify. Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens. I 318 Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used. I 321 Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Nagel, Th. | Nominalism Vs Nagel, Th. | Frank I 133 Nominalism/VsNagel: Standard objection: it does not really make sense to raise questions that cannot be answered on grounds of principle. E.g. what it is like to be a bat. I 134 NagelVsNominalism/NagelVsReductionism: its consequences are intuitively unacceptable. Unlike our realism of the world, of which we indeed distance ourselves verbally, but which we cannot really give up. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Nominalism | Armstrong Vs Nominalism | Arm III 81 Nominalism/Armstrong: some allow the existence of objective relations of similarity between particulars. But they cannot analyze them in terms of common property, because that would lead them to realism. (Lit: 1978(1), ch 5: ArmstrongVsNominalism). Vs: here: In his opinion there is nothing common of F and G. F is similar to all other Fs, but one other F also resembles many other things. The same applies to the Gs. It is doubtful whether this wavering reason is sufficient to provide the necessary uniform connection between being-F and being-G. 1. D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols, Cambridge 1978 Arm II (c) 97 Similarity/ArmstrongVsNominalism: if one, on the other hand, regards the situation in a way where similarity is analyzed in terms of identity: Martin and Armstrong: agree that one thing causes the things it causes by virtue (of a subset) of its properties. If now causally effective property can also be identical between different instantiations, then one can explain why the same property produces the same effect in the same circumstances. Schiffer I 234 Realism/Schiffer: Realism equates these two relations: 1. between name and object 2. between predicate and property. Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiates the second. Schiffer: this can be paraphrased: (b) Mother Teresa has the quality of being modest. Here the second singular term ((s) "property to be modest") has the same status as the first one. NominalismVsRealism/Schiffer: reasonable (sensitive) nominalism denies all this. FN I 288 The unreasonable nominalist takes the reference to properties too seriously. E.g. ArmstrongVsNominalism (Armstrong 1978), besides the exchange between Armstrong 1980, Devitt 1980, Quine 1980. (SchifferVsArmstrong) I 235 Schiffer: there is no entity "the quality of being modest" that is related to "modest", as Mother Teresa is related to "Mother Teresa". Understanding/Schiffer: example (a) only requires knowledge (awareness) of Mother Teresa, not modesty. Property/Schiffer: Thesis: Properties do not exist, they are not to be found among the things that really exist. Existence/"there is"/Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Schiffer: nevertheless, the rational nominalist should be careful and not say "there is no quality to be modest". Realism/Nominalism/Referential Quantification/Substitutional Quantification/Schiffer: the dispute arises over what kind of quantification is present in (b). I 236 Nominalism: the apparent singular term refers to nothing at all. The "logical form" of (b) is not Fab With "F" = "x has a", "a" for Mother Teresa, "b" for modesty. But only Fa. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Nominalism | Carnap Vs Nominalism | Quine XI 155 CarnapVsPlatonism/CarnapVsNominalism: is a metaphysical pseudo discussion. Solution: it is about the choice of a language. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Nominalism | Field Vs Nominalism | I 67 FieldVsNominalism: I do think that ME like numbers, functions, sets etc. are dispensable, but I do not claim the dispensability of any entity that some self-proclaimed nominalist rejects E.g. spacetime regions. I 68 Because we have causal knowledge of of Sp.t.r., in the case of ME, we must postulate mysterious connections to a Platonic realm beyond time and space. E.g. A knowledge about an absolute infinity of objects in that realm. Sp.t. does not bring epistemic problems with it, even if we do not stand in a causal relation with each tiger. I 69 FieldVsPlatonism: its entities are in principle inaccessible. Reference/Relation/Knowledge/Field: Problem: a) How do words stand for things? b) more fundamental: how do beliefs stand for things? Problem: in the broad sense: ME do not only stand in no causal, but also in no physical relation with us. Sp.t.: no problem: we can point to many of them! And refer to them with index words ("here", "now", etc.). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Nominalism | James Vs Nominalism | I 30 James VsNominalism: inductive classification uncovers the "real identity of the phenomena". Cf. Order. >Empiricism: I 57 JamesVsEmpiricism: supports a kind of "nominalism": empiricists assert that there is a term for any object. James: how about facts for which there is no concept?. - Worse: Language /James: supports the nominalist tendency to fragment the stream of consciousness. |
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| Nominalism | Leibniz Vs Nominalism | I 28 LeibnizVsNominalism: A type does not only have a nominal status: There must be something real in common which every individual of this type possesses. As such, Leibniz moves away from an empirical nominalistic mindset. If the general (general term) would not be more than a collection of individual things, a science based on proofs would not be possible. [Wenn das Allgemeine (Allgemeinbegriffe) nicht anderes wäre als eine Sammlung von Einzeldingen, wäre eine Wissenschaft durch Beweise nicht möglich.] |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Nominalism | Lewis Vs Nominalism | Schwarz I 94 Heterology/Properties/Set theory/Lewis/Schwarz: Advantage: the set theory approach provides a solution for properties that apply to exactly those properties that do not apply to themselves. Solution/Set theory: bypasses these paradoxes (of >heterology) by prohibiting certain classes. For example, there is no class for all non-cats, there is no class that contains the pair (A,A) for every thing A, and there is no class that contains the pair (A,B) for all things A,B with A ε B. So if properties are classes, there is no property to be non-cat, no identity, and no elementness ((s) as a property! (1990(1),163,Fn 15,2002a(2),8) Properties/Set theory/Lewis/Schwarz: how is it then to understand that identity is transitive but not the property of being an element? Lewis has to reinterpret that: Identity/Lewis: that it is transitive only means that whenever A = B and B = C, then also A = C. SchwarzVsLewis: thus LewisVsNominalism falls: he wants to "somehow reinterpret all the sentences about properties" - this accusation falls back on Lewis himself. Schwarz: but anyone who wants a consistent theory of properties is faced with this problem. For example, it does not help to understand properties as irreducible abstract entities: even then the Russell property ((s) cannot apply to itself) cannot exist. Cf. >transitivity, >identity. 1. David Lewis [1990]: “Noneism or Allism?” Mind, 99: 23–31. In [Lewis 1999a] 2. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Nominalism | Quine Vs Nominalism | II 221 QuineVsNominalism: Tokens are not sufficient for proof theory. (Goodman ditto). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Nominalism | Russell Vs Nominalism | Quine II 102 RussellVsNominalism: Even if it was somehow possible to reinterpret astutely all speech about qualities by paraphrase in speech on similarity to individual things that exemplify these qualities, one universal would still be left: the relationship of similarity. Quine: here Russell even admits too much to the Platonists: the maintenance of the double-digit predicate "is similar" is no evidence that a corresponding abstract entity assumes the similarity relationship, as long as this relationship is not taken as the value of a bound variable. One lesson that can be drawn from all this is: ignoring the semantics of reference has results in two directions: a) some ontological conditions are hidden, b) a mirage of further ontological conditions is conjured. Questions with respect to what is there, are twofold for Russell. a) existence in the limited sense of this term b) otherwise questions of being in place ("subsistence") for Russell are less important than questions of existence. (This prejudice in favor of the existent would explain his indiscriminate use of existence-attribution in Principia Mathematica(1).) II 103 Of course, he stops this approach through the identification theory, yet he proceeds afterwards extremely wasteful with attributions of existence. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Nominalism | Wittgenstein Vs Nominalism | PU 383 Nominalism/Wittgenstein/Bezzel: WittgensteinVsNominalism: makes the mistake of interpreting all words as names, so not really to describe their use. PU 383 |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Nominalism | Bigelow Vs Nominalism | I 62 NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations. BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proved him here. But he is the only way to solve the problem of the similar and the different (problem of quantities) (namely with the 3 levels). Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be able to be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to assume complex relational predicates as primitive. I 97 Quantities/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if he eliminated quantities, they would come back in through the back door because of the rules of composition. I 98 E.g. instead of refering to the quantity of rabbits, he might say it applies to all and only rabbits. BigelowVsNominalism: one could say this is just an abbreviation for "the quantity of all and only the rabbits". Be true/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter. "Is true" must be discussed further before this paraphrase could proof something ontological. ((s) BigelowVsQuine, > semantic ascent). Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: whether one believes in it, is not sure. The semantics does certainly not decide that. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Nominalism | Castaneda Vs Nominalism | Frank I 337 Belief/NominalismVsPropositions/Castaneda: instead sentence theories that understand belief as a relation between a believer and a particular sentence or a class of sentences. VsNominalism: Problem: There may not be enough sentence or attribute classes to carry nominalistic reductions. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Nominalism | Mentalism Vs Nominalism | Frank I 262 MentalismusVsNominalismus/Chisholm: alles Semantische hat im Denken seinen Ursprung. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Nominalism | Meixner Vs Nominalism | I 95 MeixnerVsNominalism: while it is true that the property of being 176cm tall is not a causal explanation, on a most general ontological level it fully answers the question of what it is that makes the sentence true. NominalismVsTrope Ontology: "...is true if a 176cm tall trope is part of Hans": this is probably acceptable, because only individuals are spoken of, but: I 96 For example "red is a color" should be true according to trope ontological analysis, because a colored trope is part of red. Vs: but this does not mean "Hans is a color". Solution: the analysis must be changed ad hoc from case to case. Universals/Armstrong/Meixner: most everyday predicates do not correspond to universals, for Armstrong there are only scientific universals. Vs ontological standard analysis: the connection between predicates and universals is not as close as it seems. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Nominalism | Millikan Vs Nominalism | I 250 Nominalism/identification/Millikan: thesis: identifying involves a number of answers of the same kind to the world. Ex identifying "red" means repeatedly using that expression, or repeatedly having the corresponding internal reaction as an identification-as-the-same-again. Identity/sameness/Millikan: however, nominalism believes, thesis: that many of the things we identify in that manner are not really identical! The sameness is constituted only by the act of identifying. I 251 Nominalism/Millikan: Is particularly skeptical about the identity of properties and types, which leads to the mystery of what it means for the same word or the same mental reaction to occur again. Repetition/Millikan: Ex sneezing is a response of the same sound to the same stimulus, yet nothing is identified. Ex adrenaline: the same reaction as in other people to the same stimulus: danger. But also no identification. Convention/solution/Hobbes: words are conventional, sneezing is not. MillikanVsNominalism: but he must somehow explain what distinguishes representation from bare presence. His definition of identification as repeated use of a word is circular. (To reasonably repeat a word (S), the object must be identified beforehand). How can the application of a word help in recognizing an object? Learning/MillikanVsNominalism: how can the repetition of words help us in learning about things? The repetition of the same reaction on a subsequent occasion is rather a sign that nothing has been learned. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Nominalism | Saussure Vs Nominalism | I 58 SaussureVsNominalism: based on the false assumption that imaginations exist already before the language. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Reductionism | Nagel Vs Reductionism | Frank I131 NagelVsReductionism: most fundamental objection: the identifications cannot explain that mental states are attributed not only to other "objects", but that they are consciously experienced by subjects. NagelVsReductionism: Argument structure: (1) A reductionist theory of experience has to explain all essential aspects of mental states (2) It is an essential aspect of (at least some) mental states that they are of subjective nature (3) Reductionist theories of the mind cannot explain the subjective nature of mental states Hence the conclusion: (4) There is no reductionist theory of the mind. Mental States/Nagel: are states "conscious experience". E.g. hunger. Fra I 132 Nagel does not speak here about states like knowledge or intentions! Def Subjective/Nagel: that it is "somehow" to make this experience. ((s) the phrase "it is somehow for" avoids the attribution of an aspect initially regarded as a separate, such as a "quality".) I 134 NagelVsNominalism/NagelVsReductionism: its consequences are intuitively unacceptable. Opposes our realistic view of the world, from which we do verbally distance ourselves, but which we cannot really give up. I 137 NagelVsReductionism: any reductionist program must be based on a complete analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves out something (e.g. materialism, the subjective quality) the problem will be put wrongly. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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