Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Negation, philosophy, logic: negation of a sentence. In logic, this is done by prefixing the negation symbol. Colloquially expressed by the word "not", which can be at different positions in the sentence. If the negation refers only to one sentence part, this must be made clear by the position, e.g. a predicate can be denied without negating the whole sentence. In logic, therefore, inner and outer negation is distinguished by the use of different symbols.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Chisholm II 181 ff
Negation/Frege/Simons: Problem: negative facts - Solution: simply two truth values ​​(t/f) and a function that swaps the two - WittgensteinVsFrege: connection should not be represented as a function - Operator N: forms a conjugates negation from a sentence: the asserted (the used variables) is false - Notation: x^: all values ​​of x. - Negation/Simons: only has the smallest range: atomic sentences. - Operator N: always negates the disjunction, never the conjunction, because of Wittgenstein’s need for atoms. - Ontology: only complexes and the verbs E! and N.
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Frege IV 61
Negation/Denial/Judgment/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. - That’s quite unnecessary - even a negative one judgment is a simple judgment.
IV 64
Negation/Denial/Frege: is not equal to the judgments. - It is not an "opposite pole" to the judgments.
IV 69
Description/Subordinate Clause/Subset/Name/Frege: E.g. "the negation of the notion that 3 is greater than 5" - this expression refers to a specific individual thing. - This individual thing is a notion. - The definite article turns the entire expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name.
IV passim
Thought/Frege: to every idea belongs its denial as an independent second idea. - Thoughts are not made up, but composed. - Their truth is not their being thought. - They are timeless, precisely because they must always carry a determination of time with them. - Thus, "today", "yesterday" and "I" become "He" (two thoughts). - By replacing "horse" with "mare" the thought does not change, only the coloring.
- - -
Tugendhat II 66f
Negation/Frege: not a property - not always with the sign of negation. - E.g. "Christ is immortal" is not negative per se. - The negation sign applies only to the propositional content. - Proof: Negation in subsets: only the whole sentence is asserted. - In the subset (non-asserting) the "not" belongs to the propositional content from the outset.
Tugendhat II 12
Proposition/Frege/Tugendhat: negation always refers to the propositional content, not the assertion.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-11-20