Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Metaphysics: is a theory that has the claim to ask questions and provide answers beyond our available knowledge. It is objected that even for asking questions, a knowledge of the meanings of the words used is required. This knowledge is not given when experiences or at least theories using these terms are not available. See also essentialism, metaphysical possibility.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 107
Metaphysical: is the assumption: that if there is a fact about the intentional state, then it is this fact that makes the attribution match the physical facts best.
IV 110
Metaphysical/Fodor/Lepore: not metaphysical: the finding that a suitable property is assumed as defining - metaphysical: e.g. the assumption that rationality is constitutive of intentionality - e.g. that explanatory force and simplicity are constitutive of the nomological - is transcendental. E.g. Davidson s assumption: the PdN is to be rooted in the epistemic situation of the interpreter. - LewisVsDavidson: intentional attribution must not be understood with reference to the epistemic situation of the RI - Lewis instead: the principle of charity is part of our concept of the person.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-25