Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Mentalism, philosophy of the mind: the assumption that there are inner, mental objects that play causal or functional roles in the formation of attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, etc. These roles are rather understood as processes by theories, which are opposed to mentalism. See also intensional objects, thought objects.
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Books on Amazon
SchifferVsMentalism: language-independent internal entities as objects of belief - Solution: nominalism: Vs internal language-independent entities and Vs facts - no extra-linguistic irreducible psychological entities - no sentential dualism (belief sets as objects). - Pro Schiffer - We tentatively accept a token-token physicalism.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-22