Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Mentalism, philosophy of the mind: the assumption that there are inner, mental objects that play causal or functional roles in the formation of attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, etc. These roles are rather understood as processes by theories, which are opposed to mentalism. See also intensional objects, thought objects.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
I XIX
SchifferVsMentalism: language-independent internal entities as objects of belief - Solution: nominalism: Vs internal language-independent entities and Vs facts - no extra-linguistic irreducible psychological entities - no sentential dualism (belief sets as objects). - Pro Schiffer - We tentatively accept a token-token physicalism.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-19