Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Action Theory Habermas III 369
Action Theory/Analytical Philosophy/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed.
III 370
Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point. (1)
III 371
HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors are not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand.
III 373
Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication.
III 384
Action Theory/Habermas: HabermasVsWeber: unlike Weber, who assumes a monological action model, Habermas considers a model that takes into account the coordination of several action subjects. He differentiates between action types according to situation and orientation: Action Orientation: success-oriented - or communication-oriented
Action Situation: social - or non-social
Instrumental Action/Habermas: is then success-oriented and non-social
Strategic action: success-oriented and social (it takes into account the actions and interests of others).
Communicative Action: is social and communication-oriented (without being success-oriented).


1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Intention-Based Semantics Habermas III 369
Intention-Based Semantics/Action Theory/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed.
III 370
Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point. (1)
III 371
HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors is not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand.
III 373
Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication.

1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Meaning Field II 161
Def Quasi-translation/Def quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field : this is what most mean by meaning. - Not a literal translation but the use of the words by the interpreter in his own language at the time in his actual world. - Comparability is preserved even in the quasi-translation, not in a literal. Sententialism/sententionalism/Field: Thesis: When we say someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the set of
1st quasi- translation and quasi- meaning rather than literal
2nd "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #snow is white#. - ((#): What stands between #, is to be "quasi-translated".) In the quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is obtained.
II 167
Intentional meaning/Field: it is completely empty – E.g. Suppose we wanted a theory of intentional meaning, then we also needed one of their combinations. – We also need a theory of the corresponding truth conditions. - Problem : if we set up a theory here, it is not completely trivial, that the intentional meaning of "Plato" is just Plato! - We need an extra explanation. - That would solve nothing. – It would only bring problems. – Better instead: compositional theory of expressions (not of meanings).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Representation Field II 55
Representation/Field: if they were only related to public language, why then internal? - Solution: distinction type/token - question: why then referring to public language: because one can only speak with respect to types of tokens. ---
II 58
Representation: their syntax can be determined without regard to the meanings - if we have laws for body movements from wishes, etc. (narrow psychological theory). ---
II 58
Semantics/Representation: We can make truth superfluous: if we have 1. laws of beliefs from stimuli -
2. laws for body movements from beliefs and desires.
That would be the "narrow psychological theory": then we do not need to assume meanings in representation.
---
II 59
But if representation should be true, it must be correlated with meanings. ---
II 60
Representation without meaning: E.g. for all sentences S1 and S2 in a system: if a person believes [S1 > S2] and desires S2, then he also wants S1. - Field: Meanings not because the believed sentences can all be wrong. - E.g. Radical Interpretation: the native raises his rifle: a reason to believe that a rabbit is nearby - (even if he is deceived). ---
II 61
Representation/semantics/psychology: for their psychological explanations, we do not need the semantic notions like "true" and "refers to", which usually sets sentences in relation to the world - belief/truth: nothing compels me to assume of a person that she has believes that are true of rabbits. - ((s) It is enough when he lifts his rifle.) Truth: (of internal representations) we only need this if we assume that they are reliable indicators about the world. - E.g. a child behaves guiltily - For example, if a mathematician believes in a theory, it is a reason for me to believe it, too. (> Reliability).
---
II 66
Language/representation/Schiffer: early: (1972): The meaning of a sentence can be explained only by the notions of believe and desire. For example, to know the meaning of "Caesar was egoistic," one must know that the proposition is conventionally correlated with believe that Caesar was egoistic. Everything goes through inner representations and these can be explained without further reference to language.
FieldVsSchiffer: the symbols in my representation system have gained their role by appropriation of e.g. a name in the public language. - Animals/Field: although they are likely to have representations, meanings and therefore truth, cannot be applied to them.
---
II 69
Representation/Field: one could also assume this as neither linguistic nor pictoral: E.g. "light bulb model" - that would be uninterpreted and could not explain behavior. ---
II, 77f
Representation: representative terms can replace properties - most psychology can do without them. - Advantages? - Intentional terms are projective. - E.g.: "He raised his rifle ...". - The truth conditions (tr.cond.) do not matter then - The advantage of representations lies in the combination of explanation and predictions. ---
II 94
Representation/StalnakerVsField: the basic relation is between words rather than between sentences or "morphemes" (the thought language). Not even between whole states. - Field: that could be correct. ---
II 154
Representation/truth conditions/translation: one can accept representation without translation and without truth conditions: solution: one accepts reactions to his believe and a corresponding threshold for his reaction - crazy cases: e.g. the person believes that something quite different is represented . Solution: the role cannot be specified exactly, but the objective core is that there is a role. - Explanation 2nd class: "sufficient similarity to our own representation" E.g. "Khrushchev blinked" as an explanation for Kennedy's action. - Problem: our own representations are not objective. - Deflationism: for it this is not a problem.
Truth conditions: we only need them if we do not know how the details of the explanation are.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Translation Field II, 147ff
Untranslatable/Translation/Extension/Deflationism/Field: Problem: Incorporation of untranslatable sentences. - solution potential extension of one's own language by accepting truth-preservation in conclusion. ---
II 148
Names by index: "Georg-i": the George, to which Mary refered at the occasion of Z. ---
II 149
Per sentence theory: "UTT Guru, Z": the sentence the Guru uttered at Z. - The special sentence is then superfluous. ---
II 152
Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotational true. ---
II 161
Def Quasi-translation/Def Quasi-meaning/FieldVsChurch/FieldVsSchiffer/Field: this is what most understand as meaning. - Not literal translation but reproduction as the interpreter understands the use of the corresponding words in his own language at the point of time in his actual world. - Comparison: is preserved in the quasi-translation at the moment, not in a literal translation. Sententialism/Sententionalism/Field: Thesis: If we say that someone says that snow is white, we express a relation between the person and the sentence. - 1. Quasi-translation and quasi-meaning instead of literal. - 2. "La neige est blanche" quasi-means the same as #Snow is white# - (#) what stands between #, should be further translated (quasi-). - In quasi-translation, the quasi-meaning is preserved.
---
II 273
Translation/Parameter/Field: in many cases, the relativization of the translation to a parameter is necessary to make it recognizable as a translation. - E.g. "finite": the non-standard argument tells us that there are strange models, so that "is in the extension of "finite" in M" functions as a "translation" of "finite" which maintains the inferential role of all what we say in pure mathematics. - N.B.: "Is in the extension of "finite" in M" is a parameterized expression.
Solution: what we are doing is to "translate" the one-digit predicate "finite" into the two-digit predicate "is in the extension of "finite" in x", along with the statements to determine the value of x on a model M with the necessary characteristics.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Austin, John L. Schiffer Vs Austin, John L. I 266
Austin: the expression : "the meaning of a word" is almost always a dangerous nonsense. (1961, 24, also Wittgenstein 1953 Ryle 1957) so all VsFrege. DavidsonVsSchiffer/DavidsonVsAustin/DavidsonVsWittgenstein : speaks of an entity that is designated by the "that" as in for example "that snow is white". (Davidson 1968).

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Block, Ned Schiffer Vs Block, Ned I 40
Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): is supposed to be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock:
1.
If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief characteristic of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block has to say that there must be a theory Ts that nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: be a token of the Z-type, having the Ts correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). I.e. the role that will be indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts.
Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a postieriori knowable after the theory Ts would be brought up.
SchifferVsBlock: why on earth must the reference or extension of a belief E.g. that bugs are mortal, be revealed by a theory that no one knows?
VsSchiffer: one could argue, in the same way, E.g. as it was eventually discovered that dogs have this and that genotype (set of genes). ((s) meaning empirically)
SchifferVsVs: 1. scientists cannot discover this!
Science/Philosophy/Schiffer: thesis: Scientists cannot discover that to be a dog = to be from a particular genotype (set of genes).
Science: might only determine all phenotypic (appearancewise) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from this, we need a philosophical theory that
a) contains a completion from
to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype, if...
and
b) contains in connection with the scientific discovery that
I 41
to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype. ((s) no additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there were a philosophical theory of this strength, it is unknown to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog".
Problem: the theories that have been developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.species terms, are unsuitable for belief predicates.
SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: has no more credibility than the credibility that there is a correct semantic theory of belief predicates that contains, along with a scientific psychological theory Ts Bel = BelTs.
Problem: There is not the slightest reason to assume that such a semantic theory for belief predicates exists.
2.
VsBlock: that a psychological theory can determine the extension for "believes", it has to be able to use the word!
Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) But it must be translatable into everyday language (> universalism of everyday language). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986).
SchifferVsUniversalism of everyday language: the everyday language concepts may be too blunt.
Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "then there is just nothing, which corresponds to belief."
SchifferVs: it misses the ultimate in our everyday language psychological terms. (see below 6.4).
I 42
3. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: even if a scientific theory on functional states of belief has to quantify, we have to probably not construct it as a relation to propositions.
Psychology / Schiffer: a scientific psychological theory (cognitive) is quantifying over functions of external indices for functional roles on internal physical states,
external indices: do not have to be propositions but can also be phrases or formulas. Even uninterpreted formulas! (see below)
1. Thesis: if propositions are good indices for a functional theory, then phrases or interpreted formulas of a formal language could be it just as well. (Field, 1978, Loar 1981).
2.
Content/cognitive psychology/attribution/belief/Schiffer: the psychological theory probably needs nothing more than uninterpreted formulas, not even sentences (not propositions anyway). ((s) belief or belief attribution could be explained scientifically without the use of content).
Psychology/belief/Field: (1978, 102): if psychology describes the laws that lead from input to belief and from belief to action, then semantic characterizations of belief are superfluous. (see also Field 1986b, Fodor 1980, Loar 1981, Schiffer 1981a, Stich 1983).
I 44
4. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: it is absurd to assume that there is a single theory about beliefs and desires that is weak enough that is applicable to all kinds of believers, and at the same time strong enough to establish a functional property for each belief.
Such a theory would have to uniformly explain the belief settings of such diverse people as normal adults, children, natives and disabled.
Problem: for this a necessary condition to believe something would be needed
((s) stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: defines details. Weak: is applicable to many).
5.
SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: E.g. Twin earth, E.g. Arthritis: to explain these cases we need a sufficient condition to believe something.
Twin Earth/TE/Arthritis/Schiffer: we need sufficient conditions for belief, so that the Ts-correlated functional roles are held by Ralph but not by Twin Earth Ralph and by Alfred in w but not in w’ where the use of "arthritis" is correct.
Stephen Schiffer
I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning
Cambridge (MIT) 1987
Kripke, S. A. Schiffer Vs Kripke, S. A. I 175
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/SchifferVsKripke: Paradox/Schiffer: Solution: Usually, by showing that one of the propositions must be rejected.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: we represent so canonically:
(P1)
(1) Yesterday Clem meant addition instead of quaddition with "plus". (2) But there is nothing in Clem's past, which could find that he meant the one in place of the other, there is simply not a fact.
(3). But (1) and (2) are incompatible: if there was not a fact that it stipulated, then it is not that he meant addition instead of quaddition in the past.
(P2) The same for the present.
I 176
Schiffer: if (P1) and (P2) are paradox, then also (P3):
(1) Clem believes that there are lions in Africa
(2)But there is nothing in Clem's past, which specifies that he believes that. There is no fact of belief about Clem, specifying this.
(3) Because (1) and (2) are incompatible, it is not the case that he believes that there are lions in Africa.
((s) difference to Kripke's Wittgenstein: there it says in (3) that he believes either addition or Quaddition (wherein Quaddition can be any deviation). But in (P3) it is said that he cannot believe that there are lions in Africa, and even Clem itself would have to notice that.). So that it is not possible at all to have an attitude is something different than the inability to determine the exact content of the attitude).
Schiffer: Here too it can be said that there is neither a "reducible" nor a "irreducible" fact.
Pointe: Pointe: if there is a solution to (P3), it could also be used for Kripke's Wittgenstein. How would the solution look like?
"Direct solution"/Kripke's Wittgenstein would ultimately be a physicalist reduction. That many want. But that is impossible. We cannot reduce "to mean".
Fact/Schiffer: if we are talking about the fact, then from the non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact, that, however, does not exist for Kripke's Wittgenstein.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/solution/Schiffer: both (2) and (3) are ambiguous in terms of "fact", it can be read here pleonastic or non-pleonastic.
pleonastic: here (3) is true and (2) false: Clem meant addition and believes that there are lions in Africa, so it is a fact that he does. ((s) in the "superfluous", non-ontological sense of "fact".)
non-pleonastic: here (2) is true and (3) false: there is indeed no objective language-independent fact which stipulates that Clem thinks or believes this and that.
Nonfactualism/solution: there is no property that is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it.
I 177
Belief-predicate/propositional attitude: E.g. "means by "plus" the addition" E.g. "believes that there are lions in Africa". SchifferVsKripke/Kripke's Wittgenstein: the fact that there are no non-pleonastic facts regarding belief and meaning, does not conclude that you cannot mean anything.
Conclusion/Schiffer:
(a) Clem means addition and believes that there are lions in Africa.
(b) the propositions about Clem's meaning and belief are not reducible to propositions without semantic, Intentional or Mentalese vocabulary. (They are irreducible intentionalistic).
(c) there is no non-pleonastic, ontologically serious fact or property in respect of meaning or belief, that is in relation to the predicate "means addition" or "believes that lions ..." as the name "Greta Garbo" to Greta Garbo.
Schiffer: which makes the way for the ontological physicalism.
VsSchiffer: it could be argued: E.g. Clem died yesterday after he has used "plus" for 50 years. Now we have a complete sound film his life along with complete records of its neurophysiological life and his stream of consciousness.
I 178
Then we can formulate two empirically adequate hypotheses which exclude each other: 1. Clem meant addition, 2. Clem meant Quaddition. That is a mystery, isn't it? SchifferVsVs: this is indeed a mystery. Here I have another one: there are two empirically adequate hypotheses about myself, one that my sensory experience originates from physical objects, 2. that they are caused by Descartes evil demon. ((s)> brains in a vat). Nevertheless, I believe in physical objects.
Stephen Schiffer
I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning
Cambridge (MIT) 1987
Loar, B. Avramides Vs Loar, B. Avramidis I 29
Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages ​​within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is ​​parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111
Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Schiffer, St. Harman Vs Schiffer, St. Avramidis I 56
Common Knowledge/HarmanVsSchiffer: (Vs"Meaning"): even in (8) deception could find a halt. (41). (8) does not say anything about S intending that A recognizes that S intends to implement E etc. I 57 (10) (...) S expresses x and intends thereby to realize E. Harman: are there ever such states (facts) which this type of analysis requires? Answer: there would have to be self-referential states (facts), so that E is a conjunctive fact: "S expresses x and S and A know together that E exists". Harman: dilemma: either a) self-referential states are possible, then why not return to the beginning, and include self-referential intentions in the analysis? Or b) they are not possible, then it is not clear how the proposed analysis should be sufficient for speaker meaning. Solution/Harman:
(11) S intends that a listener A responds in a certain way r, at least in part because of A’s recognition of the intention of S. Schiffer/Grice/Harman: these two avoid this, because they want to avoid self-referential intentions. Problem: this leads to the great complexity: I 58 if condition b) was added, then retroactively, because c) made it necessary. Regressive series.

Harman I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Harman II
Gilbert Harman
"Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Meaning Schiffer, St. Field II 65
Def Meaning/Sentence Meaning/Schiffer/Field: (Schiffer early, 1972): the meaning of sentences in spoken and written language can be explained by concepts of belief (and desire), namely those that are conventionally correlated with these sentences.
II 66
Representation Meaning/FieldVsSchiffer: Thesis: part of what it is that a symbol in my representation system stands for Caesar is that it has acquired its role there as a result of my appropriation of a name that stands for Caesar in public language.
II 66
Meaning/Representation/VsSchiffer/Field: a reverse approach to Schiffer's thesis would reduce the semantics of the representation system to the semantics of the public language.
Graeser I 116
Meaning/Stephen Schiffer: ("The Remnants of Meanig, 1987): provocative book: Thesis 1. There is no correct theory of meaning
Thesis 2. The questions that determine the current philosophy of language are based on false assumptions.
Schi passim
Meaning/Schiffer/Bio: I was a student at Oxford in the 60s. SchifferVsGrice: Representation of the speaker meaning is inadequate (incomplete), but pro
Thesis: Reduction of semantics to psychology (like Grice) + reduction to physicalism. >
1972 "Meaning".

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002