Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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II 54
Knowledge/Belief/Covariance/Nozick: the more a belief (co-)varies with the truth of what is believed, the better it is as knowledge - Knowledge: is what we have when our belief varies subjunctively with the truth - but if there were beings with better knowledge (possible world), our attitude would not be in the best relation to what is believed, and would no longer be knowledge - ((s) again depending on other things, extrinsic property) - II 175
Counterfactual condtional: shows covariance.
II 175ff
Covariance/Conditional/Counterfactual Conditional/Nozick: Conditional: provides only half of the covariance: if p were false, the person would not believe it - the conditional only varies with those cases where the antecedent is false. - Problem: still missing: when p>S believes that p.
II ~ 220ff
Knowledge/Connection/Covariance/Nozick: knowledge requires covariance with the facts; if they were different, I would believe other things - that is the connection (track) - Covariance/(s): if yes, then yes, if no, then no.
II 224f
Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world in which pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - Therefore, I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! - And because it does not vary, it shows me that h (he is in pain) is true. - VsSkepticism: in reality, it is not about the fact that h is not known, but non-(e and non-h).
II 227
Openness of knowledge: means that knowledge varies with the facts, because it is in connection with them - (>covariance) -.
II 283
Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: there are different degrees of covariance of knowledge with the facts and degrees of sensitivity with respect to truth value - for evolution, it is not necessary that beings perceive all changes - let alone respond to them - our ability to develop beliefs is finer than the ability for perception - we can doubt perceptions.
II 297
Constancy/Covariance/Nozick: E.g. suppose we want to recognize the content of preferences - Then preferences must at least sometimes be kept constant from situation to situation - form of thought - ((s) that is so, because otherwise you cannot be sure whether the preference belongs to the situation or the person.) - Nozick: both people and situations must be able to share preferences - form of thought independence - otherwise there is no trinity.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28