Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Contingency, philosophy: Contingency is not synonymous with randomness, but expresses that an existing fact could have been different. Its counterpart is necessity. See also coincidence, necessity, necessity de re.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
II 64
Contingent/Necessary/Predicate/Cresswell: suppose predicate P is contingent and applies to the objects a1, a2... - Point: we can convert this contingent predicate into a necessary predicate: - Necessary/Predicate: Q: should necessarily apply to precisely those objects to which P applies contingently - Solution: Q: "is a1 or a2 or is..." - Meaning/Point: the meaning of these two predicates is of course not the same, but it would have to be, because they apply to the same set of things - could there be two such predicates? Some perception predicates seem to work like this - E.g. Suppose the set of red and round things happened to be the same set - but the internal patterns (devices) in recognizing subjects are different.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-19