Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Attitude-Semantics Cresswell I 64
Attitude Semantics/VsPossible World Semantics/Semantics of Possible Worlds/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, yet the other one is not, but still both are true in the same possible world - e.g. all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress.
I 65
CresswellVs: the situations are to play roles that cannot be played simultaneously - solution: possible world semantics: the roles are played by entities of various kinds - solution: context with space-time indication - incorrect sentences: describe non-actual situations.
I 66
Sentences describe situations in a context - the context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. - Interpretation/Barwise: meaning of sentences in context.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Barcan-Formula Bigelow The Barcan formula (x) Na > N(x)a

Barcan formula/BF/Bigelow/Pargetter: VsBarcan: one could argue that the intended interpretations of "necessary" falsifies the barcan formula.
E.g. "N" be it logically necessary that "and suppose some of the kinds of atheism are true, according to which everything must be localized spatial-temporally. Then we have
(x) (x is spatial)
But one could add that a given spatial thing - e.g. a screwdriver - logically impossible could be non-spatial.
To put it paradoxically, if this screwdriver had been non-spatial, it would not have been that screwdriver.

N (if the screwdriver ever exists, it is spatial)
In general
(x) N (if x exists, x is spatial) This has the form
(x) Na.
---
I 110
Barcan-formula/Bigelow/Pargetter: notes that ((x) NA > N (x)a).
That is, if the atheist accepts the Barcan-formula (together with the modus ponens) he is obliged to
N (x) a
That is,
N (Everything is so that if it exists, it is spatial)
Problem/VsBarcan/Bigelow/Pargetter. Many atheists would deny this. For the Barcan-formula would fix them on logical impossibility, although they proceed from a contingent fallacy.
Barcan-formula/(s): fixes the atheist to the conclusion that God is logically impossible, even if he proceeds from a contingent fact.
Barcan-formula/BF/Bigelow/Pargetter: we nevertheless plead for an acceptance of the Barcan-formula for modal realism, if it assumes the strictest interpretation of necessity.
But the reason arises only from semantics, not from logic.
N.B.: if we set up the semantics for a rejection of the Barcan-formula, we notice that we have to assume the Barcan-formula for this.
((s) question: does this not apply to any assertion of an impossibility of a thing?)
Modal Realism/Barcan Formula/BF/Bigelow/Pargetter: modal realism must therefore deny that it is contingent, what things there are. It is merely contingent on what things there are in the actual world, because it is contingent, which world is the actual world.
Possibilia: since the modal realism accepts Possibilia, it must say "there is a God or God could exist," but which is then, for him, equal with "God exists". And this already from the logical possibility! Because of its own interpretation of "there is".
"There is"/Interpretation/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): can be interpreted differently: for modal realism it means, what is possible, exists also.
Barcan-Formula/BF/Bigelow/Pargetter: is an axiom that connects modal operators and quantifiers.
Similarly, Hughes/Cresswell's principle of predication:
Principle of Predication/Hughes/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: HC 1968, S 184-8):
(x) (Na v N~a) v (x) (Ma u M~a).
Everyday language translation/(s): all things have their properties either necessarily or possibly.
Bigelow/Pargetter: that divides all the properties (or conditions) that an object has to fulfill) in two kinds:
A) essences
B) accidents.
Principle of Predication/Hughes/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: is there to exclude properties that a thing could have essentially, but other things accidentally.
BigelowVsHughes/Cresswell/BigelowVsCresswell: you should not exclude such features! E.g. the property to be awake in the first hour of the year 1600 is accidental for Descartes, but essentially impossible for other objects.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Impossible World Hintikka II 12
Impossible world/Hintikka: I believe that we must allow the impossible world to fight the problem of another kind of omniscience, the logical omniscience.
II 63
Impossible worlds/Logical omniscience/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: Thesis: the problem of omniscience does not occur here at all! E.g. (1) A sentence of the form "a knows that p" is true in a world W iff. P is true in all a-alternatives. That is, in all worlds, which are compatible with the knowledge of a.
Logical omniscience: their failure can be formulated like this:
(2) There is a, p and q such that a knows that p, p implies logically q, but a does not know that q.
Logical truth: is then analyzed model-theoretically:
(3) A sentence is logically true, iff. it is true in every logically possible world.
Problem: (1) - (3) are incompatible! However, they are not yet incompatible in the form given above, but only with the additional assumption:
(4) Every epistemically possible world is logically possible.
II 64
Problem: now it can be that in an epistemic a-alternative W'q is wrong! Problem: According to (4), these epistemic worlds are also logically possible.
However, according to the logical truth of (p > q) ((s) in this example), q must be true in any logically possible world. This results in the contradiction.
Solution: different authors have responded differently:
Positivism: positivism takes refuge in the noninformative (tautological) logical truth.
HintikkaVs: instead: semantics of possible worlds.
(4): already presupposes omniscience! It assumes that a can only eliminate seeming possibilities. This is circular.
Solution: there may be possibilities that appear only possible but contain hidden contradictions.
II 65
Problem: the problem here is (4) and not (2)! Solution/Hintikka: we have to allow worlds that are logically impossible, but still epistemically possible. ((s) unlike the impossible worlds discussed in Stalnaker and Cresswell.)
Then (1) - (3) can be true together. That is, in an epistemic world (p > q) can fail.
Impossible world/Hintikka: Problem as how we can allow it.
Impossible world/Cresswell/Hintikka: Cresswell proposes a reinterpretation of the logical constants. (Model theoretical).
HintikkaVsCresswell: the real problem with omniscience is that people do not recognize all the logical consequences of their knowledge. And this takes place in classical logic. Non-standard logic: bypasses the problem. You could say it destroys the problem instead of solving it.
II 65
Impossible world/Logical omniscience/Solution/Veikko RantalaVsHintikka: has solved some problems of this approach.
II 66
Nonclassical models: nonclassical models are for first level sentences. Impossible world/Rantala: are not "impossible" according to Rantala, but they differ from normal possible worlds, in the way that they are "changing worlds" by allowing new individuals.
However, in such a subtle way that they normally cannot be distinguished from invariant worlds (with always the same individuals). It is about:
Urn model/Statistics/Omniscience/Hintikka: whereby the variant worlds are such worlds with which moves from the urn possibly get new individuals into the game. But only so few that you may not notice it.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Situation Semantics Barwise Cresswell II 169
Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1983): here it is explicitly denied that logically equivalent sentences in contexts with propositional attitudes are interchangeable. (1983, 175, 1981b, 676f) - e.g. double negation in the attribution of propositional attitudes. - Solution: partial character of situations. - Not everything has to be given - or the speaker may have to suspend judgment. ("do not ...") - Definition sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry: a relation between situations.
Cresswell I 63
Situation SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/knowledge/meaning/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: the possible worlds are too big to explain what the speaker knows when he/she utters a meaningful sentence. Possible worlds: are complete possible situations.
Situation semantics: we need a more partial type of entity. ((s) partial, nothing complete).
CresswellVsSituation Semantics: (Cresswell 1985a, 168 ff, 1985b, Chapter 7)
Solution/Cresswell: Thesis: The situations only have to be partial in the sense that they are small worlds.
Definition Abstract Situation/Barwise/Perry: (1983,57 ff): are theoretical constructs used for an adequate semantic modeling of reality consisting of real situations.
Cresswell: I ignore this distinction here. The semantics of possible worlds is better here, even if one differentiates between reality and theoretical representation.
What we need to compare are abstract situations and worlds.
I 64
Setting-SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two proposition, one of which is believed by the person, but the other is not, but both are still true in the same worlds - for example, all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress.
I 65
CresswellVs: the situations should play roles that cannot be played at the same time - solution: -Semantics of possible worlds: the roles are played by entities of different kinds. Solution: Context with space-time specification - incorrect sentences: describes non-actual situations.
I 66
Sentences describe situations in a context - context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. - Interpretation/Barwise: Meaning of sentences in a context. Meaning/CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Meaning: = set of worlds in which they are true.
Problem: Meanings are often equated with proposition, and then there are problems in playing roles that they cannot play at the same time.
I 67
On the other hand, some of the other things that Barwise and Perry ask for from situations behave like worlds! For example: Mollie barks
e*: = in I, Mollie, yes.
That describes a situation e iff e* < e. ((s) Subset of situations where Mollie barks otherwise? Or where Mollie exists and someone barks?).
Definition Generation property/terminology/Cresswell: (generation property): sentences that describe a situation have a situation property ((s) that is part of a set of situations). A sentence ? has the generation property in terms of a context u, iff there is a situation e*, so that
u[[φ]] e iff e* < e.
((s) If there is a sentence that is more general than the sentence "Mollie barks in the space-time situation I" Or: Generation property is the property that embeds the sentence in the context, because proposition as sets of worlds must not be limited to a single situation.
The sentence φ has the generation property (simpliciter) iff it has it in every context.
Atomic sentence/BP: Thesis: all atomic sentences have the generation property.
Cresswell: if situations are to be understood as proposition, all sentences should have the generation property. And that is because the generating situation e* can be understood as the proposition expressed by the sentence ? in context u.
In fact, we do not need the other situations at all! We can say that e* is the only situation described by ? in u. But that doesn't matter, because each e* determines the only class of e's, so e* < e, and each class generated by an e* determines that e* uniquely.

Barw I
J. Barwise
Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Truthmakers Quine II 56
DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: no thing makes sentences true (VsTruthmaker) - Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to beliefs.
II 217 ff
Truthmaker/making true/QuineVsCresswell/Quine: Cresswell poses his metaphysical question as follows: "What is it that makes one physical theory true and another false?"
Quine: I can do nothing but answer with unhelpful realism that it is the nature of the world.

Cresswell, however, helpfully adds that this question is often asked in the epistemological sense: How can we know that one theory is true and the other is false?
That is a completely different question, and it must be taken more seriously. One obstacle still lies in the verb "to know". Does it have to imply certainty, infallibility? Then the answer is that we cannot know.
But if instead we ask why belief in one theory is more justified than belief in another, our question has substance.
A complete answer would be a complete theory of observational evidence and the scientific method.
Cresswell quotes Quine briefly and quickly that the final decision lies with the Court of Arbitration of Experience.
II 218
CresswellVsQuine: "Quine's metaphors about the arbitration will never be executed as far as we feel is necessary". Cresswell compares Quine's view with Russell's logical atomism and rightly finds both incompatible. "Quine does not value a theory that would turn atomic facts into simple facts about our experience that are logically independent of any other. Quine: that is correct.
II 218
Experience/Quine: my observation sentences are not about experience (!) but they are reasonably naturalistic analogues of sentences about experience in that their use is learned by direct conditioning on the stimulation of sense receptors. Moreover, simple observational sentences are in most cases actually independent of each other. QuineVsAtomism/QuineVsRussell: the fundamental difference between Russell's logical atomism and my view is that, in my view, the other truths are not somehow composed of or implied by the observation propositions. Their connection with the sentences of observation is more mediated and more complex.
II 219
Cresswell burdens me with a realm of reified experiences or phenomena, which stands in contrast to an inscrutable reality. My naturalistic view has no resemblance to this: I have forces that affect our nerve endings from real objects of the outside world.
III 57
Def Fulfillability/Quine: a sentence-logical scheme is called fulfillable if there is an interpretation of the letters it contains that makes the scheme true. Otherwise unattainable.
I 425
Facts/Object/making true/Quine: one should not take facts as objects just to have something that makes sentences true.
I 426
Facts: Tendency (though not in those who perceive facts as true propositions) to imagine facts as something concrete. Facts are what makes sentences true. For example, "The King's Boulevard is one kilometre long" and "The King's Boulevard is 50 metres wide" are true. In this case they describe two different facts, but the only physical object that plays a role here is the King's Boulevard. We do not want a quibble, but the fact that the meaning of concreteness in the facts is "concrete", does not make facts particularly appealing to us.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Cresswell, M.J. Bigelow Vs Cresswell, M.J. I 110
Principle of predication/Hughes/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: it exists in order to exclude properties that a thing could have essentially, but other things accidentallly. BigelowVsHughes/Cresswell/BigelowVsCresswell: such properties should not be excluded, however! E.g. The property of being at the first hour of the year 1600 is accidental for Descartes, but essentially impossible for other objects.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Cresswell, M.J. Hintikka Vs Cresswell, M.J. Cresswell I 158
Game-Theoretical Semantics/GTS/Game Theory/Hintikka/Terminology/Cresswell: is actually not important for my purposes. I 159 HintikkaVsCresswell: Vs use of higher order entities. ((s) instead of 2nd order logic and instead branching quantifiers in order to re-establish compositionality). (Hintikka 1983, 281-285). CresswellVsHintikka/CresswellVsGame-Theoretical Semantics: 1) quantifies over higher-order entities itself, namely strategies! In particular, in the truth conditions for sentences like (28), despite Hintikka’s assertion that branched quantifiers would only mention individuals. (p 282). CresswellVsHintikka: 2) Def Truth/Game-Theoretical Semantics/Hintikka: consists in the existence of a winning strategy. If we formalize (x)(Ey)Fxy as Ef(x)Fxf(x), we are not involved in a move!
Move/Game Theory/Hintikka/Cresswell: consists of a single specific choice of nature of x and then a specific choice by me.
Sentence Meaning/CresswellVsHintikka: Important argument: then a single game can define the sentence meaning, and not represent how the speaker deals with it or represents its meaning.

Hintikka II 63
Logical Omniscience/Semantics of Possible Worlds/Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: the problem does not occur here! E.g. (1) A sentence of the form "a knows that p" is true in a possible world W iff. p is true in all a-alternatives. I.e. in all possible worlds that are compatible with the knowledge of a.
logical omniscience: its failure can be formulated as follows:
(2) There is a, p and q so that a knows that p, p logically implies q, but a does not know that q.
logical truth: is then model-theoretically analyzed:
(3) A sentence is logically true, iff it is true in every logically possible world. Problem: (1) - (3) are incompatible! However, they are not incompatible yet in the above given shape, but only with the additional assumption:
(4) Every epistemically possible world is logically possible.
II 64
Problem: now it may be that in an epistemic a-alternative W’q is false! Problem: according to (4), these epistemic worlds are also logically possible. Following the logical truth of (p>q) ((s) in this example) q must be true in any logically possible world. This creates the contradiction. Solution: different authors have different responds: Positivism: takes refuge in the non-informative of (tautological) logical truth. HintikkaVs: instead: possible world semantics. (4): already presumes omniscience! It assumes that a can already eliminate only apparent options. This is circular. Solution: There may be possibilities that only appear to be possible, but contain hidden contradictions.
II 65
Problem: the problem here is therefore (4) and not (2)! Solution/Hintikka: we must allow possible worlds which are logically impossible, but nevertheless epistemically possible ((s) other than the impossible worlds that are being discussed in Stalnaker and Cresswell. Then (1)-(3) can be true together, i.e. can in an epistemic possible world (p > q) can fail. Impossible World/Hintikka: Problem: how we can allow it. Impossible World/Cresswell/Hintikka: suggests a reinterpretation of the logical constants (model-theorically). HintikkaVsCresswell: the real problem with omniscience is that people do not recognize all the logical consequences of their knowledge and that takes place in classical logic. Non-standard logic: goes past the problem. One could say that it destroys the problem instead of solving it.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Cresswell, M.J. Cresswell Vs Cresswell, M.J. I 126
Necessity/Necessary existence/Self-criticism/CresswellVsCresswell: (and Hughes/Cresswell I 191): (35) represents an interpretation that we proposed in HC for E.g. "the man next door = the Major" as a necessary truth. I’m afraid that’s unnatural. Properties/Chisholm/(s): unreal examples "living opposite": creates no resemblance to other things that also have this property. Real Properties create similarity among the things that have them. E.g. red, round, etc. On the other hand: E.g. All neighbors of Schmidt have the basement full of water": is certainly a similarity, but being a neighbor of Schmidt is part of the explanation here (with hidden premises), but not a property that makes the persons similar.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
Cresswell, M.J. Stechow Vs Cresswell, M.J. I 154
Lambda-Operator/λ-Operator/Stechow: the language used here corresponds pretty much to the λ categorial of Cresswell 1973. Only difference: Cresswell: does not differentiate between syntactic categories and types. The type symbols act at the same time as category symbols.
StechowVsCresswell: this is impractical, because different categories can have the same type.
For example intransitive verbs as well as nomina are of type ep.
Here: we choose a language with meaning*types, so e, p etc.
Lambda-Operator/Semantics/Linguistics/Stechow: interprets the motion index. Thus the logical properties of the operator are transferred to the interpretation of the movement.
Movement: (on LF) creates a lambda operator that binds its track and thus all the same variables (pronouns) that it commands c.
1. Interpretation: of a closed expression does not depend on the choice of a certain occupancy. This is a consequence of the so-called
Def Coincidence Lemma: this means that two expressions, which differ only by free variables, can be interpreted in the same way by suitable assignments.
2. The syntax of the λ language contains the principle of the
Def λ conversion, which is our function conversion. The principle says that you can break down a λ operator if you use an expression of the variable type for the variables bound by the operator. This follows from the >transition lemma. (>binding).
3. Bound Renaming/Stechow: if two expressions differ only in the choice of their bound variables, they mean the same thing. ^These are the alphabetical variants.
A. von Stechow
I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik
www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006)
Lewis, D. Cresswell Vs Lewis, D. I 23
Performance/Competence/Semantic/Cresswell: what relationships are there between the two of them? Lewis: Convention of truthfulness and trust: in L: thesis: most language use is based on it.
---
I 24
We assume that the speakers are trying to express true sentences and we expect the same from others. Important argument/CresswellVsLewis: this may be the case, but to me it seems to be more a matter of empirical investigation than a definition that it should be so. And therefore:
---
I 33
Language/Bigelow/Cresswell: John Bigelow tells me, thesis: that one of the earliest functions of language was storytelling. Then it is more about imagination than everyday communication! ((s)VsCresswell: 1) How does Bigelow know that? 2) Why should one draw such far-reaching conclusions from that). CresswellVsLewis: even if it should turn out that there was a logical link between the convention and the use of language, it seems better to me not to include this in a theory of semantics from the start. Anyway, we do not need a connection of competence and performance.
---
II 142
Fiction/Belief de re/Lewis/Cresswell: (Lewis 1981, 288): E.g. In France, children believe that Papa Noel brings gifts to all children; in England, Father Christmas only brings them to the good children (and these get twice as many gifts, as Pierre calculates). De re/Fiction/Lewis: this cannot be an attitude de re, because there is no such res in both cases.
Fiction/CresswellVsLewis: here you can also have a reference de re, even if the causal connection is not direct.
Solution/Devitt: storytelling.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Quine, W.V.O. Davidson Vs Quine, W.V.O. I (c) 41
Quine connects meaning and content with the firing of sensory nerves (compromise proposal) This makes his epistemology naturalistic. - DavidsonVsQuine: Quine should drop this (keep naturalism) but what remains of empiricism after deducting the first two dogmas. - DavidsonVsQuine: names: "Third Dogma" (> Quine, Theories and Things, Answer) dualism of scheme and content. Davidson: Scheme: Language including the ontology and world theory contained in it; I 42 - Content: the morphological firing of the neurons. Argument: something like the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make the concept relativism comprehensible. In Quine neurological replacement for sensory data as the basis for concept relativism. Davidson: Quine separation of scheme and content, however, becomes clear at one point: (Word and Object). Quine: "... by subtracting these indications from the worldview of people, we get the difference of what he contributes to this worldview. This difference highlights the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of the human, the area where he can revise his theories without changing anything in the data." (Word and Object, beginning) I 43 - Referring to QuineVsStroud: "everything could be different": we would not notice... -DavidsonVsQuine: Is that even right? According to the proximal theory, it could be assumed: one sees a rabbit, someone else sees a warthog and both say: Gavagai! (Something similar could occur with blind, deaf, bats or even with low-level astigmatism. The brains in the tank may be wrong even to the extent that Stroud feared. But everyone has a theory that preserves the structure of their sensations.
I (c) 55
So it is easy to understand Cresswell when he says CreswellVsQuine: he has an empire of reified experiences or phenomena which confronts an inscrutable reality. QuineVsCresswell> Quine III) -
I (c) 64
DavidsonVsQuine: he should openly advocate the distal theory and recognize the active role of the interpreter. The speaker must then refer to the causes in the world that both speak and which are obvious for both sides.
I (d) 66
DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is based on the first person, and thus Cartesian. Nor do I think we could do without some at least tacitly agreed standards. ProQuine: his courageous access to epistemology presented in the third person.
I (e) 93
 Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action: event and reference object. Explicating this ontology is a matter of semantics. Which entities must we assume in order to understand a natural language?
McDowell I 165
McDowell: World/Thinking/Davidson: (according to McDowell): general enemy to the question of how we come into contact with the empirical world. There is no mystery at all. No interaction of spontaneity and receptivity. (DavidsonVsQuine) Scheme/Content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language in Quine - Content: "empirical meaning" in Quine. (I 165) Conceptual sovereignty/Quine: can go as far as giving rise to incommensurable worldviews. DavidsonVsQuine: experience cannot form a basis of knowledge beyond our opinions. It would otherwise have to be simultaneously inside and outside the space of reason.

Fodor/Lepore IV 225
Note
13.> IV 72
Radical Inerpretation/RI/Quine: his version is a first step to show that the concept of linguistic meaning is not scientifically useful and that there is a "large range" in which the application can be varied without empirical limitation. (W + O, p. 26> conceptual sovereignty). DavidsonVsQuine: in contrast to this: RI is a basis for denying that it would make sense to claim that individuals or cultures had different conceptual schemes.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Quine, W.V.O. Verschiedene Vs Quine, W.V.O. Davidson I 55
CreswellVsQuine: he had a realm of reified experiences or phenomena facing an unexplored reality. Davidson pro - - QuineVsCresswell >Quine III)
Kanitscheider II 23
Ontology/language/human/Kanitschneider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism.
KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology more as a research programme.
Quine VI 36
VsQuine: I've been told that the question "What is there?" is always a question of fact and not just a linguistic problem. That is correct. QuineVsVs: but saying or assuming what there is remains a linguistic matter and here the bound variables are in place.
VI 51
Meaning/Quine: the search for it should start with the whole sentences. VsQuine: the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation leads directly to behaviorism. Others: it leads to a reductio ad absurdum of Quine's own behaviorism.
VI 52
Translation Indeterminacy/Quine: it actually leads to behaviorism, which there is no way around. Behaviorism/Quine: in psychology one still has the choice whether one wants to be a behaviorist, in linguistics one is forced to be one. One acquires language through the behavior of others, which is evaluated in the light of a common situation.
It literally does not matter what other kind psychological life is!
Semantics/Quine: therefore no more will be able to enter into the semantic meaning than what can also be inferred from perceptible behaviour in observable situations
Quine XI 146
Deputy function/Quine/Lauener: does not have to be unambiguous at all. E.g. characterisation of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V so that both the objects of U and their substitutes are included in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be represented as
background theory within which their own ontological reduction is described.
XI 147
VsQuine: this is no reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we can assume U for the duration of the argument. (>Ontology/Reduction).
Lauener: this brings us to ontological relativity.
Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires an overcountable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range.
For this one needed a much stronger frame theory, which then could no longer be discussed away as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal.
Quine X 83
Logical Truth/Validity/Quine: our insertion definitions (sentences instead of sets) use a concept of truth and fulfillment that goes beyond the framework of object language. This dependence on the concept of ((s) simple) truth, by the way, would also concern the model definition of validity and logical truth.
Therefore we have reason to look at a 3rd possibility of the definition of validity and logical truth: it gets by without the concepts of truth and fulfillment: we need the completeness theorem ((s) >provability).
Solution: we can simply define the steps that form a complete method of proof and then:
Def Valid Schema/Quine: is one that can be proven with such steps.
Def Logically True/Quine: as before: a sentence resulting from a valid schema by inserting it instead of its simple sentences.
Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the propositions,
X 84
namely those that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods generate true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define logical truth as the sentence generated by these proofs.
1st VsQuine: this tends to trigger protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of evidence" is uninteresting in itself. It is interesting only because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with logical truth!
2. VsQuine: if one defines logical truth indirectly by referring to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its ground. It becomes empty of content.
QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: The sentence of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all!
Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes logical truth interesting in the first place.
Equivalence/Quine: important are theorems, which state an equivalence between quite different formulations of a concept - here the logical truth. Which formulation is then called the official definition is less important.
But even mere terms can be better or worse.
Validity/logical truth/definition/Quine: the elementary definition has the advantage that it is relevant for more neighboring problems.
3. VsQuine: with the great arbitrariness of the choice of the evidence procedure it cannot be excluded that the essence of the logical truth is not grasped.
QuineVsVs: how arbitrary is the choice actually? It describes the procedure and talks about strings of characters. In this respect it corresponds to the sentence. Insertion definition: it moves effectively at the level of the elementary number theory. And it stays at the level, while the other definition uses the concept of truth. That is a big difference.





Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Situation Semantics Perry, J. Cresswell I 63
Situations-SemantikVsMöWe-Semantik/Wissen/Bedeutung/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: die MöWe seien zu groß um das zu erklären, was der Sprecher weiß, wenn er einen bedeutungsvollen Satz äußert. MöWe: sind vollständige mögliche Situationen.
Situations-Semantik: wir brauchen eine mehr partielle Art von Entität. ((s) partial, nichts vollständiges).
CresswellVsSituations-Semantik: (Cresswell 1985a, 168 ff, 1985b, Kapitel 7)
Lösung/Cresswell: These die Situationen müssen nur in dem Sinn partiell sein, daß sie kleine MöWe sind.
I 64
Einstellungs-Semantik/Cresswell: (Cresswell 1985b) These: ich verteidige den Zugang zu prop Einst über MöWe-Semantik.
I 73
BP: These damit Joe sieht, daß Sally raucht oder nicht raucht müßte er entweder sehen wie sie raucht oder sehen, wie sie nicht raucht.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984