Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Compositionality, linguistics, language philosophy: the thesis (originally by G. Frege) that the meaning of composite expressions, e.g. sentences, results from the meanings of the parts. It follows that a change of the parts, e.g. replacement of a single word by another, can change the meaning of the entire composite structure. See also Frege principle.
 
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IV 177
Compositionality principle/compositional/Fodor/Lepore: CRT (conceptual role) requires identification of inferential role with meaning together with distinction analytic/synthetic, so that the constituents of inferences can provide the meaning - Fodor/Lepore Vs: but then meaningless semantics: brown cows are dangerous would be analytical! - Field thesis inf. role = subjective probability - FL Vs: sW itself not compositional - e.g. no addition of subjective prob. about cows and brown things.
IV 182
Compositionality/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. idioms and metaphors are not compositional - compositionality: is local: E.g. the order is important for spelling. - against: global: confirmation of theories through the entire science - empirical inferences: global, not local. - IV 183 compositionality: could only be met by a CRT which recognizes the (a/s) distinction and is not holistic.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23