Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Causality: causality is the relation between two (separate) entities, whereby a state change of the one entity causes the state of the other entity to change. Nowadays it is assumed that an energy transfer is crucial for talking about a causal link.
D. Hume was the first to consistently deny the observability of cause and effect. (David Hume Eine Untersuchung über den menschlichen Verstand, Hamburg, 1993, p. 95).

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 104 ff
Davidson: the causal relation itself is independent of description! It exists between event tokens, no matter how they are described.
Causal laws, however, operate on the level of description, so they refer to event types.
Causal laws are strict laws, i.e. they apply without distinction. Such laws can only exist in a sealed frame, i.e. a system of nomological sentences.
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McDowell I 100
Causality/Concepts/Davidson/McDowell: the objects that fulfill the sui generis concepts have causal relations with their kind and other things.
But that does not endanger the thesis that causal relations only exist between residents of the realm of ​​the laws of nature.
McDowell: A reason may therefore be a cause, although it is not in causal relations by virtue of its rational relations.
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Rorty VI 179 ff
Causality/Rorty: plays an indispensable role in determining what we say and believe. It is generally impossible to determine beliefs first and then their meaning, and then ask what its causes are.
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Dav I 59
Causality/Davidson: the causal relations between world and belief are not decisive, because they provide evidence, but because they are recognizable also for others - (>Communication)
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Horwich I 452
Causality/Belief/Davidson/Rorty: explanation does not require causality - E.g. how we explain communication with simultaneous presence at same place - we do not know what it would be like for people if they were not there - similarly: e.g. truth has no explanatory use - we do not know what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-11-21