Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 92 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Davidson | Glüer II 108 Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >Events/Davidson. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father. Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation. Glüer II 109 f Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws. Brandom I 724 Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved I 726 Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent. Brandom I 727 She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow). I 728 Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs. Brandom I 957 Accordion Effect/success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action. - Example Mountain Climber. I 958 Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURDs: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded. I 729 Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine. I 957 Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto). Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established. Glüer II 92 Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object. Glüer II 96 Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted. MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely) Glüer II 110 Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - ((s) Because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers.) ((s) Something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.) >Intentions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Actions | Dummett | I 187 DummettVsDavidson: action is not specifically linguistic. Therefore, not much is gained for the meaning (meaning theory). >Meaning, >Meaning theory, >Success. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Animals | Davidson | V 130 Animal/Thinking/Beliefs/Davidson: Thinking is possible not without language, because it must be possible to think of the same thing and to discover error, belief about belief - different living beings need to share the same concept of truth. - (Baseline of triangulation). >Triangulation. V 136 Thinking/Language/Animal/Davidson: The lack of language makes thought impossible in animals - SearleVsDavidson: we know that human children have consciousness long before they have language. >Animal language, >thinking without language. V 139 Animal/Propositional Attitude/Thinking/Davidson: E.g. the dog believes his master is at home, but not that the bank manager is at home, even though they are the same person - Searle: according to this argument, there is no intentional state without a certain fact that coresponded to its propositional content - SearleVsDavidson: we do not need language to recognize an incorrect belief. >Gavagai. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Animals | Dupré | I 315 Animal/Speech/Thinking/Dupré: it is not quite correct to speak of "pets", it is rather a coevolution of humans and other species that live for a long time in a symbiotic relationship. "Domestication" and "socialization" is something quite different. >Animals, >Animal language, >Evolution. I 316 Animal/Communication/Intention/Dupré: an important criterion for intended communication is the possibility of deception. >Communication, >Delusion. I 318 Animal/Thinking/Language/Descartes/Dupré: even those who defend the cognitive abilities of the animals most, often accept the Cartesian assumption that it is in principle impossible to prove the thinking or even the consciousness of animals because this would be conceptually dependent on behavior. >Behavior, >Language, >Thinking without language, >Language and thinking, >Gestures, >Understanding. I 319 DupréVsDavidson: if Davidson were right, the question at stake would not only be whether or not one can teach monkeys, but whether to teach them to think. >Animals/Davidson, >Language/Davidson, >Thinking/Davidson. I 320 Animal ethics/Dupré: animal ethics does not depend in any way on the success of the project, to teach animals to speak. >Ethics. I 321 Language/Thinking/Dupré: there are many forms of non-verbal behavior that allow communication, and many non-verbal manifestations of thinking. Animal/Dupré: the research of the language with monkeys can tell us much about monkeys and ourselves, which we cannot learn in a different way. John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge |
Dupré I John Dupré "Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Anti-Realism | Rorty | Horwich I 462 Anti-Realism/Dummett/RortyVsDummett: rather refers to values - realism rather to chairs. >Values, >Objcets, cf. >Realism. Rorty I 305 Anti-Realism/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam does not understand antique and our modern theories as two roughly correct descriptions of a fixed set, but he does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is just our theory, then we might as well ask the Neanderthals instead. >Pragmatism, >Truth. PutnamVsAnti-Realism: the problem is that for antirealism truth only makes sense as a subordinate concept to theories. But extension is indissolubly linked to truth: x belongs to the extension of a predicate F precisely when " x is an F" is true. ((s) Anti-realism is understood differently here than with Dummett). Problem: changing extension is senseless. - justified assertibility can change. PutnamVs equating truth with justified assertibility. >Extension, >Anti-Realism/Dummett. VI 406 Per distinction realism/anti-realism: Dummett, Nagel (vsGadamer, VsDavidson) Vs distinction realism/anti-realism: Rorty, Davidson. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Beliefs | Avramides | I 122 Concept/Instantiation/Davidson: a concept can be instantiated. (Realize, E.g. swimming) without having the concept. Davidson: but not with convictions. >Instantiation. I 122f Conviction/Belief/Davidson: Condition: Awareness of the distinction subjective/objective (because of the necessary ability to be surprised). >Subjectivity, >Objectivity. I 123 Bennett/AvramidesVsDavidson: in animals there is also learning ability (= distinction subjective/objective) instead of language ability. >Animals. DavidsonVsVs: this is about properties of concepts, not beings. Davidson: per conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological. Therefore, there is no thinking without language. >Thinking without language. I125 Reductionism/Antireductionism/Avramides: both are not separated by the dispute over ontological asymmetry, both could accept ontological symmetry like asymmetry. - It is really about deep epistemic asymmetry. >Terminology/Avramides. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Beliefs | Brandom | I 788 You can weakly believe of Pegasus that he had wings. But if you strongly believe in something, you have to be able to pick it out. Cf. >stronger/weaker. I 759f Belief de re/Quine/Brandom: aroused interest in de re by distinguishing between the conceptual and relational meanings of belief - you do not have relational beliefs about an object by simply knowing the singular word - definition of weak de re: someone who only believes that the smallest spy is a spy does not know much about spies - not yet de re of any objects - epistemically strong: Example of Rosa Kleb who believes that she is the smallest spy (de re). >de re, >de dicto. I 790 Definition strong/weak/belief/Brandom: you can weakly believe of Pegasus that he had wings - but if you strongly believe in something, you have to be able to pick it out. --- II 226 Belief/Brandom: 1. you only believe what you believe to believe - 2. and also everything that one is more or less tied to by hione's s believes - e.g. if I believe that Kant revered Hamann and I believe that Hamann was the Magus of the North, I also believe that Kant worshiped the Magus of the North. I 764 Belief/de dicto/Davidson/Brandom: Davidson only allows de dicto beliefs. I 962 Belief/Def weak relation/Dennett/Brandom: what is expressed by de re attributions. I 765 but strong de re convictions would have little meaning, if useful at all. Belief/cnviction/Dretske: (widely spread thesis): de re convictions are understandable regardless of de dicto convictions. I 765 Conviction/belief/Brandom: demonstrative, indexical de re convctions are conceptual, but not independent - they cannot stand alone - decisive are the weak ones - and not a special kind of contact with the object. I 965 Belief/Brandom: Each conviction, be it strong or weak, can be attributed de re or de dicto. II 48 Belief/BrandomVsDavidson: Definition via wish. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Beliefs | Friedman | Horwich I 499 Belief/FriedmanVsDavidson: most beliefs can be wrong because the causal theory of reference specifies accepted sentences regardless of truth. |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Beliefs | McDowell | I 168 Belief/McDowellVsDavidson: He could also have said: nothing is conceivable as a reason for a belief if it is not also located in the space of reasons, such as the fact that it seems to a subject to be this and that. >Belief/Davidson. Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this and that or if I am convinced that it is so. I 192 McDowellVsPeacocke: ... that is not proof that the non-conceptual content is conceivable as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something. The subject may not even have reasons. Example: the experienced cyclist makes the right movements without the need for reasons. The description does not require reasons either. >Experience/Peacocke, >Perception/Peacocke. I 193 McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: this neither justifies the assumption that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor that beliefs are founded by experience "as reasons". Experience/World/McDowell: the condition of correctness is that the object is actually square. --- Rorty VI 179 McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: beliefs can also be justified by mental processes that are different from judgments. >Judment/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Beliefs | Rorty | III 84 Beliefs/Rorty: a belief that can be justified before anyone is not interesting for anybody! The traditional distinction between "rational conviction" and "belief, which is brought about by causes rather than reasons" should be abolished! In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value. >Reason/Cause. III 89 Belief/Rorty: a belief that could be justified to anyone would interest no one. III 90 In the end, the replacement of vocabularies is what counts and not of beliefs! - The replacement of truth value candidates, not the determination of a truth value. >Vocabulary/Rorty, >Description/Rorty, >Truth values. VI 63ff Truth/Rorty: there is no cause of the truth of beliefs. >Truthmakers, >Facts. VI 144 Belief/existence/Dennett/Rorty: sometimes you do not accept the existence of an entity, but concede that we must have faith in this entity. E.g. belief in qualia and the phenomenological. >Ontology. VI 187 Belief/Davidson: thesis: most of our beliefs must be true - beliefs are no more or less accurate representations, but they are states that are attributed to people for the purpose of explaining their behavior. - One cannot determine first the belief and then its cause, but rather the reverse. - Rorty: (like Davidson) we are interested in the beliefs of the others, because we want to be able to deal with their behavior. VI 214 Beliefs/Davidson/Sellars/Brandom/Rorty: are imposed on us by the world, and that happens in the course of causal interactions between the program forced upon us in the educational process and the sensual organs. >DavidsonVsMcDowell. VI 231 Belief/Davidson/Rorty: self-attribution of experiences presuppose the self-attribution of intentional states. - That’s only possible for someone who already believes many true things of about the world. - That is about the causal link between beliefs and world. >World/thinking, >Causal theory of knowledge. VI 233 Belief/Davidson. we can only know the content of our intentional states if we know about their causes. >Causality. M. WilliamsVsDavidson: this is just the foundation thought that he rejects. VI 426f Belief/experience/Rorty: the spirit of the adult is more complex than that of the child. - Thus, the distinction between causation and justification of beliefs disappears. - (> Beliefs/Davidson). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Causation | Bigelow | I 276 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should understand it as a relation between events (in a broad sense). Speech of causation/causality/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter. We take over from Davidson (1980)(1): Problem: singular causal statements. E.g. "The short circuit caused the fire." >Causality, >Causes, >Observation sentences. Truth conditions: the statements can be true because the relation exists, even if it is clear that short circuits are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for fire. >Truth conditions. Generalization: can be true, but only if we reword the sentence. >Generalization/Bigelow. Causal Relation/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter: exists, if and only iff there is a way of describing the events so that they can be brought under a general causal law. >Causal relation. BigelowVsDavidson: (see above) the causal relation is rather local than global. BigelowVsDavidson: the nature of the causal relation is not derived from the existence of an underlying law. >Laws. I 277 Bigelow/Pargetter pro Davidson: however, the truth conditions of a singular causal statement require the existence of a relation (but not under a description). Causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: some must be rewritten: E.g. "The stone caused the window pane to break." Must be rewritten to: "That the stone touched the window pane caused the window pane to break." E.g. "Becker's easy victory over Lendl surprised the commentators." Must be changed: "Becker's victory surprised ... and if it had not been easy, it would not have been surprising." Bigelow pro Davidson: So far his theory is convincing. Causality/causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: sometimes we must also make general causal statements: For this, we need types of events or properties of events. Causal statements: must then be counterfactual conditionals: E.g. "If Lendl's defeat had not been so clear, it would not have been surprising." E.g. "The antidote slowed the death of Protheros." This seems to require causal relations between characteristics of events (e.g. lightness, slowing). I 278 Universals: are sometimes used here. Sometimes it is about unique events, sometimes about characteristics of events. >Universals, >Events. Problem: why should the relations between such different entities be summarized? Why should they all be causal? Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we must assume that they all supervene on a basic causal relation. This can not be specified in modal terms. >Modalities. Causal Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is largely unknown to us. It is best to recognize it when it is encountered. I 279 Our task is now to figure out what it is. This is a metaphysical, not a semantic task. >Metaphysics, >Semantics. I 288 Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Let's assume that we can close the gap between everyday forces and the fundamental forces. I 289 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do we justify that we have chosen forces for the explanation? >Forces, >Forces/Bigelow. Explanation/David Fair/FairVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Fair 1979)(2): he selects instead of forces energy flow. ((s) >Energy transfer/Gerhard Vollmer). Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: we take them because they occur in Newton's 3rd law. For us, there are two instances of causation then, because there are two forces. David Fair: for him it is an instance of energy flow and thus a causation. BigelowVsFair: his theory does not provide the right relations of higher levels between universals that we need. Energy flow/energy transfer/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: this term requires the identification of packages of energy in time. Energy/Cause/Effect/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: The energy present in the effect is numerically identical to the energy lost in the cause. Problem/BigelowVsFair: but there is also cause, where no energy is transmitted, but only impulse. Therefore, it needs a shared access. Then the causation is hardly a unifying element in any explanation. Problem: besides, there are cases where both energy and impulse are transmitted, and how should one choose then? The causation cannot be identified with both. ((s) also BigelowVsVollmer). >Single-case causation, >G.Vollmer. I 290 BigelowVsFair: besides, energy transmission and pulse transmission supervene on properties and relations. Therefore, according to Fair, there can be no Humean world, which coincides with a causal possible world in all properties of the 1st level. This should, however, be possible (see Chapter 5): a theory that allows this must also recognize causation as a relation of a higher level. Fair cannot do this. >Levels/order, >Description levels. 1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press. 2. Fair, D. (1979). Causation and the flow of energy. erkenntnis 14, pp. 219-50 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Coherence Theory | Dummett | I 29 Correspondence Theory/Coherence-Theory/Tradition: Meaning has to be fixed before truth. - DavidsonVsTradfition: truth before meaning (the truth conditions are defined later by the theory). - DummettVsDavidson: Truth and meaning have to be defined together! >Truth theories/Dummett, >Truth condition/Dummett, >Understanding/Dummett. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Coherence Theory | McDowell | I 172 Definition "unforced coherence theory/McDowell: the thesis that the exercise of spontaneity has no external constraints - it can be controlled in a rational way by the facts if the facts manifest themselves in the experience. This is a control from outside of thought, not from outside of the thinkable. >Spontaneity, >Concept/McDowell, >Experience/McDowell. DavidsonVs: spontaneity is not subject to any external rational conditions. McDowellVsDavidson: so his coherence theory is without control. I 49 McDowellVsCoherence theory: it threatens to seperate idea and reality. Cf. >Coherence. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Conceptual Schemes | Davidson | I (c) 41/42 Third Dogma/Conceptual Scheme/DavidsonVsQuine: Scheme: Language along with ontology and world theory - Contents: build exemplary firing of the neurons. - (in Quine instead of sense data) - QuineVsDavidson: Separation is not intended, it only appears in Davidson's presentation like this - The concept of the uninterpretable content is necessary, however, to make conceptual relativism clear. Conceptual relativism: The conceptual scheme is a human creation; it is arbitrary. - "Conceptual sovereignty". I (c) 44 DavidsonVsQuine: There are no last data, therefore no subtraction. I (e) 87ff Conceptual Scheme/Separation Scheme/Content >relativism - "stream of experience" - "uninterpreted givenness" - conceptual relativism. I (e) 96 Scheme/Contents: Both have come into play as a pair, (Cl. Lewis) now we can let them drop out as pair. - Then no objects remain, in terms of which the question of representation could be raised - beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing. >Representation/Davidson. I (e) 98 Third Dogma/Scheme/Content/Error/Deception/Davidson: Deception is no longer a problem after the abolition of the separation scheme/content, no matter whether we are capable of knowing the world and other minds. - All the more: how - but these are no epistemological questions anymore now, but questions of the nature of rationality. Glüer II 133 Incommensuralibilty presumes the separation scheme/content (Third Dogma). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Conceptual Schemes | McGinn | ad I 134 McGinn/(s): uses a (insurmountable) "conceptual scheme" to make his view of the natural limits of knowledge clear. McGinnVsDavidson. Cf. >Scheme/content, >Third Dogma. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Conditions | Bigelow | I 270 Conditions/causation/cause/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, we will not treat the necessary and sufficient conditions separately, but assume a general modal relation between cause and effect. It is this theory that we reject. >Causality, >Effect, >Causes. Conditions/sufficient/necessary/causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: general problem: corresponding theories are too strongly bound up with a determinism of nature. Determinism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is here meant only in a broader sense. >Determinism. VsDeterminism/Bigelow/Pargetter: from it would follow that there is no effect without sufficient conditions. And that would mean, to the extent that there is indeterminism, we would have to give up the conept of causation. Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not have to give it up in the macroscopic world. >Causality. Causes/Bigelow/Pargetter: are not conditions. Cause/Probability/Bigelow/Pargetter: Representatives of causes as conditions could weaken their thesis and speak of probability rather than of sufficient conditions. >Probability, >Sufficiency. I 271 Probability/cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus sufficient and necessary conditions are brought together. This is very plausible for many cases. Nevertheless, it is wrong. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a local feature of a cause-effect pair. It is a two-digit relation. No relation with undefined many places. However, we can leave the causal relation unchanged if we insert a different cause. For example, a backup system (see, for example, another slice of bread which has the same effect). Conditions/sufficient/necessary/Bigelow/Pargetter: are - unlike the causation relation - a global feature. For example, when the backup system occurs, what is a necessary condition ceases to be a necessary condition. However, the intrinsic character of the process is unchanged. >Process. Causal laws/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: there are causal laws! And they are global. The truth of the causal laws rests on the character of the world as a whole, not of its constituents. But the truth supervenes on the existence of a pattern of causal transaction in the world. >Causal laws, >Supervenience. I 272 Causal Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: is (or includes) a generalization of causal transactions. It is even stronger than a generalization, because we believe that modality plays a role. >Modality, >Generality, >Generalization Causal/Bigelow/Pargetter: are not the transactions because the laws exist but vice versa. Conditions/sufficient/necessary/Bigelow/Pargetter: are supported by causal laws. Therefore, they are also global. Causal Reaction/Bigelow/Pargetter: is local, in contrast. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus, it is also local. Causal process/Bigelow/Pargetter: is local. >Cause, >Effect. I 273 Effect/Bigelow/Pargetter. One and the same effect could have had different causes. E.g. pregnancy by different men. DavidsonVs. > BigelowVsDavidson: this is wrong, but we do not go into it. But even if he were right, it would not save the modal theory of causation ((s) which integrates necessary and sufficient conditions). Probability/probabilistic causation/theory/Bigelow/Pargetter. E.g. causing a pregnancy by an almost infertile man - could also be understood as the prevention of parthenogenesis. I 274 LewisVs: such counterexamples are implausible. >Prevention. 1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Content | Lewis | Schwarz I 161 Content/DavidsonVsLewis: depends on the language that we speak - LewisVsDavidson: Content is a class of possible individuals that e.g. get the desire fulfilled - Meaning/LewisVsDavidson: what the sentences of public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, wishes and beliefs. --- Schwarz I 169 Mental Content/Content/Lewis: class of possible situations where it rains, not class of possible worlds where it rains - What kind of worlds should that be? - It would have to be somewhere it rains here and now. Possible situations are centered worlds with a designated here and now. >Situations, >possible worlds. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Convention T | Davidson | Glüer II 37 Convention T/Davidson: says that a theory must be translating (translational). ((s) Problem: sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" are equivalent.) >Disquotation scheme. Glüer II 38 Convention T allows only extensional language. >Extensionality. II 22 Def " Convention T " /Tarski/Glüer: "A definition of "true" formulated in the metalanguage is factually correct if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema follow from it. S is true, just when p is obtained by inserting a name of any sentence in the object language for the symbol "S" and the translation of this sentence into the meta language for the symbol "p". The convention T tests whether a definition of truth for a language L correctly determines the extension of the predicate "true in L". Neither the convention T nor the "T-equivalences" may be confused with the definition of truth itself. >Truth definition. II 28 Def T-equivalence/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer : simply true exactly when the linked propositions have the same truth value under all circumstances. The right side does not have to be a translation of the left side. If, on the other hand, a translation would be required, then 1. the circumstances under which the W-equivalences are true are not arbitrary, and 2. the searched meaning would already be presupposed. Def Convention T*/new/Davidson/Glüer: A T-theory formulated in the meta language for an object language L is appropriate if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema (T) S is true gdw. p is obtained by using for the symbol "S" a designation of any proposition of the object language and for the symbol "p" a proposition of the meta language, which is true exactly when S is it. Glüer: here are equivalences, which are not required to translate the sentence on the right the sentence on the left, true iff. II 29 the linked sentences have the same truth value under all circumstances. DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Whoever wants to apply Davidson's reinterpreted convention T* must therefore know when T equivalences are true. TarskiVsDavidson: with Tarski, you need to know the meaning of both object and meta-language sentences. ((s) To be able to judge whether there is a correct translation). T-predicate/Davidson/Glüer: for Davidson, on the other hand, the T predicate must be interpreted. Davidson/Glüer: thus presupposes a prior understanding of the concept of truth. Truth/Interpretation/Translation/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: a G-theory that fulfils the (new) convention G* can be read as an interpretation theory: it implies for each proposition S of the object language L a T-equivalence derived from its structure, the right side of which indicates the truth conditions under which S is true. >Truth predicate, >Object language, >Metalanguage. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Definitions | Putnam | I (i) 248/9 Fact/definition/QuineVsReichenbach: Problem: the distinction between "fact" and "definition" has collapsed, on which Reichenbach has depended on. PutnamVsDavidson: the perception of a tree depends on our conceptual scheme. It is a matter of degree, what is a fact, and what is convention. >Conceptual Schemes, >Facts. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Descriptions | Rorty | II (f) 130ff Description/Rorty: the described nature will always have some sort of order!. Criterion: according to which criterion are new descriptions helpful? - Rorty: Those who ask such a question imagine that the language of the future should be a tool in the hands of the present-day language. These are ultimately power struggles. In the sense of Gadamer one would simply see that everyone’s order system requires storage compartments with enough space for the order systems of all others. >Order. VI 128f World/insight/reality/existence/Rorty: E.g. once you’ve described a something as a dinosaur, it is causally independent of this description. But before you have described it as a dinosaur or anything else, it is pointless to claim that it is "out there" and has properties! What’s out there? The thing itself? The World? Tell us more! Describe it! Once you did that, we are able to specify which properties of the object are causally independent of the description and which are not. >Description-dependence. Independent of description/Rorty: E.g. oviparous. Dependent on description/Rorty: E.g. "an animal whose existence was only suspected in recent centuries." This is not about the distinction >intrinsic/>extrinsic. VI 128 Independent of description: causal relationships are not given under a description. Independent of description/Davidson: in contrast to the explanation, causality is not bound to the any description. Independent of description/RortyVsDavidson: Davidson is not quite right: he should have said that the same causal relationship-with-a-description can be explained in many different ways. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Determinism | Davidson | McGinn I 135 Domestication Theory/McGinn: The decision connection only applies as a special case of domestication attempts, of a natural connection of a different kind, whereas the modality concerned is not fundamentally different from other modalities. Approximation to an independent model of the course of action. Such reductivist experiments can a) be deterministic (Davidson) or b) indeterministic. McGinn I 135 Davidson/Domestication Theory/McGinn: previous world conditions are a causally sufficient condition for a specific decision. Freedom is then a certain kind of causal series, namely, in which there is a corresponding set of mental precursors. >Initial conditions, >Free will, >Anomalous monism. Freedom is that desires and beliefs cause causal effects. McGinnVsDavidson: makes no sense to the concept of freedom of action, for it looks as if it is of the same kind as any other causality. The corresponding causality is then not an "event causality" but an "action causality". >Actions/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Effect | Bigelow | I 273 Effect/Bigelow/ Pargetter: one and the same effect could have had different causes. E.g. pregnancy by different men. DavidsonVs. > BigelowVsDavidson: this is wrong, but we do not pursue it further here. But even if he were right, the modal theory of causation ((s) that integrates the necessary and sufficient conditions) would not be saved. >Modality, >Necessity, >Sufficiency, >Conditions. Probability/probabilistic causation/theory/Bigelow/Pargetter. E.g. causing a pregnancy by an almost infertile man - could also be understood as the prevention of parthenogenesis. I 274 LewisVs: such counterexamples are implausible. >D. Lewis, >Causation/Lewis. 1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Empiricism | McDowell | Rorty VI 201 McDowellVsDavidson: In so doing (i.e. eliminating experience), the old philosophical questions still look as if they were reasonable. It will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak through the back door again. We still need something that allows us to make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. >Understanding7McDowell, >Reality, >Experience/McDowell, >Justification/McDowell. --- McDowell I 12 Minimal empiricism/McDowell: Thesis: thinking that is focused on judgments is in so far responsible for how things are, (in the world) as it can be carried out right or wrong - it’s about justification in front of the "tribunal of experience". >Tribunal of experience, >Accountability towards the world, |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Errors | Brandom | I 424ff Objectivity of conceptual standards: we cannot all individually (each of us) be wrong about them, but we can also be wrong about them all together! (electron, mass in outer space). Error about proper use. >Use, >Objectivity. I 102f Error: everyone individually and all together can be wrong about whether a conceptual content is appropriate in a particular situation. I 269 Objectivity/Error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to give allegations objectively representational content. These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community can be wrong with such an assessment. Universal error is only possible with standards, not with concepts, see above I 105). (VsDavidson). I 921 Error/Brandom: The words that community as a whole could not be mistaken were put into the mouths of Wittgenstein, Kripke and Wright - if that was true, practice would not have to orient itself on the accuracy of representations - BrandomVsKripke). >Correctness, >Representation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Events | Davidson | Events/Action/Davidson: action is description-dependent (Mary-example: Mary shoots the lion and kills the cow). - In contrast: Events are independent of description. >Description dependence. Glüer II 86 ff VsEvent-Ontology: various authors: Events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "modifier theory": has no events, ia not restricted to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus. Jaegwon Kim: identifies events not as individualized individuals, but with the help of properties. Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. >Ontology/Davidson. Distinguishing between event token and description. Only then, it is clear, what sense it makes to speak of variously described event tokens, as far as these descriptions contain no intentional adverbs. Thus, there is no subclass of intentional actions. >Actions, >Intentions. But Mary has long since stopped shooting when the burglar dies. But that does not change the fact that it is about descriptions of one and the same event token. The rest is left to nature. Mountaineer-Example: is a mere event, not an intentional action. Event/Davidson: all events can be explained in principle with regard to the operations of the natural laws. (McDowell). Glüer II 97 Def Events/Davidson/Glüer: an identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff a and b have identical causes and consequences - Glüer: then the causal relationship forms a coordinate system in which each event is uniquely determined - QuineVsDavidson: Regress: Causes and consequences are again events, which have again a place in the net - Davidson: VsDavidson: assumes Quine's criterion for objects: Glüer II 89 Def Identity for objects/Quine: have the same space time coordinates - Event/Davidson/new: two events can happen at the same time in the same location. >Identification. Glüer II 189 Problem: E.g. muscle soreness in singing running - Solution/Davidson: Language instead of coordinates - metaphysical ontological assumptions of everyday language. Solution/Davidson: Description. Glüer II 101 Description/event/Davidson: E.g. Mary shot at the burglar, but he dies much later. - Identity theory of the events: Problem: the same action - solution: these are descriptions of the same event tokens - Mary only needs to pull the trigger to kill, the rest does the nature. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Events | Meixner | I 167 f Event/Davidson/Meixner: from the true sentence "Hans laughed loudly" follows logically "Hans laughed" but not according to predicate logic. >Propositional Logic, >Predicate Logic. How can we receive a in conclusion predicate logic? Solution: We must assume that there are events as entities. ((s) for the quantification): "For at least one current event applies it is noisy and a laugh from Hans". (Ditto for the two part-state of affairs loudness and laughter). >"Adverbial analysis", >Quantification, >States of affairs. Event/ontology/Meixner: however, it is not even decided whether they are objects or functions. >Ontology, >Objects, >Function. Event/LewisVsDavidson: as properties they are functions. >Properties/Lewis, >Events/Lewis. DavidsonVsLewis: as individuals they are objects. >Events/Davidson. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Experience | Evans | McDowell I 73 Experience/Evans: experience is not conceptual. But it has representative content. McDowellVsEvans: experience is conceptual. Definition experience/Evans: a state of an information system is only an experience if it is the input of a thinking, conceptual and logically information system. >Information system/Evans. E.g. animals probably have a feeling for pain, but no a concept of pain. Pain/McDowell: pain is not conceptual, it is inner experience. Experience/McDowell/Evans: in both of us the experience in the Kantian sense is limited, by the connection to the spontaneity (conceptuality). Experience/Evans: although it is not conceptually in Evans (and therefore, according to Kant, it must be blind), he wants to protect it by asserting a "content". That is, an objective property of reality must be present to the subject. Namely, as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: without concepts, that does not make any sense. Evans: on the other hand, he makes the demand that perception objects must be supported by an "accompanying theory". McDowell: that is precisely the >spontaneity. --- McDowell I 80/81 ff Experience/Evans: its richness of detail cannot be grasped with terms! For example, there are much more color shades that can be experienced than concepts which are available for these color shades. ((s) The notion of difference is sufficient when samples are present.) McDowell I 91 EvansVsDavidson: (different horn of the dilemma): experience is probably outer conceptual, but still subject to rational control by the outside world. --- Frank I 524f Experience/Evans: experience is different from self-attribution: it is not clearly true/false. I 526 Judgment: although judgments are based on experience (non-conceptual), they are not about the state of information - the "inner state" deos not become the object. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Facts | Putnam | V 266 Def Fact/Putnam: a fact is something to believe that is rational. Fact: a fact is also the idealization of the concept of a credible rational statement. Every fact is value loaden. >Idealization, >Rationality. --- I (i) 248/9 Fact/definition/QuineVsReichenbach: problem: the distinction between "fact" and "definition" has collapsed. Reichenbach did support this collapse. PutnamVsDavidson: the perception of a tree depends on our conceptual scheme. It is a matter of degree, what is a fact, and what is a convention. >Reichenbach. PutnamVsDavidson: The perception of a tree depends on our conceptual scheme. It is a matter of degree what is actual, and what is convention. >Conceptual scheme, >Convention. Parisi I 311/312 Facts/values/economic theories/Putnam: In an economic analysis of law, disputes and conflicts between parties are often framed as disagreements as to facts. When facts are in dispute the parties can undertake further investigation and they can recalculate their choices and reassess their optimal course of action. The focus on factual disagreement lends itself to the objective and rational point of viewlessness that grounds the claim that economics is a science. In law, however, disputes are frequently about something more than a disagreement as to facts; they involve disagreements as to values (Putnam, 2002)(1). These value-based disagreements shape the facts as people understand them, and influence the relative importance attributed to any given fact by any particular party. Value disputes are not easily resolved by appeal to economic analysis. At best, economics can only offer some indirect input on factors to consider in a given situation, but in the end law must operate to make a judgment—a value choice between and among competing claims that are often based on emotion, culture, and other human characteristics that are not easily subject to an economic calculus. Consequently, when economic analysis is applied to law, it often functions to redirect attention away from a conflict involving deeply held values and translates the disagreement into one of competing facts. The problem with this move is that it may function to “mask” what the law is really doing and can undermine the traditional role of law in working to mediate tensions among competing and deeply held values in our system of democratic governance (Noonan, 1976)(2). 1. Putnam, Hilary (2002). The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Noonan, Jr., John T. (1976). Persons and Masks of the Law. Berkeley: University of California Press. Driesen, David M. and Robin Paul Malloy. “Critics of Law and Economics”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Facts | Taylor | Graeser I 57 Fact/Charles TaylorVsDavidson/VsDummett: some phenomena, which are talked about, only gain form through the use of language. N.B.: inasmuch they cannot well serve as data of a theory, which make meaning understanding dependent on the knowing of truths. >Circular reaoning, >Knowledge, >Proofs, >Thinking, >Understanding, >Truth, >Content, >Language use, >Method, >World/Thinking. |
EconTayl I John Brian Taylor Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice 1993 Taylor III Lance Taylor Central Bankers, Inflation, and the Next Recession, in: Institute for New Economic Thinking (03/09/19), URL: http://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/central-bankers-inflation-and-the-next-recession 9/3/2019 TaylorB II Barry Taylor "States of Affairs" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 TaylorCh I Charles Taylor The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity Cambridge 2016 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Free Will | Davidson | McGinn I 135 McGinn: Freedom/Determinism/Davidson/Domestication-Theory: thesis: prior world states are a causally sufficient condition for a specific decision. Freedom is then a certain kind of causal series, namely those in which an appropriate amount of mental precursors occurs. >Anomalous monism. Then freedom means, that desires and beliefs have causal effects. >Beliefs. McGinnVsDavidson: his idea of the freedom of action makes no sense, because it looks as if it would be of the same type as any other causality. >Actions. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Holism | Dummett | Rorty I 289 DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: VsHolism: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (fact/interpretation and necessity/contingency). >Facts, >Interpretation, >Necessity, >Contingency. III (b) 84/85 HolismVs distinction sense/reference, extreme holism: Basic Doctrine: meaning changes constantly - theory: believing-to-be-true - new sentences change language behavior (approval and rejection of other sentences) - later no identification of the new sentences anymore. - Extreme holism: Basic Doctrine: no concept of meaning, the concept of change in meaning useless - DummettVsHolism: our presentation would depend on where we happen to begin - still: determine dispositions only after believing-to-be-true - (first truth, then meaning.) - In every theory, new judgements change the dispositions, therefore dispositions are not determinant for the meaning! - It is wrong to think a sentence has no inherent meaning. - Theory: it is about new judgments, not new meanings. III (b) 85 Extreme Holism says, from the quantity of sentences believed to be true (without knowledge about the causal circumstances) future dispositions could be derived.- Vs: that is impossible. III (c) 125ff Holism/Deception/Dummett: has no criterion for specific speaker meaning in a particular case - only the tendency of believing-to-be-true - hence we have no concept of error. III (c) 130 Holism believes meaning theory to be impossible. - Dummett: maybe he is right. III (c) 150 Holism/DummettVsHolism: Problem: the set of all true sentences must then not contain any index-linked characteristics - HolismVs: solution: could propose instead a set of index-linked judgments. - DummettVsVs: then no speaker knows the meaning theory. >Meaning theory. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Holism | Suppes | Esfeld I 364 SuppesVsDavidson: Physics as well as psychology treats open, non-deterministic systems and these are holistic. >Systems, >Holism, >Physics, >Psychology. |
Suppes I P. Suppes Introduction to Logic Mineola 1999 Suppes II P. Suppes Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays New York 2010 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Idiolect | Quine | Dummett I 139 Idiolect/Quine: has priority over the concept of community language - never sure that the meanings are the same. Dum I 139 Quine: Meaning and accepted theory are not distinguished. >Two Dogmas. Davidson: radical interpretation: idiolect is from specific time and situation. > Radical interpretation/Davidson. Dum I 141 DummettVsQuine, DummettVsDavidson: not the idiolect, but common language has priority. Idiolect/Dummett. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Indirect Speech | Foster | I 22 Indirect speech/paratactic analysis/Davidson: "The earth moves, Galileo said this." (makes "this" from "that"). FosterVsDavidson: paratactic analysis is not suitable for a meanting theory: a translator would have to swing the reference to his own statement - which provides a translation theory, but no meaning theory. >Paratactic analysis. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Individual Causation | Davidson | Armstrong III 94 Causality/DavidsonVsHume/Armstrong: individual causation: we often recognize that an individual case is causal, without having any idea to what regular sequence it belongs. Solution: differentiation knowledge-that: that there is a law/knowing what: the law is. Solution: there is a description, under which the event is lawlike. AnscombeVsDavidson: many characteristics are causally irrelevant, therefore causality is description dependent. >Causality/Davidson, cf. >regularities. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Intentionality | Searle | Davidson II 112 SearleVsDavidson: Davidson suggests to distinguish two types of intentions: a) "prior intentions" and b) "intentions in action". Intentional acts only occur when the first, causes the second. --- Dennett I 281 SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". (see below) --- Dennett II 67 Definition derived intentionality/Searle: definition derived intentionality is a limited form, that some of our art products have: e.g. words, sentences, books, maps, pictures, computer programs, etc. Their intentionality is only a loan from our mind. E.g. a shopping list, whether written or memorized, likewise, mental pictures, something internal - these things are still an art product. --- Searle I 67 Intentionality is biological, teleological: SearleVs: in case of confusion: words like "horse or cow" would be necessary. Intentionality is normative: truth, consistency, rationality are intrinsic. The Darwinian evolution is in contrast not normative. I 178 Fulfilment conditions: intentional states represent their fulfilment conditions only under certain aspects that are important for the person concerned. >Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Aspect/Searle. I 266f Intentional phenomena: regulating consequences: are genuine causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts, causality only arises through interest-based descriptions here. Rules are no cause of action. >Rule following. Objects of intentionality need not to exist: hope, belief, fear, wishes - there is no record of them, one just has them. >Object/Searle. --- II 208 Intentionality/fulfilment conditions/Searle: the mind gives the production of sounds intentionality, so that it gives the fulfilment conditions of the mental state to the production -> speech act. - Double level of intentionality: a) mental state b) level of intention. --- III 156 As-if intentionality/Searle: the as-if intentionality explains nothing, if there is no real intentionality. It has no causal power. SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as its "intentional attitude". >Intentionality/Dennett. --- Graeser I 124 Intentionality/speech acts/Searle: action intentions have fulfilment conditions that are represented by them and by representing their fulfilment conditions, intended actions are ipso facto intentional. Derived intentionality: physical realizations of speech acts are not intrinsically intentional as the propositional attitudes themselves. >Speech act. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Interpretation | Brandom | I 954 Interpretation/Davidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretation within a language and between languages. >Translation. BrandomVsDavidson: in your own language you do not hear noises, but meanings. I 893 Interpretation/Brandom: goes beyond explanation. >Explanation: when is it appropriate? Whenever it is possible. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Knowledge | Davidson | McGinn I 179 McGinn: Domestication theories of knowledge: newer version: refers to the externalism with regard to the content of consciousness: the mind and the world can diverge, as far as the skeptic would like to accept. (Putnam, Davidson). >Externalism. Davidson I (eb) 18 DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so the ignorance of imaginary objects is possible. Sense/feature/FregeVsDavidson/Frege per Hume: only what is relevant belongs to the comprehension of sense. Therefore "hidden" features may not be part of the meaning. Dummett: these are the "internal characteristics". >Sense, >Relevance. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Language | Dummett | I 11 ff Evans: Thesis: Language can be explained by modes of thinking - DummettVsEvans: vice versa! (Frege ditto). Husted IV 448 DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: Language is not an idiolect, but common language prevails. (> Two Dogmas/Dummett). 1) Frege, Wittgenstein earlier: language as a means of representation or reproduction of reality, "the meaning of a sentence is its truth condition". 2) later Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle: everyday language and speech act theory: the constitutive rules of the language are not primarily a representation of reality, but allow actions of various kinds. "the sense of an expression is its use". McDowell I 152 Language/Dummett: 1) an instrument of communication 2) carrier of meaning. None should be primary. Language/McDowellVsDummett: both are secondary. Primarily, language is a source of tradition. (McDowell per Gadamer). To acquire language means to acquire spirit. ((s) Cf. >Gadamer.) Dummett III (b) 81 Language/infinite/Dummett: each quantity of knowledge is finite, but must allow an understanding of infinitely many sentences. III (c) 145 Idiolect/DummettVs: Language is not a family of similar idiolects, but the speaker declares responsibility of the common usages - without fully dominating them. III (c) 150 The concept of idiolect is important to explain variations, but idiolect can be explained by language, not vice versa. Horwich I 461 Language/DavidsonVsDummett: is not a "veil" - it is a network of inferential relations. - Nothing beyond "human abilities" - Like a stone against which we hit ourselves - and that is stone by stone, bit by bit. ((s) > satisfaction ,not >making true.) - This applies to "this is good" and "this is red". (1) - DavidsonVsMoore/DavidsonVsDummett. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Language | Kripke | Rorty II 130f Positivists/Rorty: replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the concept "language" - then primary qualities are no longer more closely related to reality than secondary ones (VsLocke) but it was this precise thesis that was resurrected by Kripke’s revolution against Wittgenstein (KripkeVsLinguistic Turn). >Positivism, >Linguistic turn, >Consciousness, >Ideas, >Experience. --- III 335 Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": a language must not have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the "first language". Cf. >Language acquisition. III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: we just have to demand that only a finite number of axioms includes "new" vocabulary (weaker). >Axioms/Kripke. III 397 Language/infinite/Kripke: if the domain D is countable, the infinite sequences which can be formed from its objects are non-countable and therefore cannot be mapped on to D one-to-one. They can therefore ((s) in the meta language) not even be coded and therefore not be reduced. >Meta language. Even then there may be nothing in the vocabulary of the meta language that is sufficient. >Are there infinitely many possible sentences?. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Language | Proust | I 230 Animals/Davidson: since animals have no language, they also have no concepts. >Concepts, >Language, >Animals, >Animal language, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language. ProustVsDavidson: Davidson uses a Cartesian strategy. >Cartesianism. I 231 Triangulation: triangulation seems impossible in animals, because the absence of a shared symbolic language does not allow access to intersubjectivity. >Triangulation. Concepts/Davidson: concepts are normative because each has its particular application conditions. With this, Davidson takes up Descartes' basic idea. 1. If an organism has the concept of X, it is predisposed to decide whether something is X or not. 2. The term can then be applied to new cases. 3. Concepts form an inferential structure (a theory). >Predication, >True-of. I 232 Concept/Animal/ProustVsDavidson: it is not an overstated assumption that certain animals can form concepts that make important aspects of their environment understandable to them. Possibly social animals (dogs, primates, etc.) have theories for the organization of social relations. These theories contain concepts for dominant animals, offspring, enemies, allies, as well as the inferential and associative links between these categories for sharing food, protection, partnering, etc. Cf. >Theory of Mind. |
Proust I Joelle Proust "L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Lawlikeness | Fodor | IV 86 Holism/radical interpretation/RI/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: Davidson's argument for holism is based on his assumption that individual sentences, e.g. "Kurt belongs to the German-speaking Community and Kurt holds true": "It is raining on Saturday afternoon and it is indeed raining in Kurt’s area on Saturday afternoon" are lawlike (laws). >Radical interpretation, >Holism, >Laws. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the generalizations thereof e.g. (x)(t)(if x belongs to the German-speaking community, then x holds "it s raining" to be true at t if and only if it is raining in the vicinity of x at t) do not support counterfactual conditionals and therefore, according to Davidson's definition of the law, are not lawlike. There is no support of counterfactual conditionals. E.g. the meaning of "it is raining" could be: "the cat is on the mat", then it does not follow that the cat is not on the mat when it is not raining. IV 87 Solution: "... for a relation R and each speaker S..." then the statement is nomological, but not yet a radical interpretation. Lawlikeness: we only had to assume lawlikeness because of the conventionality of language. Problem: the radical interpretation cannot find out conventionality by definition. IV 89 Radical Interpretation/RI/Fodor/Lepore: our image of the radical interpretation is much richer than that of Davidson. IV 90 Problem: the nomological approach is not holistic. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Meaning | Dummett | I 18 Sense: according to Frege, the term has the meaning simply. The user need not always have the sense before his mind. In itself the meaning is objective. I 29 Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes use of the concept of truth superfluous > Meaning before Truth. I 45 f .... Husserl: a statement adopts the meaning with which it is met by an internal act . ((s)> Humpty- Dumpty Theory of Meaning). Def Meaning/Dummett: what one must know in order to understand the term (an expression). I 152 Def meaning: what makes a sentence true. I 154/55 Dummett : meaning must not be explained by understanding. ( Speakers have no explicit theory.) - but also: DummettVsWittgenstein: mastery over practical ability. I 188 Dummett/Frege: Knowledge of Meaning = knowledge of the truth conditions - WittgensteinVs A criterion of meaning has no basis when it is no theory of meaning as a proposition. II 109 Meaning/DummettVsDavidson: trivial axioms ( . " Snow..." / snow) does not even show understanding, but push the task of explaining the theory of meaning - it explains what it means to capture the corresponding proposition. II 133 Meaning/Dummett: remains an unsolved problem. I 29 Correspondence Theory/Coherence Theory: meaning before truth - Davidson truth before meaning (Defined truth conditions - later the theory) - Dummett both together. Use/truth /Wittgenstein/Dummett: use theory makes the concept of truth superfluous. > Meaning before Truth. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Schiffer | Graeser I 129 Meaning/intending/SchifferVsDavidson: if there is neither a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, the possibility of the conception of a judgment as a relation collapses. >Meaning theory, >Sentences, >Propositions, >Judgments. Graeser: so that we lose the ground under our feet. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Meaning Theory | Avramides | I 7ff Theory of meaning/meaning theory/Davidson/Dummett/Avramides : Davidson and Dummett represented a "pessimistic" approach: Instead of asking directly what is meaning, we can only wonder how a theory of meaning must look. Meaning theory/Dummett: "meaning is what meaning theory explains". Avramides: Dummett stands in stark contrast to Grice. DummettVsGrice. Avramides: Dummett's approach is too pessimistic. Meaning theory/Davidson: what form must a meaning theory have? 1st Theorems must be comprehensible to speakers and hearers 2nd We will have to explain potentially infinitely many sentences 3rd We will have to explain compositionality. Solution/Davidson: a semantic notion of truth (Tarski) will have to understand the language. DummettVsDavidson: verification. Conditions of verification instead of truth conditions. >Verification conditions, >Truth conditions. I 94 Meaning theory/Grice/John Biro/Avramides: it is about the theory, not about how to find out the meaning but what it constitutes. - Not what reveals the significance, but what does it mean that an expression has a meaning. Biro: "Constitution of meaning is one thing - to tell you is another". |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Meaning Theory | Foster | I 4 Meaning Theory/m.th./Foster: the meaning theory does not say what is "meaning" but it reveals what conditions it must meet. - Analog: Science theory does not explain what is the concept of a natural law, but it covers the canon of scientific methods. I 6 Meaning Theory/Foster: the extension of "means that p" is not determined by the truth value or the extensional structure of the sentence , which is used for "p". - It is an error to presuppose an intensional idiom for "that means" (presupposes what we are looking for). - Solution: Extension instead of intension. I 7 Meaning Theory/ Foster: examined language L: is about (contingent) facts - metalanguage: uses essentially methodological vocabulary (not contingent) to establish the theorems. I 11 Meaning Theory/truth theory/FosterVsDavidson: the truth condition is determined to set out the specific truth value in all circumstances. - Problem : Tarski: the scheme would correspond to a counterfactual condition "would be true if ... " - but the schema is indicative. I 17 Meaning Theory/Foster: Problem: all T-sentences of the Tarski schema ("Snow is white" is true iff snwo is white) remain true if one uses just something that preserves the truth values and the right side is a translation of the left. - It provides no meaning, only a truth-definition. A meaning Theory can arise when one knows that the conditions are met - i.e. that the truth th. is a meaning theory. I 19 But only if the theory is formulated in the same language as the object language - Because the theory is not really interpreting. Solution/Foster: We need the facts and the knowledge that the facts are truth-theoretical. I 20 Then the meaning theory is a single sentence: q *: " a truth theory T in L represents that ... " - I 21 ... if we are aware, we can find out what determines each selected sentence. - This implies the ability to interpret each sentence due to its structure , because it implies to perceive what each element contributes. ( >Compositionality) Per: that is interpretive. Vs: Problem: "notes that" is still intensional! I 22 E.g. someone who does not know what U denotes, could know the facts that U says . - Problem: if the meaning theory is purely extensional, then it is no longer interpreting. Summary: Meaning theory/Foster: is a meaning theory for an object language L0 in the design of an appropriate range of possible worlds if it exhausts all possible facts that allows our philosophical standpoint. This together with a finite set of axioms true, which provides for each L0 - sentence S the relevant canonical reformulation of the T-conditional. This would consist of the scheme "(w) (x is true-of-w, if w, then it would be the case that p)" by inserting the structural description (sound, character) of S for "p." Instead of "part-of" relation "material-part-of" is between x and y: if y is a world and x is an ordered pair whose first element is the class of all material things, and whose second element is the class of all ordered pairs of all the tangible things that are in the part-whole relation. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Metaphysics | Fodor | IV 107 Metaphysical: is the assumption that if there is a fact about the intentional state, then it is this fact that makes the attribution match the physical facts best. IV 110 Metaphysical/Fodor/Lepore: not metaphysical: the finding that a suitable property is assumed as defining is not metaphysical. Metaphysical: e.g. the assumption that rationality is constitutive of intentionality, e.g. that explanatory force and simplicity are constitutive of the nomological is transcendental, e.g. Davidson's assumption: the principle of chartiy is to be rooted in the epistemic situation of the interpreter. LewisVsDavidson: intentional attribution must not be understood with reference to the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation. Lewis instead: the principle of charity is part of our concept of the person. >Principle of charity, >Attribution, >Belief ascription, >Mental states. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Nature | McDowell | I, 123 et seq Nature/Kant/McDowell: nature is equal to the realm of natural laws in Kant. He does not know the concept of the second nature, although he is well aware of the concept of >education. But not as a background. >Second nature, >Nature/Kant, >Natural laws/Kant. --- I 118 Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: there are rules of nature, whether you are receptive to them or not. This is the result of proper education. "Naturalism of the Second Nature", "Naturalized Platonism". >Platonism. Nature/Natural Law/McDowellVsNaturalism: Vs "blunt naturalism": The space of nature is not equal to the space of natural laws. The forces are partially part of the second nature. >Theory of force/McDowell. Nature/McDowell: encompasses everything that belongs to the most fundamental understanding of things, that is, neither meaning nor values. (VsAristotle). Disenchantment of nature is progress. But: what has been disenchanted does not have to be identified with nature. --- Rorty VI 212 McDowell/Rorty: Nature may not only exercise causal but also rational control over human research. Definition Second Nature/McDowell: "People acquire a second nature, among other things, by developing conceptual abilities whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons." (E.g., initiation, entry into a moral community, "education"). That one's eyes are opened gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. And thus to be able to make judgments that are responsible to the world. In addition, this gives a rational freedom. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: all this becomes incomprehensible when we use Sellar's, Davidson's, or Brandom's terms. >Sellars, >Davidson, >Brandom. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Nature | Rorty | VI 213 Def Second Nature/McDowell/Rorty: people acquireit, inter alia, by conceptual skills being unravelled to them whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons - this gives one the ability to be controlled rationally by the world - this enables one to judge in a ways that is responsible to the world. >Second nature. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson: with their concepts it becomes incomprehensible - these authors would not refer to the world as a conversation partner. >Robert Brandom, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Donald Davidson. VI 215 McDowell: thesis: the world calls on us to judge. >Judgments. VI 214 World/SellarsVsMcDowell/BrandomVsMcDowell/Rorty: the world is not a conversation partner, VI 215 it does not merely call on us to judge. VI 434 Nature/technocracy/technocratic//Rorty: the beauty of purely mechanical explanations from the atheistic point of view is that they demand nothing except our own purposes. >Technocracy. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Objectivity | McDowell | I 216 Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). >Triangulation/Davidson. McDowell: It is too late to worry about the constitution of the concept of objectivity, if the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity walk together out of an initiation into the space of reasons. >Space of reasons/McDowell, >Subjectivity. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Paratactic Analysis | Brandom | I 743 Paratactic analysis/Davidson: 1. focuses on tokenings, not on types. I 744 2. an exposed sentence tokening should stand in relation to the one that is attributed. I 745 3. essential relation of "equal speech". Problem: the substitution in the range of "that" does not preserve the truth value of the entire attribution. >Attribution, >Truth value, >Truth preservation. Solution: the sentence-tokening located within, is not part of the actual attribution. - BrandomVsDavidson: the relation between the two tokenings should be an anaphor and not demonstrative. - e.g. Galileo said (something in his mouth that commited him on that, what an assertive utterance of the following in my mouth would now commit me to). >Anaphora, >Demonstration. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Paratactic Analysis | Cresswell | II 137 Paratactic Analysis/Propositional Attitude/Davidson/Cresswell: here there is no attitude sentence - we need instead a semantics for demonstratives. >Demonstratives, >Propositional attitudes. II 161 Paratactic Analysis/ArnaudVsDavidson/Cresswell: (Arnaud 1976)(1): a sentence like E.g. "What Galileo said, namely, that the earth moves, is true," involves reference to a language as well as reference to synonymy. >Language dependence, >Synonymy. 1. Richard B. Arnaud (1976).entence, Uttarance, and Samesayer Nous No. 10. (pp. 283-304). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Paratactic Analysis | Foster | I 22 Indirect speech/paratactic analysis/Davidson: "The earth is moving. Galilei said that." - FosterVsDavidson: the paratactic analysis is not suitable for a theory of meaning: a translator would have to swing the reference to his own utterance. - That provides a theory of translation, but not a theory of meaning. I 22ff Paratactic Analysis/Quotation/Davidson: "The earth is moving. Galilei said that." FosterVsDavidson: Problem: e.g. a translation of a lecture into French "....a dit cela": "cela" does not refer to what the speaker said. I 24 FosterVsDavidson: the requirements of strength and extensionality are incompatible. A theorem (of a truth theory) has strength only if its correctness depends on the English sentence having the same truth condition as the structurally determined proposition. - But the theorem will only be extensional if its truth is not changed by replacing a translation with the same truth value! |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Paratactic Analysis | Loar | II 147ff Paratactic analysis/Davidson: 1. avoids problems of the logical form of sentences with propositional attitudes - (purely significant position/not purely) 2. propositional attitudes no longer refer to intensional entities "The earth moves" is simply both times a meaningful expression. No reference to meaning. LoarVsDavidson: but this can be true only if there is something substantial behind it. KripkeVsVs: E.g. measuring: relates an object onto another, the standard meter. But if there were no standard meter, the object would still have a length. LoarVs: but that does not go for the meaning theory. - Thesis: therefore it is necessary to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. >Meaning theory, >Intensional objects. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Paratactic Analysis | Schiffer | I 122ff Paratactic Analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: paratactic analysis cannot be extended to doctrines - The relation exists through the meaning of the content sentence "The earth moves." N.B.: thus it is also expandable to Italian. >Translation, >Generalization. I 127 Paratactic Analysis/belief relation/SchifferVsDavidson: the paratactic analysis is not suitable for beliefs: it cannot be a relation to actual utterances. - Then there is also no proper two-digit relation. Identical content/sameness/content/SchifferVsDavidson: Davidson has no concept of identical content of utterances. - This is only circularly expressible within the paratactic analysis. - ((s) This is no problem for Davidson) >Content, >Belief content. I 130 Paratactic Analysis/Davidson/Schiffer. For belief: False solution: utterance type. Problem: you have to say of what sort the kind is. False solution: "... of the same content" - that would be an artificial term - we do not know yet what concept of content is intended here. DavidsonVsVs: we cannot trivialize the role of "content" here (for a belief theory). I 133 Paratactic Analysis/Davidson/propositional attitude/Schiffer: Problem: a) Sam's propositional attitude that flounders snore (here one must know the content to determine the claim and the truth value b) Sam's propositional attitude that flounders snore..: here one knows the expression, without needing to know the content of the propositional attitude. E.g. Pierre: "La neige est blanche" Donald: Tarski said that. According to Davidson, you can know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres utterance. (Without knowing the content). Solution: one knows that any utterance of Tarski has the same content as ... - only assertion is the fact that Sam said something. (Or has a propositional attitude). SchifferVsDavidson: if his theory were correct, (ii) Sam believes something that is true iff flounders snore is not included by (i) Sam believes that flounders snore. Test solution: "utterance type, that has the same content like this" again says nothing about the content. False solution: a feature F (content determining proposition for propositional attitude) this should be known by all people. - (All these are objections VsExtensional theory). >Extensionality. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Paratactic Analysis | Searle | II 238f Paratactic analysis/SearleVsDavidson: Galileo and I are not equal sayers, I am just saying that Galileo said that. Also, the subordinate clause of the original is different: (Galileo said that the earth moves) is intensional. II 241 Searle: propositional content: is repeated in the citation. Illocutionary force: we get a report about it. (-> speech acts, >propositional content). |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Principle of Charity | Fodor | IV 79 Transcendental/argument/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: Davidson's transcendental argument for the principle of charity is as follows: if we do not assume that the speaker believes the most things correctly, then language acquisition by radical interpretation is impossible. IV 80 Language acquisition is possible, however. So it must be assumed that most of the beliefs of the speaker are true. >Belief/Davidson. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: there is no clear reason to believe the second premise (that radical interpretation is possible). Therefore, the transcendental argument fails. IV 95f Principle of Charity/Charity Principle/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: the Principle of Charity is not necessary at all. The fact that an interpretation that makes more sentences true than another interpretation is preferable itself is not the principle of charity. It is rather a methodological principle for evaluating theories. IV 99f Holism/meaning holism/Fodor/Lepore: the charity principle buys more than the compositionality for iterated belief contexts. These are in fact more fine-grained. "Believes that" is more opaque than it is nomologically coextensive. Then the radical interpretation does not allow to assume most beliefs of the speaker to be true. Principle of charity: cannot eliminate the hypothesis that Sam believes that snow is F. Radical Interpretation/RI/Fodor/Lepore: the radical interpretation works only in non-intentional contexts. >Semantic holism, >Holism, >Radical interpretation. IV 109 Principle of Charity/Charity Principle/Lewis: the principle of charity is part of our concept of the person. IV 160 Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: charity cannot be used by the omniscient: he will always misinterpret the erring if he assumes his sentences as mostly true (in the light of the interpreter). So he must not apply the same method (IV 159/160). Solution: the omniscient must construct my false beliefs as false in his light and the true ones as true in his light. He can only do that if he waives the charity principle. IV 160 Charity/Fodor/Lepore: charity can only be used between two omniscient beings. It is an incoherent concept to have an omniscient exercise charity with a erring being. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Proper Names | Dummett | III (b) 64 Names/Davidson: we can only know that "Valencia" refers to Valencia. DummettVsDavidson: Davidson confuses awareness of the reference with knowledge - the fact that the word has a reference object (at all). Names/DummettVsDavidson: the subject must understand the meaning of the name: not that the name refers to something, but what it refers to. >Reference, >Meaning. III (b) 87f Names/Kripke: meaning is not "the one who is generally thought to be the author of Waverley". Dummett: knowing that (sentence is true): e.g. a child hears "postal strike in Milan" - but does not understand the proposition. - What is necessary for a proposition? - Certainly not knowledge about Ambrosius - Sentence: knowing-that "someone named Gustav Freytag was a lecturer in Wroclaw. - proposition, propositional knowledge: precisely the one who wrote Debit and Credit was a lecturer in Wroclaw - (description). III (b) 87f Names/Dummett: Standard explanation: Language use in community - actual baptism irrelevant, just like speaker, snatches of conversation - different: if only snatches of conversation, I must track speakers. Goedel: the concept of knowing-of-Gödel that he... has more substance than the concept of knowledge that "Goedel" is the name of the person who... E.g. Goliath: confusion of the names, not the person - E.g. Obadiah (author, only action ((s) quasi "anonymous"): here a confusion of persons, not the names, is possible. III (b) 92 DummettVsCausal theory: just a theory about the sense of names, not one that replaces the sense with something else - it provides no explanation of the function of names in general. >Causal theory of names. III (b) 93 E.g. hurricanes, constellations etc.- it is hard to prove that we named them wrongly - Causal theory does not explain the mechanisms of naming. III (c) 151 Dummett per description theory: verbal explanations of unfamiliar names help. >Descriptions, >Description theory. Wolf II 354 Meaning/Names/DummettVsFrege: (E.g. > |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Propositional Knowledge | Dummett | II 69ff Propositional Knowledge/Meaning Theory/Dummett: even representation of a practical ability is propositional knowledge. >Representation, >Propositions. III (b) 62f Knowledge/Dummett: That the murderer is on the roof, is not knowledge-who. - All predictive knowledge is based on propositional knowledge, because all theoretical knowledge is propositional. - Attribution of knowledge never grasps the whole knowledge of the subject. Difference: to know the truth of a sentence/knowledge of the corresponding proposition. ((s) the fact). E.g. "That the earth is moving is true" is not the knowledge that the earth rotates. - Reason: there is also simple translation knowledge: the Earth moves = "la terra si muove". III (b) 68 Language/Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: usually there is little difference between knowledge of the proposition and knowledge of the truth of the sentence. - But propositional knowledge is not sufficient for language proficiency. - Propositional knowledge is not sufficient for word understanding. - Knowledge of a single proposition is not sufficient for understanding of words. - ((s) The word must be able to appear in several contexts.) - ((s) That is the converse to the substitution principle.) III (c) 106 Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: propositional knowledge is necessary to explain what the knowledge of the meaning consists of. - Knowledge that ... "the earth moves". III (c) 109 But also the proposition as such cannot play a role in the explanation of understanding (circular). III (c) 108 Understanding/Meaning/Propositional Knowledge: E.g. Kripke: "horses are called horses": those who know how to use "being called" must know that the sentence is true, even if he does not know what horses are. - However, then he would not know what truth is expressed by this; he does not know the proposition, he has no propositional knowledge. Understanding: not only knowledge that a sentence is true, but knowledge of the proposition - (but not necessary for knowing the truth). III (c) 111 Meaning theory/Dummett: the sense of it to show the correct derivation of consciousness of a truth. III (c) 112 Davidson: from capturing the axioms. Special case: "Homer denotes Homer": here one has to know that Homer refers to something. III (c) 113 DummettVs: not in order to know the meaning of "Homer" in our language. III (c) 117 Propositional Knowledge/DummettVsDavidson: Those who do not know what "the Earth" means learn something from the postulate "the Earth denotes the Earth": they learn that "the Earth" is a singular term. - But for meaning it is not sufficient to say that this is an axiom of English. - You need knowledge of the proposition. >Knowledge. III (c) 133 Propositional Knowledge/Dummett: logical form: "X knows that b is F" or "X knows that the Gs are F" - here the subject of the that-sentence stands within the opaque context of the that-sentence itself. >That-Clauses. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Propositions | Loar | II 140 Proposition/Davidson: (meanings as entities) are not independent of descriptions: "The meaning of "Theaetetus flies". Problem: Relations between such descriptions cannot be specified in such a way that the compositionality can be shown. >Compositionality. LoarVsDavidson: instead: semantics of possible worlds. >Possible world semantics. II 147 Proposition/Loar: Problem: if the form of the words is irrelevant, the reference becomes doubtful - this happens when propositional attitudes are made a relation between speaker, sentence and an intentional entity. Solution/Frege: "that S" describes the meaning of "S" as an entity, but not S as "having a certain meaning". >Meaning/Frege. Even better solution: paratactic analysis/Davidson. >Paratactic analysis. Schiffer I 25f Loar/Schiffer: establishes a theory in which there are a pair of functions from propositions to internal states in which one is determined by the content of the theory. Propositions are then external indexes of the functional roles that you want to assign to physical states. So the propositions remained external to the system. Analogy: Physical Properties/Stalnaker: For example, having a certain height or weight. This can be seen as a relation between a thing and a number, because they belong to a family of properties that have a common structure with the real numbers. >Properties/Stalnaker. In this way one can also pick out propositions: as a relation between person and proposition. The theory then has a form where the quantified variables (the "φ-s") pass over functions that map propositions to physical Z-types. If the theory is true then these Z-types have the functional roles that determine the theory. (All this applies only with assumed relation theory, i.e. a relation to assumed objects of belief). >Relation theory, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. Schiffer I 45 Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar began with propositions. These later became superfluous. SchifferVsLoar: the theory is not completely general - only for normal adults. It is not immune to twin earth cases and arthritis examples ((s) >externalism, >arthritis/shmartritis). |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Propositions | Schiffer | Graeser I 129 SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are no language-independent contents of corresponding settings: they could not even perform this function. >Content. SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a language of thought. >Representation, >Language of thought. Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation. >Relation theory. Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there can neither be a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses. Graeser: thus we lose the ground under our feet. --- Schiffer I XVIIff SchifferVsPropositions/late: propositions should contain E.g. dog property. Intention-based semantics/Grice: requires, however, that propositions are neural sentences. Problem: there are no truth conditions in mentalese. >Mentalese, >Truth conditions. I 14 Propositions: have their truth values essentially. Phrases/expressionsSchiffer: have their truth values contingently. - (in public speech or in mentalese) Proposition: content itself, is not representation but is represented. I 49f Propositions/Belief object/relation theory/SchifferVsPropositions: a proposition always requires natural kind terms. Even substitution is not compatible with any propositional theory. Propositional theory: says 1) that "p" is a real object variable 2) that propositions are their values. Proposition: abstract, not in space and time - yet real concrete components. E.g. Capitol in "The Capitol is in NY". But only if fine-grained (as a complex of individuals and properties). - They are objective and mind-independent as opposed to pain and mental representations. >Pain, >Mental representation. "Thought"/Frege: = Proposition; also the components and characteristics of propositions are abstract and language independent: e.g. the whiteness of snow. Problem: VsPropositions: they carry an ontological commitment to Platonism. >Platonism. I 51 SchifferVsPropositions: propositions are superfluous such as facts and features. - E.g. Michele has the property to be funny (or the fact that funny ...). - This is a doubling. Complexes that include individuals as a structure as components and properties. Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry, Lewis 1970a - (grainy: set of) Problem: from compositionality for reference follows that the proposition "snow is white" is necessarily true if snow is white. Different: as sets of possible worlds propositions include their speakers not as components. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. I 52 Proposition: different: if = functions of possible worlds on truth values, then speakers do not function as components. - Then maybe partial functions that maps a possible world onto the truth, iff snow is white. Problem: unstructured propositions (functions) cause necessary equivalent propositions to be identical. - Then the problem of logical omniscience follows. >Omniscience. Solution: structured (fine-grained) entities: contain objects, properties, operators, which they determine. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Proximal Theory | Quine | VI 57 Proximal/distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be located in the common world than on the private outer surfaces of the body. The world should be the common cause. Better a common situation than a rabbit or any body. We should adopt an ontology of situations. >Stimulus/Quine, >Ontology/Quine VI 58 Proximal/distal/QuineVsDavidson: I would rather stick to attaching our irritations to neural input. I am particularly interested in the question of the transport of perceptual indicators from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (though not the interpreted individual) to freely refer to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects. VI 59 "Common situations" are too vague for me. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Millikan | I 209 Quotation marks/quotation/Davidson/Millikan: (D. Davidson Quotation, 1979)(1) thesis: mentioning quotation marks are indexical or "demonstrative". Their filling is semantically outside the sentence. Just like when I point at a fish and say "I caught this fish" the fish lies outside the sentence. >Quotation marks/Millikan. I 210 Mentioning quotation marks/Davidson: something like e.g. "the expression with the form shown here". >Mention. MillikanVsDavidson: Suppose the quotation marks alone get the indexing. Then the indexical matching relation is a relation to a type of filling ((s) the content does not matter). But if the filling is considered as part of the sentence, then the question is what is the criterion for where the sentence ends and where the environment of the sentence begins? E.g. "I caught this fish today" is a complete sentence with and without fish. On the other hand, ""___" has five letters" is not a complete sentence. ((s) The demonstrative therefore needs not to be fulfilled in the sentence, but can be supplemented by ostension, but the filling of quotation marks is indispensable in the sentence. Quotation marks/Davidson/Millikan: thesis: Quotation marks refer to the form of the expression (filling) between them. MillikanVsDavidson: that is inadequate because you have no clear concept of an expression type. Expressions are never categorized by the form. Millikan: Thesis: a strength of my approach is that linguistic units can be grouped into types. But this is not about form, but about the lowest types or genetic families. Millikan: when we say "he first drew this ... and then that...", we need demonstratives and ostension, not quotation marks. >Terminology/Millikan. 1.Davidson, D. Quotation. Theory and Decision 11 (1):27-40 (1979) |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Radical Interpretation | Dummett | II 130 Radical Interpretation/RI/DummettVsDavidson: conversely, downstream from the theory of reference, the meaning - concrete statements are never predictable in circumstances, only general principles that rule judgments. Cf. >Principle of Charity. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Radical Interpretation | Fodor | IV 70 Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: 1) Radical interpretation specifies empirical evidence. 2) Since different ways of selecting evidence lead to different truth theories, the choice must be justified by the radical interpretation theory. Problem: the truth theory cannot be attributed regardless of the correctness of the meaning theory. VI 72 Evidence/Quine: everything that is accessible to the radical interpretation is evidence (e.g. language learning of the child, stimuli). >Learning, >Stimuli, >Language acquisition. IV 77 Similarity Spaces/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: similarity spaces are not available to the radical interpreter (because different culture must be assumed, other than in language learning). >Radical interpretation. IV 86 Holism/RI/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: his argument for holism is based on his assumption that individual sentences, e.g. "Kurt belongs to the German-speaking Community and Kurt holds true: it's raining on Saturday afternoon and it's raining around Kurt on Saturday afternoon" are law-like (laws). Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the generalizations thereof e.g. (x)(t)(if x belongs to the German-speaking community, then (x holds it rains to be true at t iff it is raining in the vicinity of x at t) do not support counterfactual conditionals and are therefore not law-like according to Davidson's definition of law. There is no support of counterfactual conditionals e.g. the meaning of "it's raining" could be: "the cat is on the mat". Then it does not follow that the cat is not on the mat when it is not raining. IV 87 Solution: for a relation R and every speaker S: is then nomological but not yet a radical interpretation. Lawlikeness: we only had to assume it because of the conventionality of language. Problem: by definition, radical interpretation cannot find out the conventionality. IV 89 Radical Interpretation/RI/Fodor/Lepore: our image of the radical interpretation is much richer than that of Davidson. IV 90 Problem: the nomological approach is not holistic. >Holism, >Semantic holism. IV 88 Conventionality/language/RI/Fodor/Lepore: by definition, conventionality is nothing that the radical interpreter can find out, e.g. non-German speakers do not say "Hund" when the are referring to a dog. >Conventions. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Radical Interpretation | Schiffer | I 204 Radical interpretation/Schiffer: in it we seek explicit propositional knowledge: Davidsonians: no translation: this is possible without understanding a language. ((s) mechanically comparing pairs of sentences.) Davidson: we have to have a meaning theory for the own language. >Meaning theory. SchifferVsDavidson: for the radical interpretation a theory of translation is possible. - We do not need a meaning theory for the native language, because we do not need compositional semantics. >Compositionality. Solution: a psychological model. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Representation | Brandom | I 155f Kant-Hegel representation: Experience: inferential activity. Representation > de re attribution. Other authors on attribution. I 900 Representational contents: linguistic through and through, but not purely linguistic. The representational dimension of propositional contents becomes explicit through the social perspective nature of accounting. >Content. --- Rorty VI 179 ff Representation/Brandom/Rorty: wants to save them from Davidson, who threw them out with the bathwater. The representationalist semantic theory contains an undeniable insight: whatever has a high propositional content necessarily has such a representational side; nothing which does not have this aspect would be seen as an expression of his proposition. BrandomVsDavidson. Rorty: With this he does not mean that truth is a property, it is in fact only about approval, not about description (>metaphysics). --- Bandom I 127 Representation/Brandom: problematic: there is no room for the concept of error: representation requires accuracy - statement truth - representation is not possible without practice: red dots, blue lines on the map. >Practise, >Experience, >Error, >Deception, >Correctness. VsDescartes: does not explain what it means to understand representation, namely understanding how we are responsible for them. I 126 Representation is not an expression. I 130 VsDescartes: it is about the correctness of the representation prior to understanding. Cf. >Understanding. I 145 BrandomVsRepresentation: unclear how to come to the concept of propositional content. I 923 Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be understood intrinsically and before analysis - but representation of signs, sounds not intrinsic, mere object of nature - derived intentionality comes from original intentionality of the mind. I 404f Representation/Brandom: from Descartes dualistic worldview of representation and the represented. four aspects: 1) Apart from "true", representation also needs "refers to" and "means" >Reference, >Meaning. 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts >Extension, >Intension. 3) "of" in de re-contexts: something true of Kant but not of Hegel >de re 4) Correctness of judgment and inference. >Judgment, >Inference, >Correctness. I 412 ~ BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. I 482 Representation/Brandom: Minority (Davidson): between propositionally rich intentional states and facts - Majority: no semantic priority is the result of the pragmatic prevalence of propositional - representation is initially representation of things, Reil and properties- Brandom: if this is true, allocation of intention and success cannot be explained at the level of propositional content. I 719 Representation/Brandom: E.g. McCarthy: propositional content as worldview depends on the facts in relation to the objects they represent - representation in this sense is fundamental intentionality. >Propositional content, >Intentionality. I 719f Representation/Brandom: a) pre-conceptual: does not require grasping the specific contents - e.g. orienting oneself with a map (also possible non-linguistically) E.g. interpreting a cloud as a sign of rain.Cf. >Map example, >Natural signs/Armstrong. b) as part of a discursive practice: E.g. infer from symbols that there is a river between two cities. I 722 Assertions and beliefs with a high propositional content are necessarily representationally substantial, because their inferential structure is essentially a social one. >Propositional content. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Putnam | Rorty VI 63 PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: parts of what we call "language" or "mind", penetrate so deeply into the so-called "reality" that "pictures" of something "language independent" must fail. --- Putnam III 38 Representation/PutnamVsDavidson: that the word "cat" refers to cats is not simply due to the causal relationship. The word stands in many causal relationships. It is just the case that I would not use the word, if there were no cats. Instead of representation one might assume fundamentally an evolutionary role. >Roles. --- V 17/18 Representation/reference/Putnam: mental images arise as little as normal pictures in a necessary connection with the represented (otherwise no mistake would be possible). E.g. Martians (who know no trees) are faced with a tree image. The internal mental images are then no representations. One who recites unfamiliar words, for him they refer to nothing. Thoughts have no intrinsic connection to something outside - but they possibly have connections. >Reference/Putnam. --- I (h) 209ff Representation/Putnam: a representation is not a magic connection between a phenomenological character and denoted objects - there is no intrinsic connection. >Intrinsic. Problem: brains in a vat: without intrinsic connection, one could say that the word "vat" with inhabitants of vats that come up with the idea, "we are in the vat!" refers to phenomenological manifestations of vats and not to real vats (and also in the case of "brain" and "in"). Problem: if a real vat were to collapse, the people could not use their "vat" word anymore. But that would be a connection between a vat and every word they use and no distinctive connection between real vats and the use of the word vat. Putnam: the truth conditions of the inhabitants of vats would be something like that they are in the vat in the image. And that is what is wrong if they think it (although they are in the vat, (s) because they have not learned the use in their environment.) >Brains in a vat/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. 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Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. 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Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Rorty | I 162 Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions). >Judgements, >Sensory impressions. SellarsVsLocke: Locke puts both together. I 278f Rorty: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! >Beliefs/Rorty. But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists. II (c) 76 Camps: Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey. - On the other hand: later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality. >Nietzsche, >Dewey, >Wittgenstein, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Davidson. II (e) 112 PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented. PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation. >Pragmatism, >Correspondence theory. VI 45 Representation/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism. >Realism. VI 51 R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense - VI 49 Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance. VI 54 Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.). >McDowell's Wittgenstein. RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii. >Kripke's Wittgenstein. VI 63 Representation/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world - VI 71f Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs. R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs). DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.) >Judgment/McDowell. VI 107f Representation/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians. But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former? VI 125 f RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us! >Metaphysical realism. VI 130 Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything. >Language/Rorty, >Language. VI 139 Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling. VI 140 Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. Charles Taylor: handling. Coping is more primary than representation. Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Representation | Schiffer | Graeser I 129 SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a "language of thought". >Language of thoguht, >Sentences, >Content. Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation. >Relation theory. Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there cannot be a sentence-oriented, nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of a conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses. >Meaning, >Judgments. Graeser: thus, we lose the ground under our feet. --- Schiffer I 15 Representations/Schiffer: representations realize mental states- - Mental representations are in mentalese. >Mentalese, >Mental states. I 275 Truth Value/representation: borderline case: propositional attitude as a relation to neural formulas: then belief is a relation to other beliefs. - As representational states beliefs have then truth values, regardless of whether they have a sentence structure. >Truth values, >Beliefs/Schiffer, >Sentences. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Representation | Searle | Brandom I 923 Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use is done. According to this model, the content cannot be transmitted through the use. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic, >Contents, >Intentional Contents, >Use, >Use theory. Searle/characters: sounds coming out of the mouth and characters on paper, are mere objects in the world. Their representation capacity is not intrinsic but derived from the intentionality of the mind. The intentionality of the mind in turn is not derived from any prior intentionality, it is an intrinsic property of these states themselves. >Intentionality, >Signs. Someone uses a sentence to convey an idea. In this sense, he/she does not use his/her ideas and beliefs and desires: he/she simply has them. Belief: belief is a representation. It consists of an intentional content and a psychological mode. It is wrong, that there must be a person who must use any entity as a representation, so that there is a representation at all. This applies to sentences, characters and images, (i.e. derived intentionality) but not for intentional states. (> More autors on representation). Representation needs background of non-representational skills. The compositionality principle without background is not sufficient. >Compositionality. Searle I 271 Pattern: patterns play in functional terms a causal role, but do not guarantee an unconscious representation (intentionality). II 28 f Representation: speech acts and intentional states have this in common: no pictures, but propositional contents. Key to understanding: are the fulfilment conditions - from representation follows no ontology. Recognition needs not to contain representation. >Speech acts, >Ontology. III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. III 197f Representations are private, language is public. >Language. I 195 Existence: is a truth condition. Possible existence: comprehensibility condition. >Existence/Searle. Graesser I125 Representation/Searle: an object X represents a situation A, when a subject S is available, that intends that X represents A. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Rules | Wright | I 260f Rules only exist within a practice, which is maintained by the fact that the parties are in agreement. >Convention, >Community, >Language community. Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectic exactly achieves it forces in any case some kind of restriction for a realistic idea of rules and meaning. >Realism. And therefore also for truth, because truth is a function of meaning. >Truth, >Meaning. Rule-following/Wright: shows that judgments about meanings and that what corresponds to these conditionally, are withdrawn from cognitive coercion. And then the same must also apply to claims about the truth of sentences. >Cognitive coercion, >Rule following. This intuitive reasoning is therefore not a trivial solipsism and the ghost of a global minimalism (Boghossian) is still among us. >Nonfactualism, >Minimalism/Wright. I 288 Rule-following/Wright: in the three other areas of discourse (without evidence transcendence as in mathematics) however, it appears that they are biased by considerations to rule consequences. These considerations may 1. prevent the formulation itself, and prevent that the problem appears solvable at all 2. discover misconceptions, presented jointly by the opponents, 3. affect the result from the outset in favor of minimalism. 4. Difficulty: how can we achieve the desired realism of objectivity, if our response to a problem will never be able to free itself from a dependence on skills and aptitudes to spontaneous reactions whose own state is drawn into doubt with respect to objectivity. >Objectivity. --- Rorty VI 55ff WrightVsDavidson: Cognitive bid, language, meaning, truth and knowledge would collapse if there is no offense in relation to what we call "addition". >Nonfactualism, >Cognitive coercion, >Quaddition, >Facts, >D. Davidson. --- II 225 Rules/Wright: not in the same language. >Metalanguage, >Object language. Exception: an expression of what someone understands when he understands "red": can be formulated in the same language. >Understanding. Chess: not from the inside/(s) otherwise learnable by observation - then never certain whether these are all rules, or if not in reality quite different rules. >Chess. Prevailing view/Wright: the prevailing view is that rules can be recognized from the inside out. WrightVs: that would demand that language use can be explained as an application of rules. - That excludes to see it at the same time as a game (as actually desired). II 226 Rules/vagueness/Wright: problem when applying predicates which should be guided by rules: then in the case of vagueness simultaneous application and non-application prescribed when overlapping. >Vagueness, >Predication, >Attribution. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Scheme/Content | Putnam | Rorty VI 63 ff Position/PutnamVsDavidson: we must always use a specific conceptual system (we cannot do otherwise), but we cannot simultaneously claim that this is not actually the way in which things behave themselves. >Conceptual Scheme. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Second Nature | Rorty | VI 213 Def Second Nature/McDowell/Rorty: people acquireit, inter alia, by conceptual skills being unravelled to them whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons - this gives one the ability to be controlled rationally by the world - this enables one to judge in a ways that is responsible to the world. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson: with their concepts it becomes incomprehensible - these would not refer to the world as a conversation partner. - VI 215 McDowell: thesis: the world calls on us to judge. VI 214 World/SellarsVsMcDowell/BrandomVsMcDowell/Rorty: the world is not a conversation partner. I 215 It does not merely call on us to judge. >John McDowell. VI 434 Nature/technocracy/technocratic//Rorty: the beauty of purely mechanical explanations from the atheistic point of view is that they demand nothing except our own purposes. >Explanation. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Self- Consciousness | Davidson | Frank I 27ff Self-Consciousness/Davidson: direct, not through perception. Most of our beliefs are true, because their contents are identical with what was accomplished by the original causal learning situation. >Beliefs/Davidson, >Self-knowledge. Twin Earth: only explicable because objects are not directly causally identified, but by a learning situation. >Twin earth. FrankVsDavidson: how can learnings and non-perceived matter ever be compared. >Comparisons. Glüer II 171 Subjectivity/Subject/Self/I/Davidson: there is a subject regardless of whether you attribute predicates to it or assume relations between the self and something else. I make it rather easy for myself by not raising any profound questions about this self. >Self, >Subjectivity. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Semantics | Schiffer | I 13 Semantic Property/Schiffer: e.g. to have content. Truth theoretical property: to be true. I 14 Relation theories/intention bases semantics/i.b.s./Grice: Solution: semantic properties (s.p.) are permitted if they do not stem from the public language - then no circularity. Propositions: not-public. Sentences: public. I 221 Verificationist Semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-conditional): Verification conditions instead of truth conditions. >Truth-conditional semantics, >Verification conditions. DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain a truth theory. >Meaning theory/Davidson, >Truth theory. I 241 Intentionality/Semantics/Schiffer: semantic concepts can be defined in terms of propostional atittudes - but not vice versa. Schiffer:There are no propositional attitudes as belief properties or belief objects. >Belief properties, >Objects of belief. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Syllogisms | Davidson | Glüer II 84 Action Theory/Practical Syllogism/Davidson/Glüer: Aristotle: conclusion is itself the direct action - E.g. if I eat the chocolate because I have reasons, then the reason is the cause - cause = reason (in the practical syllogism). WittgensteinVsDavidson: (Blue Book, p 35): statements about causes are empirical (nomological) - but that does not apply to specifying your own reasons for action. Cause/Wittgenstein: is anybody's guess. Reasons/motive/Wittgenstein: to know - (from language skills) - on the other hand: "can"/Wittgenstein: refers to logical possibility. II 85 Conclusion: reason and action are not separate. >Reasons/Davidson, >Causes/Davidson, >Actions/Davidson. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Theories | Quine | I 34 Theory does not have to be based on intention, it was internalized in the past. I 56 QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence within the theory with one outside - Inter-theoretically no meaning - no additions with "or" ((s) Cf. Goodman, Davidson, "fake theories"). >Verification, >Additional hypotheses. I 57 For the time being, we retain our beliefs in theory creation. I 74 Basics for a theory: Carnap: terms - Quine: sentences. I 393 Theory is only predication, universal quantification, truth function (for derived properties) - general term (for primary properties) - (no "because"). I 429 Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: behavior in every case more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore it is acceptable - but not allowed in ontology - unlike geometric object: Position of mass points made no sense - therefore no individuation - no identity. (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960(1), §52.) I 431 Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically - like Church: "true in a higher sense" - sometimes acceptable. I 432 Theory: Structure of meaning, not choice of objects (Ramsey, Russell) Quine: new: even with physical objects they are also theoretical. Reason: sentences are semantically primary. >Frege principle. 1. Quine, W. V. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press --- II 45 Equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation - both true - but possibly logically incompatible. --- VI 134 Theory/Empirically equivalent/logically equivalent/Quine: Two theories can be logically incompatible and yet empirically equivalent. E.g. Riemann/Euclidean geometry. Case 1: even untransformable theories (in the same terminology, where each implies certain sentences that the other one does not imply) are empirically equivalent - no problem. Case 2: additional theoretical terms Case 3: logically incompatible. Davidson: can be traced back to case 2 - because contentious sentences depend on theoretical terms which are not empirical - therefore they are still empirically equivalent. Solution: theoretical term in question in two spellings (according to theory) - that makes them logically compatible. >Theoretical terms. VI 136 Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Case 2: (theory for global worlds without context embedding): solution: eliminate exotic terms (without predictive power) Important argument: then it is about consistency (otherwise QuineVsConsistency theory). Elimination: justified by the fact that we have no other access to the truth except our own theory. >Elimination. VI 139 Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Variant/Davidson: Both theories are valid, truth predicate: in comprehensive, neutral language. QuineVsDavidson: how much further should the variables reach then? - We need a stop, because we do not want a third theory - "everything different"/Important argument: the two systems definitely describe the same world - purely verbal question. --- XII 70 Theory form/Quine: after abstraction of the meanings of the non-logical vocabulary and the value range of the variables - reinterpretation of the theory form provides models. >Vocabulary, >Reinterpretation, >Abstraction, >Models. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Thinking | Avramides | I 104 Thinking/Language/Avramides: thesis: beings without language can have thoughts. >Thinking without language, >Language and thought, >World/Thinking, >Thoughts. I 113 Thinking without Language/Avramides: then language is a mere vehicle for communication. >Communication. Schiffer: the Gricean concepts allow for that, but contingently there are no such beings. >Communication/Schiffer. I 115 Thinking without Language/Reductionism/Avramides: there is only a problem for reductionism if the assertion is conceptually related to the semantic and psychological concepts - (and is not simply empirical). >Reductionism. Davidson: psychological concepts cannot be instantiated without semantic ones - SchifferVsDavidson: ditto, but they can be grasped without them! Avramides: then the mere intuition that there can be no thinking without language is not sufficient for an antireductionism. Antireductionism: must assert that the assertion of the reductionist a deep epistemic dependence is unfounded. >Terminology/Arvramides. I 142f DummettVsIdealism/DummettVsLocke: Locke proposes a wrong code concept of language for ideas. Significance is not explained by thoughts. - Where the thoughts, in turn, are without reference to language - this does not explain how thoughts themselves come to significance. - Then mother tongue would be like a foreign language. >Code, >John Locke, >Meaning, cf. >Language of thought. Solution/Dummett: grasp = use: E.g. thw word "square" sorts out square things. -Then no representations are needed to connect sentences with thoughts. >Representation. It is about understanding instead of association. >Association, >Understanding. AvramidesVsDummett: but this approach allows no thinking without language. I 15 Thinking/Dummett: thinking can only be investigated through language (not through behavior). AvramidesVsDummett: also through behavior. >Behavior. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Thinking | Davidson | Brandom I 232 Language/Thinking/Davidson: "Neither the language nor thinking can be complete within the meaning of the other and none of them has a conceptual primacy in explanations." >Language and thought, >World/Thinking. McDowell I 38 Thinking/Davidson: The thinking is not exposed to external control, is only exposed to an external causal influence. >Causal theory of knowledge. McDowell I 42 McDowellVsDavidson: This rejects that thoughts and ideas are linked in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not get an empirical content. (The views are blind, (Kant) without concepts). Davidson I (e) 101ff Thinking/Davidson: There are no "objects of thought" as ghostly beings on the model of sense-data, or the like. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Thinking | Dummett | I 93 ff DummettVsFrege: his theory of perception contradicts his thesis that every human can only grasp those thoughts which he understands as the sense of sentences. There are two interpretations. I 105 Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activity). - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl's noema. I 137 f Thinking: Strongest interpretation: we can only think in language - Weakest interpretation: none of us can have a thought that we cannot express. Cf. >Psychological theories on language and thought, >Animal language. I 141 DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not >idiolect, but common language prevails. III (e) 209 Language/thinking/Wittgenstein/Dummett: the role of language as a vehicle of thought is subordinate to its role as a tool of communication. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Thinking | Dupré | Perler I 318 Animal/Thinking/Language/Descartes/Dupré: Even those who defend the cognitive abilities of the animals the most often accept the Cartesian assumption that it is in principle impossible to prove the thinking or even the consciousness of animals because this would be conceptually dependent on behavior. >Animals, >Animal language, >Communication, >Consciousness, >R. Descartes. Perler I 319 DupréVsDavidson: if Davidson were right, the question at stake would not only be whether or not one can teach monkeys to speak, but whether one can teach them to think. >Animals/Davidson, >Language/Davidson, >Thinking/Davidson. Perler I 321 Language/Thinking/Dupré: there are many forms of non-verbal behavior that allow communication, and many non-verbal manifestations of thinking. >Thinking and language, >Thinking without language. John Dupré, 1991. "Conversation with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of language". In: Investigating Psychology, Science of Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (ed.) London, New York: Routledge |
Dupré I John Dupré "Conversations with Apes. Reflections on the Scientific Study of Language", in: Investigating Psychology. Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein, J. Hyman (Ed) London/New York 1991, pp. 95-116 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
| Transcendentals | Fodor | IV 79 Transcendental/argument/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: Davidson's transcendental argument for the principle of charity takes this form: if we do not assume that the speaker rightly believes most things, then language acquisition by the radical interpreter is impossible. >Radical interpretation, >Language acquisition. IV 80 Language acquisition is possible, however. So it must be assumed that most of the speaker's beliefs are true. >Beliefs/Davidson. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: there is no clear reason to believe the second premise (that radical interpretation is possible). Therefore, the transcendental argument fails. IV 105 Transcendental: what made the arguments transcendental was the assumption that radical interpretation is metaphysically impossible if holism does not apply. >Holism. --- Kripke I 46 Metaphysical/Kripke: what could have been different is precisely a question that cannot be answered empirically at all, hence it is metaphysical. Contrary: epistemic. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Truth | Esfeld | I 181ff Truth/EsfeldVsDavidson: if the everyday realism has no privileged position, most beliefs need not be true. Davidson will have to rely on an omniscient interpreter. >Beliefs/Davidson, >Realism, >Radical Interpretation/Davidson. For us, content consists in inferences that may change dramatically - though not all at once, but in course of great change. >Inference, >Inferential role, >Inferential content, >Content, >Meaning. If truth supervenes on something in the world, facts cannot be avoided as ontological, they are still distinct from conceptual content. >Conceptual content, >Supervenience. Truth: truth is not determined by our practice! >Practice. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Truth Predicate | Davidson | Rorty VI 20 "True"/Davidson: "true" is not a name of a relationship between language statements and the world. In other words: the expression "true" should neither be analyzed nor defined. There is no thing that makes sentences and theories true. >Truthmakers. "True" is not synonymous with anything at all. Neither with "justified according to our knowledge", nor with "justified by the circumstances in the world". --- Glüer II 27 Truth-Predicate/Tarski: Problem: DavidsonVsTarski: object language and meta language should contain the predicate true. >Expressiveness, >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Truth theory. The truth predicate defined in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language. Solution/Davidson: does not set up a truth definition at all. Instead: Truth Theory/Davidson: Reinterpretation of the convention truth as a criterion of appropriateness for truth-theories of natural languages. Glüer II 28 Truth-Predicate/Tarski: any predicate that delivers correct translations is a truth-predicate. - This presupposes meaning in order to explicate truth. Glüer II Truth-predicate/TarskiVsDavidson: provides a structural description of a language whose translation is known. - The truth-predicate does not contribute to the truth theory. - It is not interpreted in Tarski. - ((s) we do not know what truth is - Truth-Predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: is interpreted a priori.) - ((s) we already know what truth is.) - Definition interpreted/(s): know what a word means. Rorty IV 22 True/Davidson/Rorty: does not correspond to any relationship between linguistic expressions and the world. - No correspondence. Cf. >Correspondence theory. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Truth Theory | Davidson | II 34 Truth Theory/Tarski/Davidson: shows how the truth values of the sentences of L depend on their structures, and why some sentences contain others, and how words perform their function through their relationship to things in the world. >Truth values. Tarski: Meaning as the basic concept. II 35 FosterVsDavidson: Mistake: to overlook that someone could have a clear theory without knowing it. - Then there is no meaning theory. - (Davidson ditto). >Meaning theory. II 37 Truth Theory/Davidson: ""Snow is white" is true" is not an accidental fact about a sentence but a fact that interprets it. - This shows that the ability to interpret does not equal translation. >Interpretation, >Disquotation scheme. I (e) 111 Tarski: defines Truth - Davidson: Truth is an undefined basic concept. - "mine", "wanting to say": presupposes the concept of meaning. l (e) 111 Tarski: proceeds formally, Davidson empirical (laws instead of axioms, empirically verifiable). Glüer II 28f Truth Theory/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Conversely: it is not required of T-equivalences that the right-hand side translates the left-hand side. - Definition Truth-Equivalence/Tarski: true iff the linked sentences (in the schema) have the same truth value under all circumstances. Glüer II 29 Then one must know for Davidson's reinterpreted convention truth (provides only true equivalences) when truth-equivalences are true. - It is therefore not necessary to know the meaning of both object language sentences and meta-language sentences. - ((s) the meaning is not presupposed. TarskiVsDavidson: the meaning of the sentence of both the object language and the meta-language must be known - truth-predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: his truth-predicate must be interpreted - Davidson: then the truth theory is an interpretation theory which, for each statement sentence S, a truth-equivalence derived from its structure, whose right-hand side indicates the truth conditions under which the left-hand side (S) is true. Glüer II 45 Truth Theory/Davidson/Glüer: for unknown language: 3 steps: 1. The totality of the data must be available, interpreter transmits his logic to the foreign language - basis: observations on sentences that are believed to be true at all times ) - 2. Predicates identified as such become the object of the interpretation (fulfillment conditions are approximated via opportunity sentences) - 3. Extension to general sentences (indirectly developed truth conditions). >Truth conditions. Glüer II 54/55 Truth Theory/Davidson: because of malapropisms: not structure, but intension has priority. >Intensions. Glüer II 56 Truth Theory: in principle, only for certain occasions correct - problem: for a theory of competence: there is no distinction anymore between the ability to know a language and to know about the world - language competency fuses with worlds. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Truth Theory | Dummett | III (c) 118 Truth Theory/Dummett: The truth theory presupposes an understanding of the metalanguage. >Metalanguage. Horwich I 459 Truth/Truth Theory/Truth Conditions/Dummett/Rorty: It could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the contents of the right hand side of the T-sentence. ((s) T-sententce: E.g., "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white.) The T-sentence explains nothing, if the meta language contains the >object language - and then the same is true when meta language and object language are separated. Davidson: no single T-sentence says what understanding is, but the whole body. DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolism: with that he admits that the holism can not explain how the speaker comes to the understanding of individual sentences. - Davidson: Language use is not separable into sub-skills. - The T-sentence embodies no skills - or else we would have to assume mental entities.(1). Cf. >Objects of thought. 1. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Truth Theory | Peacocke | II 162ff Truth theory/PeacockeVsDavidson/VsTarski: actually empirical - relativise a T-sentence to persons and times - a criterion of acceptance of a truth theory for arbitrary languages already presupposes a general concept of truth. >Truth, >Truth definition, >Language use, >Acceptability. Vice versa, we do not know which interpreted language the community uses, if we only know the truth conditions of the sentences. >Truth conditions, >Language community. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Truthconditional Semantics | Strawson | Graeser I 123 Truthconditional Semantics/StrawsonVsWittgenstein/StrawsonVsDavidson/StrawsonVsFrege: Problem: the language include phrases or expressions that have no truth conditions. >Truth-conditional semantics. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Truthmakers | Brandom | Rorty VI 179 ff "Make true"/truth maker/fact/Brandom/Rorty: "make true" is harmless. ( BrandomVsDavidson ): which assertions are true does not depend on whether somebody makes them true. >Facts. --- Brandom I 469 Make true/Fact/Brandom: misleading: it is not the fact that p that makes true that p. Solution: in a sense facts are what makes acts of assertion true - there are no specifically semantic facts, >Semantic facts. There are physical facts through physical predicates, but not semantic facts through semantic predicates - "true that snow ..." semantic predicate for non-semantic fact. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Vocabulary | Kripke | III 335 Language/Davidson: Davidson’s criterion: a language may not have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the first language. >Language acquisition. III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: we only have to demand that only a finite number of axioms contain new vocabulary (weaker). III 338 Truth theory/Kripke: (here): condition i) the axioms define truth implicitly (i.e. we assume that the referential variables have intended domains and the substitutional variables have intended substitutional classes (which implicitly defines a quantity of truths of L.). Condition ii): a) the new axioms must have a true interpretation in the old vocabulary (with the intended interpretation)..., b) there is an equivalence schema for each closed sentence of the object language that only contains old vocabulary. Advantage: the ontology does not contain quantities of expressions of the meta language. Condition iia): is the requirement that there is a new interpretation of the predicates that contains the old ones. Condition iib): guarantees that T(x) contains a single extension (uniqueness). Tarski: Tarski only needs i) for its explicit truth definition (i.e. only old vocabulary). III 249 Condition (i) is satisfied (without presupposed truth concept) by (4) - (6) in the old vocabulary. III 347 Truth Theory/Davidson//Kripke: meta language may also contain semantic vocabulary! Translation is also guaranteed if both sides contain semantic vocabulary. Kripke: this is quite different in Tarski: truth and all semantic terms are explicitly defined in non-semantic vocabulary. >Truth theory, >Axioms/Kripke, >Meta language, >Object language. --- Frank I 32 Mental/physical/Kripke/Frank: the distinction mental/physical teaches the difference of the logical subjects of the physical and the mental. I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalist one (semantic structures). >Naturalism, >Mentalism, >Semantics, >Syntax. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| World/Thinking | Putnam | McDowell I 177 PutnamVsDavidson: when the cause-effect description is complete, then the sounds that we utter, cannot be more than a mere "expression of our subjectivity". RortyVsPutnam: Putnam understands by a "declaration of X" still a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of disquotation believe that people can only be described in a behaviorist manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional.) >Disquotation, >Behaviorism, >Norms/Putnam. McDowell I 177 Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment, does not rule out that one invents a story, after the speakers are expressing thoughts, and make assertions, and try to not make mistakes. These stories are then eventually not distinguishable. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Pragmatism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Anscombe, E. | Armstrong Vs Anscombe, E. | Armstrong III 95 Causality/VsAnscombe: here it looks as if Anscombe’s position is weakened: if a’s F become b’s G are caused, don’t we have a law F>G? Armstrong: (pro Anscombe) that actually does not follow. We only have such a law if the first event causes the second by virtue of the universals F and G. Although it is natural to expect that universals are as operational as this, I do not see how it can be proven. I for my part would think worse of the universe if they were non-operational. Nevertheless Anscombe can rightly say that it is logically possible that the causation is a mere isolated case causation. She is also right with AnscombeVsDavidson. (ArmstrongVsDavidson). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Bennett, J. | Avramides Vs Bennett, J. | Avra I 17 Avramidis Bennett: Bennett/Avramidis: (Griceans, modified): Proposes a community of speakers who use a communication system that does not rely on Grice’ intentions and beliefs: the "Plain Talk" ("direct speech", "simple speech", "candid speech"). Def Plain Talk/Bennett: the speakers rely on the listener, they believe in the form of a generalization: whenever an utterance U is uttered, a particular proposition p is true. This is how they can do without a speaker’s intention. BennettVsGrice: if this simpler analysis is true, we do not need the more complicated one. (65). BennettVsVs: but Bennett himself believes that the Gricean is capable of withstanding this: GriceVsVs: Solution: "Background fact": if the speaker did not want to transmit p, the utterance U would have been inappropriate under the generalization that whenever U is uttered, p is true. (Bennett 1976 p.172). I 18 This saves the introduction of complex propositional attitudes in the analysis. Modification: the audience is presented with "intention dependent evidence for the proposition". AvramidesVsBennett: the modification is not necessary, it is already covered by Grice’ original analysis. Avra I 18 Communication/LoarVsBennett: Not only is this kind economy unnecessary, the elimination of the intentions removes something essential. The fact that intentions, expectations and beliefs should be simple in ordinary communication and personal relationships, seems to me so improbable that it surprises me why this should be a more realistic view. (70). I 121 Def Register/Bennett: A theoretical expression that stands for whatever in relation to an animal, and that validates predictions about its behavior (evaluates it, rates it yes/no) based on facts about its environment. (Bennett 1976, p.52). Avramides: Registering is necessary but not sufficient for belief. E.g. cruise missiles with thermal infrared equipment: can be described as reacting but not as learning. Belief/Bennett: We achieve sufficient conditions, if we add the ability to learn to registering. (see Bennett 1976, p 84). DavidsonVsBennett: Instead distinction subjective state/objective world. AvramidesVsDavidson: one could argue that the awareness of this distinction is the possession of the concept of belief. Davidson: this awareness is belief about a belief. Scaring/Davidson: only reaction to a stimulus. AvramidesVsDavidson: then there is certainly still room between the act of being surprised and the possession of the concept of belief. This allows, for example: the ability to learn that Bennett propagates. DavidsonVsBennett: rejects his approach, because his (Davidson’s) concept of awareness (of the distinction subjective / objective) is very strong. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Bigelow, J. | Davidson Vs Bigelow, J. | Bigelow I 273 Effect/Bigelow/Pargetter: one and the same effect could have had various causes. E.g. pregnancy by various men. DavidsonVs. Identity/Incident/DavidsonVsBigelow: (Davidson 1980) Identity of incidents: Thesis: a criterion of identity makes necessary, because various causes cause numerically different incidents. BigelowVsDavidson: this is wrong, but we will not go into that here. But even if he was right, that would not save the modal theory of causation ((s) which includes necessary and sufficient conditions). |
Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Charity Principle | Fodor Vs Charity Principle | IV 93 Principle of Charity/PoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not play a significant role! It might be useful for the attribution of intentional contents, but in any case not for physicalistic attributions. Therefore, Davidson also denies that there are laws of action, or of psychophysical attribution. Fodor/Lepore: we believe the following is true: if one is willing to infer from "L speakers hold S to be true in circumstances C" to "S is true in L if C", then you cannot coherently deny that if an L speaker utters S in C, then what he/she says is true. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Coherence Theory | Williams, M. Vs Coherence Theory | Horwich I 488 Coherence Theory/M. Williams: has to do with skepticism. The coherence theory says that the analysis of truth in non-epistemic terms makes it inaccessible. M. Williams: if that were true, disquotationalism, but also the richer correspondence theory, would be excluded. I 489 Truth/justification/acceptability/Arthur Fine: when one sees that the realistic T-concept creates a gap that keeps the epistemic approach ((s) justification) always out of reach, one might be tempted to redefine truth in epistemic terms to literally make it accessible. M. WilliamsVs: as an epistemic thesis, skepticism can only be derived under skeptical premises! Truth/Skepticism/M. Williams: no concept of truth makes it inaccessible by itself: one always needs epistemic premises! Gap/M. Williams: the gap Fine means is probable: even the best justified belief can be wrong. M. WilliamsVs: nevertheless, why should this lead to radical skepticism? ((s) Everyone can be wrong, but not all can be wrong). Correspondence Theory/Skepticism/M. Williams: combined with a Cartesian dualism it leads to skepticism. But if representations can only be compared with other representations, this leads to the coherence theory ((s) Berkeley> Coherence Theory). Correspondence Theory/M. Williams: modern form: tends towards naturalism and physicalism by identifying reference with a causal relation. (Causal Theory of Reference). I 490 Correspondence Theory: argues with the impossibility of an alternative. Coherence theory does the same! M. Williams: both do not answer the question: why not be satisfied with deflationism? Deflationism/M. Williams: can share many of the criticisms of Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory and vice versa. Because he neither shapes the idea of truth as correspondence nor shows that truth is an epistemic property. I 495 Correspondence Theory/Putnam/M. Williams: Putnam: because the truth of our beliefs explains success, a correspondence theory can explain, I 496 what is the contribution of language behaviour to the success of overall behaviour. Truth/Explanation: this is how success explains it: (i) if we have true beliefs about our goals, we will generally achieve them. (ii) We have true beliefs about how we achieve our goals. (iii) We generally achieve our goals. Horwich: admits that truth actually has an explanatory role here. Putnam would be right if there were no alternative explanation. VsPutnam/VsCorrespondence Theory: yet there is no obvious connection between his argument and a physicalistic correspondence theory: Truth/Law/M. Williams: you can save Putnam's argument by assuming that (i) involves a generalization that may even be lawful. BoydVsPutnam: does not want truth to appear in any laws. ((s) The theory explains success as well as the truth of the theory. Instead, the theories could simply be listed. - Vs: that would only work without generalization.) M. Williams: I do not believe that (i) is a law. That is because it is not really an empirical position. Belief/Content/Truth/Davidson: determining their content is not independent of giving meaning to our general behaviour and therefore most must be true. Ad (i): is then not an empirical law but a reflection of a condition of interpretation. I 497 Correspondence Theory/Putnam: it is not the explanation of our success that motivates the correspondence theory itself, but the consideration of Premise (ii): that most beliefs are true. Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give (ii) meaning if we explain the reliability of learning and only realism can do that. Causal Theory/Correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would present us as reliable signal generators. What would the truth theory contribute? It communicates that the proposition is true iff the state exists. This is the correspondence involved in causal theory, it is exactly the correspondence established by the T-Def. Deflationism/Correspondence/M. Williams: to him this minimal correspondence is also available. I.e. Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or any other substantial theory. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Correspondence Theory | Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory | I (e) 96 So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection. Horwich I 443 Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation." Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world). Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism. Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism. Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist. Def Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism. Truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything. Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist. Horwich I 553 Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence"). "true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis. Truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them. Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition. We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory). DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia". "Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true". DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world. RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Quine II 56 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Davidson, D. | Brandom Vs Davidson, D. | I 268 Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson). I 931 Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him. I 932 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization. I 383 VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires. I 954 BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies. I 692 Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible. I 957 Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing. I 958 BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way." I 729 Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach. I 747 Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution! Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution. I 961 BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one. II 48 BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection. NS I 166 Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms. Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Davidson, D. | Danto Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson II 74 Davidson: "native speakers" normally say the right thing, where it is plausibly possible. ((s) > DantoVsDavidson: "It may be difficult even for native speakers to see whether something is a work of art.") |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Dummett Vs Davidson, D. | Dummett I 28ff DavidsonVsTarski: ... one must have a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! Because this knowledge will be determined by the theory of truth!. Dummett: What has to be introduced, however, is the realization of the conceptual link between meaning and truth. DummettVsDavidson: In Davidson much remains implicit, E.g. this same context, which is required of every speaker. Without the exact nature of this relation the description of the T-Theory is still not a sufficient explanation of the concept of meaning. Correspondence Th./Coherence Th.: meaning before truth - Davidson: truth before meaning (truth conditions defined later by theory) - Dummett both together!. I 142 Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer assumes the language of a particular individual to be the starting unit, but the disposition for language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevailing. I 146 Davidson def idiolect (refined): Language, date, speaker, certain listener. If there was a language that was only spoken by one personn, we could still all learn it. DummettVsDavidson: but in this case remains unresolved: the relation between truth and meaning, more precisely, between truth conditions and use. Dummett: every participant in the conversation has his own theory of what the words mean. And these theories coincide, or nearly so. I 187 DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding depend on the private and non-communicable knowledge of a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is then more likely trying to see an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings. I 149 E.g. What a chess move means is not derived from the knowledge of the rules by the players, but from the rules themselves. DummettVsDavidson: If the philosophy of language is described as actually a philosophy of action, not much is gained, there is nothing language-specific in the actions. Avramides I 8 DummettVsDavidson: not truth conditions, but verification conditions. The theory of meaning must explain what someone knows who understands one language. (This is a practical ability). I 9 This ability must be able to manifest itself, namely through the use of expressions of that language. DummettVsDavidson/Avramides: a realistically interpreted theory of truth cannot have a concept of meaning. I 87 Dummett: talks about translating a class of sentences that contain a questionable word. DavidsonVsDummett: This class automatically expands to an entire language! (Holism). (s) So to speak this "class of relevant sentences" does not exist. DavidsonVsDummett/Avramides: Davidson still believes that you need a body of connected sentences, he only differs with Dummett on how to identify it. There may be sentences that do not contain the word in question, but still shed light on it. It may also be important to know in what situations the word is uttered. Solution: "Translation without end". II 108 Truth Theory/M.Th./Dummett: There is certainly a wide field in non-classical logic for which is possible to construct a m.th that supplies trivial W sets. DummettVsDavidson: whenever this can be done, the situation is exactly reversed as required for Davidson’s m.th. A trivial axiom for any expression does not itself show the understanding, but pushes the whole task of explaining to the theory of meaning, which explains what it means to grasp the proposition expressed by the axiom. Putnam I 148 Truth/Dummett: Neither Tarski’s theory of truth nor Davidson’s theory of meaning (assuming a spirit-independent world) have any relevance for the truth or falsity of these metaphysical views:. DummettVsDavidson: one has to wonder what this "knowing the theory of truth" as such consists in. Some (naturalistic) PhilosophersVsDummett: the mind thinks up the statements consciously or unconsciously. VsVs: but how does he think them, in words? Or in thought signs? Or is the mind to grasp directly without representations what it means that snow is white?. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Davidson, D. | Evans Vs Davidson, D. | McDowell I 93 Thinking / world / Davidson: waived rational control of thought through an independent reality. Pure causal connection with reality. ((s) experience non-conceptual). Simply a set of beliefs. McDowellVsDavidson: thus the ownership of content is ever questioned. "Set of beliefs" has philosophically not yet been clarified. EvansVsDavidson: (another horn of the dilemma): probably extra-conceptual, but still subject to rational control by experience of the outside world. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Davidson, D. | Fodor Vs Davidson, D. | IV 68 Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect T-sentences. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like! IV 69 Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/Fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well. Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side. QuineVsDavidson: Davidson shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: e.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. x is white and LT). This could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof". This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem. E.g. assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a truth theory (WT), which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives. That seems to be a holistic consequence. Vs: but that is premature. Language/radical interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation! I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct truth theory (WT) by that evidence which observation allows. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all! Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a truth theory with proof about the speaker behavior: 1) that the child and the field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible. IV 74 Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of a truth theory is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/Fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, it is therefore not in the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation. It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions. From the perspective of the radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist (> hermeneutic circle). These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc. IV 84 Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Davidson's idea that T-sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the T-sentences to the content holism. W-sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language! IV 98 "Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsPoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true! IV 100 Principle of Charity/radical interpretation/RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that: 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions, 2) are syntactically atomistic. The interpretation of such expressions cannot be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts. IV 101 We do not know whether such forms exist, e.g. maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable. > Behavior/wish IV 120ff. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Davidson, D. | Hacking Vs Davidson, D. | Fodor/Lepore IV 102 Note HackingVsDavidson: he tries to revive meaning through a translation theory, which is located within a theory of truth. Meaning is then never mentioned. IV 233 Then we just make do with sentences and their truth conditions. That’s the kiss of death for meaning. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Davidson, D. | Harman Vs Davidson, D. | Field II 59 Meaning/HarmanVsCompositionality/HarmanVsDavidson: (1075, p.286): Davidson’s theory would be circular if the speaker, who somehow has to represent that snow is white, used the words "snow is white". If that is to be solved with Mentalese, the problem occurs again with the question about the meaning of Mentalese. Solution: not knowing the truth conditions is important for the semantics of representations, but we must attribute the truth conditions, not their knowledge. Field: we also want to be able to distinguish between beliefs about Caesar and those about quarks. Field: but it is a serious question why we should distinguish these contents of representations at all!. For the purposes mentioned above we only need syntax, no semantics of representations. E.g. Suppose a super-simple psychological theory that only seeks to explain the link ">" in representations legally: II 60 E.g. for all sentences S1 and S2 in a system: if a person believes [S1> S2] and wishes S2, then they also want S1. Important argument: although this is explained by a truth value table, we do not need it for our psychological laws (of the super-simple theory). I.e. we do not need to know the meaning of the sentences S1 and S2. ((s) Is this about attribution? Then it is okay. Otherwise it would correspond approximately to: "I wish that the conditions for positive events are realized." And that is too complex and indirect.) Field: however, we must be able to introduce degrees of belief here. The super-simple theory could also include laws such as this: E.g. There is a special class of observation sentences in the representation system, with the property that each of them is connected with a particular type of stimulus. Whenever the stimulus occurs, the organism believes the observation sentence. Important argument: here we do not need to know the meaning of the observation sentence. The psychological theory does not need to assume that the sentence E.g. "there are rabbits in the vicinity" is true. Scientifically nothing is lost if the relation R is assumed to be one between people and meaningless sentences. E.g. in RI: RI: E.g. the native lifts his rifle in the face of the rabbit. This is an overwhelming reason to assume that he beliefs that there are rabbits in the vicinity. Solution: he beliefs a sentence in his language, which in his psychology II 61 plays about the same role as the sentence "there are rabbits in nearby" plays in mine. Semantics/Field: Important argument: is this really a semantic concept? Translation: Is a semantic concept, but a weak one. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Kant Vs Davidson, D. | McDowell I 124 Spontaneity/Davidson: characterized what effectively are the operations of the sentient nature, but they are not characterized as such. McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still in rational relations, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant maintains that this choice is unacceptable. Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must also restructure the operations of our sensibility as such. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Davidson, D. | Kripke Vs Davidson, D. | III 335 Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": A language cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: Otherwise it cannot be "first language". III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: We only need to demand that only a finite number of axioms possess "new" vocabulary (weaker). Horwich I 450 Reference/Radical Interpretation/RI/Field Linguist//Davidson/Rorty. Reconciles these two approaches saying that Strawson is right when his approach is seen holistically, i.e. if one places Aristotle’s formulation of the "whole and for the most part" first. Rorty Strawson: Yet his criterion cannot be applied to individual cases while being sure that one is right. Quine/Rorty: Stands between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of both, of the causation and of the reference, is equally a question of the conviction’s coherence of the native and the field linguist. Reference/Kripke/Rorty: His approach is a "building block" approach: Here we see causal paths of objects leading to individual speech acts. Conviction/true/Truth/KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: this approach leaves the possibility open that all our convictions could be wrong. Or that one basically does not know what he refers to (because one misunderstands all causal paths). KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: which makes it possible to completely separate the reference and intentional objects. DavidsonVsKripke / Rorty: Davidson warns exactly against this: The gap between scheme and content. Solution/Davidson: Reverse order: We must first maximize coherence and truth, and then the reference, as a byproduct, can be like as it wants to be! Important Argument: This ensures that the intentional objects of many convictions (the "most direct cases") are their causes. ((s) Vs: it would then still be possible according to Löwenheim that what appears to be direct to us is not the most direct. DavidsonVsKripke: Kripke’s gaffe, e.g. the Gödel-Schmidt case must remain the exception. I 451 Because if the gap between references and intentional objects (which one refers to, and the one of which one believes one refers to) would be the rule, then the term "reference" would have no content! He would be as useless for the field linguist as the term "analytic". Gavagai/RI/Communication/DavidsonVsKripke/Rorty: the field linguist can communicate with the natives when he knows most of his intentional objects. Therefore: DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The radical interpretation (RI) starts at home. Then we can assume for ourselves as well as for the natives that most of our beliefs are true. Rorty: Is this an answer for the skeptic or does it only express what JamesVsSkepticism says:that the question is a bad question? Language/Representation/Intermediary/Medium/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson rejects "intermediaries" (intermediate members) between the organism and its environment (to be able to perform RI). Intermediate links between the organism and object: e.g. "special meaning", e.g. "intended interpretation", e.g. "what stands before the mind of the speaker" Without them we can say "RI begins at home". I 453 Solution/Davidson:fulfillment/DavidsonVsSkepticism/DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: For his refutation we need Tarski’s fulfillment ratio (word-world) instead of "correspondence" (which would correspond to the truth of sentences) of the relation proposition world). ((S) Because only whole sentences can be true). RI/Gavagai/Field Linguist/Davidson/Rorty: The field linguist is going to connect individual words of the native with objects (pieces of the world). Translation/fulfillment/Davidson/Rorty: Problem: The fulfillment relation is not a basis for translations, the fulfillment is rather a byproduct of translations. Hermeneutical circle/HC/Gavagai/RI//Davidson/RortyVsKripke: To go back and forth in the HC is not a building block-theory. It corresponds more to the "Reflective Equilibrium" of Rawls. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Lewis Vs Davidson, D. | Schwarz I 176 Wide content/xxternalism/Davidson/Schwarz: externalist theories often imply that humans with no proper relations to external objects, e.g. Davidson's "swampman" (1987)(1), have no wishes or opinions, even though they are built the same way like we are, they can converse with us, and their actions can be rationally explained by us. LewisVsDavidson: this seems unbelievable. (1994b(2), 315). Cf. >Narrow content, >externalism, >internalism. 1. D. Davidson [1987]: “Knowing One’s Own Mind". Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60: 441–458 2. D. Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | McDowell Vs Davidson, D. | I 42 McDowellVsDavidson: the myth has deeper roots: we can not understand how the pursuit of spontaneity could ever represent a world if spontaneity were not subject to any external control. (And Davidson denies this control.) I 41 McDowellVsDavidson: refutes that thoughts and observations are connected in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not come to an empirical content. (without concepts, observations are blind (Kant)). I 168 Conviction/McDowellVsDavidson: he could also have said: nothing comes into consideration as a reason for conviction if it is not also located in the realm of reasons, e.g. the fact that it appears as such to a subject (!). Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this or that, or if I am convinced that it is so. I 172 Davidson: spontaneity not subjected to external rational condition. McDowellVsDavidson: therefore his theory of coherence is without control. I 86 Myth/Davidson: to escape it, one must deny that experience is epistemologically significant. (EvansVs, McDowellVs). I 124 The idea that all things belong to nature does not help. (I 102ff) Spontaneity/Davidson: characterizes what are in fact the operations of the sentient nature, but it does not characteriz them as such. McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still rationally related, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant considers this choice to be unacceptable. I 216 McDowellVsDavidson: if we turn off the background of tradition (and still only presume radical interpretations), we succumb to the myth of the given. Hegel: "lack of mediation." Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). McDowell: It's too late to take care of the configuration of the concept of objectivity when the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity emenate together from the inauguration in the space of reasons. Rorty VI 205 McDowell/Rorty: Difference betweej "logical space of nature" ("realm of the law") "logical space of reasons". McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: too impressed by the realm of law, such that they explain experience in a way that the tribunal of senses is no longer possible. Conviction/justification/cause/Davidson/SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: convictions can only be justified by convictions. (McDowellVsDavidson). VI 206 McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: if proceding in this manner (to eliminate experience), the old philosophical questions look still as if they were any good. VI 207 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in again through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility towards the world. Rorty VI 213 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility for the world. Rorty VI 213 Def Second Nature/McDowell: people acquire a second nature, e.g. by exploring conceptual skills whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons. (E.g. initiation, access to the moral community, "Education"). To have one's eyes opened, gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsBrandom: all that becomes incomprehensible if we use the terms of Sellars, Davidson or Brandom. Rorty VI 217 McDowellVsDavidson: a merely causal explanation carries the risk of emptiness. (With Kant: "spontaneity of thought") ("spontaneity: corresponds to rational truths, receptivity: truths of fact). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Davidson, D. | McGinn Vs Davidson, D. | I 134 McGinn used (insurmountable) "conceptual scheme:" to reveal his conception of the natural boundaries of knowledge. McGinnVsDavidson. I 136 McGinnVsDavidson: its determinism provides no sense to the idea of the freedom of action, because it looks like as if it were of the same type as any other causality. I 192 Consciousness/insight/McGinnVsDavidson: at this point often times an appeal is made to causal theories, but that is not satisfactory: it gives no explanation of the perceptivity of the attentive consciousness. And that is precisely the reason why one assumes frequently the causal approach leads to skepticism. Rorty VI 166 McGinnVsDavidson/Rorty: we have to revive the distinction "experience"/"belief" (DennettVs). McGinn: the (phenomenological) content of experience is determined by the intrinsic state of the brain. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Davidson, D. | Physicalism Vs Davidson, D. | Horwich I 452 Korrespondenz/PhysikalismusVsDavidson/Rorty: der Physikalismus versucht immer noch, eine „Korrespondenz“ zu finden. (>Reduktionismus). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Positivism Vs Davidson, D. | Horwich I 457 PositivismVsDavidson: would trust too little in the "hard facts". That would be trivializing the concept of truth. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Putnam Vs Davidson, D. | McDowell I 177 PutnamVsDavidson: when the cause-effect description is complete, then the sounds we utter will be far more than mere "expression of our subjectivity". Putnam III 154 Incompatibility/Language/Theories: (Goodman and Davidson find that so exciting): point, line, border, etc. are used differently in the versions. E.g. "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not quantities, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes either there is no world, or we live in more than one. Davidson: the actually recognized phenomenon of equivalent descriptions somehow contained a logical contradiction. PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. Putnam I (k) 263 PutnamVsGoodman/PutnamVsDavidson: E.g. point: we should just give up the notion that the various sentences about the point as a concentrically shrunken sphere or space portion preserve something that is called their "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. Use Theory/Putnam: here there is no need to decide whether a such a change of use is a change of meaning! ((s) E.g. sinus in analysis or in elementary trigonometry. Kursbuch 8 p. 80, Waismann). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Davidson, D. | Quine Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson I 42 QuineVsDavidson: answered in "Der Kerngedanke des dritten Dogmas" (Th. and things): Davidson's account of his dualism of scheme and content involved a separation of conceptual schemes and language, but he did not think of separation but the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make conceptual relativism comprehensible. Davidson II 92 Quine: privileged access - Davidson Action/QuineVsDavidson: "well-swept ontology": not more than physical objects and classes. ((s) I.e. act not an object, but event) (>ontology). II 97 An identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff. a and b have identical causes and consequences. II 98 Idea: that the causal nexus of all events opens up a kind of system of coordinates similar to that of material things in space and time in which each event is unique. QuineVsDavidson: the criterion presupposes already that we know what it is yet to tell us. Causes and consequences are in turn events, and each event has exactly one place in the network. Infinite recourse. Thereupon Davidson rejects his idea. He takes over Quine's identity criterion for material objects: An identity statement "a = b" for material objects is only true if a and b have the same space-time coordinates. Quine II 56 Empiricism/Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to securitized beliefs. Quine: Davidson is right in that there is nothing to be added to Tarski when it comes to the concept of truth. QuineVsDavidson: However what I feel to be a fusion of truth and belief is that Davidson, when he speaks of "the totality of experience" and "surface irritation", makes no difference between these and the "facts" and the "world". Quine: Experience and surface irritation should not be the basis of truth, but the foundation of the securitized conviction. Empiricism: If empiricism is interpreted as a theory of truth, it is right that Davidson claims the third dogma to him and rejects it, fortunately this causes empiricism to go overboard as a truth theory. Empiricism: Empiricism remains a theory of evidence. However, minus the two old dogmas. Quine: the Third Dogma remains untouched: now, however, with respect to securitized beliefs! It has both a descriptive and a normative aspect. And in none of these aspects it seems to me like a dogma. This is what partially makes scientific theory empirical, not merely a quest for inner coherence. VI 57 Proximal/Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be localized in the common world than at the private external surfaces of the object. The world should be the common cause. Rather a common situation than a rabbit or any object. We should make an ontology of situations our own. VI 58 Proximal/Distal/QuineVsDavidson: I prefer to stick to determining our stimuli by neural input. I#m particularly interested in the issue of transport of perception evidence from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (if not the interpreted individual) to relate freely to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects. VI 59 "Common situations" are too vague for me. VI 62 Private Stimulus Meaning/QuineVsDavidson: I locate them still on the outer surfaces of the individual (proximal): hence its stimulus meanings also remain private. I would be completely indifferent if they turned out to be as idiosyncratic as the internal nervous structures of the individuals themselves! VI 63 In any case, outside in the open air we are dealing with our generally accessible language which each of us internalizes neurally in our own way. VI 136 Theory/Empirical Equivalence/Empirically Equivalent/Quine: we now restrict our consideration to global world systems to avoid the question of the integration of both theories in a general context. Ex So we imagine an alternative global system that is empirically equivalent to ours, but is based on exotic terms. VI 137 If this theory is as simple as ours, we eliminate all the exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy", since they have no predictive power. Here, then, in fact coherence considerations materialize! (>Coherence Theory). In fact, there are cases where we have recourse to elements foreign to the theory: Ex computers to solve the four-color problem, e.g. additional truths of the numbers, theory by digressions into analysis. Assuming the alternative theory is just as simple. But the exotic terms do not cover any newly added observable facts. VI 138 Quine: recommends the "secessionist" position: we should reject all the contexts in which exotic terms are used. With this unequal treatment we do not justify that our own theory is the more elegant one, but we can claim that we have no access to the truth beyond our own theory. The reverse position would be ecumenical: both theories would thus be simultaneously true. VI 139 Davidson: Variant: let both theories apply and understand the truth predicate so that it operates in an encompassing and theory-neutral language in which both theories are formulated quote-redeemingly. QuineVsDavidson: which raises questions with regard to the comprehensive language. The variables would have to extend further, but how much further? How about the truth? We must stop this at some point. We did not want a third theory. The secessionist position may as well recognize the same right of the competing global theories. It can still award the label of entitlement, if not the truth, impartially. VI 140 It can also switch between the two theories, and declare the terms of the other theory pointless for the time being while declaring their own to be true. XI 156 Event/Identity/QuineVsDavidson/Lauener: the identity of events is a pseudo-problem. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Rorty Vs Davidson, D. | VI 88 Truth/disquotation/DavidsonVsRorty: had interpreted him wrongly when he depicted him as a representative of disquotation. Rorty had missed the part of the contents of the concept of truth that is detected by truth theories. >Truth Theory, >Disquotation. VI 89 RortyVsDavidson: no idea why Davidson believes "truth" is more central to the explanation of linguistic behavior than the remaining terms (meaning, belief, affirmation, etc.). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Davidson, D. | Ryle Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson II 84 Conclusion/Davidson: like Aristotle Davidson takes the conclusion directly to be an act. RyleVsDavidson: drawing conclusions is not an act! |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Searle Vs Davidson, D. | Brandom I 923 SearleVsDavidson/representation: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use occurs. According to this model, the content can not be transferred during use. >Representation, >intrinsic, >content. Davidson II 112 Only the following criterion is possible: (K2) x action is intentional under the description d only if -the actor has d a primary reason g for x to the description d and - g caused x in the right way. SearleVsDavidson: proposes two types of intentions can be distinguished: a) "prior intentions" and b) "intentions in action" Intentional act only when the first caused the second. Other condition: "predictable regulatrity" predictability depends on the rest of the convictions, and is therefore never fully explicable. To explain how it apparently despite the omnipresent possibility of differing causal chains manage to rationalize actions by specifying the strongest reason, Davidson is forced to a revision of the simple syllogistic reading of the explanation relation. Searle I 28/29 SearleVsDavidson: From the zeal to stick to the traditional categories, grows some strange terminology: >"anomalous monism" >"token identity" etc. ((s) Quotation marks by Searle.) Searle I 147 Once you realize that there are forms of causation running from bottom to top, there is nothing more to do for the notion of >supervenience in the philosophy of mind. And the analogy to ethics is just a source of confusion. (SearleVsDavidson). I 148 As Wittgenstein says: If you only wrap enough paper to various pieces of furniture, you can make them all look as if they have the same shape. Searle II 238 paratactic analysis/Davidson: E.g. Galileo said that the earth moves. Be equivalent to: The earth moves. Galilei said this. Searle: the subordinate clause of the first and the second proposition are entirely extensional. After Davidson Galilei and I become by my consent "Equal Sayer". SearleVsDavidson: we are not equal sayer, because I'm just saying that Galileo has said it. In addition, the subordinate clause is intensional. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Strawson Vs Davidson, D. | III 189 Truth theory/tr.th./meaning theory/m.th./Strawson: sentences that ascribe actions are sensitive to adverbial modification, for example, if the expressed proposition includes any other proposition if one omits the modifiers. M.th./tr.th./Davidson/Strawson: a theory like his refers to well-understood logical structures that lie beneath the surface of action ascribing sentences. "Adverbial theory"/StrawsonVsDavidson: I prefer a theory which examines the explanation closer to the surface of everyday language, and thus recognizes, however, more complex basal syntax than Davidson's theory. ("Adverbial access"). The contrast between the two theories is a question of depth and universality: StrawsonVsDavidson: if we seek our understanding in logic (surface) structures that differ from the grammar. III 193 VsVs/StrawsonVsDavidson: but it remains mysterious that the actual mastering of the current language would have to be explained by the mastering of a potential language (Davidson's theorems). adverbial access/StrawsonVsDavidson: instead: the adverbial access is much more direct. Here, the success of the claim can also be shown more directly. III 194 This is not to deny that we could take paraphrases as help or equivalent sentences with a different grammatical structure. But by this Davidson's program becomes less attractive, a program that is set from the beginning to explain our grasping by those strongly bounded structures, namely the predicate calculus. III 197 Language forms must of course be taken into account, III 198 when we assess our theory for simplicity, reasonableness and realism. StrawsonVsDavidson: and here his approach has problems. 2. the second reason why it is possible to bring in extra syntactic considerations from outside of linguistic philosophy: Actions and events generally suffer from the identity subordination on substances. Strawson IV 139 StrawsonVsDavidson: one can not expect that an ordinary language speaker masters the predicate calculus. But that is unnecessary. Our conceptual scheme is in space and time. IV 141 Another problem: ontology: nominalization of speech parts e.g. "The Kissing". |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Davidson, D. | Tarski Vs Davidson, D. | EMD II 340 TarskiVsDavidson/Kripke: in one place (§5) he explicitly brings what is for Davidson the bete noire: for each sentence T(φ) ↔ φ. (1) 1. Saul A. Kripke, "Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?" in: G. Evans/J. McDowell (eds.) Truth and Meaning, Oxford 1976 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Davidson, D. | Williams, M. Vs Davidson, D. | Rorty VI 230 Skepticism/Davidson: since he has already shown that most of our beliefs must be true, the skeptic is already beaten. Belief/M. WilliamsVsDavidson: did not really show that most of our beliefs have to be true. M. WilliamsVsDavidson: derives both coherence and correspondence theory from the principle of indulgence. Principle of indulgence: notion of unproblematic access to certain causal relationships. Williams: the game is over before it has begun! VI 231 M. WilliamsVsDavidson : if we do not already have a way to associate coherence with truth, we cannot possibly know that our beliefs are interpretable in Davidson's sense! Williams quotes here Peter KleinVsDavidson: "he can only show that if there are beliefs they are on the whole true". Rorty: but Klein continues: "For this we would have to know that outside our bodies there are events that are in causal interaction with states of ourselves". Davidson/Rorty: he would surely agree with the first part, and to the second that (if there are any beliefs at all) he does not need to rack his brains! VI 232 Skepticism: Mr Williams doubts whether we have any beliefs at all. But this kind of skepticism is not Descartes' or Stroud's! Beliefs/M. WilliamsVsDavidson: (Davidson: most beliefs are true): does not solve the problem of skepticism, but shifts it to the problem of the inscrutability of reference. Brains in a vat: For example, the external interpreter of the brains in the vat has no reason to believe that his idea of what the brain in the vat is talking about corresponds to "the self-understanding" of the brain in the vat! VI 233 DavidsonVsWilliams: would ask back: "Why do you think that we (as brains in a vat) did not think that our utterances related to events in the computer? The "self-understanding" is only a variation of the "epistemic situation". (According to Davidson, both are forms of the "schema" in the sense of dualism schema/content). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Davidson, D. | Wittgenstein Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson/Aristotle: practical syllogism causes are reasons - WittgensteinVs: Causes not empirical but recognizable through language skills. --- Davidson II 84 All such arguments assume that between reason and act exists such a tight logical-conceptual relation that reasons and actions cannot be understood as two distinct events. Only as numerically different, they could stand in a cause-effect relationship. This would, however, be prevented by the deductive relation. --- II 85 DavidsonVsWittgenstein ("Actions, Reason and Causes") This is false solution: Essential for the relationship is that the agent performs the action because he had reasons. One can also have a reason and not act according to that reason. What interests us is the reason for which the agent did x, not any arbitrary reason. As long as this "because" is not explained, the actual explanation performance of explanations of reasons is not exhausted. This deficit is only avoidable if we assume that "rationalization is a species of causal explanation". --- Dummett I 111 Turning to the language: Wittgenstein's Tractatus principle of analytic philosophy: the only way to the analysis of thought leads via the analysis of language. Davidson always presupposes a theory of meaning, WittgensteinVsDavidson: avoids in his later writings, the formation of a general theory of meaning, because he thinks that any attempt at a systematic explanation of language cannot help but to squeeze various phenomena in a single form of description: distortion. But also Wittgenstein believes that the goal of philosophy is to get us in a working order by overview of the functioning of language and thus on the structure of our thoughts to correctly recognize the world. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Davidson, D. | Verschiedene Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson I 114 SchulteVsDavidson: the downside of the "literal" concept of meaning, which he considered to be solely accessible to theory, is that many interesting phenomena are thrown to rubbish, at least as theoretically not comprehensible. II 70 VsDavidson: (Rüdiger Bittner): From the fact that beliefs can be determined only in patterns does not follow a reasonableness of meaners (to mean). It follows only that pollsters must proceed in this way. GlüerVsBittner: to accuse Davidson of "unfathomable verificationism" seems unthinkable: the most fundamental assumption is the publicity of the meaning and the content of belief. VsEvent Ontology: various authors: events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "Modifier Theory": no events, not limited to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus. Davidson II 97 Jaegwon Kim: Identifying events not as individual individuals, but with the help of properties. Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. Differentiation between event tokens and description. II 141/142 HaugelandVsDavidson:It is not immediately clear that the term "event" in (NK) and (AI) is used in the same way. (macro/micro). The identity relations between macro- and micro-level are not trivial. Davidson's argument is not conclusive without additions that allow an unambiguous assignment. Another question: Scope of the argument: Davidson leaves open whether there can be mental events that are outside of any causal interaction with physical events. An event that does not interact with physical events would therefore be causally impotent and difficult to identify as such. (Other AuthorsVs: Assumption is pointless!). 1.Vs: Jaegwon Kim: the supervenience principle contradicts the anomalism thesis. If every mental token could be described physically unambiguous, would it not then be possible to form an extension-equivalent physical predicate P? ..+.. II 145 f II 147 II 150 2.Vs Isn't the mental causally irrelevant? (Fodor: "epiphobia": fear of epiphenomenalism). 3. HaugelandVsDavidson: Criticism against the ontological prerequisites of the token identity thesis. The concept of the event contains, as we have seen, ambiguities (micro/macro). Lanz I 281 Are micro-events identical to everyday events? Haugeland: For example, wave movements can hardly be described physically. + Doesn't that mean: what is considered a single token depends on the description? Wouldn't it be more plausible to assume that different discourses not only sorted differently, but also constituted different individuals? Haugeland: The world is given to us just as little in the form of prefabricated individuals as they are already categorized independently of our means of description. This would have had fatal consequences for the token identity thesis if it had been transferred to mental entities, because Davidson has no independent argument for their identification with events. LanzVsDavidson: if representation is only determined by causality, no error is possible. EMD II 220 James CargileVsDavidson: 1. You might think "Shem beat Shaun" would consist of two names and a two-digit relation but that is wrong. 2. The sentence is actually a three-digit relational form with two names and an existence quantifier. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Davidson, D. | Bigelow Vs Davidson, D. | I 276 Causal relation/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter: exists iff there is a way of describing the events in a way that they can be placed under a general law of causality. BigelowVsDavidson: (see above), the causal relation is rather local instead of global. BigelowVsDavidson: the nature of the causal relation is not derived from the existence of an underlying law. I 277 Bigelow/Pargetter pro Davidson: But the truth conditions of a singular causal statement require the existence of a relation (but not under a description). |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Davidson, D. | Avramides Vs Davidson, D. | Avra I 119 Antireductionism/Avramidis: the anti-reductionist does not need to deny thought without language (Thw/oL). But at least one anti-reductionist makes this position incompatible with ontological asymmetry: Davidson: a conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological involves an ontological symmetry. (compare Dav. 1984e and 1982). AvramidisVsDavidson: that does not work: Beliefs/Convictions/Davidson: is essential for all types of thinking. The system (of endlessly interlinked) beliefs identifies a thought by locating it in a logical and epistemic space. (94). ((s)> holism). Avramidis: with that he says that there can be no Thw/oL. 1) a being can only have a belief if it has a concept of belief, 2) a being can only have a concept of belief if it is part of a linguistic community. Davidson: more precisely: it does not need to have a concept of a particular belief, only a general one. In order to have a general concept of belief the being must be able to imagine what it is like to be wrong. (Dav 1984e, p. 157) I 120 That requires the idea of an objective public truth (to set up a context of interpretation). (Dav 1984e, p. 157). AvramidisVsDavidson: this can be can denied either by 1) arguing that one does not need the concept of belief to believe or 2) that being a member of a language community is not the only way to obtain the concept of belief. Detecting/Instantiation/Term/Davidson: because of the need of detecting the intersubjective truth we cannot instantiate the concept of belief without grasping itself and having it. I 122 AvramidisVsDavidson: there is a different way to be aware of the distinction subjective/objective I 123 a way which is also open to speechless beings (animals) (106): learning ability in animals. This applies to Bennett’s thesis. Bennett/Avramidis: the awareness of the distinction subjective/objective is sufficient for learning. (correcting things). To do that, speechless beings only have to be able to interact with their environment. VsDavidson; his strict requirement could be interpreted as anthropomorphism. DavidsonVsVs: it comes down to properties of certain concepts, not properties of people. (Dav 1982 S.319). Semantics/Psychology/Davidson: are interdependent. ((s) So no asymmetry but symmetry?). DavidsonVsontological asymmetry. Avramidis: for us, this is a rejection of conceptual asymmetry. (For Davidson as well). I 124 Davidson: rejection of the ontological asymmetry is a consequence of the rejection of conceptual asymmetry. AvramidisVsDavidson: it does not follow. (For the anti-reductionists). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Davidson, D. | Schiffer Vs Davidson, D. | Avramides I 115 Davidson: our psychological concepts can not be instantiated without the semantic, because we simply cannot capture the semantic without the psychological. SchifferVsDavidson: ditto: they cannot be instantiated, but they can still be captured independently! Thinking without language/Reduction/Avramides: if all that is true, then the mere intuition, that thinking without language cannot exist, cannot be sufficient for a antireductionism. Schiffer I 125 paratactic analysis/Davidson/Schiffer: problem: quantification into that-propositions. The theory must be refined for this, because otherwise it cannot represent the following: E.g. Galileo said of a particular person that he makes great lasagna. Ambiguity: E.g. Galileo said that his mother makes great lasagna. Problem: to say de re. (We do not elaborate this further here). Foreign language/paratactic analysis/SchifferVsDavidson: the following does not work: (1’) Galilei a dit que la terre bouge. Galileo a dit que!. false solution: to understand "that" as orthographic part of the semantically primitive verb "to say that": vs: then there is no term in (1) that brings the reference to the statement. I 126 A. First problem paratactic analysis/say/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: his analysis can only be applied to "say" and not be extended to belief. (3) Galileo believed that the earth moves First, there are similarities: 1. The logical form of representation may initially be the same. Galileo believed this. The earth moves. 2. "This" is also in this case demonstrative 3. "Believe" is a two-figure relation. Problem: it cannot be a relation to the actual statement. And then it can also not be a correct two-figure relation. B(x,u) With an actual statement. E.g. Galileo said something If this is true, then (Eu) S(Galileo,u) I 127 But this does not work with Galileo believed something (Eu) B(Galileo, u) LoarVsDavidson/LoarVsparatactic analysis/belief: it might have been another than this particular statement that gives belief its contents. Therefore it cannot be a relatum in this relation. Schiffer I 131 3. Belief/Schiffer: unfortunately you cannot just say that belief is a relation to a statement type: you have to say to what kind of type! Vs(4): the statement "the earth moves" has many types. possible solution: The earth moves Galileo believed a statement type to which the statement belongs, if it has the same content as my last statement. SchifferVs: this does also not yet work, because "content" is here an artificial term, because we do not know yet what in (3) (Galileo believed that the earth moves) is referenced as a relatum when we do not yet have the content determined properties. Pointe: this is about the old (bad!) objection VsDavidson that he relies on an unexplained concept of content equality. Because he does not rely on such concept! Content/SchifferVsDavidson: problem: the role of "content" in Davidson's theory cannot be trivialized as desired by us when we revise his theory as we want it. Because here the "this" can still reference to an actual statement, but not to a primary occurrence, but as secondary within the singular term "the type statement, which has the same content as this". Problem: we will not know the reference if we do not know which term of content is intended here. B. Second problem paratactic analysis/SayLoarVsDavidson/SchifferVsDavidson: (Loar verbally): his analysis of "say" is in conflict with a certain correct principle: I 132 Def primary occurence/singular term/Loar/Schiffer: a singular term occurs primarily iff it is properly contained in the occurence of another singular term. E.g. primary: "George's car" in "George's car is blue" – E.g. secondary: here : „George“. singular term/content proposition/principle/Loar: (P) If the occurence of a singular term t in [speaker S said that ..t... ] is primary and references to x, then this proposition is only true if S referenced to x. E.g. assumed I say: Ralph said that she was driving the car. Where I reference to a particular car and a certain woman. Then my statement is only true if Ralph referenced to the same things. Alternative: Ralph said that she was driving George's car. Here Ralph somehow had to reference to George's car but not to George! SchifferVsDavidson: now there is a problem for Davidson: (5) Laplace said that Galileo said that the earth moves. From Davidson's theory follows that the second occurrence of "that" is the primary. As a consequence SchifferVsDavidson: 1. principle (P) 2. if Davidson's theory is correct, then the second occurrence of "that" in (5) is a primary, with the speakers "the earth moves." I 133 3. problem: but (5) may be correct, even if Laplace is not referring to this statement at all! 4. Ergo Davidson's theory is not correct. C. Third problem paratactic analysis/belief/propositional attitude/SchifferVsDavidson: (this is the really urgent problem): Davidson's presentation of (a) Sam PA, that flounders snore ("PA": any propositional attitude) as (b) Sam PA that. flounders snore cannot be correct because (1) we cannot know the made assertion and its truth by (a) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude of Sam (2) but you can know the made statement by (b) without knowing the content of the propositional attitude. Schiffer: (1) seems correct. Problem: if Davidson acknowledges (2) he is forced to say that either it is possible to know the truth, without even knowing what Sam said. Or that the knowledge ((s) of the truth value) brings no knowledge of the content with it. I 134 Schiffer: Ad (2): is certainly correct as well! E.g. Pierre: La neige est blanche Donald: Tarski said this. Schiffer: according to Davidson you may know what Donald claimed without knowing the content of Pierres statement! And so without knowing the content of Tarski's statement! (…+…). Schiffer I 135 SchifferVsDavidson: problem: according to Davidson you would have to know a content determining property φ which, however, no one knows! I 136 (9) Sam said the type of statements that are φ like this. Flounders snore. Conclusion/SchifferVsDavidson: to escape the objections, he would have to find the token φ and put it in to individuate the statements. But such a token would have to be known to all the normal people! Even if there were this token it does not go into the propositional knowledge. I 137 If there ever was an extensional theory of meaning for a language out there that finds explicitly something whose knowledge for interpretation of statements is sufficient, then no one knows what it is that determines this theory. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Davidson, D. | Loar Vs Davidson, D. | I 20 Anomalous Monism/Davidson/Loar: there are no psychophysical laws. Loar: this does not concern me, but the argument for it does: because then there can also be no functionalist reduction. (Which is a stronger thesis). Davidson/Loar: his most important premise is: the "constitutive force of rationality" in the attribution of belief and desire. Without a certain logical consistency we cannot ascribe any attitudes at all. Davidson: Thesis: it would always be possible to find a person whose belief has a different content, with the same physical state. Therefore, a psychophysical generalization G cannot be a law. Reason: mental and physical schemata have different commitments. I 21 Mental states: are fixed on rationality Physical states: are fixed to nothing comparable. I.e. a physical state is never correlated in this way with other physical states as a mental state is with other mental states. Coherence/Davidson: concerns mental states and has no echo in the physical. Functionalism/LoarVsDavidson: shows that Davidson's argument is false. Functional States; are physical states of the 2. level Structural physical states: 1. level. LoarVsDavidson: there is a much simpler reason against adopting psychophysical laws: 1. that there is no 1:1 correlation between propositional attitude and structural physical states. Functional Role/Loar: may look different in each person depending on how they have learned something. However, people with the same attitude may also have something physical in common. But according to functionalism, this is a quality of the 2. level! I 22 2. Rationality/Loar: it would be surprising if our theory of rationality had structural parallels to the structure of a physical system. But that is not Davidson's argument and it does not convince either. It would be no wonder at all if a person had a correspondence between the physical and the mental. Functionalism/Loar: Main question: can it recognize the constitutive power of rationality? Of course! And it must! (see below chapter 4) Thesis: each predicate of the form "z believes that p" attributes a certain functional state that determines the role of the predicate in theory, including constraints on rationality. Problem: this must be said in physical vocabulary and how can we do this with propositions? I 23 Functionalism/LoarVsDavidson: functionalism is not about reducing laws to laws. There can be contingencies on both sides. I 24 Rationality: their ingredients are not contingent, but that certain physical states fulfill them is. Psychology/Unrevocability/Rationality/Davidson/Loar: other authors read Davidson's argument as follows: Rationality is constitutive of rational psychology, which is therefore irrevocable. And revisability is a central feature of scientific laws! Loar: that is not my argument. I 25 Rationality/Physical States/LoarVsDavidson/Loar: Thesis: the idea is not incoherent that certain physical states meet the conditions of rationality ((s) coherence, consistency, etc.). |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Davidson, D. | Peacocke Vs Davidson, D. | EMD II 164 Davidson: speaks himself of the assimilation of a translation manual. PeacockeVsDavidson: but that only leads us back to the general concept of truth that we are looking for. (Circular). Davidson: suggested himself that if the truth theory becomes empirical, we have to change the convention T so that each sentence of the form pt (true (s, p, t) ↔ A (p.t)). counts as T-sentence, and the modified convention T requires that all T-propositions derived thereof are true. PeacockeVsDavidson: but that's is exactly what is blocking the way to the concept of truth (already presumed). Our question is precisely what the truth conditions for such sentences are. Language/Community/Davidson/Peacocke: Davidson also proposed that a truth theory must maximize for the language of a community the number of sentences considered to be true and do so in the light of our own beliefs about the world. PeacockeVsDavidson: which in turn does not fill the gap, EMD II 165 because "true" in "considered to be true" is not semantically inert (does not transfer itself), and it is here the general concept of truth which must occur in "true", if that is to be a criterion for acceptance of the truth theory for any language. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Davidson, D. | Cresswell Vs Davidson, D. | I 94 Davidson/CresswellVsDavidson: his analysis does not help in cases that are about distinguishing two predicates that are not true of anything (apply to nothing). Because then there is trivially a y that is x ’G-be iff. there is a y that is x’s F-be. Intensional interpretation: here the same thing applies if the two predicates apply to nothing. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Davidson, D. | Skepticism Vs Davidson, D. | Horwich I 451 SkepticismVsDavidson/Rorty: wird einwenden, dass es viel mehr braucht als eine Darstellung dessen, was der Feld Linguist braucht. Dieser muss zwar annehmen, dass die meisten unserer eigenen Überzeugungen wahr sind, aber er hat keine Sicherheit, dass es so ist. DavidsonVsVs: dennoch ist es unsere einzige Möglichkeit einen Standpunkt außerhalb des Sprachspiels einzunehmen. SkepticismVsDavidson: damit hat Davidson den philosophischen Punkt verfehlt. Sein Standpunkt ist "nicht weit genug draußen". DavidsonVsVs/Rorty: kann nur auf (2) verweisen: 2. Wir verstehen alles über die Relation Überzeugung Welt, wenn wir die Kausalrelation mit der Welt verstehen: (das teilt er mit Kripke): mehr als die Kausalrelation gibt es da nicht zu verstehen. Das Ergebnis ist ein Übersetzungs Handbuch cum Ethographiereport. ("Report"/Quine Davidson: weil man Bedeutungen und Überzeugungen nicht unabhängig von einander herausfinden kann). Wörterbuch/Rorty: damit haben wir ein Übersetzungshandbuch für uns selbst. Enzyklopädie/Rorty: Auto Ethnographie. Welt/Wissen/DavidsonVsKripke/Rorty: über diese beiden hinaus gibt es nichts, was wir über unsere Relation zur Realität wissen können, was nicht schon wissen. Für die Philosophie gibt es hier nichts mehr zu tun. PragmatismusVsSkepticism/Rorty: das ist es, was der Pragmatist dem Skeptiker schon immer gesagt hat. >Korrespondenz: Korrespondenz/Erklärung/Davidson/Pragmatismus/DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory/Rorty: wenn Korrespondenz eine Relation zwischen Überzeugungen und der Welt ist, die sich verändern kann, während alles andere (auch die Kausalrelationen) gleich bleibt, kann sie keine Erklärung sein. Erklärung/Wahrheit/Korrespondenz/Davidson/Rorty: wenn als Wahrheit als "Korrespondenz" verstanden wird, kann sie nicht als erklärender Ausdruck verstanden werden. Horwich I 497 DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory/VsCausal theory der Referenz: wenn umgekehrt Referenz durch eine physikalische Relation fixiert wäre, brauchte die Übereinstimmung zwischen den beiden Korrespondenzen eine Erklärung. Denn nach der Kausaltheorie wäre es möglich, dass wir oft oder meist auf Dinge referieren, die wir nicht verläßlich berichten können. Danach wäre es eine interessante empirische ((s) kontingente) Tatsache, dass unsere Überzeugungen im allgemeinen wahr sind und keine Konsequenz unserer Interpretationsmethode. I 498 Ist das ein Grund, eine solche Theorie anzunehmen? Putnam hat das vielleicht geglaubt. Sicher aber Michael Friedman:... |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Castaneda Vs Davidson, D. | Frank I 466 Belief/CastanedaVsDavidson: goes beyond language. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Kim Vs Davidson, D. | Pauen I 125/126 KimVsDavidson/Pauen: 1. letztlich eine epiphänomenalistische Auffassung: damit kann er selbst dem Prinzip 1. (kausale Interaktion zwischen mentalen und physischen Ereignissen) nicht gerecht werden. Und zwar wegen seiner Unterscheidung zwischen mentalen und neuronale Eigenschaften, wobei nur die physischen kausal wirksam seien. DavidsonVsKim/Pauen: "Eigenschaften" sind für ihn hier nichts weiter als Prädikate einer bestimmten Beschreibungssprache. Bei der Supervenienz kommen nicht etwa "zusätzliche" Eigenschaften ins Spiel, sondern lediglich eine zusätzliche Beschreibungsmöglichkeit. VsDavidson/Pauen: 2. schwerwiegenderer Einwand: fraglich ist die Reichweite von Davidsons Argumenten für den Holismus des Mentalen: der seiner seit die Basis für seine Anomalie These ist. I 127 Es gibt nämlich eine große Gruppe von mentalen Zuständen, die über propositionale Einstellungen hinausgehen: die Prozesse des phänomenalen Bewusstseins. Bsp Schmerzerfahrungen können doch weitgehend unabhängig von den übrigen Erfahrungen und Überzeugungen einer Person auftreten. Auch über Rationalität. VsVs: das Argument verliert an Gewicht, wenn Davidson selbst einräumt, dass strikte Gesetze nur in der Physik vorkommen. Patrick Suppes/Pauen: These: bezweifelt sogar, dass strikte Gesetze auch nur in der Physik diese strikte Rolle spielen. I 128 VsDavidson/Pauen: 3. Erklärungslücke: Problem: wäre die Psychologie tatsächlich im strengen Sinn irreduzibel, dann könnten Erkenntnisse der Wissenschaften auch grundsätzlich nicht für die Beantwortung psychologischer Fragen benutzt werden. Damit könnte die Beziehung von mentalen und neuronalen Prozessen nicht mehr verständlich gemacht werden. Die Identität wäre in Frage gestellt. Allerdings wäre der Monismus damit nicht widerlegt. Die Identität könnte gegeben sein, auch wenn eine Kluft zwischen den Beschreibungen bleibt. Aber es fragt sich, ob von den gleichen Entitäten die Rede ist. |
Kim I J. Kim Philosophy of Mind 2010 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Davidson, D. | Friedman Vs Davidson, D. | Horwich I 498 Korrespondenztheorie/Kausaltheorie der Referenz/Michael Friedman/M.Williams: (wie Boyd mit der Verläßlichkeit unserer Methoden befaßt): wenn Wissenschaft als rationales Handeln gerechtfertigt werden muss, muss es möglich sein zu zeigen, dass es eine enge Verbindung von Bestätigung und Wahrheit gibt. ((s) Lager: Friedman: „substantieller W Begriff, VsDeflationismus),. Lösung/Friedman: ein statistisches Gesetz für die Verbindung von Bestätigung und Wahrheit. Dies leiten wir von unseren psychologischen und physikalischen Theorien und den Theorien darüber, wie der Geist durch Interaktion mit der Umgebung zu Überzeugungen kommt, ab. Friedman/M. Williams: weil er Wahrheit innerhalb von Gesetzen verlangt, scheint das einen substantiellen W Begriff zu verlangen. DeflationismusVsFriedman/M. Williams: aber das stimmt nicht. Und das könnte auch gar nicht sein: Das Zitattilgungsschema liefert die Mittel für semantischen Aufstieg und auch semantischen Abstieg: d.h. Wahrheit kann immer wegparaphrasiert werden. So kann man Friedman paraphrasieren. Bsp Für jedes p, wenn p durch unsere Methoden bestätigt wird, dann wahrscheinlich p. ((s) ohne Wahrheit). M. Williams: das involviert Quantifikation über Propositionen oder Sätze (statements). Verwandt mit „Alles was er sagte“, und dafür gibt es ähnliche konventionelle Lösungen. Wahrheit/FriedmanVs: kann damit aber nicht ad acta gelegt werden: das Zitattilgungsschema allein zeigt nicht den Sprachgebrauch (s.o.). Kompositionalität/W Theorie/Friedman: These WT verlangt eine kompositionale WT. Wahrheit/Deflationismus/M. Williams: das heißt aber nicht, dass ein reicherer (substantieller) W Begriff benötigt wird! Das zeigt der Fall von Davidson (s.o.). Selbst Validierung/Selbst Bestätigung/Überzeugung//Wissenschaft/FriedmanVsDavidson/M. Williams: Friedman These: Selbst Validierung ist möglich. Aber dazu darf nicht angenommen werden, dass unsere Erklärung, wie Referenz bestimmt ist, von vornherein garantiert, dass unsere Überzeugungen wahr sind. Pointe: d.h. dass Friedman keinen substantiellen W Begriff aus der Tatsache herleitet, dass Wahrheit in Gesetzen vorkommt. (?). Statt dessen argumentiert er für einen „realistischen“ Ansatz .für Referenz. I 499 substantieller W Begriff/Friedman: ist dann ein Abfallprodukt davon! Selbst Validierung/Friedman/Zirkel/M. Williams: erscheint zirkulär, weil wir die Methoden gebrauchen, die bestätigt werden sollen. Ähnlich;: VsPutnam: Kausaltheorie der Referenz: setzt die Verläßlichkeit voraus, die sie erklären will. Lösung/PutnamVsVs: es ist nur eine Art „Check der Konsistenz“. Lösung/Friedman/M. Williams: es ist kein Zirkel, weil nicht von vornherein garantiert ist, dass es unsere besten Theorien sind, die die Verläßlichkeit garantieren. Wissenschaft/Friedman: eine wichtige Aufgabe ist es zu zeigen, wie Wissenschaft nicht ihre eigene Belegbasis unterminieren kann. Wie Quine sagt: Wissenschaft/Quine: verteidigt sich von innen, gegen ihre Selbstzweifel. Friedman/M. Williams: das sieht so aus, als ob Friedman Raum für einen allgemeinen Skeptizismus schafft. Das wird klar wenn er unterscheidet: a) Kausaltheorien der Referenz b) Theorien die auf dem Prinzip der Nachsicht basieren, (Davidson). Referenz/Davidson/M. Williams: nach Davidson ist die Zuschreibung von Referenten eine Sache der Methode unserer Interpretation. Verläßlichkeit: d.h. dass wir auf Dinge referieren, über die wir verläßlich berichten können ist keine empirische Tatsache, die wir aus „unseren besten Theorien“ ableiten. Kausaltheorie/Referenz/Friedman: dagegen: spezifiziert Referenz durch Überlegungen, die unabhängig von Wahrheit oder Falschheit der Sätze die wir zufällig akzeptieren, sind. Überzeugung/FriedmanVsDavidson: das läßt die Möglichkeit offen, dass die meisten (oder alle) unserer Überzeugungen falsch sein könnten. I 500 Wahrheit/Friedman: dann haben wir etwas signifikantes (substantielles?) gezeigt, wenn wir zeigen, dass unsere Methoden meist wahre Überzeugungen liefern. Aber das geht nur mit der Kausaltheorie, denn sie erlaubt diese selbst kritische Kraft, die am Ende die Selbst Rechtfertigung liefert. Skeptizismus/Friedman/M. Williams: diese Selbstkorrektur ermöglicht Friedman dadurch, dass er allgemeinen Skeptizismus zuläßt. M. WilliamsVsFriedman: das ist pervers, so wie man eine Krankheit erwirbt aus Freude daran, sie zu kurieren. Außerdem setzt er eine Menge voraus, z.B. die Existenz „unserer induktiven Methoden“, oder die kausale Definition von Referenz. |
Econ Fried I Milton Friedman The role of monetary policy 1968 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Davidson, D. | Millikan Vs Davidson, D. | I 209 Quotation marks/quotation/Davidson/Millikan: (Davidson, 19XX) thesis: mentioning quotation marks are indexical or "demonstrative". Their filling is semantically outside the sentence. Ex when I point to a fish and say "I've caught this fish" the fish is outside the sentence. I 210 Mentioning quotation marks/Davidson: Ex "the expression with the form shown here." MillikanVsDavidson: suppose that quotation marks alone arrange the indexing. Then the indexical relation of adaptation is a relation to a type of filling ((S) the content does not matter). But if the filling is regarded as part of the sentence, then one wonders what the criterion is for where the sentence ends and where the environment of the sentence begins. Ex "I caught this fish today" is a complete sentence with and without a fish. By contrast, "___" has five letters" is not a complete sentence. ((S) The demonstrative therefore need not be met in the sentence, but may be supplemented by ostension. But the filling of quotation marks is indispensable in the sentence.) Quotation marks/Davidson/Millikan: Thesis: quotation marks refer to the form of the expression between them (filling). MillikanVsDavidson: that is inadequate because there is no clear concept of an expressive type. Expressions are never categorized by the shape. Millikan: thesis: a strength of my approach is that linguistic units can be grouped into types. But while it's never about shape, but about lowest types or genetic families. Millikan: when we say "he first drew this ... and then ..." we need demonstratives and ostension, not quotation marks. I 211 Introduction/novelty/new/Millikan: if we introduce a completely new expression with be mentioning quotation marks, we refer to a reproductively specified family. In addition, the new symbol should be at least partly from known elements or aspects. Otherwise, the token does not fall into any scheme of the same / different - which is necessary so that one could recognize the progeny of this expression (tokens of the same type). Articulateness/articulation/quotation marks/quotation/introduction/Millikan: some characters between quotation marks are articulated, others are not: Ex "The letter "c"": here, the "c" is completely inarticulate, like a name or Ex "red" in "The German word "red"". articulated: if something is presented as a token of one type, it has to be articulated ((S) have a structure). articulated: (between the quotation marks) Ex "The syllable "red"" Ex "The term "King of France"": articulated in the sense in which a sentence is articulate, or a complex denotation. MillikanVsDavison: if the filling between the quotation marks is without significant semantic structure, it can not be a singular term. It is a denotation if you will. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Newen Vs Davidson, D. | Newen I 201 Behavior/DennettVsCausal Explanation/Explanation/Explanation of Behavior/Dennett/DennettVsDavidson/Ryle/Newen: Dennett (like Ryle): behavior cannot be explained causally, but by desires and beliefs as intentional attitudes, not causes. (DennettVsDavidson). I 205 Belief/Intentionality/Intentional Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Dennett's explanation does not include the thesis that desires and beliefs even exist. DennettVsDavidson/VsCausal Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Thesis: the levels (intentional, physical, functional) are isolated and must not be linked. Mental Phenomena/Dennett/Newen: can only be detected by the attribution of intentional attitudes. I 206 VsDennett: E.g. toothaches are a mental state. Then Dennett has to assert that the state depends on whether it is useful for someone to attribute toothache to this person. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Deconstructivism | Searle Vs Deconstructivism | Rorty VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstructivism/Rorty: suppose I catch a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me, the carburetor is anyway only text and there was nothing to talk about except on the textuality of this text, then the communication has collapsed. RortyVsSearle: the deconstructionist intellectuals who with happiness found a job as an auto mechanic, it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. >Deconstructivism. The Deconstructivism has not changed his life, as atheism the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the mental element. Rorty VI 120 Description/action/understanding/Searle: Our practices are incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with not realistic or non representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some propositions may not be questioned without considering the practices themselves in doubt. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical flourishes that will give the practice the appearance to maintain a huge thing, namely, the metaphysical reality. Rorty VI 120 RortyVsSearle: Hard realism leads to metaphysics. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Deflationism | Brandom Vs Deflationism | I 467 Deflationism is in danger to undermine itself. Fact: Snow is white No fact: no fact is claimed when we say "It is true, that snow is white". NS I 163 Truth Meaning/BrandomVsDavidson: the return from meaning to truth could only succeed with a stronger concept of truth that is not available. (BrandomVsDeflationism, BrandomVsTarski). Conclusion relations/Brandom: three types of conclusions that illuminate meaning: 1. those that commit to further beliefs (e.g. deductive conclusions). 2. those that allow (inductive and deductive) 3. those that exclude. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descartes, R. | Burge Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 699 Reliability theoryVsSkepticism/Burge: some want to block the skepticism by denying seclusion principles. BurgeVsDescartes: I think we can be sure that we are not being deceived by any deus malignus. We derive this knowledge from our perception knowledge. This is not transcendental, as some authors believe. BurgeVsDescartes: the second stage judgment (reflective) simply inherits the content of the first-stage thought. E.g. "Water is a liquid": 1) you need the ability to think the empirical thought of the first stage, and 2) to attribute it to yourself at the same time. The knowledge of the content of the thoughts does not require an upstream separate examination of the conditions, just like the knowledge of the contents of perception does not require this. Fra I 700 One simply knows the thought by thinking it. We have no criterion, no phenomenon and no empiricism. I 705 BurgeVsDescartes: it is wrong to conceive one’s own thoughts as objects and to attribute a special faculty of infallibility to oneself. Either you introduce the new entity of an ability or special objects as new entities. OckhamVs. E.g. propositions which can only be thought if they have been fully understood, or ideas whose esse is their percipi. That would be objects about which no mistakes could be made, like items that could be seen at once from all sides. I 708 BurgeVsDescartes: main error: the difference between a-priori knowledge and authoritative self blurring knowledge of the first person. One has clearly no authority to know whether one of one’s own thoughts can be individuated or to explicated in a certain way. But one does not need this authority to know that one is thinking them. E.g. I can know that I have arthritis, and know that I think that without having clear criteria for arthritis. It is a truism that you have to understand what you think well enough to think of it. But this does not mean that such an understanding brings an ability to explication or substitution with it, nor that such an understanding is immune to errors. So you can know what your own thoughts are, even if you only understand them partially. DavidsonVs: that undermines the authority of the first person. BurgeVsDavidson: that is not necessary if a distinction is made between understanding and the ability to explicate. I 709 Explication: requires a higher degree of objectification: a conceptual mastery of the conditions that are the basis of your own thoughts and a conceptual mastery of the rules that you follow. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Disquotation | Putnam Vs Disquotation | Putnam VII 431 Truth/Putnam: the only reason one can have to deny that truth is a property would be that one is physicalist or phenomenalist. Or maybe a culture-relativist. Truth/property/Putnam: only reductionist theories deny that truth is a property. (PutnamVsDisquotationalism: >Disquotationalism). Truth/Putnam: is a property - >PutnamVsDeflationism - Rorty: (R. Rorty, The Mirror of Nature): truth is no property. --- Horwich I 455 Divine perspective/outside/PutnamVsGods perspective/Rorty: Putnam is amused as James and Dewey about such attempts. Rorty: but he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: this one is too reductionist, to positivistic, to "behaviorist" for him ("transcendental Skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: if a philosopher says, truth is something other than electricity because there is probably room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, Horwich I 456 and that the knowledge of the truth conditions was everything what one could know about the truth, then he denies that truth is a property. Thus, there is then no property of the correctness or accuracy ((s)> Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover. PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions assertions. Theory/existence/reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam assumes here that the only reason to deny is that one needs a theory for an X, to say that the X is "nothing but Y". ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that assertions can be reduced to noise. Then the field linguist must reduce acts on motions. Davidson/Rorty: but he does not say that assertions were nothing but noise. Instead: Truth/explanation/Davidson: unlike electricity truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained that a sentence which it claims, is true). Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 --- Horwich I XIV VsDeflationism/Horwich: provides no explicit truth-definition, but is only based on a scheme (disquotational scheme). Horwich I XVI Truth/simple/unanalysable/Russell/Moore/Cartwright/Horwich: if truth is unanalysable basic concept (VsDeflationism), then it is completely independent of awareness. That is, truth gets something metaphysical. Problem: then we cannot assume that the propositions which we believe, have this property. Then the skepticism follows. --- Horwich I 457 Correctness/PutnamVsDavidson: although he shares his distaste for intentionalist terms, (and therefore does not consider truth as an explanation), he nevertheless wishes a representation of what kind of statement it is, to be correct. Putnam/Rorty: he wants that because he is afraid that the "inside view" of the language game where "true" is an appreciative term - is weakened, if it is not philosophically supported. Because: If language is only production of noise - without normative element - then the noises that we utter are nothing but "an expression of our subjectivity". Normativity/standard/language/Putnam: why should there be no normative elements in the language game? That would be the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPutnam: thus it still depends on a synoptic God's perspective to be brought together in the inner view and outside view of the language game. Norm/JamesVsPutnam/DeweyVsPutnam: we cannot take such a God's perspective. That is, we cannot solidify our standards in that we support them metaphysically or scientifically. Truth/appreciation/PragmatismVsPlato/DeweyVsPlato/RortyVsPutnam: we should not repeat Plato's error, and interpret expressions of appreciation as the names of esoteric entities. --- Williams II 497 Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true, is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give a sense (ii) if we explain the reliability of learning and that can only do the realism. Causal theory/correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would represent us as reliable signal transmitters. What would the truth theory add? It announced that the sentence is true iff the condition exists. This is the correspondence, which is involved in the causal theory, it is precisely the correspondence that is established by the truth definition. Deflationism/correspondence/M. Williams: the minimal correspondence is also available for him. That is, Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or another substantive theory. Williams II 502 Truth/Putnam: must be substantial ((s) explanatory role, truth as a property, PutnamVsDeflationism). Otherwise it leads to cultural relativism. PutnamVsCultural relativism: an extreme culture-relativist may himself not even consider a thinker or speaker, as opposed to a mere noise maker. ((s) speaking not distinguishable from sound). This is mental suicide. PutnamVsDisquotationalism: has no explanatory power, unless something is said about the concept of assertion. M. WilliamsVsPutnam: do we need that? Putnam: to be able to view ourselves as thinkers, speaking must be more than noise-making and then we must be able to explain to ourselves what it means to understand a sentence. PutnamVsmetaphysical Realism/M. Williams: although Putnam finds this picture sympathetic, he prefers to explain meaning in terms of situation appropriate use. Problem: that we do not stop that there are various inguistic practices ((s) different communities) and therefore different ways of justification. Solution: ideal justification. And that is how Putnam understands truth. Truth/PutnamVsDisquotationalism: if we say nothing about the truth in terms of assertibility conditions, we do not get a concept of objective truth, which allows the cultural relativism to escape. Then we identified truth implicitly with assertibility relative to the norms of a particular community. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Dummett, M. | Avramides Vs Dummett, M. | Avra I 8 AvramidesVsDummett/AvramidesVsDavidson: the approach of the "theory makers" is too pessimistic, their pessimism is premature and unwarranted. I 10 AvramidesVsDummett: his reasons are not convincing, the fact remains that he merely expresses a preference. The "knowing of a language" is therefore more complex than just knowing of meanings. Meaning/Dummett: What are the linguistic or non-linguistic means which we can use to determine the meaning of an expression without determining it explicitly? Or perhaps one should not ask at all how we express something in a situation, but rather how we should analyze sentences that include the concept of meaning. AvramidesVsDummett: this might apply to other terms as well. Analysis/Avramides: is a harmless means, if we meet Wisdoms demand. (And clearly capture the subject matter). I 12 AvramidesVsDummett: he does not say why we should proceed like this in the case of the concept of knowledge (providing a theory that explains all knowledge of the actors (the users of the term)). Avra I 143 Dummett/Avramides: shows three things: 1) Locke’s idealistic theory is not irreparable. It can be completed. I 144 2) Dummett moves from the question "What associates a concept or idea with a word or phrase?" to the question: "What does it mean to understand a concept or idea?" AvramidesVsDummett: he could just as easily have started with both questions at the same time; if both are not answered, the ideational theory of meaning only wastes time. 3. AvramidesVsDummett: he has not developed his view of how we grasp a concept or an idea in a way that it also permits the attribution of thoughts to speechless beings. (Thw/oL). I would therefore like to propose an extension. Thinking without Language/Thw/oL/AvramidesVsDummett: if we allow Thw/oL (> See Dummett: W.James Lectures No. 8, pp. 48), how do we understand this kind of (speechless) thoughts? We could say, we attribute them through the behavior. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Dummett, M. | Schiffer Vs Dummett, M. | I 221 Verificanistical semantics/Dummett/Schiffer: (not truth-theoretical): verification conditions instead of truth conditions. Dummett: (like Davidson): we must ask what form a meaning theory (m.th.) would have to take to find out what meaning is. This M.Th. should be able to specify the meaning of all words and propositions. (Dummett 1975, p. 97). Dummett: pro compositionality (with Wittgenstein): no systematic meaning theory is possible without explaining the understanding of infinitely many sentences. Therefore one must, like Chomsky and Wittgenstein, accept that we have an implicit capture some general principles. (Dummett 1978, p. 451). DummettVsDavidson: the meaning theory does not have to contain any truth theory (tr.th.). Verification condition/verification conditions/Dummett: (for propositions) the verification conditions are also recursively specified. Schiffer: but that does not follow that a compositional truth-theoretic semantics does not exist as well. I 222 Dummett: with the specification of the verification conditions the meaning theory could at the same time specify the truth conditions (Dummett 1978 Foreword). Verification conditions/SchifferVsDummett: it is not clear how the verification conditions should look like. Relation theory/meaning theory/Schiffer: when I argued VsRelation theory, I had a standard meaning theory in mind. The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics (tr.th.sem.). Otherwise, it would be true!. Verificationist meaning theory/Verif. m.th./relation theory/Dummett/Schiffer: with a verificationist meaning theory could the relation theory maybe also be true?. I 225 Use theory/Dummett/Schiffer: for Dummett the point of use theory is: "the meaning of a word is uniquely determined by the observable characteristics of its linguistic use". (Dummett 1976, 135). SchifferVsDummett: but what counts as "observable characteristic" and what as "openly shown" ?. Does Dummett think that a description of the use in purely behavioral, non-semantic and non-psychological terms would be sufficient that a word has a specific meaning? That would be too implausible as that Dummett would accept that. Still, he notes that the description should not use any psychological or semantic terms. Meaning/Dummett/Schiffer: should therefore also become understandable for beings who have no semantic or psychological concepts themselves! So even for Marsians. (Also McDowell understands him like this, 1981, 237). McDowellVsDummett: according to Dummett it must be possible to give a description of our language behavior that is understandable for extraterrestrials. That does not work, because the intentional "(content-determining) is not reducible to the non-intentional. Content/McDowellVsDummett/SchifferVsDummett: is not detectable for extraterrestrials. ((s) Not "speechless", but only those who do not share our intentional vocabulary). I 226 Ad. 4: ("To know which recognizable circumstances determine a proposition as true or false"). Schiffer: that means how do we get from behaviorism to anti-realism?. Manifestation/SchifferVsDummett: this one makes do here even with pronounced psychological terms!. 1. Recognizing (that the conditions are met) is itself a form of knowledge, which in turn contains belief. You cannot describe that non-psychologically. 2. How can one then achieve the further conclusion that a purified attribution should ascribe a skill that can only be "openly shown"? (The showing understood behavioristically). Behaviorism/Dummett/Schiffer: However, I am not ascribing any behaviorism to Dummett, I ascribe him nothing, I just wonder what his position is. meaning theory/m.th./Dummett: thinks that natural languages have a m.th.! Their core will be recursively definable verif. cond.. Anti-Realism/Schiffer: here Dummett is uncertain whether the m.th. should have falsification conditions, but that will not affect my subsequent criticism. 1. Whether the knowledge that a state of affair exists, counts as verification of a proposition. I 227 Could depend on extralinguistic knowledge and not by the understanding of the proposition! We usually need background information. Understanding/SchifferVsDummett: then it should not be about verification conditions!. Direct verification conditions/Dummett: has to exist for each single proposition!. QuineVsDummett/Schiffer: (Quine 1953b): direct verification conditions cannot exist for every proposition. ((s) ~Theories are not verifiable proposition by proposition). 2. Surely there are meaningful propositions that have no recognizable conditions that would turn out this proposition as true or false. Dummett/Schiffer: insists, however, that a proposition must be shown as true or false and in fact "conclusively" (conclusive verifiability). (1978, 379). This leads to anti-realism. ((s) Def anti-realism/Dummett/(s): is exactly to demand that the verification must be performed in order to understand a proposition. The realism would waive the verification.) Anti-realism/Dummett: you still should not rely too heavily on the anti-realism! Because often a "conclusive verification" is not to obtain!. Schiffer: so Dummett itself holds the verification conditions contestable!. I 228 Pain/Verification/Wittgenstein/Dummett/Schiffer: Dummett quotes Wittgenstein with consent: that pain behaviors can be refuted. (Dummett 1978, S. XXXV) SchifferVsDummett: then the m.th. needs contestable criteria as well as contestable conditions!. Problem: this applies to most empirical judgments E.g. "That is a dog". 3. We know what kind of semantic values we must attribute to the non-logical constants (predicates and singular term) in the conditional sentences in a truth-theoretic semantics. But how shall that look like in the alternative with verification conditions instead of truth conditions?. Solution/Dummett: the verificationist semantics will make every predicate an effective means available, so that it can be determined for each object whether the predicate applies to the object or the singular term references to the object. I 230 Relation theory/SchifferVsDummett: the by me disapproved relation theory for propositional attitudes (belief as a relation to belief objects) seems inevitable for Dummett. ((s) because of the relation of predicates to objects to which they must apply verifiable). Problem: that can only happen in a finite theory, and for propositional attitude it would have to be infinite, because for each prop the VB would have to be found individually. Relation theory/Schiffer: has to assume propositional attitude as E.g. "believes that Australians drink too much" as semantically primitive - namely, 2-figure predicate between believer and content). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Foster, J.A. | Davidson Vs Foster, J.A. | II 35 DavidsonVsFoster: my mistake was not assuming that any theory that gives the correct truth conditions could serve as an interpretation. My mistake was, however, (like Foster says) to overlook that someone could have a sufficiently clear theory without knowing that it is there! It was easy for me to overlook this, because I departed from the one who constructed the theory himself. FosterVsDavidson: Question: whether Davidson made clear enough what a competent translator must know. FosterVsDavidson: Davidson’s theory is in ruins because in order to secure the translation II 38 an intensional expression like "determines" (or "asserts") must be used. DavidsonVsFoster: But I’ve never tried that! My attempt at finding access to language and meaning, makes significant use of concepts such as belief and intention, but I do not think that these concepts can be reduced to something behavioristic or scientific. I avoid substantial use of unexplained linguistic concepts. Saying that an interpreter necessarily must know a so-called intensional concept does not ruin my theory. (Beliefs and intentions are also intensional). DavidsonVsFoster: has not exactly distinguished two problems: 1) whether the paratactical analysis can be applied here at all. (Marginal). 2) whether the radical interpretation is threatened if the relevant concept "determines" obscures an unanalysed linguistic concept. Davidson: I propose paratactic semantics for "determines", unless it can be shown that it is not working. Reference/DavidsonVsFoster: it cannot be sufficient to maintain the same reference, because then all true propositions would assert the same fact. II 40 DavidsonVsFoster: ...this is not a "notational variant", notation has nothing to do with it. Both accept the same notation, the possible-world semanticist and I. We differ in the semantic analysis. Reference/Translation/Token reflexive/Davidson: the fact that the reference is changed in translation often occurs in token-reflexive sentences (so-called by Reichenbach). (E.g. snow ... snow, this ... this). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Foster, J.A. | Hintikka Vs Foster, J.A. | EMD II 15 FostersVsDavidson: a truth theory is no longer truly interpreting for all languages if that what the elements designate exceeds that which is relevant to the truth. These languages include at least all extensional languages for which L is typical. VsFoster: there are at least 4 ways to attack this view: 1) HintikkaVsFoster: (correspondingly): Foster reads more meaning into an extensional language that its simple syntax allows. In such a language, the meaning of the elements does not exceed their truth-relevant designation function. The additional conditions cited by Foster ("the earth moves and...") are more of an extensional fragment of a richer, non-extensional language. 2) VsFoster: no natural language could ever be purely extensional, a language needs propositional attitudes, and these are attributed non-extensionally. 3) VsFoster: (weaker): even if there may be a purely extensional languages, all known natural languages are non-extensional. I.e. Foster’s conclusions have little relevance. 4) VsFoster: if the method of truth theory sufficed for a certain type of non-extensional language, we can easily adapt it to an extensional language by constructing the theory only for a hypothetical non-extensional language of which this language would be a fragment. Common denominator of this criticisms VsVsDavidson: that the peculiarity of the language with which Davidson’s theory is tested was not grasped. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Goodman, N. | Putnam Vs Goodman, N. | III 145 Putnam: where do these worlds even come from? PutnamVsGoodman: this is a form of realism that is no less extreme than that of Hegel or Fichte! III 146 Goodman/Putnam: the limits of natural species are in some ways arbitrary, albeit less than in artificial species. (III 268, water always contains H4O2, H6O3, etc.). Not every glowing gas cloud is deemed star. Some stars do not shine. Is it not ourselves that by the inclusion and exclusion attribute all these different objects to a category? In this respect it has been us ourselves who has made them stars. PutnamVsGoodman: Now Goodman makes a daring extrapolation: then there should not be anything that we have not made to what it is. III 147 If we want to beat Goodman in his own chosen sport by trying to nominate a "substance independent of consciousness", we obviously get into great difficulties. But we can mitigate Goodman: There is actually a fundamental difference between such expressions as "constellation" and "Ursa Major" on the one hand and an expression like "Star" on the other. The extension of the term "Ursa Major" is determined by a language convention. A typical proper noun when learning. Which stars belong to it we learn by finding out what is called the "Ursa Major". III 148 That it includes all these stars, I would not call "analytical", because if one disappeared, we undoubtedly still spoke of Ursa Major and would say it no longer encompasses as many stars as previously. Which stars are Ursa Major is a question that does not concern the astrophysicist, but the ethnologist or the linguist. The word "star" (as opposed to the term "Ursa Major") is an extension that can not be determined by specifying a list! No single object belongs to an extension by the very fact that it is called a star. In this regard, the term "constellation" lies somewhere in the middle between "Ursa Major" and "star". If we find out that all the stars are giant dummies, we would say: "actually there are no stars", but not "actually, it's not Ursa Major." Would we no longer view it as a constellation? That's not certain! III 149 Goodman: asks: can you name anything that we did not create ourselves? PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius itself. We have not even made it a star! We have brought about the term star, and it applies to Sirius. Our concept of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, our language practice making him a bachelor! Objectivity/Putnam: We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true. III 154 Incompatibility/change of meaning/change of concept/change of theory/language/theories: (Goodman and Davidson find them so exciting): point, line, border etc. are used differently throughout the versions. Ex "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not sets, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes, either there is no world or we lived in more than one. Davidson: the actually acknowledged phenomenon of equivalent descriptions would somehow hold a logical contradiction. PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another. III 157 Goodman: Challenge: "all right, then please describe this reality as it is, independent of these modes of expression." PutnamVsGoodman: but why would you assume that it is possible to describe the reality independent of our descriptions anyway? Why should that lead to the assumption that there is nothing but the descriptions? Finally, also according to our own descriptions it applies that the word "quark" is something completely different than a quark. I (k) 257 Ontology/Goodman/Putnam: in a sense, there is nothing we have not created! One can even conceive of elementary particles as dependent on our spirit. Putnam: it is really difficult to find any stuff "independent of spirit"! PutnamVsGoodman: in fact there is a difference between constellations and stars: the extension of "Big Dipper" is determined by linguistic convention. One can learn what stars are in the group, if one learns the meaning of the expression. A typical proper noun. It is not analytical that the Big Dipper includes the stars. Ex If one of the stars should disappear, we would still speak of the constellation. We would say: the Big Dipper no longer includes as many stars as previously, just like someone losing hair, yet the person remains the same. Ex if a new star appeared, we would not automatically include it in the constellation! Which stars belong to the constellation is a question for anthropologists or linguists, not for the astrophysicists. I (k) 257/258 The expression "star" in contrast to the expression "Big Dipper" is an extension which can not be defined by a list. No object is the extension of "star" because it is called a star. Ex Someone who believes that Sirius is a giant light bulb, would thus not demonstrate not knowing how to use the expression "star"! Conversely, someone who doubts that this constellation is the Big Dipper the fact shows not knowing how to use the expression "Big Dipper"! Ex If aliens have replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper with giant light bulbs, we would say: "That aren't really stars", but not "This is not really the Big Dipper". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Holism | Davidson Vs Holism | I (e) 98 Errors are difficult to identify and to explain if holism is not somehow limited. Glüer II 70 Radical Interpretation/RI/Belief holism/BittnerVsDavidson: (Rüdiger Bittner): from the fact that beliefs can be found only in patterns, does not follow a rationality of the meaners. It only follows that pollsters (interpreters) must proceed in this way. (s) does that mean that rationality is assumed or only that the interpreter has patterns for his own approach? Glüer II 71 DavidsonVsBittner/GlüerVsBittner: accusing Davidson of "unpenetrated verificationism" appears to be thoughtless: The most basic assumption is precisely the publicity of the meaning and content of the conviction. Glüer II 72 Understanding/RI/Problem: how many convictions are essential and how much agreement is necessary in order to secure understanding? |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Holism | Dummett Vs Holism | Fodor/Lepore IV 8 Analytic/Synthetic/(a/s)/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: there is an argument that anatomical features are also holistic, which presupposes that the distinction anal/synth (a/s) is suspended. E.g. DummettVsHolism: shows neither how communication should function nor language acquisition or language proficiency. (If you have to know all propositions at the same time, which is impossible). ((s) This therefore expects that even anatomical properties are holistic. (or that there are no analytical propositions). Due to this extreme position learning only becomes impossible). Dummett/(s)VsDummett: Departs from the extreme assumption that anatomical properties (which only a second similar thing can have) are also holistic, i.e. are shared by many similar things. So almost a bugbear. Dummett: nor does holism show how a whole theory can be significant at all: if in turn its internal structure cannot be broken down into significant parts, then it has no internal structure. Fodor/Lepore: Dummett argues from the following analogy: Sentences are interpersonally understandable, because their meanings are formed from the meanings of their components and the speaker and hearer are privy to these meanings. Dummett/Fodor/Lepore: this explanation assumes that the speaker and hearer mean the same thing. Fodor/Lepore IV 9 And it assumes that the constituents have meaning at all. If holism were true, this would be false. Fodor/Lepore IV 10 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: is also a revisionism: he could reply HolismVsDummett: "so much the worse for our conventional understanding of how languages and theories learned and taught". Quine, Dennett, Stich, the Churchlands and many others are strongly tempted by this revisionist direction. Horwich I 459 Meaning Theory/M.Th./DummettVsDavidson: we need more than he gives us: it could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the content of the (metalinguistic) right side of the T sentence. T sentence/Dummett: explains nothing if the metalanguage contains the object language. And because this is so, the same applies if meta language and object language are separated (terminology/Dummett: "M sentence". T-sentence/Davidson: "neutral, snow-bound triviality" No single T-sentence says what it means to understand the words on the left side, but the whole corpus of sentences says that this is everything you can know about it ((s) no theory "beyond", "about"). DummettVsDavidson: thus Davidson admits defeat: then it cannot be answered how the speaker came to his own understanding of the words he used. ((s)> DummettVsHolism) DummettVsDavidson: The ability for language use cannot be split into separate skills Language/Use/Wittgenstein/Davidson/SellarsVsDummett/Rorty: such partial skills do not exist. If "tertia" such as "special meaning ", "response to stimuli", etc. are abolished, there are no components anymore, in which the capacity for language use could be divided (>competence?). E.g. "How do you know that this is red?" Wittgenstein: "I speak German." T-sentence/Davidson: does not double any internal structures. They do not even exist, otherwise the "Tertia" would be introduced again. Meaning theory/DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: he makes a virtue of necessity. But we can expect more from a MT. And that is that it retains the traditional concepts of the empiricist epistemology. Such a theory must explain the ability to use language through knowledge of the truth conditions. Dummett: Contrast: E.g. "this is red" and E.g. "there are transfinite cardinal numbers". Holism/Wittgenstein/VsDummett/DavidsonVsDummett: There is no contrast!. Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is acquiring the inferential relations between the sentences and other sentences of the language. Meaning/Wittgenstein: accepting some inferential principle helps to determine the meaning of words. (Davidson ditto). DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsHolism: This leads us to the attitude that no systematic MT is at all possible. RortyVsDummett: does not show, however, how it is possible.(1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty I 289 Philosophy/Dummett/Rorty: (VsDavidson) (like Putnam): only task of philosophy is the analysis of meaning. (It is the foundation, and not Descartes’ epistemology). DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolismus/Rorty: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (Givenness/Interpretation and Necessity/Contingency). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Horwich, P. | Field Vs Horwich, P. | I 175 Relationism/Field: Advantage: good technical conditions for the formulation of field theories and to avoid long-distance effect. Also: "Problem of Quantities": >acceleration. (see below) Def Monadicism/Horwich/Field: (Horwich, 1978): Thesis: denies just like Relationism that there is spacetime (sp.t.). ((s) empty, self-relying sp.t.). Sp.t. only logical construction! VsRelationalism: no aggregates of matter or relations between them. Instead: primitive monadic properties of sp.t. places. ((s) as the fundamental concept). SubstantivalismVsMonadicism/Field: according to substantivalism such monadic local properties are not primitive: they are gained from the two-digit relation "occupied", with an argument being instantiated with a sp.t. point. MonadicismVs: denies sp.t. in general. Instead, a piece of matter can either have or not have these primitive properties. FieldVsMonadicism/FieldVsHorwich: this is mainly based on a confusion of the "predicate interpretation" and the "interpretation of a higher level": Reduction/Field: when we say that we want to reduce the ontology by a stock of primitive properties, I 176 we mostly think in reality that we expand our stock of primitive predicates. This can often be very important in order to gain simplicity. Monadicism/M/Horwich: Substantivalism and M acknowledge a lot of properties that can be expressed by predicates of the form "appears at time t". Only difference: Substantivalism/S: double-digit predicates such as "Brother of John" or place occupied by a name or description of a moment. Monadicism: purely monadic predicates. FieldVsMonadicism/FieldVsHorwich: the "predicate monadicism" does not look attractive: it is unclear what analogues it has to the sp.t. points of S. Talk about regions or points cannot simply be replaced by talk about properties, because: M does not quantify at all on local properties, but it uses predicates. ((s) no existence assumptions). Then we have to assume a supply of uncountably many semantically primitive predicates. II 71 Def Fallacy of the Constitution/Horwich/Field: the (false) assumption that what constitutes relational facts would itself be relational. Representation/Horwich: instead we would have to find a monadic physical property that constitutes "believing that snow is white", etc. for each and every belief. E.g. that Pius X was the brother of Malcolm X!. These individual properties would not need to have anything in common. Important argument: above all, they do not need to involve a physical relation. Deflationism: Horwich pro, he needs his thesis for that. Field pro Deflationism. FieldVsHorwich: his resources are not fit for deflationism: because the "Fallacy of the Constitution" is not indeed a fallacy. His demands to a physicalist approach are too weak. E.g. a physical relation like "has the same temperature as". Surely you will not say that "having the same temperature as b" constituted another monadic property in the case of object b2, etc. through a monadic property in the case of b1, with these properties having nothing in common. II 72 If other requirements are to apply to the physical relation between people and propositions than for other physical relations, then you have to say why. FieldVsHorwich: it would not help him to say that other reduction standards apply if one of the sides is abstract. Because we also have this in the case of assigning numbers to objects, which preserves the relational character. But that may not be just transferred to intentional relations, as we have seen. ((s) FieldVsDavidson?). But as long as we cannot specify a reason for weaker standards, it is not shown that we do not need a genuinely relational approach, only that it is more difficult here. 2) On the other hand: some of the mental relations for which Horwich tries to avoid a relational approach exist between physical entities: E.g. "x has a belief about the person p". II 243 Nonfactualism/Value/Assessment/Ethics/Evaluative/Horwich/Field: (Horwich 1990): the deflationism that is attached to the ENT (Horwich pro) can still make sense of emotivism. Emotivism/Horwich: ...can say that the meaning of "x is good" sometimes is given by the rule that a person is in the position to express it if he is aware that he assesses X as good... (p. 88). FieldVsHorwich: this is the same problem as with Horwichs handling of vagueness: it boils down to him denying vagueness! Vagueness/Horwich/Field: he says that we cannot know if Jones is bald, because we can only know his physical description and baldness is not determinable from it. Assessment/Horwich/Field: here his remarks are compatible with the fact that "good" denotes a completely factual (evidence-based) property, but one with the special characteristic that our own assessment gives us the evidence that a thing instantiates this property - ((s) circularly) - and/or that our belief that something has this property, somehow to brings us to evaluate it ((s) just as circularl Unlike >Euthyphro). FieldVsHorwich: it is completely unclear now what nonfactualism actually is. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Kant | McDowell Vs Kant | I 69 Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito. McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality. I 69 Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other. I 109/110 Second Nature/(s): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education/McDowell. I 111 Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. I 122 Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world. I 123 McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background. I 126 Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm. I 127 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| McDowell, J. | Schiffer Vs McDowell, J. | I 204 SchifferVsDavidson/SchifferVsMcDowell/SchifferVsEvans: thesis: a translation theory is possible for the Radical Interpretation (RI). compositionality/Schiffer: problem: If Davidson is right, and we first need a theory of meaning for our own language for the RI, then our language must have a compositional semantics. (…+…) |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Prosentential Theory | Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory | Horwich I 344 Quote/VsProsentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: one accuses the prosentential theory of ignoring cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences is stated. Example (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: we could say here with Ramsey that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: this obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become clearer when we use a foreign-language translation. Example (28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then… Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then Or If snow is white, then… CGB: there are several possible reasons here. We may want to make it clear that the original sentence was written in German. Or it could be that there is no elegant translation, or we do not know the grammar of German well enough. Or example: "Snow is white" must be true because Fritz said it and everything Fritz says is true. I 345 Suppose English* has a way of formally presenting a sentence: E.g. „Betrachte __“ („Consider____"). (29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work the same as "snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: you could argue that it requires a reference to sentences or expressions because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation marks/CGB: we deviate from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. ((s) not for CGB). Quote/CGB: should not be considered as a reference to expressions in normal English. But we do not want to follow that up here. I 346 VsCGB: one has accused the prosentential theory of tunnel vision: Maybe we overlooked certain grammatically similar constructions? Example (30) John: there are seven legged dogs Mary: that's surprising, but true. (31) John: the being of knowledge is the knowledge of being Mary: that is profound and it is true. Ad (30): of course the first half is "that is surprising" in no way prosentential. It is a characterization! VsCGB: Ad (31) "is profound" expresses a quality that Mary attributes to the sentence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood in the same way? CGB: it makes sense to take "this" here as referring to a sentence. But that would make things more complicated because then we would have to treat "that" and "it" differently in "that's true" and "it's true". CGBVsVs: 1. it is just not true that the "that" in "that's surprising" refers to an utterance (in the sense of what was said, or a proposition). What is surprising here? Facts, events or states of affairs. Statement/Surprise/CGB: a statement can only be surprising as an act. I 347 The surprising thing about the statement is the fact reported. ((s) But then the content rather than the act of testimony.) CGBVs(s): it is not the fact that there are seven legged dogs claimed to be true in (30), because that fact cannot be true! Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositions are not profound. Acts can be profound. For example insights or thoughts. Truth/Act/Action/Statement/CGB: but statements in the sense of action are not what is called true. ((s) see also StrawsonVsAustin, ditto). Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: even if we consider "that's surprising, but it's true" as referring, the two parts don't refer to the same thing! And then the theory is no longer economic. Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: are there perhaps other cases where it is plausible that a pronoun refers to a proposition? Example (32) John: Some dogs eat grass. Mary: You believe that, but it's not true. Proposition: is often understood as a bearer of truth, and as an object of belief. (CGBVs). I 348 However, if "that" is understood here as a referencing pronoun, then the speaker must be a proposition. CGBVs: we can interpret "that you believe" also differently: as prosentential anaphora (as above in the example "that is wrong", with preceding negation prefix). Then we have no pronominal reference. N.B.: the point is that no property is attributed. Truth is not a property. VsCGB: another objection: it is also a "tunnel vision" that we only have "that is true" but not "that is right" in view. Or the example "exaggerated" by Austin. Example: a child says I've got 15 logs That is right. I 349 Question: should this (and e.g. "This is an exaggeration!") be understood prosententially? CGBVsVs: "that is right" is here the statement that the child counted right, that it did something right. Sometimes this can overlap with the statement that a statement is true. The overlap must exist because there is no clear boundary between language learning and use. I 349 Anaphora/Prosentential Theory/VsCGB: could not one split the prosody and take the individual "that" as an anaphora? CGBVsVs: then one would also have to split off "is true" and no longer perceive it as referencing, but as characterizing ((s) And thus attributing it as property). CGBVs: then we would have to give up our thesis that speech about truth is completely understandable without "carrier of truth" or "truth characteristic". Moreover: Reference/CGB: it is known that not every nominalization has to be referencing ((s) E.g. Unicorn). Predication/CGB: also not every predication has to be characterizing. Divine Perspective/outside/PutnamVsGod's point of view/Rorty: Putnam amuses himself like James and Dewey, about such attempts. Rorty: But he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: it smells too reductionist, too positivist, too "behaviorist" ("transcendental skinnerism"). Truth/Putnam: when a philosopher says truth is something other than electricity because there is room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory, I 456 and that knowledge of the truth condition is all that could be known about truth, then he denies that truth is a property. So there is also no property of correctness or accuracy ((s) >Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions are assertions. Theory/Existence/Reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam here assumes that the only reason to deny is that you need a theory for an X is to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism). PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that claims can be reduced to sounds. Then the field linguist would have to reduce actions to movements. Davidson/Rorty: but this one does not say that claims are nothing but sounds. Instead: Truth/Explanation/Davidson: other than electricity, truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a sentence that claims it is true). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Dummett Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Dummett I 142 Since the vocabulary changes and can be used differently, Davidson no longer considers the language of a particular individual as a starting unit, but the disposition to language usage. DummettVsQuine, VsDavidson: not idiolect, but common language prevalent DummettVsDavidson, DummettVsQuine: It is not permissible to assume that meaning and understanding of the private and non-communicable knowledge depend on a theory. It is not natural to understand precisely the idiolect primarily as a tool of communication. It is rather tempting to consider an internal state of the person concerned as that which gives the expressions of idiolect their respective meanings. I 149 E.g. What a move means is not derived not from the players’ knowledge of the rules, but from the rules themselves. Fodor/Lepore IV 34 Language Philosophy/Fodor/Lepore: current status (1992): 1. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because the distinction analytic/synthetic must be maintained nevertheless. (VsQuine). Representatives: DummettVsQuine: the smallest language in which the proposition that P can be expressed is the one that can express those propositions with which P is analytically connected. 2. It may turn out that the semantic anatomism is correct (and atomism is false), and yet holism does not follow, because even though the distinction analytic/synthetic cannot be maintained because there is a different way of distinction for those propositions, which are constitutive of content, and those that are not. 3. It may turn out that holism follows the assumption that semantic properties are anatomical, but that semantic properties are not anatomical at all! This would mean that the semantic atomism was true. If 3 should be true, someone needs to invent a new story about the relation symbol/world that is not based on similarity or behaviorist stimulus-response scheme,. Fodor/Lepore: Thesis: what we doubt is that the previous arguments show that atomism could not be true. But we want to be moderate. ("Modesty is our middle name"). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Hintikka Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 184 Intentionality/Hintikka: if it is to be defined by the need to explain it with possible worlds, we have to examine possible counterexamples. Counterexample/(s): shall be something that also requires possible worlds without being intentional. However, the thesis was not that intentionality is the only thing that requires possible worlds. Possible counter-examples to the thesis that intentionality is essentially possible-world based: 1) E.g. physical modalities: E.g. causal necessity really does not seem to be intentional. II 185 Vs: but this is deceptive: Solution: Hume has shown that causality is what the mind adds to regularity. To that extent, causality is quite intentional. It points to something behind the perception. 2) E.g. logical (analytical) modalities. They are certainly objective and non-psychological. Nevertheless, they are best explained by possible worlds. I 186 Solution: Meaning/Intentionality/Quine/Hintikka: Quine has shown that meanings are indeed intentional, in that they are dependent on the beliefs (convictions) of the subject. Thesis: According to Quine, we must always ask what are the beliefs of a person are to understand what are their meanings are. DavidsonVsQuine. QuineVsDavidson: belief and meaning cannot be separated. Quine/Hintikka: for meanings what Hume was for causality. 3) E.g. Probability/Probability Theory/de Finetti/L.J.Savage/Hintikka: according to the two authors all probability is subjective. Def Probability/Prob/Mathematics/Hintikka: measure in a sample space. Samples: are "small possible worlds". II 187 Possible Worlds/Dana Scott: "Is there life in possible worlds?". Intentionality/Hintikka: if probability can only be subjective (Thesis: there is no objective probability), this corresponds, in the turn, to what Hume says regarding causality and Quine in relation to meanings. Probability/Prob/Hintikka: is then not a real counterexample to the thesis that intentionality is possible-world based, because even probabilities are in a way intentional. (If probability is possible-world based, in any case). Gradually/Degree/Yes-No/Explanation/Method//Definition/Hintikka: Thesis: seemingly dichotomous concepts can often be better explained if they are conceived as gradual. Definability/Rantala/Hintikka: Rantala: Thesis: we do not begin by asking when a theory clearly specifies a concept, but how much freedom the theory leaves the term. II 188 Determinacy/Hintikka: is a gradual matter, and definability sets in when the uncertainty disappears. This is an elegant equivalence to the model theory. Qualitative/Comparative/Hintikka: by assuming that a property is gradual, a qualitative concept can be transformed into a comparative one. Then we no longer only deal with yes-no questions. Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis is a gradual matter. This is obvious, given that in case of intentionality we must always consider unrealized possibilities. "Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the farther you can go beyond the real world. Degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: is measured by the distance to the actual world. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Radical Interpretation | Newen Vs Radical Interpretation | NI 63 Radical Interpretation/RI/Newen/Schrenk: Basic requirement: that the community has a coherent, rational system of beliefs that is respectful of our logic. Davidson: If this is violated, the foreign language cannot be a language and the strangers can be no thinking beings. VsDavidson: Many argue that this is too strong. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Searle, J.R. | Rorty Vs Searle, J.R. | VI 109 Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation". >Correctness/Rorty. VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). VI 118 Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. >Deconstructivism. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins. The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element. Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle). Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility. RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality. VI 121 Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic. VI 140 RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling"). Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation. VI 141 Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. VI 157 RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity"). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Tarski, A. | Peacocke Vs Tarski, A. | EMD II 162 T-Sentence/PeacockeVsTarski: logical form for a language with index words: ApAt (true (s,p,t) ↔ A(p.t)). s: "structurally descriptive name" of a sentence A(p,t) is a formula that does not contain "true" and "fulfilled". p, t: people, time points. (s) this takes circumstances into account, unlike Tarski, thus making it empirical. Truth/PeacockeVsTarski/PeacockeVsDavidson: Point: i.e. we must assume a certain access to the concept of truth already! When we omit this empirical tendency, the question is what makes one language the language of a community instead of another language. (>Meaning theory/Loar). EMD II 163 Then we do not know what "true in L" means for a particular population P. Demanding an answer here does not mean to criticize Davidson's program. We merely sought to fill a gap. Vs: it could be argued that this gap is already closed by the requirement that every truth definition must satisfy convention T. (Convention T: right side must be a translation of the left, material equivalence, extension is not enough). Davidson: himself speaks of the assimilation of a translation manual. PeacockeVsDavidson: but that only leads us back to the general concept of truth that we are looking for. (Circular). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Tugendhat, E. | Davidson Vs Tugendhat, E. | Frank I 668 Twin Earth/Davidson: does not depend on the idea that social language use dictates what speakers mean and of course not, what their narrow psychological states are. Meaning/DavidsonVsTugendhat: is partially determined by the circumstances. TugendhatVsDavidson. Twin Earth/Stereotype: "Water" is not only applied to substances with the same molecular structure, but also to substances that are sufficiently similar. (Stereotype), E.g. odorless, colorless, etc. Rigid Designator/Davidson: this remark shows that it is possible that I do not recognize a rigid designator when I see one!. Facts/Twin Earth/Davidson: the special fact does not depend on such cases, and also not on how we analyze or should analyze them. It depends instead simply on how the basic connection between words and things is made. Frank I 669 Otherwise we would have no way of knowing what others mean. Meaning/Davidson: we can easily learn the meaning of "Moon" without ever having seen the moon! Davidson thesis: all thinking and every language has a foundation in such direct historical connections (> Putnam, Kripke, baptism/not only for the name, but for all the words). Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Williams, M. | Davidson Vs Williams, M. | Rorty VI 232 Scepticism: M. Williams has doubts whether we have beliefs at all. But this kind of skepticism is not that of Descartes or Stroud!. Beliefs/M. WilliamsVsDavidson: (Davidson: most beliefs are true): does not solve the problem of skepticism, but shifts it to the problem of the inscrutability of reference. Brains in a vat/BIV: E.g. the external interpreter of the brains in the tank has no reason to believe that his idea of what the brain talks about in a vat corresponds to "the self-understanding" of the brain in the tank!. VI 233 DavdisonVsWilliams: would ask back: "Why do you think that we (as brains in the tank) do not think that our comments relate to events in the computer? The "Self-understanding" is only a variant of the "epistemic situation" (Both are forms of "scheme", according to Davidson, in the sense of the dualism scheme/content). Brains in a vat/BIV/M. Williams: We would probably not relate our beliefs to events in the computer. DavidsonVsWilliams: would retort: Williams only believes that, because he has embarked on the idea that we can know the contents of our intentional states without even knowing their causes. That would be exactly the foundation idea that Williams criticized!. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intensionality | Pro | EMD II 151 LoarVsDavidson, LoarVsFoster: semantic analysis is non-formal, non-extensional, but intensional. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning Theory | Davidson, D. | Avramides I 8 Meaning/Davidson/Avramides: Thesis: In order to know what meaning is, we must see what form a meaning theory must have. Davidson: Thesis: to have a semantic concept of truth for a language means to know what it means for a sentence to be true, and that means in a reasonable sense to understand the language. (Davidson 1984b,p.24). Dummett III 83 VsDummett: One could argue that I simply denied Davidson's thesis that when constructing a meaning theory we can only proceed from sentences that are believed to be true and from the conditions under which judgments are made. Horwich I 455 Language Philosophy/Davidson: Thesis: we need nothing but the view of the field linguist. DummettVsDavidson: we need more. Skipper I 3 Meaning Theory/Davidson: Thesis: should have the form of an extensional, finally axiomatized truth theory for language in Tarski style. And somehow relativized to utterances. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Belief | Davidson, D. | Rorty VI 187 Conviction / Davidson: most of our beliefs must be true - beliefs are no more or less accurate representations - but they are conditions that are ascribed to people for purposes of explanation of their behavior Rorty VI 205 Belief / justification / cause / Davidson / SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and reason leads to the thesis that beliefs can be justified only by beliefs. (McDowellVsDavidson). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Content | Lewis, D. | Schw I 161 Mental Content/Lewis: Thesis: is determined by the causal role, by the typical causes and effects. Content/DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning/LewisVsDavidson: what the sentences of the public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, wishes and beliefs. Schw I 171 Naturalization of Content/Representation/Schwarz: Thesis that mental representations are sentence-like to such an extent that their content can be explained compositionally. (cf. Fodor 1990). |
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| Radical Interpretat. | Lewis, D. | Fod / Lep IV 113 Radical interpretation/ r.i. / principle of charity / Lewis: the principle of charity is a condition of the possibility of attribution of intentional states because it (partially implicitly) defines the notion of a belief system. (Primacy of belief). LewisVsDavidson: intentional attribution must not be understood with reference to the epistemic situation of the r.i. |
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| Satz-Bedeutung | Lewis, D. | Grover II 158 Meaning / Lewis / Grover: (Lewis 1972): truth conditions that are mapped by the pictures of circumstances (possible worlds) and contexts to truthe values, grasp the sentence meaning. Schw I 161 mental content / Lewis: is determined by the causal role, through the typical causes and effects. Content / DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language that we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning / LewisVsDavidson: what sentences of public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, desires and beliefs. |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Radical Interpretat. | Schiffer, St. | I 204 SchifferVsDavidson / SchifferVsMcDowell / SchifferVsEvans / SchifferVs EMD: for RI a theory of translation is possible. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self-affirmation | Friedman, M. | Horwich I 498 Self-validation / self-confirmation / conviction /Science / FriedmanVsDavidson / M. Williams: Friedman thesis: Self-validation is possible. But it should not be assumed that our explanation of how reference is determined automatically guarantees that our beliefs are true. Pointe: that is, Friedman derives no substantial T-term from the fact that truth is found in laws. Instead, he argues for a "realistic" approach for reference. I 499 substantial T-term / Friedman: is then a waste product of it. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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