Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Content: content is that part of a statement, what can be represented by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 45
Content/"Deep Content"/"Deep Reference"/Wright: can be masked or simulated by syntax. (negations, conditionals). (>Expression Theory: do the sentences have content or is it only simulated syntactically?).
Common basis of realism and anti-realism: that this is not the case!
 E.g. with Frege's numbers, there is no deep reference. The suitability of an expression to refer to one object depends on its syntax. It ensures that it can function as a singular term. Then no more questions can be asked whether the object reference is successful. However, it is conceded that the appropriate contexts in which this is the case are true. (No "deep reference").
I 44
Syntactic Surface Characteristics: it must be ensured that a sentence that contains a truth predicate can be embedded in conditionals and has significant negations.
Content/Wright: must satisfy discipline and surface syntax (e.g. conditional, negation) of a discourse. The thus secured content is enough to qualify a truth predicate (by platitudes).
- - -
I 157
Content/Wright: in conditions: is needed to prevent expressions like "whatever it takes" (> role, > circularity) - solution: independence condition: fulfillment must be logically independent of the details of the extension of the terms (projectivistic terms such as color, morality, humor ) - then only terms within intensional operators - WrightVs provisional equations for moral discourse.
I 242f
Def far-reaching cosmological role: (I 250) a content plays a far-reaching cosmological role iff the mention of facts of which it consists can occur at least in certain types of explanations of contingencies; explanations whose possibility is not only guaranteed by the minimum capacity for truth of the discourse.
 E.g. thesis: morality plays no far-reaching cosmological role.
Far-reaching cosmological role of content: we want to measure its reach for a discourse on the extent to which the provision of the various facts can potentially contribute to the explanation of all those things that have nothing or not directly something to do with our attitude states by which we conceive such facts as objects.
I 248
Cosmological role: explanation of meaning/content not from our attitudes.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

> Counter arguments against Wright

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-22