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Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Inferences: when we move from premises to conclusions we carry out inferences. See also Conclusions, Implication, Conditional, Logic, Inferential content, Inferential role, Inferentialism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Wilfrid Sellars on Inference - Dictionary of Arguments
Brandom II 76 Material inference/Sellars/Brandom: from a east of b" to "b west of a" - also from lightening to thunder - needs no logic. >Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars. Brandom II 79 Formally valid inferences can be derived from good material inferences, but not vice versa. Proof: given is a subset of somehow privileged vocabulary, so an inference is correct if the material is well and it cannot turn into a poor inference, if non-privileged vocabulary is replaced by non-privileged vocabulary. If one is only interested in logical form, one must be able to distinguish previously a part of the vocabulary as specifically logical. E.g. if you want to examine theological inferences, one must examine which substitution preserves the material quality of the inference when replacing non-theological vocabulary by non-theological. >Vocabulary, >Privileged vocabulary, >Conservativity, cf. >Material implication, >Formal implication._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |