Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity/Syntheticity Rorty VI 159
Analyticity/Quine/Rorty: quine (according to Rorty) proposes instead: "central position in relation to our system of beliefs." >network of beliefs, >holism.
I 192
Analytical/RortyVsSellars: in Sellars there is still a rest of analyticity: it still tacitly distinguishes between necessary and contingent, structures and empirical.
Analytical/synthetic/necessary/contingent/RortyVsAnalytical Philosophy/Rorty Thesis: Analytical philosophy cannot be written without one or the other of these distinctions. There are neither views that can be dissolved into concepts (as in Carnap) nor internal relations between the concepts that enable "grammatical discoveries" (as in Oxford philosophy). There is probably nothing left today that would be "analytical philosophy".

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Animals Sellars Rorty VI 185
VsSellars: the most common objection to Sellars psychological nominalism is "proto-consciousness": small children and dogs are aware of their pain without being able to talk about it. Sellars can give no room for sentience.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Assertibility Brandom I 197
VsJustified Assertibility: Assertibilty conditions do not contain the entire meaning. ---
Rorty I ~ 325
(According to Rorty): assertible/Brandom/Rorty: in addition to the term "assertible" for the pure philosophy of language we still need "true". Especially for understanding how the language works as opposed to understanding how it spreads to the world. (Semantics/epistemology). Also naive: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" importance, and thus abandon any need for harmony. ---
Brandom II 238
Assertibility Theories/Brandom: Thesis semantics must be oriented towards pragmatics (Brandom pro). ---
II 240
Two tasks: 1. assertive force, i.e. declaring accuracy, i.e. making a distinction between traits at all 2. saying when those traits are allowed. ---
II 241
a) what are the reasons, evidence b) directly ask whether a statement is true - "semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions. ---
II 242
BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality; either it remains circular with recourse to the notion of truth, or trivial. (Also BrandomVsHabermas). ---
II 243
Brandom's own approach: Thesis rule-governed language game that allows to combine propositional contents that are objective in the sense that they detach from the settings of the speaker with declarative sentences - which splits assertibility into two parts: determination and authorization (two normative statuses) - goes beyond Behth, because it allows the distinction between right and wrong use. - (> Dummett:> chess). ---
II 254f
Semantic Theories/Assertibility/Brandom: Pro: Advantage: close connection to use - Problem: Dilemma: either a) linked to attitude or b) to the object - N.B.: Same assertibility conditions, but different truth conditions - the object could be red without me being able to say it. ---
II 259
Solution: Conditional: "If the pattern is red, it is red" - Tautology: this is correct because it codifies a definition preserving inference - but not: ---
II 260
"If I am entitled to the assertion that the pattern is red, it is red"- not definition preserving. ---
II 261
Distinction between authorization and definition does not need the notion of truth. ---
II 261
BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the definition/authorization without the aid of incompatibilities (negation). Distinction between sentences that share the assertibility conditions and those that share the truth condition is not possible without the notion of truth.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Atomism Sellars I 33
Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. (>circumstances/Sellars). - It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances.
---
I 34
Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content.
2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism.
3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space.
Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of ​​a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time.
Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements.
---
I 70
Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. (External: Definition truth-functional: Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations).
(External: Definition truth-functional: Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts.)
---
II 314
SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito.
---
II 321
If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. (?!) Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus).

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Beliefs McDowell I 168
Belief/McDowellVsDavidson: He could also have said: nothing is conceivable as a reason for a belief if it is not also located in the space of reasons, such as the fact that it seems to a subject to be this and that. Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this and that or if I am convinced that it is so.
---
I 192
McDowellVsPeacocke: ... that is not proof that the non-conceptual content is conceivable as the reason for a subject to be convinced of something. The subject may not even have reasons.
Example: the experienced cyclist makes the right movements without the need for reasons. The description does not require reasons either.
---
I 193
McDowellVsEvans, McDowellVsPeacocke: this neither justifies the assumption that judgments and beliefs are founded in experience, nor that beliefs are founded by experience "as reasons". Experience/World/McDowell: the condition of correctness is that the object is actually square.
---
Rorty VI 179
McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: beliefs can also be justified by mental processes that are different from judgments.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Convention T Putnam I (b) 66
Truth/PutnamVsTarski: his convention T does not clarify the concepts of truth and reference, because it uses the concepts of the "designation" of a sentence and of "following from something" - these are (too?) closely related to truth and reference. PutnamVsSellars: his analysis of the designation is not helpful: "wheel" plays the role of "Rad" in English. - This is not a description of the role, but the name of the role!
---
II 89f
Def Convention T/Tarski/Putnam: the requirement that all sentences from the language S are equivalent with the corresponding sentence of the metalanguage MS. - Putnam: this only determines the extension of "true" only when the connectives are interpreted classically and not intuitionistically. - Intuitionistically it would be about "provable". - Tarski: "electron refers" is equivalent to "There are electrons". - Intuitionistically: there is a description D, so that "D is an electron" is provable in B1 - That could be true with the appropriate theory, even if there are no electrons. - Intuitionism: here, existence is intra-theoretical.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Distribution Function Cartwright I 156
Distribution function/Probability distribution/Cartwright: There is not real - false "which p.f. is in this room?". - correct: it only exists in the model. - That is, in real space, the vectors do not exist. - Another problem: the "billiard" model is true for simple, but not for complex situations. - Analogy/Billiards/Sellars: takes place at a higher level. - The relations between the properties are analogous, not the features themselves - E.g. laser and oscillator have no characteristics in common. - ((s) Even though the behavior described in part by the same equations.) - CartwrightVsSellars: the generality and validity without exception is only an illusion.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

Facts Quine Rorty I 217
Fact/Quine/Rorty: "Dog" is the English word for "dog", and "Robinson believes in God": that is not a truth type that expresses a "fact", something "factual". Quine thus offers us a distinction between truth by virtue of convergence truth by virtue of correspondence instead of the positivist distinction between conventional and empirically confirmed truth.
Davidson.... Quinesian resolution of the distinction between questions of meaning and questions of fact.
---
Quine I 426f
Facts/Quine: not something mediating according to the image of our sentences (VsSellars, VsWittgenstein?) - better: true sentence or true proposition - facts not are required, especially not in addition to propositions. ---
II 37
Another term I want to save from the abyss of the transcendental is the term factual which proves to be relevant in the theory of radical translation. In this case, none of the facts decides which of the two manuals is right. And this term of the factual is neither transcendental nor epistemological to such an extent ((s) no fact can decide - requires facts that are just not fit to do so.) ++ ---
II 37
Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the manuals is right - Actual things are ontological, naturalistic - neither transcendental nor epistemological - physical conditions, not empirical skills - reinterpretation only with others, not with ourselves. - Factuality as gravity, inherent in our nature. ---
VI 113
Fact/Quine: we can erase that. - "It is a fact" does not contribute anything. - It is only seemingly founded in correspondence theory. - A true sentence as a whole corresponds to a fact. - "It is true that" is necessary for sentences that do not exist.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Given Chisholm Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 28
Given / RutteVsSellars: we need it to explain what ever is developed in the perception and what is expected - we also need memory that is always hypothetical

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Idealism Ayers Rorty VI 402
Ayers about Locke/Rorty: a striking example for the transmission of unsuitable problems. RortyVsAyers: Ayers book about Locke is only a pretext for his criticism of what he calls "linguistic idealism" (AyersVsSellars).

Ayers I
M. Ayers
"Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Knowledge Brandom Definition knowledge: justified true beliefs - must be caused in the right way. - (Goldman) - (Gettier)
I 321
Knowledge: in order for the token "that is green" to express knowledge, one must not only have a symptom of the presence, but one must also know that this token is a symptom of the presence. ---
I 322
Justification: it presupposes - BrandomVsSellars: it presupposes that the reporter has to justify himself. ---
I 715/6
Knowledge/Brandom: 1) the one who knows must assign an inferentially structured, propositionally substantial definition (belief condition) - 2) assign an inheritable authorization for this definition - 3) the account holder must accept the same propositional definition that is assigned. ---
II 127
Knowledge/Plato: true opinion plus logical explanation is necessary. ---
II 129
Knowledge/Reliability theory/Brandom: one could believe that p without believing that one knows that p - because a belief is a different precondition of knowledge, it follows that if one does not even believe that one knows that p, then one does not know that one knows.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Language Sellars Rorty VI 184
Language/world/Sellars/Rorty: Thesis everything linguistic - "VsSellars: most frequent objection: small children and dogs also have pain without being able to talk about it. ---
Rorty VI 185
Language/Sellars: cannot be verified on the base of non-liguistical things. Rorty: Therefore, the utility is only interesting for pragmatism. ---
Sellars I 81ff
"Our Rylean ancestors" E.g. Primitive language vocabulary for public properties of public goods, conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification, and especially the subjunctive conditional. Moreover, vagueness and openness.
SellarsVs: an intersubjective language, must be a Rylean language: that rises from a too simple image of the relationship of intersubjective speech and public objects. I 81: >Thinking/Sellars.
---
Brandom II 72
Language/Sellars/Brandom: there are languages without theoretical terms - just some terms need to have non-reporting use, so that some may have reporting use.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Nature McDowell I, 123 et seq
Nature/Kant/McDowell: nature is equal to the realm of natural laws in Kant. He does not know the concept of the second nature, although he is well aware of the concept of >education. But not as a background. ---
I 118
Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: there are rules of nature, whether you are receptive to them or not. This is the result of proper education. "Naturalism of the Second Nature", "Naturalized Platonism". Nature/Natural Law/McDowellVsNaturalism: Vs "blunt naturalism": The space of nature is not equal to the space of natural laws.
The forces are partially part of the second nature.
Nature/McDowell: encompasses everything that belongs to the most fundamental understanding of things, that is, neither meaning nor values. (VsAristotle). Disenchantment of nature is progress.
But: what has been disenchanted does not have to be identified with nature.
---
Rorty VI 212
McDowell/Rorty: Nature may not only exercise causal but also rational control over human research. Definition Second Nature/McDowell: "People acquire a second nature, among other things, by developing conceptual abilities whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons." (E.g., initiation, entry into a moral community, "education"). That one's eyes are opened gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. And thus to be able to make judgments that are responsible to the world.
In addition, this gives a rational freedom.
McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: all this becomes incomprehensible when we use Sellar's, Davidson's, or Brandom's terms.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nature Rorty VI 213
Def Second Nature/McDowell/Rorty: people acquireit, inter alia, by conceptual skills being unravelled to them whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons - this gives one the ability to be controlled rationally by the world - this enables one to judge in a ways that is responsible to the world. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson: with their concepts it becomes incomprehensible - these would not refer to the world as a conversation partner. - VI 215 McDowell: thesis: the world calls on us to judge.
VI 214
World/SellarsVsMcDowell/BrandomVsMcDowell/Rorty: the world is not a conversation partner. I 215 it does not merely call on us to judge.
VI 434
Nature/technocracy/technocratic//Rorty: the beauty of purely mechanical explanations from the atheistic point of view is that they demand nothing except our own purposes.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Philosophy Ayers Rorty VI 408
Philosophy/AyersVsRorty: the following theses are generally represented by the same people 1. Realism/antirealism is an important distinction
2. Dummett is right: these antirealism/realsim conflicts have been the most decisive in the history of philosophy.
---
VI 409
3. Wilson is right when it expresses doubts about the contingency of the problems. 4. Ayers is right, one must not allow one's own metaphysical and epistemic theories to be influenced by one's own politics and morality.
5. Color: the problem of "the nature of color" is not solvable. The same is true of the body-soul problem.
6. Descartes' skepticism is ahistorical.
7. Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the sensory organs merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: Revival of Empiricism.
8. Identity with oneself is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, nonrelational features. Some terms are rigid.
9. Recognition of the unspeakable is praiseworthy intellectual modesty.
10. Locke's "Essay concern human understandig" is not a signpost, but a work still to be explored that contains not yet articulated truths.
RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I have diametrically opposed views.
---
VI 410
Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the ten theses. ---
VI 411
"Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: conflict term of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot has to be already in the language before a plausible appeal to the taste of onions is possible at all.
---
VI 412
This also includes the notion of an inner "Cartesian stage". This also includes the notion of "consciousness" (as a notion of the 17th century).

Ayers I
M. Ayers
"Locke" in: Arguments of the Philosophers London 1993


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Reality Lewis I (c) 50
Ambiguities in connection with reversed spectra are ordinary ambiguities that exist in everyday life when it comes to relativity without clear criterion. E.g. What are "relevant investigations" when it is not clear whether they are relevant to the politics of the day, the emotional well-being or for understanding or whatever. ---
Rorty VI 208
Objects/Reality/World/Lewis/Rorty: all objects in the universe except the elementary particles are manipulated artifacts. ---
Rorty VI 208
LewisVsSellars: even he was too much inclined to label nature as "atoms plus empty space" like Democritus and to invent pseudo-problems about the possibility to reconcile the "scientific" to the "manifest" idea of man. (reductionist view of the non-human nature).

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Representation Rorty I 162
Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions) >judgements, >sensory impressions. - SellarsVsLocke: Locke puts both together.
I 278f
Rorty: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! >Beliefs/Rorty. But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists.

II (c) 76
Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey - later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality.
II (e) 112
PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented. PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation.

VI 45
R/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism.
VI 51
R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense -
VI 49
R/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance.
VI 54
Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.) - RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii.
VI 63
R/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world -
VI 71f
Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs. R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs).
DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.)
VI 107f
R/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians. But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former?
VI 125 f
RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us!
VI 130
Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything.
VI 139
Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling.
VI 140
Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. - (Taylor: handling) - Coping is more primary than representation. - Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Rylean Ancestors Pauen V 91
Sellars/Pauen: thesis: our seemingly direct experience of mental states is the product of theoretical generalizations. - Question: how could such a theory arise, if one does not know the (everyday psychological postulated) mental states from their own experience? - Solution: Rylean ancestors: Step 1: Language and ideas are exclusively linked to behavioral dispositions and verbal expressions - Step 2: attribution of internal states, so thoughts. ---
V 91
Rylean ancestors/Sellars/Pauen: thesis: we do not know our mental states from own experience. - Solution: 1. Language and ideas relate only to behavior - 2. after that attribution of "thoughts"- one knows mental states (e.g. thoughts) not from the first-person perspective. - We do not have direct access to our inner states - only mediated through everyday psychology. ---
V 105
VsSellars/VsRylean ancestors/Pauen: implausible, how should one has ever come up with the idea to explain behavior with the attribution of mental states if one had not known them before from own experience. ---
V 106
Sellars disregards that an explanation is conceivable even without such attributions.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Use Theory Rorty I 139
Language/Use theory/Rorty: no one would say that there is e.g. a "nature of crime" which could be found out by a study of our language - solution: it is about social practices, not just about language use.
II (c) 70
Rorty: Analytical philosophy VsUse theory (VsMeaning change). >Meaning change.
III 36
RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what kind of work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets. >Use, >vocabulary.
III 101
Use theory of meaning/Rorty: problem: that you know in advance for which purpose a tool is designed. This is not the case with language! As long as we are still trying to figure out how they can be used, we cannot consider Christianity, Newtonian physics, the romantic movement or political liberalism as tools!.
III 102
Use theory/Rorty: Problem: the purposes of language are not yet established - unlike tools.
III 194
SellarsVsHeidegger/SellarsVsUse theory: Physics prevail - HeideggerVsSellars - HeideggerVsWittgenstein: not physics but the poetry shows that the language game is inappropriate.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Anthropic Principle Rorty Vs Anthropic Principle VI 134
World/knowledge/reality/Rorty: we simply cannot hear any more from inorganic objects which are desperately hoping to be discovered by us. (RortyVsAnthropic Principle).
I 325
Sellars/RortyVsSellars/Rorty: Echoes of the anthropic principle can be found in Sellars: Sellars wants to look at human research in such a way that the determination of "necessary ultimate agreement" describes as a causal process leading to the generation of self-representations of the universe. (Sellars meets here with the idealistic metaphysics of the late Peirce of evolutionary love). >Sellars, >Peirce.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Assertibility Brandom Vs Assertibility I 198
VsJustified assertibility: assertibility conditions do not contain the whole meaning! Just as naïve: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" meaning", and thus giving up any desire for harmony.
II 90
Assertibility/Brandom: its representatives also treat the aspect of the conditions (circumstances) as exhaustive and neglect the consequences of the use of the terms.
II 91
BrandomVs: assertions can have the same conditions but different consequences. E.g. "I’ll write a book about Hegel" - "I predict that I will write a book about Hegel": same circumstances, different consequences or determination. Meaning/Use/Dummett: if we have learned only the circumstances (conditions) for the use of a predicate, it may be that we have not seen through all connections with other terms.
II 242
A philosophical analysis of the concept of truth is therefore not necessarily made by a definition of the word "true". "Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions.
II 262 ++
BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of the so defined semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as does the alternative language game theory.
BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the determination/authorization without the auxiliary means of incompatibilities (negation).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Ayers, M. Rorty Vs Ayers, M. VI 408
Philosophy/Rorty: we have distinguish clear clearly between questions of the tasks of philosophy and content-related topics such as e.g. knowledge, and express ourselves as clearly as possible about their mutual relationship. Philosophy/Rorty: the following theses tend to be represented by the same people
1) Realism/Anti-Realism important distinction
2) Dummett is right: these Antirealism/Realism struggles have been decisive in the history of philosophy. >Antirealism, >Realism.
VI 409
3) Wilson was right to express doubts about the contingency of problems. 4) Ayers is right to say that we must allow our own metaphysical and epistemological views to be influenced by our politics and morals.
5) Color: the problem of the "essence of color" is not solvable. The same is true, consequently, for the body-mind problem.
6) Descartes' >skepticism is ahistorical.
7) Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the senses merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: revival of empiricism.
8) self-identity is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, non-relational features. Some terms are rigid.
9) Recognition of the unspeakable is laudable intellectual modesty.
10) Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding`" is not a guide, but a work that is yet to be studied and still holds not yet articulated truths.
RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I represent diametrically opposed views.
VI 410
Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the 10 theses.
VI 411
"Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: battle cry of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot it must be established in language before a plausible reference to the taste of onions is at all possible.
VI 412
     This includes the notion of ​​an inner "Cartesian stage". >Cartesianism.       This includes the notion of ​​"consciousness" - (As 17th century notion).

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Best Explanation Fraassen Vs Best Explanation Field I 15
Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up
b) this class of phenomena is large and complex
c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow
d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S.
Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S.
False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct":
As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc).
Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact.
(van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980)
Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things.
Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed.
I 16
Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief.
FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc.
Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such.
FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc!
I 25
VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge.
I 90
Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness.
Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true.
FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics.
2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy.
3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic?
I 91
Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity:
Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are
a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent.
b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent.
Difference:
a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention).
b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains".
Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances.
Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic.
I 92
Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal).
I 197
Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it.
Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics.
I 23
Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars).
Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs).

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Church, A. Sellars Vs Church, A. Putnam I 66
Description/PutnamVsSellars: nor does the analysis of the description help Sellars: (1) "wheel" describes a wheel in English.
Putnam: that means that "wheel" plays in English the role that "Rad" has in German.
ChurchVsTarski: (1) is not statement on the German word "Rad".
SellarsVsChurch: introduces a special means: the "point mention" (as Frege's "oblique sense"):
A word in point mention denotes its own linguistic role:
"Rad" and "wheel" are then both names for a certain role, namely the same!
Important: wheel is not synonymous to a description of this role: it is rather a name of that role! That concludes:
(2) "wheel" has in English the role "Rad".
Then the extension of described is a class of ordered pairs (word/role), not (word/thing). (> Description). Sellars: no relation word world but word role.
I 66/67
Description/Sellars: this is not a big restriction for him as nominalist as "roles" are not abstract entities for him. PutnamVsSellars: but this does not cast a particular light on the problem of reference.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Davidson, D. McDowell Vs Davidson, D. I 42
McDowellVsDavidson: the myth has deeper roots: we can not understand how the pursuit of spontaneity could ever represent a world if spontaneity were not subject to any external control. (And Davidson denies this control.)
I 41
McDowellVsDavidson: refutes that thoughts and observations are connected in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not come to an empirical content. (without concepts, observations are blind (Kant)).
I 168
Conviction/McDowellVsDavidson: he could also have said: nothing comes into consideration as a reason for conviction if it is not also located in the realm of reasons, e.g. the fact that it appears as such to a subject (!). Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this or that, or if I am convinced that it is so.
I 172
Davidson: spontaneity not subjected to external rational condition. McDowellVsDavidson: therefore his theory of coherence is without control.
I 86
Myth/Davidson: to escape it, one must deny that experience is epistemologically significant. (EvansVs, McDowellVs).
I 124
The idea that all things belong to nature does not help. (I 102ff) Spontaneity/Davidson: characterizes what are in fact the operations of the sentient nature, but it does not characteriz them as such.
McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still rationally related, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant considers this choice to be unacceptable.
I 216
McDowellVsDavidson: if we turn off the background of tradition (and still only presume radical interpretations), we succumb to the myth of the given. Hegel: "lack of mediation." Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). McDowell: It's too late to take care of the configuration of the concept of objectivity when the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity emenate together from the inauguration in the space of reasons.

Rorty VI 205
McDowell/Rorty: Difference betweej "logical space of nature" ("realm of the law") "logical space of reasons". McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: too impressed by the realm of law, such that they explain experience in a way that the tribunal of senses is no longer possible.
Conviction/justification/cause/Davidson/SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: convictions can only be justified by convictions. (McDowellVsDavidson).
VI 206
McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: if proceding in this manner (to eliminate experience), the old philosophical questions look still as if they were any good.
VI 207
There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in again through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility towards the world.

Rorty VI 213
There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility for the world.

Rorty VI 213
Def Second Nature/McDowell: people acquire a second nature, e.g. by exploring conceptual skills whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons. (E.g. initiation, access to the moral community, "Education").
To have one's eyes opened, gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world.
McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsBrandom: all that becomes incomprehensible if we use the terms of Sellars, Davidson or Brandom.
Rorty VI 217
McDowellVsDavidson: a merely causal explanation carries the risk of emptiness. (With Kant: "spontaneity of thought") ("spontaneity: corresponds to rational truths, receptivity: truths of fact).

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Descartes, R. Quine Vs Descartes, R. I 56
The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method.

Stroud I 227
Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects.
Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion!
Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts.
Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes.
Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is.
StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts"
I 228
the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that:
Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed?
StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science.
SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science:
"Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either
a) science is true and gives us knowledge or
b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Fraassen, B. van Cartwright Vs Fraassen, B. van I 10
Asymmetry/Explanation/Causality/Fraassen: (The scientific image): Thesis: the asymmetries (by way of explanation) are not real!. CartwrightVsFraassen: I think he is mistaken. But his question is strong and could cause us to abandon certain explanation strategies.
Cartwright Thesis: what we do not give up so easily are our strategies for action in everyday life. E.g. spraying marshes with anti-mosquito agents is effective E.g. burning sheets of malaria patients is not.
I 89
FraassenVsTheoretical Entities/Cartwright: why should one believe in them?. CartwrightVsFraassen: theoretical entities exist, because there is no real regularity at the level of phenomena.
Regularity/Cartwright: Only exists at the level of theoretical entities, not of phenomena.
Law/Laws of Nature/Cartwright: their universal applicability does not only explain why the phenomena behave as regularly as they do, but also why we sometimes see exceptions. Van Fraassen admits that.
Explanation/van Fraassen: Problem: but from the fact that a bunch of principles ensures the phenomena it cannot be concluded that they are true!.
right: E.g. "I think therefore I am".
wrong: E.g. "P explains Q. Q is true, therefore P is true".
I 92
Electron/Cartwright: Important argument: is not an entity of any particular theory! (Electrons are not theory-dependent!). That means it is not about Bohr’s electrons in contrast to Rutherford’s electrons. CartwrightVsFraassen: I choose an E.g. of van Fraassen to show how we differ:
E.g. Cloud chamber/Fraassen: unlike the contrails in the sky, we cannot see anything at the frond of the cloud chamber trail, no matter how well we look. Therefore, there are no theoretical entities.
CartwrightVsFraassen: I agree with the premise, not the conclusion.
I 93
Theoretical entities/Cartwright: The special thing about explanations that involve theoretical entities is that they are causal explanations (not inferring the best explanation). And existence assertion is characteristic of causal explanations. Cause/Causality/Fraassen/Cartwright: he does not believe in causes. The whole causality is a fiction.
I 160
Theory//Fraassen/Sellars/Cartwright: both have extraordinary respect for the theory. Both expect it to grasp the facts about the observable correctly. For van Fraassen, theoretical assertions (about the unobservable) do not have to do that. CartwrightVsFraassen/CartwrightVsSellars: a good theory does not have either! The observation consequences ((s)> observation conditional) can be broadly what we believe to be true, but they are usually not the best we can expect.
CartwrightVsFraassen: 2) For me, it is not only about the observable. I suppose theoretical entities and causal processes. This brings me closer to Sellars.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Holism Rorty Vs Holism I 190
Holism/Rorty: exmambple: Sellars: it may turn put that there are no colored objects at all.
RortyVsHolism/RortyVsQuine/RortyVsSellars: these holistic statements sound pointless and paradoxical, because the accuracy in question requires a theory privileged representations.
Pro: justification is not a function of particular relations between ideas (or words) and objects, but a function of social practice. The justification of a conversation is holistic by nature, as it were.

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Quine, W.V.O. Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 183
Internal/external/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnap's distinction there must be something else. The fact that it can be answered as an internal question but not as an (identical) external one shows that the two must not be confused. Language/Carnap/Stroud: therefore Carnap distinguishes different "languages" or "systems". These answer only internal questions.
Expressiveness: that a "philosophical" (external) question is then meaningless is not only due to the terminology.
I 184
The terminology is always meaningful. For example, within mathematics, "There are numbers" makes sense.
I 223
Knowledge/Skepticism/Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, no part of it can be invoked. ((s) > Example "Everything he said is true"). Empiricism/knowledge/solution/Quine: this is the reason why knowledge must be justified on the basis of sensory experience.
Psychology/knowledge/explanation/justification/Quine: a surrender of epistemology to psychology leads to circularity. ((s) Because psychology itself goes beyond the mere detection of stimuli).
StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: is also a surrender of epistemology to psychology. And thus just as circulatory!
Epistemology/Stroud: can it be that the traditional epistemology has been refuted, but not Quine's naturalized epistemology itself? Is the solution the relation between the two?
Quine: sometimes suggests that the two points of view (NaturalizedVsTraditional Epistemology) differ: the "doctrinal" question should be put aside as false hope.
Consciousness/knowledge/tradition/knowledge theory/justification/Stroud: the traditional epistemology insists on the isolation of certain objects of consciousness in order to identify undoubted information.
Consciousness/QuineVsTradition: we can bypass the question of consciousness and simply try to explain,
I 224
how our rich output arises from the events that occur on our sensory surface (nerve endings). N.B.: this can be approached scientifically.
Then one can distinguish two types of events in the observable physical world, and that is the scientific goal.
StroudVsQuine: it looks like Quine just changed the subject. Skepticism then still threatens. And Quine does not want that.
"Liberated epistemology" (roots of reference, 3): is not the same as empirical psychology, it is rather an "enlightened persistence" (enlightened) of the traditional epistemic problem.
Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: (see above) Tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular.
QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness.
"Enlightenment/"liberated" epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to fight it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge.
QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all.
I 225
Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: the doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. Consciousness/Quine: the confusion was based on the concentration on consciousness.
Introspection/Tradition: thought that facts about our "lean" input would be brought to light through introspection.
QuineVsIntrospection: the reasons for finding the input lean come from science.
I 227
Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception simply consists in deviating from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusions exist only relative to a previously accepted assumption of real bodies.
Given/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: this may be the reason to assume a non-binding given. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: N.B.: then it might seem impossible to invoke the possibility of deception because some knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion!
Stroud: we have dealt with arguments of this form before (see above >Distortion of meaning). Violation of the necessary conditions for the use of certain terms.
Quine/Stroud: it could now be answered analogously to StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine does not make these errors.
Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no possibility to invoke what lies within the meaning of a particular term.
StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts"
I 228
the epistemologist is "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question is made even more difficult by Quine's explicit denial that:
Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying he leaves the question unanswered, he is right to use science to reject science. I am simply saying that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical mistake to refute doubts from science itself, so that in the end there is certainty, then what is the crucial logical point that he has missed?
StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science.
SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic could answer with a "reductio ad absurdum", and then epistemology would no longer be part of science:
"Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either
a) Science is true and gives us knowledge, or
b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the outer world is knowledge.
I 230
Moore/Stroud: Moore should not be slandered either. According to Kant and Carnap, what he says is completely legitimate. Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: N.B.: the results of an independent scientific study would be in the same boat as e.g. Moore's hands. They would be "scientific" versions of Moore's argument with the common sense.

Philosophy/Science/Quine: both merge continuously.

Stroud: Descartes and other traditional philosophers could agree with that.
StroudVsQuine: Problem: then maybe we have no scientific knowledge at all. We have no more reason to believe in it than we do not believe in it. No scientific investigation could provide clarity here.
I 231
Nor would any challenge be conceivable "from the inside". So skepticism would follow.
I 233
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not is not something that will be decided by future experience or experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine asks it - then we already know how future experience will be! We will always be confronted with the question of the surplus of our rich output over lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted today with an experience that undermines our belief, skepticism will be justified today. But: N.B.: the same was already justified in 1630!
I 234
Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with the reductio ad absurdum. We just have to rebuild the ship on the high seas. The traditional epistemologist can saw (identify!) the piece out of the ship that represents the lean input.
I 240
Knowledge/StroudVsQuine: even if I blamed the "meager" input for accepting a "projection," that would not be an explanation of his knowledge or true belief.
I 245
Knowledge/knowledge theory/explanation/projection/StroudVsQuine: assuming that I assume with Quine that all my beliefs are just "overflowing output from lean input" (i.e. projection), that doesn't mean that I cannot think I have true beliefs, in the sense that there's nothing to stop my beliefs from being true. Problem: even if they were all true, I would not be in a position to explain, or even understand, how a knowledge theory should explain and understand them. I cannot explain how my true belief contributes to knowledge.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Sellars, W. Brandom Vs Sellars, W. I 322
BrandomVsSellars: Two problems: 1) Sellars assumes that the reporter has to justify his assertions. This implies that general facts of the form to "X is a reliable symptom of Y" are known. I 323 But invoking something contains an implicit assertion of reliability (to avoid regress?) 2) Error: construe the authority of non-inferential reports as the act of invoking a piece of evidence. (Regress: On what is the authority of the evidence based, etc.).
The authority of inferential reports is rather sui generis.
"Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions.
II 242
BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of so understood semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as the alternative language game theory does.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Sellars, W. Field Vs Sellars, W. II 157
Scheme Letters/Field: "p" and "e" are used here with respect to an individual thinker. ((s) Not for the role in the linguistic community). Idiolect: a single speaker then has an idiolect. This will typically not coincide with the limits of the use of any language, or with the union of all languages. As insertions for the scheme letters we use expressions here in the idiolect of the person (at a time). Ambiguities are not considered. II 158 Then we have "p" (as I understand it now) means that p (s) while the that-sentence is not necessarily a literal rendering.) and means "e" (as I understand it now). ((s) not necessarily a literal rendering). Quotation Marks/Meaning Attribution/Field: instead of assuming "ways of understanding", we can also assume that the expressions in quotes do not refer to an orthographic type, but on a computational one: Computational Type/Field: (here): refers to a class of expression tokens in the actual idiolect of the interpreter who are regarded as computationally equivalent. This corresponds roughly to: Def Point-Quotation Marks/Spelling/Sellars: (Sellars 1962): They should, however, refer to inter-personnally attributable conceptual roles. QuineVsSellars: then you do not know what beliefs only pretend a conceptual role. Equality of Computational Role/Field: only within one idiolect.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Sellars, W. Fraassen Vs Sellars, W. I 32
Empirical Laws/Sellars: We don’t have them! E.g. that water boils at 100 ° applies only when the pressure is normal. (> Cartwright). Fraassen: that’s only methodically so far, because we have no confidence in the generalization of our everyday experiences.
Problem: but we expect of a theory that postulates microstructure (theoretical entities) that it shows actual universal regularities.
FraassenVsSellars/FraassenVsRealism: thus an unobservable reality is postulated behind the phenomena.
E.g. Suppose at an early stage of chemistry it was discovered that different samples of gold dissolved at different speeds in aqua regia. But the samples were identical in terms of observation.
I 33
Solution: (then): for the two samples a different microstructure was postulated. Then, the variation was explained with that the samples were mixtures of these two substances (which are identical in terms of observation). Thus, the laws have no observation-wise counterpart. Without that no explanation seems possible. And that is the goal of science, so we have to believe in an unobservable microstructure.
This leads to three questions:
1) Does the postulation of the microstructure really have new consequences for the observable phenomena?.
2) Does science really always have to provide explanations?.
3) Could there be another rationale for the use of the image of the microstructure in the development of theories?.
FraassenVsSellars: Ad 1): it seems that these hypothetical chemists very well postulated new observable regularities: Suppose two substances A and B with dissolution rates x and x+y. Every gold sample is a mixture of the two substances. Then it follows that every sample dissolves at a rate between x and x+y. And that is not implied by the fact that different samples have dissolved in this scope in the past. Thus Sellars is refuted in the first point.
Suppose (for the sake of Sellars’ argument), there is still no way to predict the dissolution rates more accurately. Do we then need a categorical statement that is not based on the observable? (That was Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause, or the demand for the existence of hidden parameters).
Sellars/Hidden Parameters: clearly recognizes that this would counter the current quantum mechanics, accordingly, he says that their mathematical models are incompatible with it.
I 34
So he is limits himself to those cases where it is consistent to assume hidden variables. Consistency/Fraassen: is, of course, a logical hold point.
FraassenVsHidden Variables/FraassenVsSellars: this does not prevent the disaster: although there is some evidence that hidden variables cannot be introduced in a classical deterministic theory, this evidence demands something much more stronger than consistency: E.g. the assumption that two different physical variables cannot have the same probability distribution in the measurement across all possible states.
So if we are unable to specify differences in the forecast for the observable, there is no real difference. (No distinction without difference. Stronger demand than consistency stronger/weaker).
Ad. 3) How can anti-realism make sense of that? Apart from the actually new empirical consequences (see above) he will cite methodological reasons. With the assumption of a particular microstructure we could come to new implications of empirical regularities. This is, of course, only a hope. But:
Science/Fraassen: Thesis: it is not about explanation as such, but about new statements about observable regularities.
I 30
FraassenVsHidden Parameters: if this is empirically equivalent to the orthodox quantum mechanics, it leads to non-logical correlation of non-classical nature, which would still violate the principle of the common cause. But this question is also academic, because modern physics does not need hidden parameters.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Sellars, W. Putnam Vs Sellars, W. III 131
Map/Sellars: unlike truth and reference: our normal linguistic schemata map the world more or less adequate. Some schemes are more adequate than others, although they are in no objective semantic relationship to the world. This has led to a split in the students of Sellars: Sellarean Left: Rorty waives the notion of mapping.
PutnamVsSellars: does not explain how the picture would be possible for the frame of the ideal scientific scheme.
III 132
To make a "perspective", characters and sounds have to map something. To give an objective description, they have to describe something. Absolute View/Williams: it will tell us, but not necessarily foreign researchers, how we understand this view.
Putnam: So the "theory of error" is not provided by the absolute view, but from the "local perspective". Be it a perspective that is characterized by the absolute view. Does Williams claim that the existence of the absolute view is a member of our local perspective? Rorty could even agree on this.
---
I (c) 96
Realism/theory/science/Peirce/Sellars: both try to maintain the idea that the theory B1 - (B) A statement may be wrong, even if it follows from our theory (or our theory plus the set of true observation sentences)
  - Could be wrong (yes, sooner or later turn out to be incorrect) without using a realistic concept of truth by not having identified them with present justified assertibility but with ideally justified assertibility.
That is what both consider the meaning of the assertion, the Venus could also have no carbon dioxide.
Realism/truth/PutnamVsPeirce/PutnamVsSellars: However, this presupposes that we sensibly fill the concept of "ideal limit" without a frame of spacetime localizations, objects, etc. and can specify the conditions for science. And that does not work. Besides, it also requires convergence.
If there is no convergence, (so just more frequent cases of failure of convergence than of success) as Kuhn and Feyerabend believe, then the "ideal limit" is treated as badly as the realism.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Sellars, W. Rorty Vs Sellars, W. Frank 603
Ryle's Ancestors/Feelings/Jones/Sellars/Rorty: by the myth of "Jones" even sensations were originally theoretical entities, inner "states that were postulated to explain the occurrence of certain thoughts. E.g. the thought that there is a triangle in front of me even when there is none. (Appearance, explained by sensation.)
Even sensations had "inner qualities" that they did not share with a physical object.
"Of" is not a relational expression for feelings. "Of red": the hyphen is intended to express the simplicity or unanalysability.
Jones: the man who invented consciousness in the myth of Sellars.
Here feelings and thoughts are not considered immediate experiences, they were no objects of underived, inwardly perceptible reports, and certainly not of incorrigible reports.
Only after the introduction of the myth and long learning, it turns out that people can give underived reports on their own internal states.
Question: what's the feature of the mental here?
Frank I 603/604
Thoughts and feelings have no common characteristic except: Armstrong's "states that are capable of producing a behavior". Question: what is it then to be "interior"?
Rorty: postulating something like that does not explain the "non-physical" (just as little as >Ryle's dispositions).
They do not contrast the physical to something else.
Instead of "thought about p" you might as well say: "brain process over p". >Definition/Rorty, Knowledge/Rorty:
Definition/Knowledge/Rorty: what matters is not a new word, but only the theoretically postulated internal characteristics of the relevant entities. (s) New properties instead of new words! Also not new entities! At least not refined microstructure.
RortyVsSellars: Jones did not invent consciousness by inventing the concept of unobservable internal states, which have certain inner qualities. Jones only proposed a microstructure, but no explanation by specific mental events.

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Sellars, W. Verschiedene Vs Sellars, W. Rorty I 206
Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their claims to each other.
I 207
Language/VsSellars: some opponents argue that this is a confusion of terms and words. That having a term and using of a word is one and the same fact in psychological nominalism.
I 208
SellarsVsVs: could answer here: either you admit to everything and everyone (e.g. record players) that you are able to react distinctively to certain kinds of objects, or you give an explanation why you want to draw the line between conceptual thinking and its primitive precursor in a place other than between the acquired language and the learning process still in progress. This makes it clear that the:
Tradition: (Myth of the Given): has thrown two things together: sensations and differentiation abilities.
Sellars I 34
Logical Atomism: VsSellars: he could reply that Sellars 1. overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sensory content.
2. the concepts of sense contents show that logical independence from each other which is characteristic for traditional empiricism.
I 34/25
3. Terms for theoretical entities such as molecules have the interdependence that Sellars may rightly have attributed to terms for physical facts, but: the theoretical terms have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space! Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of physical objects in space and time.
Sense Data TheoryVsSellars:( > I 103) the individual objects are found in the cosmos of everyday language. Physical redness can be analyzed on the basis of red glow, but red glow must be analyzed on the basis of red sensory content. (SellarsVs). But why should the properties of physical objects not be broken down directly into the properties and phenomenal relationships of sensory content?
Sellars: admitted.
I 35
SellarsVsSense Data Theory: how does the sensory data theorist get to the system of sensory content? Even if red glow does not play a role in the analysis of physical redness, he hopes to convince us of this system by asking us to think about the experience of red glow of something. But so far my analysis has not even brought to light such things as sensory content!
I 36
Glowing/Appear/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of red glow. We have to distinguish between qualitative and existential glowing.





Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Sellars, W. Chisholm Vs Sellars, W. Chisholm II 28
RutteVsSellars: it makes no sense to try and unmask what is given as a "myth": we need it to make clear what is now being developed in the perception. The assumption of the way of appearance is being checked by deriving more statements from it about the experiences that then have to occur (success).   VsSellars: In the end it must be possible to say what is expected in perception.
Otherwise, that which distinguishes thinking from perception would be lost.
Problem: we always need the memory which is already hypothetical by nature.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Sellars, W. Cartwright Vs Sellars, W. I 157
Explanation/Realism/Physics/Mary Hesse: Paradigm: billiard ball model for the kinetic theory of gases. Thesis: the molecules in the gas share certain properties with the billiard balls. Model/Hesse: There are positive, negative and neutral analogies between objects in the model and the modeled objects (the objects in reality). SellarsVsHesse: the analogy takes place at a higher level: the relations between the properties are analogous, not the properties themselves! (DF level). E.g. the helium-neon laser and a real triode oscillator have no properties in common. Correct: their properties behave in a similar way, so that they can be described by the same van-der-Pol equation.
I 58
CartwrightVsSellars: the generality and universality is only an illusion. Causes/Composition/Mill/Cartwright: I use Mills expression of "Composition of Causes" (A System of Logic, NY 1893, Book III, Chapter 6).

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Taylor, Ch. Rorty Vs Taylor, Ch. VI 126
World/Knowledge/Reality/Existence/Taylor/Rorty: Taylor: Thesis: nobody is seriously prepared to deny that there are no chairs in this room, and that this is true or false because of the nature of reality. RortyVsTaylor: I do deny this, however! There are two ways to interpret the phrase "due to the sochness of things":
1) as an abbreviation: "due to the uses of our current descriptions and causal interactions.
2) "Because of the suchness of things, regardless of how we describe these things." (Rorty: this is simply pointless).
VI 127
Correspondence/Rorty: with the absence of the thing in itself, the notion of correspondence has also disappeared from the scene. RortyVsTaylor: tries to retain one concept while he renounces the other. That's doomed.
VI130
Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "Internal frame": a concept of truth, which is given by our non-representational handling of what is at hand. ((s) >practice, practical use). Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational handling" of anything is suspicious.
RortyVsSellars: also, language represents nothing! (Sellars per representation (!)).
RortyVsTaylor: our handling of things at most gives us a sense of the causal independence of things, but not a concept of truth of conformity.
VI 131
Taylor: distinguishes "internal frame" truth (correspondence) and "understanding yourself". Because we ourselves are to a great extent constituted by our acts of self-understanding, we can interpret them as if they were in the same manner as our object descriptions about an independent object.
VI 133
Reality/Knowledge/World/RortyVsTaylor: it is not good to say. "The solar system was there, waiting for Kepler". Re-Description/Rorty: difference between a new description of the solar system and of myself: the solar system is not changed by that, and I can make true statements about it at the time before that. For myself, in some cases, I even do not use them to make true statements about my past self.
But there are no scientific re-descriptions the solar system à la Sartre!
(Sartre/Rorty: e.g. "He recognized himself as a coward and thereby lost his cowardice").
TaylorVsRorty/TaylorVsPutnam/TaylorVsGoodman: those authors who say there is no description independent suchness of the world are still tempted to use form/material metaphors. They are tempted to say there were no objects before language had formed the raw material.
Wrong causal relationship: as if the word "dinosaur" caused their emergence.
Taylor: We should stop saying something general about the relationship between language and reality or the "essence of reference" at all. (Only statements about the specific linguistic behavior of certain persons are permitted, which also allows for predictions).
World/Language/Davidson/Rorty: there is certainly a very specific relationship between the word "Kilimanjaro" and a particular speaker, but we are unable to say even the slightest about it if we are not very well informed on the role of this word in sentences!
Referencing/Reference/Davidson/Rorty: no hope of explaingin the reference directly in non-language-related terminology (regardless of sentence)!
Language/Davidson/Rorty: "something like a language does not exist." (Nice Derangement of Epitaphs): there is no set of conventions that you would have to learn when you learn to speak. No abstract entity that would have to be internalized.
VI 134
Taylor/Rorty: distinguishes between things "that can be decided by means of reason" and things where that is not possible. RortyVsTaylor: at most pragmatic distinction between useful for us and not useful for us.
VI 137
Taylor: once you escaped epistemology, you come to an "uncompromising realism". RortyVsTaylor: only at a trivial and uninteresting realism.
VI 139
Representation/Knowledge/Taylor Rorty: the epistemological interpretation of knowledge as mental images is inappropriate. We can draw a line between my image and the object, but not between my handling of the object and the object itself. The notion that our understanding is based in our handling of the world rejects representations in general.
VI 140
Taylor: Heidegger ( "handiness") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis: action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: precisely these two authors are holding on to images and representations, and no matter how mediated.
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world. Object/Representation:/RortyVsTaylor: we cannot - in contrast to Taylor - draw any line between the object and our image of the object, because the "image" is also merely a form of handling.

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Tradition Luhmann Vs Tradition AU Kass 7
Subject/Object/Luhmann: is a difficult problem. First of all: who is the observer? It is the last figure, which in turn has a need for explication about certain distinctions.
LuhmannVsSubject Tradition: here you have continuities and discontinuities that allow you to decide whether you want to apply the concept of subject by location.
Luhmann: perhaps it would be better to focus on differentiation. But there is no final decision in this matter.
LuhmannVsTradition: I also continue to use the term "democracy", but it is about something else, not "rule of the people". For example, I sometimes decide for continuity. Sometimes for discontinuity.
Continuity/Luhmann: Continuity to tradition is the concept of self-reference (SR). For example, Nous, the thinking of thinking can always have a reference to itself, or the classical subject that always knew it was a subject.
On the other hand it is easy to lose sight of the fact that social systems are also subjects!
Movement/Tradition/Luhmann: Distinction movement/non-movement: seems to be decisive for European history. Distinction Divine/Human. Imagination: the immobile bank of the river alone enables the perception of the river.
LuhmannVsSellars: this whole picture could turn out to be a culturally shaped metaphor.
Not all cultures still accessible today work with the schema movement/unmoved.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Analogy Cartwright, N. I 157
Explanation/Realism/Physics/Mary Hesse: Paradigm: Billiard ball model for kinetic gas theory. Thesis: the molecules in the gas share certain properties with the billiard balls. Model/Hesse: there are positive, negative and neutral analogies between the objects in the model and the modelled objects (the objects in reality).
SellarsVsHesse: the analogy takes place on a higher level: the relations between the properties are analog, not the properties themselves!
For example, the helium-neon laser and a real triode oscillator have no properties in common. Correct: their properties behave in a similar way, so they can be described with the same Van-Der-Pol-Equation.
CartwrightVsSellars: the generality and exceptionlessness is only appearance.
Explanation Fraassen, B. van I 23
Explanatory Power/criterion/theory/Fraassen: how good is explanatory power as a criterion for choosing a theory? In any case, it is one. Fraassen: thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars).
Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/(Salmon/Reichenbach: thesis: it is imperfect as long as any regularity remains unexplained. (FraassenVs).
I 100
Thesis: explanation is not an additional property beyond empirical adequacy.
I 134
Def Explanation/Fraassen: Thesis: An explanation is not the same as a proposition or list of propositions, nor an argument, but an answer to a why-question. Even if explanations are propositions, of course. A theory of explanation must therefore be a theory of why-questions.
I 213
Explanation/Regularity/Fraassen: Thesis: are only regularities of observable phenomena that must be explained!
Sprache Sellars, W. Rorty VI 184
Language / World / Sellars / Rorty: everything is linguistically - VsSellars: the most common objection: small children and dogs also have pain without being able to talk about it.

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Truth Taylor, Ch. Rorty VI ~126
Truth/Taylor: Thesis: "internal framework": a concept of truth that is given by our non-representational approach to the available. Rorty/RortyVsTaylor: (with Sellars): according to psychological nominalism (everything is linguistic) "non-representational dealing" with something suspect.
RortyVsSellars: besides, language represents nothing at all! (Sellars pro representation (!!)).
VI 140
Taylor: Heidegger ("Zuhanden") and Merleau-Ponty (thesis action and corporeality) show a way out. RortyVsTaylor: these two authors hold on to images and representations, no matter how they are conveyed.