## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

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Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation._____________ Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||

Author | Item | Summary | Meta data |
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I 208ff Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme. Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but relationship between singular terms - a = b different names. --- I 211 Copula forms indefinite singular term: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. --- I 211 Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. --- I 365 Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmar. --- II 23 Identity/absolutely distinguishable: open sentence only fulfilled by an object. - Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. - Identity: Objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. --- I 397 Theseus ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. --- II 156ff Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. - Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless -> single Term, instead predicate. --- Geach I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". - (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa. From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a. --- Geach I 240 But Geach per relative identity. --- Quine V 86 Identity/Quine: initially only means for extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap. --- V 89 Identity/Geach: only with respect to general terms, the same thing. --- V 161 Identity: restricted: in terms of general term: "the same apple" - unrestricted: Learning: 1. anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) transitivity) 2. disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. --- I 162 Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is element of every class, from which x is element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. --- V 162 Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. - Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. --- VII 65 ~ Identity/Quine: important: the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. --- IX 24 Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. --- X 90 Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for:. Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. --- X 99 Identity/Quine: only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables, not defined between abstraction expressions or their schema letters. --- XII 71 Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. |
Q I W.V.O. Quine Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Q II W.V.O. Quine Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Q III W.V.O. Quine Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Q IX W.V.O. Quine Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Q V W.V.O. Quine Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Q VI W.V.O. Quine Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Q VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Q VIII W.V.O. Quine Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Q X W.V.O. Quine Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Q XII W.V.O. Quine Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Q XII W.V.O. Quine Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 |

> Counter arguments against **Quine**

> Counter arguments in relation to **Identity ...**

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-22