|Actions, philosophy: Actions are conscious or unconscious human actions as opposed to physical events. The action can take place against the will of the agent, but only if the opposed will is not strong enough to prevent the execution entirely.|
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Action depends on description (Example Mary) - Events are independent of description! Evening Star/Morning Star - Burglar/Father
Action: not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: primary cause and proper causation.
II 109 f
Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (CI) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (NC) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws.
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Brandom I 724
Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved - I 726 Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - description dependent - I 727 she believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow) - I 728 Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - As in beliefs.
Accordion Effect/Success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action - Example Mountain Climber: I 958 Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURD: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded - I 729 Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine - I 957 Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto) - intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established.
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Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object
Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable - 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted - MontagueVsDavidson: Events superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely)
Action: not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: primary cause and proper causation - (s) because example differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers - (s) something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001