Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 102
Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits.
I 372f
Objects of propositional attitude eliminated: "Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer the form" Fab" a = Thomas, b = () - but: "Fa" where "F" is a complex expression - no longer "believes" term, but operator.
I 402
Existence: does not arise from dichotomy "single thing" - "universal" - it does not matter whether they do exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - linking with stimuli is weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions.
I 412
Object: name which is denoted by singular terms, accepts it as values ​​- (but singular term eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness".
I 438
Ideal objects not permitted - geometric objects are permitted (no identity without localization).
I 435
Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint.
II 30
Object/Quine: Space-Time-piece can also be distributed or scattered. (Nominalism, Goodman).
II 23
Physical object is deceptive - better space-time pieces - "space" and "places as such" untenable, otherwise there would be absolute standstill and absolute movement - 4-digit coordinates suffice - ontology of pure set theory - no more physical object.
II 156 ff
Object (physical)/Quine: arbitrarily scattered and arbitrarily singled out - pocket contents, single coin at various points in time, combination with the Eiffel Tower, Space-Time-points, anything - are not so strongly body-oriented - identification like from one possible world to another: without content as long as no instructions are given - value of a variable.
VI 32
Object/Ontology/Quine: bodies constitute themselves as ideal nodes in the centers of overlapping observation sentences - problem: observation sentences are not permanent - therefore the objectification (reification) is always already a theory.
VI 34
Question: what should be considered real objectification and not just a theoretically useful one (like classes).
VI 35
Abstract objects: pointless to speak of permanent stimulus phases - solution: pronouns and bound variables - Vs singular term : often not referring - there must be unspecifiable irrational numbers - Solution: bound variable instead of singular term.
VI 38f
Objectification/Reification/Quine: for the first time in predicative connection of observation sentences - instead of their mere conjunction - "This is a blue pebble": calls for embedding pebble into the blue.
VI 41
Abstract objects/Modal/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects - QuineVsModal logic: instead quantification (postulation of objects) - so we can take the slack out of the truth function.
VII 69
Object/Quine: may be unconnected: E.g. USA Alaska.
XII 36
Properties/Identity/Quine: Problem: (unlike objects) ultimately based on synonymy within a language - more language-specific identity.
V 39
Ultimately we do without rigorous individuation of properties and propositions. (different term scheme) - Frege dito: (Basic Laws): do not extend identity to terms.
XII 68
Object/Theory/Quine: what is an object, ultimately, you cannot say - only in terms of a theory - (ultimately overall theory, i.e. language use) - but wrong: to say that talk about things would only make sense within a wider range - that would correspond to the false thesis that no predicate applied to all things - there are universal predicates.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Object ...

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

> Export as BibTeX Datei
Legal Notice & Contact   Data protection declaration

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-21