Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments
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| Author | Item | Summary | Meta data |
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| I 102 Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits. --- I 372f Objects of propositional attitude eliminated: "Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer the form" Fab" a = Thomas, b = () - but: "Fa" where "F" is a complex expression - no longer "believes" term, but operator. --- I 402 Existence: does not arise from dichotomy "single thing" - "universal" - it does not matter whether they do exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - linking with stimuli is weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. --- I 412 Object: name which is denoted by singular terms, accepts it as values - (but singular term eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". --- I 438 Ideal objects not permitted - geometric objects are permitted (no identity without localization). --- I 435 Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint. --- II 30 Object/Quine: Space-Time-piece can also be distributed or scattered. (Nominalism, Goodman). --- II 23 Physical object is deceptive - better space-time pieces - "space" and "places as such" untenable, otherwise there would be absolute standstill and absolute movement - 4-digit coordinates suffice - ontology of pure set theory - no more physical object. --- II 156 ff Object (physical)/Quine: arbitrarily scattered and arbitrarily singled out - pocket contents, single coin at various points in time, combination with the Eiffel Tower, Space-Time-points, anything - are not so strongly body-oriented - identification like from one possible world to another: without content as long as no instructions are given - value of a variable. --- VI 32 Object/Ontology/Quine: bodies constitute themselves as ideal nodes in the centers of overlapping observation sentences - problem: observation sentences are not permanent - therefore the objectification (reification) is always already a theory. --- VI 34 Question: what should be considered real objectification and not just a theoretically useful one (like classes). --- VI 35 Abstract objects: pointless to speak of permanent stimulus phases - solution: pronouns and bound variables - Vs singular term : often not referring - there must be unspecifiable irrational numbers - Solution: bound variable instead of singular term. --- VI 38f Objectification/Reification/Quine: for the first time in predicative connection of observation sentences - instead of their mere conjunction - "This is a blue pebble": calls for embedding pebble into the blue. --- VI 41 Abstract objects/Modal/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects - QuineVsModal logic: instead quantification (postulation of objects) - so we can take the slack out of the truth function. --- VII 69 Object/Quine: may be unconnected: E.g. USA Alaska. --- XII 36 Properties/Identity/Quine: Problem: (unlike objects) ultimately based on synonymy within a language - more language-specific identity. --- V 39 Ultimately we do without rigorous individuation of properties and propositions. (different term scheme) - Frege dito: (Basic Laws): do not extend identity to terms. --- XII 68 Object/Theory/Quine: what is an object, ultimately, you cannot say - only in terms of a theory - (ultimately overall theory, i.e. language use) - but wrong: to say that talk about things would only make sense within a wider range - that would correspond to the false thesis that no predicate applied to all things - there are universal predicates._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. |
Q I W.V.O. Quine Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Q II W.V.O. Quine Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Q III W.V.O. Quine Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Q IX W.V.O. Quine Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Q V W.V.O. Quine Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Q VI W.V.O. Quine Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Q VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Q VIII W.V.O. Quine Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Q X W.V.O. Quine Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Q XII W.V.O. Quine Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-21