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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conceptualism | Tugendhat | I 72f Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject Theory (>objet theory): States of affairs are taken as objects. Conceptualism: concepts are taken as objects. Immaterial - but also VsImagination. Instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure). TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion. >Aristotle, >Being. I 91 VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings". I 184f Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis. >Predicates, >Reference. I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete imagination. >Nominalism, >Universals. ConceptualismVsNominalism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual. NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations. >Generality, >Ludwig Wittgenstein. I 189 VsConceptualism: object dispensable. >Conceptualism/Quine. Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning. I 204 Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color". >Imagination, >Colour. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Constructivism | Meixner | I 12 Constructivism/Meixner: is an approach of IntersubjectivityVsObjectivity. Constructivist ontology: cannot claim objectivity, but only intersubjectivity. (> Intersubjectivity, >Objectivity.) |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Ethics | Mackie | Stegmüller IV 169 Ethics/moral/Mackie: (similar to Field): our everyday understanding calls for a realm of moral characteristics, which should be as autonomous as material objects, but which do not exist. Moral error theory: (Field, Mackie): our search for a true-making realm of facts is caused by a semantic error. >Truth makers. The correct explanation of the truth conditions of moral judgments deprives those judgments of the valuation by everyday reasoning. (Due to the metaphysical hair-raising properties). >Truth condition, >Metaphysics. Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: there are no objective values (ontologically). >Ontology. Stegmüller IV 173 Objectivistic ethics/MackieVsObjectivism/Stegmüller: leads to strange entities like "Shall Be Done". MacKieVsintuitionism/VsEmotivism: Riddle of income: what is the link between the natural fact that murder is cruel and the moral fact that it is wrong? IV 179 Metaethical fallacy: - Conclusion of beliefs on their accuracy. >Belief, >Correctness, cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. IV 280 Morality/ethics/wisdom/generalizability/generalization/universalization/Mackie/Stegmüller: everyone wants to live according to his conscience - that tends to raise the tension between morality and self-interest . Under these circumstances, however, what is wise, does not coincide with, what would be wise if we do not have a moral sense. >Generalization. Stegmüller IV 263 Morality/Ethics/Mill: Mill believed in gradual change of human nature toward a "general love of man". StephenVsMill: "impartial charity" could also lead to Stalinism. Mackie ditto - MackieVsMill. IV 269 Freedom/Mill/Stegmüller: Thesis: The only justification for interfering with the freedom of others is to prevent harm to others. MackieVsMIll: This is too weak. Freedom of thought cannot be justified with this. Instead: "Principle of legitimate intervention. >Freedom. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Objectivism | Gadamer | I 306 Objectivism/GadamerVsObjectivism/Gadamer: Historical objectivism, by referring to its critical methodology, obscures the historical entanglement in the history of effect in which historical consciousness itself is situated. Although it uses its method of criticism to remove the ground from the arbitrariness of actualizing ingratiations with the past, it creates for itself the good conscience to deny the involuntary and not arbitrary but all-carrying preconditions that guide its own understanding, and thus to miss the truth that would be attainable with all the finiteness of our understanding. Historical objectivism resembles in this respect statistics, which is such an excellent propaganda tool precisely because it allows the language of "facts" to speak, thus feigning an objectivity that in reality depends on the legitimacy of its questions. >History of Effect/Gadamer. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Objectivism | Husserl | Gadamer I 248 Objectivism/Husserl/HusserlVsObjectivism/Gadamer: Already in the fifth logical investigation he had worked out the peculiarity of intentional experiences and distinguished consciousness, as he made it a research topic, "as an intentional experience"(...) from the real consciousness unit of experiences and from their inner perception. In this respect, consciousness was there already not an "object" but an essential assignment (...). What became apparent in the research of this classification was a first overcoming of "objecivism", provided that the meaning of words were no longer confused with the real psychological content of consciousness, e.g. the Gadamer I 249 associative notions that a word evokes. >Phenomenology/Husserl, >Objecitivsm/Gadamer. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Predicates | Frege | II 47 Frege: e.g. a sentence about a unicorn is a sentence without truth value; predicates cannot be assigned or denied. (>Nonexistence - thought: is the same whether the expression has a reference ("meaning") or not. Berka I 87 Predicate/Frege: one could live with a single predicate, "is a fact". Then there is no question of subject/predicate.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 Brandom I 943 Frege: (great discovery): there must be complex predicates in this sense: so that the inferential role of sentences, e.g. "anyone who admires someone who admires themselves", can be recognized. (x)(y)[Rxy > Rxx]. (Can also occur in a language without quantification)- Strawson: this is the second distinguishing feature of singular terms and predicates: terms can be quantified. Singulär terms, >Quantification. EMD II 226ff Predicate/Frege: Function: takes objects as arguments and provides truth values as a value. Frege II 71 Predicate/Frege: e.g. "falling under the concept of human" - which means the same as "a human". ((s) Later authors: "is a human being". "Is" belongs to the predicate. Tugendhat I 192 Predicate/Frege/Tugendhat: with Frege the predicate also stands for something, but something non-objective: the concept ("to stand for") - (VsObject Theory). Tugendhat I 193 Predicate/Frege: the predicate has no reference - not because it were contradictory, but because of indeterminacy. >Reference, >Indeterminacy. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Predicates | Husserl | Tugendhat I 168f Predicate/Husserl: the meaning of the predicate could be an object or an attribute. TugendhatVsHusserl: it is not real, the meaning of the predicate is not an object. It is simply drawn up linguistically (VsObject Theory). Instead of standing for an object: the function of the predicate is characterization. Predicates are unsaturated, they are only meaningful in connection with singular terms. >"Unsaturated", >Singular terms, >Predication, >Quantification over properties. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Predicates | Tugendhat | I 172 Predicate/Tugenhat: VsObject theory: the predicate is not to stand for something - we need a different explanation. I 208 Quasi-predicates/Tugendhat: assuming primitive language, expression of these predicates only in the presence of the object - no theory of use - concurrence of usage and explanation situation. >Terminology/Tugendhat. I 209 Predicates/Tugendhat: real predicate must be situation independent (that is, especially independent from the circumstances) - situation independency by connection to singular term. >Circumstances, >Situations, >Singular terms. I 295 Predicates/Tugendhat: not all are suitable to be reformulated inside the conjunction: E.g. Peter and Paul stand next to each other: that cannot be reformulated to Peter stands next to each other and Paul stands next to each other. I 332 Predicate/Tugendhat: predicates are not about the rule of use ((s) use, meaning), but about the verification rule (s) Truth). >Verification, >Use, >Use theory. I 335 The rule of use is not determined by the particular situation - 1. the manner of use of "F "in the special use "this is F" is already the general manner of use of "F" in any sentences "Fa" 2. with that, the word "true" is already explained: with a truth condition in which the word "applies" no longer exists: if one can use the sentence 'this is F' correctly in the situation, in which one can replace "this" for "a", "correct" according to the presupposed explanation of the verification-rule of "F". I 332 Quasi-predicate/Tugendhat: E.g. in "this is red" "red" could still function as a quasi-predicate - so the essence cannot already lie in the external addition of "this is .. " - but only in the special manner of use (use) of "this"- Predicates: are needed instead of quasi-predicate because we cannot only connect the classification term "F" with other complementary expressions to say something else than "this is F ', but to say the same thing from a different situation. >Terminology/Tugendhat, >Contextuality, >Generality, >Generalization. I 483 Attributes/Tugendhat: predicates refer to attributes - not to objects. >Attributes, >Objects. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Questions | Gadamer | I 304 Question/Gadamer: The first thing that understanding begins with is (...) that something appeals to us. This is the highest of all hermeneutical conditions. We now know what is demanded by it: a fundamental suspension of one's own prejudices. All suspension of judgements, however, and therefore even more so that of prejudices, has, logically seen, the structure of the question. The essence of the question is the disclosure and keeping open of possibilities. If a >prejudice becomes questionable (...) this does not mean that it is simply set aside and the other is directly brought to the fore in its place. GadamerVsHistorism/VsObjectivism: This is rather the naivety of historical >objectivism: to assume such a relinquishment of itself. In truth, one's own prejudice is actually brought into play by the fact that it is itself at stake. Only by playing itself off it is able to experience the other person's claim to truth at all and enables him or her to play him- or herself off. Cf. >Historism, >Understanding/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. Historism/Gadamer: The naivety of the so-called historism consists in the fact that it withdraws itself from such a reflection and forgets its own historicity in trusting in the methodology of its procedure. I 368 Question/Gadamer: It is obvious that in all experience the structure of the question is presupposed. One does not experience without the activity of questioning. The realization that the thing is different and not as one first believed, obviously presupposes the passage through the question, whether it is the case or not. The openness that lies in the nature of experience is, logically speaking, precisely this openness of one way or another. It has the structure of the question. And just as the dialectical negativity of experience found its perfection in the idea of a completed experience, in which we are aware of our finiteness and limitedness as a whole, so the logical form of the question and the negativity inherent in it finds its completion in a radical negativity, the knowledge of not-knowing. It is the famous Socratic docta ignorantia that opens up the true superiority of questioning in the extreme negativity of aporia. Meaning: The essence of the question is that it has meaning. But meaning is a sense of direction. The sense of the question is therefore the direction in which the answer alone can take place if it wants to be a meaningful answer. The question puts the respondent in a certain respect. The emergence of a question, as it were, breaks up the being of the respondent. The logos that unfolds this broken being is in this respect always already the answer. Socrates/Plato: One of the greatest insights that the Platonic Socrates account gives us is that asking questions is - quite contrary to the general opinion - more difficult than answering them. I 369 In order to be able to ask, one must want to know, i.e., but know that one does not know. The openness of the questioned person consists in the fact that the answer is not fixed. Every question completes its meaning only when it passes through such limbo, when it becomes an open question. Every real question requires this openness. If it lacks the same, it is basically an illusionary question that has no real meaning. But the openness of the question is not a boundless one. Rather, it includes a certain boundary through the horizon of the question. A question that lacks the same question is void. It only becomes an emergent question when the fluid indeterminacy of the direction in which it points is placed in the specific of one way or another. Wrong question: We call a question a wrong question that does not reach the open, but rather distorts the same by holding on to wrong premises. As a question, it feigns openness and decisiveness. But where the questionable is not - or not correctly - set off against the preconditions that are really fixed, there it is not really brought into the open and therefore nothing can be decided. I 370 Crooked question: We do not call it wrong, but crooked, because there is a question behind it, i.e. an open question is meant - but it is not in the direction that the question has taken. The crookedness of a question consists in the fact that the question does not really follow a direction and therefore does not allow an answer. Similarly, we say of assertions that are not entirely wrong, but also not right, that they are crooked. I 372 Idea: Every idea has the structure of the question. The idea of the question, however, is already a dive into the levelled width of the widespread opinion. (>Doxa/Plato). We also say of the question that it arises or poses itself - much rather than that we rise or ask it. Experience: We have already seen that the negativity of experience logically implies the question. In fact, it is the impulse that is represented by the one who does not fit into the pre-opinion through which we experience. Questioning is therefore also more a suffering than an action. The question suggests itself. It can no longer be evaded and we can no longer remain with the usual opinion. See >Question and Answer/Collingwood. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Self | Stalnaker | I 253 Self/semantic diagnosis/Nagel/Stalnaker: NagelVsSemantic diagnosis: the semantic diagnosis is unsatisfactory. VsOntological solution: the ontological solution wants to enrich the objective, centerless world in the wrong way. Nagel: center position thesis: there is an objective self. StalnakerVsNagel: the semantic diagnosis has more potential than Nagel thinks. Simple solution: we need context-dependent or subjective information. I 255 Belief/conviction/Stalnaker: beliefs are sets of uncentered possible worlds. They are a self-attribution of property. >Self/Nagel. I 264 Objective self/modest semantic view/Stalnaker: the objective self dispenses with subjective content that would be more than self-localization - there is no realm of subjective facts. Cf. >Centered worlds, >Subjectivity, >Objectivity/Nagel. I 269 Then one would have to know what it is like for Napoleon to be Napoleon if all the facts are considered. Minimal subject: >Subjects/Stalnaker. I 270 Objective self/StalnakerVsObjectivation: (of subjective content) 1) the objective self takes on an extravagant metaphysics and 2) requires an explanation of the special relationship that we still would have to it. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| States of Affairs | Tugendhat | I 141 State of Affairs/TugendhatVsHusserl/TugendhatVsObject Theory (= Thesis State of Affairs = object) not every sentence corresponds to state of affairs - false "theory of objects". >Attributes, >Abstract objects, >Abstractness. I 161 State of Affairs- not composed like an object - State of Affairs: like attributes: "abstract objects". I 164f State of Affairs/fact/Husserl/Tugendhat: imperceptible - composition of state of affairs different than of objects - linguistically composed (thinking) - (VsObject theory; >object theory). Def "categorical Synthesis"/Husserl: task: of the real composition of an object of components is a special, not real composition which would be constitutive for the state of affairs to distinguish. >Edmund Husserl, >Experience/Husserl. I 167 TugendhatVsHusserl, Vs categorical synthesis: Heidelberg castle is castle and red - even "red" represents object. >Predicates, >Predication, >Properties. I 176 TugendhatVsObject theory: it fails at the question, how the meaning of the whole sentence is given by the meanings of the phrases. There are no combinations of objects in the sentence. >Compositionality. I 280ff State of Affairs/fact/Tugendhat: state of affairs as that what the sentence says: this does not work, due to potential lie. Identification of the states of affairs requires understanding the usage rules. - The same sentence can stand for different situations, and vice versa (like Austin). The states of affairs in deictic expressions: Classifications principle of incidents - the state of affairs also lacks the contention mode, which is part of the assertion of "p" - VsObject theory. >Assertions, >Meaning. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Terminology | Tugendhat | I 72f Veritative Being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject theory - VsConzeptualism (terms for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no-structure) - TugendhatVsTradition (Middle Ages): verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next unum and aliquid - would Aristotle have referred to the veritative being, he could have formed a semantics of assertion. I 91 VsHeidegger: Being of facts instead of "all being is being of any beings". I 162f Object theory/TugendhatVs: states of affairs regarded as objects - VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus: state of affairs as a combination of object, fact as existence of state of affairs - Wittgenstein, late: (self-criticism), "complex is not equal to fact". I 217 Object Theory simply ignored the communicative function of language. I 337 Singular Term/TugendhatVsObject theory: cannot make that "standing for" understandable. Not even his own basic notion, that of the object. I 338 Frege: singular terms are dependent expressions. I 246 Hysteron-proton/Tugendhat: the later earlier - fallacy of interchanging the implication relation - here: also a state of affairs can only be identified by phrases. I 266 Definition expulsion game/Tugendhat: that the rule of use which is explained, is to be understood as a verification rule - (pro). >use/Tugendhat, > truth conditions/Tugendhat, >Meaning/Tugendhat. I 276 The rules of the expulsion game are verification rules. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Unintended Models | Field | II 264 Unintended/Non-standard model/NSM/Field: Problem: we cannot simply say that the non-standard model is unintended. >Models, >Model theory. II 265 Non-disquotational view: here it is only meaningful to speak of "unintended", if we can state by what facts about our practice these models are unintend - and precisely because these models make each of our sentences just as true, the specification of such facts appears to be impossible. >Disquotationalism. II 267 Applying/Explanation/Observing/Field: our observation practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to all that and only that to which it applies to. - That explains why some non-standard models are unintended. >Observation, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Satisfaction. II 319 Unintended Model/Interpretation/Putnam/Field: there is nothing in our use of the set theoretical predicates. That could make an interpretation "unintended". (VsObjectivity of mathematics). FieldVsPutnam: but this cannot be extended to the number theory. >Number theory. II 320 Not every objective statement is formalizable. - E.g. Consequences with the quantifier "only finitely many". >Formalization. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Values | Putnam | V 232f Value/values/Max Weber: there is a distinction between facts and values (VsObjectivity of value judgments) "Non-judgmental understanding": ideal type: is the understanding of rational "instrumental" actions. Karl-Otto Apel: these can be reconstructed as transpositions of if-then rules. Sociology: does not have to prove that maximum demands are fulfilled, but only that it was rational for the actor, how he/she has fulfilled his/her objectives. PutnamVsWeber, VsApel: this is only operationalist and too instrumentalist, to understand rationality only from purposes. >Operationalism, >Instrumentalism, >Rationalism, >Teleology, >Purposes. --- I (d) 217 Facts/values/Putnam: facts are not separated. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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| Jackson, F. | Lewis Vs Jackson, F. | V 154/155 Robust/LewisVsJackson: There are two form of robustness: Def robust1: A is robust1 with regard to B, if P(A) and P(A I B) are close and both are high (like Jackson). (probability). Def robust2: A is robust2 with regard to B, if P(A) is high and remains high, even when we learn that B. (Learning!) E.g. A is robust1 with regard to B only, but not with regard to B and E together. Then A will not be robust2 with regard to B. A: "I will not believe that Reagan works for the KGB!" B: "Reagan works for the KGB". E: Not A. (I believe that Reagan works for the KGB.) ((s) robust1 on B only: even if "...I will not believe this" But only if both probabilities are high!) not robust2: (learning): When I learn that he works for the KGB, I need to believe it. Lewis: If the KGB is so successful to have one of their people on the presidential seat, then they will also control the news so that we do not learn about this. So P(A) and P(A I BE) are equally high. But naturally P(A I BE) = 0. (If I believe that Reagan works for the KGB, I will not believe that he does not work for them = 0). Learning: What I learn is what I need to believe (in order to have been able to learn). And this contrary to my initial original belief that the KGB is going to deceive me. So A is not robust2 with regard to B. Example Richmond Thomason: a man accepts: "If my wife cheats on me, I won't believe it (because she is clever)". But he doesn't mean that if he is made to believe the antecedens, he will believe the consequences. ((s) Conditional(s): the A can become more and more likely here without the speaker believing it, but if the probability function for the speaker gets higher, he/she will reject the whole conditional. Robust/Conditional/Lewis: which of the two types of robustness affects the indicative conditional? It depends on robustness2: it signals more information. V 15 On the other hand, robustness1 is much easier to determine. Both are equivalent on the assumption that the learner conditionalizes. R1 is a good guide for R2, which is really important. It is not surprising that we can signal R1, even if it clearly diverges from R2! Example I can very well say: "If Reagan works for the KGB, I'll never believe it!". Stalnaker I 269 Def Phenomenal Information/Terminology/Lewis/Stalnaker: is - beyond physical information - an irreducible different kind of information. The two are independent of each other. Stalnaker: it is the kind of information Jackson's color researcher Mary acquires. It must be included in a non-centered description of the world. Lewis/Stalnaker: had designed it for a possible response LewisVsJackson. But: I 270 LewisVsPhenomenal Information/LewisVsJackson: enriching our description of the world would not in itself solve the problem of what it is that Mary does not know. Lewis: For example parapsychology: is what one could call the science of non-physical things. Suppose we learn as much about parapsychology as possible. Yet we would always not know "what it is like..." Stalnaker: this is the same argument as Nagel's against the ontological view of self-localization. It is in vain to try to objectify a certain type of information, because the information "as it is..." will always be omitted. Objectification/VsVs: could then answer that this special information is only accessible to the subject. (see above: like Frege). Intentionality/Stalnaker: this requires access to intentionality, which explains how objective content can have this particular status. Semantic diagnosis/Stalnaker: seems to me to dampen the temptation to objectify the content. StalnakerVsObjectivation: (of subjective content) 1. takes on an extravagant metaphysics. 2. requires an explanation of the special relation we should still have additionally. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Object Theory | Newen Vs Object Theory | NS I 107 Identity/Informative Identity Sentences/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. S1 Maria believes that Peter Bieri is a philosopher S2 Maria does not believe that Pascal Mercier is a philosopher (Pascal Mercier is a pseudonym of Bieri). VsObject theory: by indication of the content the object theory cannot grasp that Mary has no contradictory beliefs, but that she believes she was dealing with two people. Negative Existence Sentences/VsObject Theory/Newen/Schrenk: E.g. Sherlock Holmes does not exist The object theory cannot even represent the reported information. Frege: Solution: Description Theory: the relevant contribution of a singular term is not the designated object, but the information that can be expressed by a description. Dilemma/Object Theory/Description Theory: the state of affairs adequacy requires in turn that in modal contexts the contribution of the singular term to the content is the object. ((s) Because otherwise the description becomes necessary. E.g. it would then be necessary that Plato was the teacher of Aristotle.) |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Objective Prblty. | Cartwright Vs Objective Prblty. | I 39 Def Objective probability/Cartwright/(s): is in a way supposed to be the opposite of the apparent correlation. CartwrightVsobjective P: Problem: insisting on the difference between apparent correlation and objective P means giving up too much of the original empiricist program. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Objectivism | Putnam Vs Objectivism | Field II 325 Universe/Standard-Platonism/Field: (thesis: "there is only one universe"). Problem/PutnamVsPlatonism: how do we manage at all to pick out the "full" (comprehensive) universe and to oppose this to a partial universe, and in accordance with this the standard element relationship as opposed to a non-member standard relationship? (Putnam 1980). (Here from the perspective of "one universe"). Putnam: thesis we cannot do that. That is, that the "incomplete content" of the terms "set" and "element of" is not sufficient to determine the truth value of all theoretical conclusions. PutnamVsObjectivism: concluded the same anti-objectivist methodological consequences such as the Platonism of perfection: although the standard Platonism has incorporated this idea that we have a set-theoretical universe, this is not really part of Platonism per se. PutnamVsPlatonism/Field: if he's right, this standard Platonism cannot be maintained. Field: Putnam is right: the "anti-objectivist" methodology is the right conclusion, whatever the ontological consequences are. The "Platonism of perfection" shows us this. Field II 338 PutnamVsObjectivism/Set Theory/Field: (Putnam 1980 first half): thesis: even if we assume that part of the standard Platonism, who says that there is only one universe, Problem: then there is nothing in our conclusion practices, which could determine the specific truth value of typical undecidable sentences. Field II 339 This can be easily extended to the relation of semantic consequence in logic 2nd order. In short: (ia) Nothing in our practices determines that the term "set" picks out the entire set-theoretical universe V and not any suitably closed part of V. (ib), even if the entire set-theoretical universe V could be picked out, there would be nothing in our practice that could determine that our term "e" picks out, the element relation E on V unlike any other relation on V that obeys our axioms. (ii) The indeterminacy in (ia) and (ib) is sufficient to allow the truth value of typical undecidable sentences of the set theory to be undetermined. ((ib) alone would also be sufficient, often also (ia) alone), Undecidable sentences/Field: which are covered by this scheme? What are the semantic facts that are determined by our conclusion practices? How is the semantics of "quantity" and "e" defined by our practice far enough to allow the quantifier "only a finite number of" to be sufficiently defined. And with that, how the truth will be determined by F-decidable, but otherwise by undecidable sentences, also for the number theory. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Objectivism | Verschiedene Vs Objectivism | Stegmüller IV 242 ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case: SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles. The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he must explain how such systems can arise at all! 1 Which human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of these artificial conventions? 2. How are they maintained? |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Subjectivism | Verschiedene Vs Subjectivism | Stegmüller IV 177 VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: he has a hard time where most people consider norms and values to be objectively anchored, so that beliefs have already found their way into the meaning of moral words. IV 178 VsVs: that would be a "metaethical fallacy": the conclusion of beliefs about their correctness. IV 216 Def Moral in the broad sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: consists of an attitude to life and a system of rules of conduct that someone makes his own. Can vary from person to person. Def Moral in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: limitation of the self-interests of the doers. Not flexible, as it must contain everything that is required to maintain cooperation. Core piece: "Minimal Morality". Reasonable. VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: two negative cornerstones: 1. Hierarchy of objective norms 2. The impossible changeability of human nature. IV 242 ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case: SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles. The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he has to explain how such systems can develop at all! 1. What human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of those artificial conventions? 2. How are they maintained? IV 304 VsSubjectivism/Moral: anyone could object that subjectivism would not prevent the extinction of a minority! There is no danger of being killed by a member of the minority! (VsRawls). IV 305 VsVs: 1. Every person is a member of some minority. 2. Minimal morality only presupposes that all are rational egoists. Morality/Ethics/Sympathy/Mackie: through the mass media, the "close range" of the human, within which he/she is capable of compassion, expands. IV 306 Minority Problem/Mackie/Stegmüller: when it comes to empiricism, one could argue that all arguments against people of a certain skin colour are based on false empirical premises. Now there is no guarantee against genocide, it has taken place! Cultural achievements can be destroyed within a very short time. IV 307 Moral Reason/Stegmüller: Motifs are Janus-faced: Seen from the inside, they are explanations, from the outside they are causes. Nor can the justification we have achieved be applied to all the principles of morality in the narrow sense. But this is not a shortcoming of the concept of justification itself. The network of standards is only intended to provide something like a framework. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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