Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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I 31
Names/Ontology/Meixner: "That Regensburg is located on the Danube" is a name for a fact-like entity - "being square": name, but not for an individual or a fact-like entity, but name for a property. (property name)
I 42
Properties/(s): Names of properties are expressions with hyphens: e.g. "example-of-the-length-of-Manhattan-in-miles" - e.g. "my-being-176-cm-tall-at-t0" are names of properties - ((s) properties themselves without hyphen!)
I 50
Exemplification/Identity/Meixner: Object X is F, this is not an identity of X and F, of the object with its property, but the property is exemplified by the object
I 73
Property/Meixner: nothing other than function. This property, when saturated with the individual Hans, again results in the fact that Hans is a human
I 75~
Property/Meixner 2nd level: Properties of properties: "the property of being a trait of x" - e.g. being egoistic is the property of being a trait - not 2nd level: e.g. being 2 meters tall - e.g. property of being a trait cannot be said of people or cities (pointless), but it can be (erroneously) said of the property of being 2 meters tall.
I 76
Individual properties ("initial properties")/Meixner: exactly expressable about individuals, not something that only individuals can have - there are cases where properties which cannot be expressed exactly about I can still apply to I.
I 78
Ontological/Property/Meixner: Distinction between relational and non-relational properties is ontological - non-ontological: distinction between negative and non-negative or between disjunctive and non-disjunctive properties.
I 150
Properties/Meixner: Identity principle for individual properties: they can be satisfied by exactly the same entities -for all individual property F and G: F is identical to G if and only if for all individuals x applies: = - for triangles: equiangular and equilateral ones are fulfilled by the same entities.
I 153 ~
Universal Name: means the property.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-21