Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.
 
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Frank I 357
Definition property/Lewis: the set of exactly those possible beings, actual or non-actual, that do or do not have a specified property - E.g. properties that segments of a street do or do not have.
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Lewis IV X
Properties/Lewis: These are the appropriate objects of attitudes.
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IV 135
Properties/Lewis: Sets of individuals - "something that segments of things (in time or space) simply have - also extrinsic properties (that things have because of their relation to other things) - in general: the property to live on one world from any set of possible worlds corresponds to these possible worlds - i.e. for each proposition there is a property to live in a world where this proposition is true.
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Ad IV 146
Proposition/Property/Lewis/(s): Proposition: not related to people, without spatiotemporal localization - simply true in possible world - E.g. Someone is happy - not possible to wish for me, because I do not know if I’m the one - in contrast, property: related to person - I am happy.
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Schw I 94
Properties/Quantity theory/Lewis: no properties: being no cat, identity, element-ship > heterology.
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Schw I 97
Disjunctive property/Lewis/Schwarz: 1) Any property is equivalent with a disjunction of two properties - disjunctive property: only if even more unnatural than the members: E.g. round is not disjunctive, as it clearly is not more unnatural than round and not red - E.g. round and lonely or not round and not lonely in contrast, are disjunctive, because it is less natural than round and lonely.
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Schw I 97
Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates -. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property - perf.nat.p. (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well.
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Schw I 101
Class/Quantity/Properties/Lewis: things with E.g. same charge have to be more common than if they were an element of the same class.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Properties



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28