|Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements.|
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|Stegmüller IV 41
Disposition/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein/VsKripke/Stegmüller: The function can be read from the disposition - then the disposition for errors must be part of the overall disposition - KripkeVs: this again requires facts relating to the correct table or correct function - Kripke: but the function does not exist before the disposition - Competence cannot explain rules, because it presupposes rules - Competence is normative, not descriptive.
Stegm IV 47
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/KripkeVsDisposition Theory: if one understands "meaning" as what I am currently meaning determines what I am to mean in the future, then it is normative, not descriptive - Disposition Theory: claims to be descriptive but it is not - Language/Kripke: Strictly speaking, we must not problematize it because we could then no longer formulate our question understandably.
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989