|Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements.|
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Disposition: Problem of unobservability - II 113 Verifivation/Place: of disp prop: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable
Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only disp) properties fulfil CoCo - Armstrong: are not made true by CoCo - Martin: it can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispo cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the CoCo, which often contain them
Armstrong: Thesis: disp = cat prop: microstructure (therefore dispo no possibilia) - others: cat "realizes" disp prop
Dispo/Martin: just as actual - perverse to call it non-actual - Dispo/Armstrong: are not in themselves causes - (others dito) - Dispo always actual, just not their manifestations - II 6 Example Wire/Martin: Problem: a CoCo can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: "electro-finch": instead brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) wrong cause)
Disp Prop/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (cat prop), therefore they cannot be identical with the disp prop
Dispo/Armstrong/Place/Martin: "in" the ED - Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our EP - > irreducible dispo - ArmstrongVs: no irreducible dispo - Armstrong: why suppose that particles have prop in addition to have the manifested purely cat prop?
Martin Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: in the real world, dispositionality is an irreducible side, connected with all cat prop.
True Maker/Armstrong: The point of the story is the question of the true maker: according to Martin, it must be irreducible "in" the particle - Vs: requires platonistic, never instantiated LoN - II 92 but the non-disp prop plus "strong" LoN which connect these non-disp prop are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction necessary - II 93 Armstrong: certain CoCo apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically.
Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispo: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected
Dispo/Martin: Solution: View particles without structure
Martin Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no MiSt allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the prop of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between cat and disp prop.
Purely Disp Prop/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation - parts/whole separate entities, as causal relation in order - disp prop of the whole effect of the disp prop of the parts and their arrangement.
Dispo: Place: outside the entities, prop of interaction (MartinVs: confusion with manifestation - Armstrong: within? - rather in the connection - Martin reciprocal reaction partner - Ryle: not localized, but belong to the person or object.
Dispo (MartinVsPlace: his introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispo is a doubling of causality.
Dispo/Martin: are always completely actual, even without manifestation - II 174 not in the eye of the beholder - unlike ability.
AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983