Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Abstraction Bigelow I 380
Abstractions/Figures/Armstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: Numbers are causally inactive. Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: some mathematical entities are even observable.
---
I 381
Causation/Mathematics/BigelowVsArmstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: in fact, people are not causes, but they are involved in causal processes. Numbers: they are also involved in causal processes. If objects did not instantiate the quantities they instanced, other changes would have occurred. Thus at least proportions are causally involved. ((s) FieldVsNumbers as causal agents, but not Vs proportions).
---
I 382
Counterfactual dependence/Bigelow/Pargetter: one can again set up consequences of counterfactual conditionals, e.g. For the lever laws of Archimedes. This also provides why-explanations. ---
I 383
Numbers/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows that numbers play a fundamental role in causal explanations. BigelowVsField: (a propos Field, Science without numbers): he falsely assumes that physics first starts with pure empiricism, in order to convert the results into completely abstract mathematics.
Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: wants to avoid this detour.
BigelowVsField: his project is superfluous when we realize that mathematics is only a different description of the physical proportions and relations and no detour.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Causes Lewis V 159
Cause/Lewis: nowadays: cause can only be an indispensable part of something. - Never a whole. - A set of law propositions and a set of fact propositions must imply C>E together. - Where E is the proposition that e exists and C that c exists. - ((s) These are general statements.) ---
V 167
Cause/Lewis: an event is the cause of another if there is a causal chain that leads from one to another. - Causal chain: we get it when we make a >causal dependency (which is not actually transitive) transitive. ---
V 191f
Cause/omission/Lewis: omission can be a cause. - For that we need a different kind of counterfactual conditionals - Sleep would also be an event in this case. - Difference: a) to assume an event as not given - b) thinking it away qua omission. ---
V 201f
Prevention/Cause/Lewis: problem: how can a preavious prevention be a cause? - (For the omission) - Solution: intermediate event between too early and too late. - So we distinguish the real cause from the prevented alternative - late prevention: is more difficult. - The prevention must come after the last alternative. - Lewis: That is not the way we see possible worlds. - Better: common sense. ---
V 326
Backtracking: E.g. of concluding various causes from different effects. ---
Schwarz I 139
Cause/causing/Armstrong: Absence is not a real cause. - LewisVsArmstrong: yes it is, but just so common that it is ignored. - Problem: in vacuum countless absences. ---
I 140
Solution/Lewis: Absences are nothing, because there is nothing - problem: if absence were merely an empty time-space region, why is there oxygen without it and not nitrogen? -> Solution/Lewis: Impact, slight increase in probability. ---
I 141
> href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=241248&a=$a&first_name=David%20K.&author=Lewis&concept=Counterfactual%20Dependence">Counterfactual dependence: exists also between the how, when and where of the action.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Chance Armstrong III 32
Def Chance/Armstrong: = probability to t - objective opportunity: property of having a certain chance (higher-level property) - Ramsey/Mellor pro, Ramsey/MellorVsArmstrong: VsLaws of Nature as relation between universals - ArmstrongVsVs: "objective opportunities" ontologically questionable, universals avoid it   III 34 Chance: logical possibility in re (instead determinist law: necessarily de re) - these forces must be understood as bare powers: their nature seems to exhaust itself in their manifestation. I.e. they cannot be understood a posteriori as the result of an empirical study, as a categorical structure S

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Dispositions Armstrong II 1 f
Disposition: Problem of unobservability.
Place III 113
Verifivation/Place: of disp prop: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable.
Armstrong II 4f
Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only disp) properties fulfil CoCo - Armstrong: are not made true by CoCo - Martin: it can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispo cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the CoCo, which often contain them
II 5
Armstrong: Thesis: dispositional = categorical properties: microstructure (therefore dispo no possibilia) - others: categorical "realizes" dispositional properties.
II 6
Dispo/Martin: just as actual - perverse to call it non-actual - Dispo/Armstrong: are not in themselves causes - (others dito) - Dispo always actual, just not their manifestations - II 6 Example Wire/Martin: Problem: a CoCo can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: "electro-finch": instead brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) wrong cause).
Place II 62
Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (cat prop), therefore they cannot be identical with the disp prop.
II (c) 90
Dispo/Armstrong/Place/Martin: "in" the ED - Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our EP - > irreducible dispo - ArmstrongVs: no irreducible dispo - Armstrong: why suppose that particles have prop in addition to have the manifested purely cat prop?
II (c) 90/91
Martin Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: in the real world, dispositionality is an irreducible side, connected with all cat prop. True Maker/Armstrong: The point of the story is the question of the true maker: according to Martin, it must be irreducible "in" the particle - Vs: requires platonistic, never instantiated LoN - II 92 but the non-disp prop plus "strong" LoN which connect these non-disp prop are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction necessary - II 93 Armstrong: certain CoCo apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically.
II (c) 94
Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispo: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected.
Place III 108
Dispo/Martin: Solution: View particles without structure
Place III 109
Martin Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no MiSt allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the prop of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between cat and disp prop.
Place III 119
Purely dispositiona properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation - parts/whole separate entities, as causal relation in order - disp prop of the whole effect of the disp prop of the parts and their arrangement.
Martin III 163
Dispo: Place: outside the entities, prop of interaction (MartinVs: confusion with manifestation - Armstrong: within? - rather in the connection - Martin reciprocal reaction partner - Ryle: not localized, but belong to the person or object.
Martin III 165
Dispo (MartinVsPlace: his introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispo is a doubling of causality.
Martin III 166
Dispo/Martin: are always completely actual, even without manifestation - II 174 not in the eye of the beholder - unlike ability.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Dispositions Rorty Frank I 594
Disposition/realism/RortyVsArmstrong: the realistic conception of dispositions implies that physicalism must be true - then physicalism would be no empirical scientific truth (or theory) anymore.
Frank I 595
Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: the phenomenalist, unlike the realist, cannot explain dispositions ((s) otherwise circular, because dispositions can also only be described) - He cannot explain why >counterfactual conditionals are true. >Phenomenalism.
Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

---
Rorty I 115
Disposition/RortyVsRyle: 1) no necessary (conceptual, linguistic) connection between sensation and disposition as between heat and redness - Rorty: nevertheless, behaviorism is on the track of something right - it makes clear that the question "mental or not mental" becomes pointless.
I 119
Dosposition/SellarsVsRyle/RortyVsRyle: his mistake was: proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that there are no internal states in reality - (f.o.th.) - Wittgenstein: (PU § 308) the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things and leave their nature open.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Functionalism Chalmers I 15
Functionalism/Lewis/Armstrong/Chalmers: Lewis and Armstrong tried to explain all mental concepts, not only some. ChalmersVsLewis/ChalmersVsArmstrong: both authors made the same mistake like Descartes in assimilating the psychological to the phenomenal (see ChalmersVsDescartes).
E.g. When we wonder whether somebody is having a colour experience, we are not wondering whether they are receiving environmental stimulation and processing it in a certain way. It is a conceptually coherent possibility that something could be playing the causal role without there being an associated experience.
---
I 15
Functionalism/Consciousness/ChalmersVsFunctionalism/ChalmersVsArmstrong/ChalmersVsLewis/Chalmers: There is no mystery about whether any state plays a causal role, at most there are a few technical explanatory problems. Why there is a phenomenological quality of consciousness involved is a completely different question. Functionalism/Chalmers: he denies that there are two different questions. ((s) Also: ChalmersVsDennett).
---
I 231
Functionalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: two variants: Functionalism of the 2nd level: Among these, Rosenthal's approach of thoughts of the second level about conscious experiences and Lycan's (1995) (1) approach about perceptions of the second level. These theories give good explanations for introspection.
Functionalism of the 1st level : thesis: only cognitive states of the 1st level are used. Such theories are better in the explanation of conscious experiences.
Since, however, not all cognitive states correspond to conscious experiences, one still needs a distinguishing feature for them.
Solution/Chalmers: my criterion for this is the accessibility to global control.
---
I 232
Kirk: (1994) (2): Thesis: "directly active" information is what is needed. Dretske: (1995) (3): Thesis: Experience is information that is represented for a system.
Tye: (1995) (4): Thesis: Information must be "balanced" for purposes of cognitive processing.
---
I 250
Functionalism/VsFunctionalism/Chalmers: the authors who argue with inverted Qualia or lacking Qualia present the logical possibility of counter-arguments. This is sufficient in the case of a strong functionalism. The invariance principle (from which it follows that conscious experiences are possible in a system with identical biochemical organization) is a weaker functionalism. Here the merely logical possibility of counter examples is not sufficient to refute. Instead, we need a natural possibility of missing or inverted Qualia.
Solution: to consider natural possibility, we will accept fading or "dancing" Qualia.
---
I 275
Functionalism/Chalmers: the arguments in relation to a lacking, inverted and dancing Qualia do not support a strong, but the non-reductive functionalism I represent. Thesis: functional organization is, with natural necessity, sufficient for conscious experiences. This is a strong conclusion that strengthens the chances for > artificial intelligence. See also Strong Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers.


1. W. G. Lycan, A limited defense of phenomenal information. In: T. Metzingwr (ed), Conscious Experience, Paderborn 1995.
2. R. Kirk, Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford 1994.
3. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge 1995
4. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge 1995.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Incorrigibility Rorty Frank I 580
Incorrigibility/Rorty: is the only consistent feature of the mind - but it follows no ontological dualistic theory. - Incorrigibility is compatible with the eliminative materialism. >Eliminative Materialism. Armstrong: incorrigibility is based on logical terms.
RortyVsArmstrong: not in the sense of "implies its own truth ".
Frank I 614
Incorrigibility: reports of mental events are incorrigible, not properties (but these are almost incorrible).

Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Junctions Armstrong II (b) 47
Junction/Armstrong: just as the state that the a"s are F contains the existence of a and F without being exhausted by the existence of the two constituents, the postulated junction of the universals implies the existence of regularity, without being exhausted by regularities.
Martin II 126
Junction/Martin: Armstrong must introduce it as a fundamental undefined causal basic concept. Only in this way can he distinguish between random and non-random (causal) co-occurrences between U-instantiations - Arm: not formal, more like meaning postulate - no mysterious necessary J between separate things - II 127 MartinVsArmstrong: we need connectivity instead of actual connection - II 128 Question. Connection betw. U itself 2nd-stage U?
Martin II 128
Martin Example: MartinVsArmstrong: (example: distant particle) - because of the possibility of constellations remote in time and space, he needs connectivity U = disp U instead of connection U as the basic concept
Martin II 129
MartinVsArmstrong: Connections between U can still be necessary or contingent, no progress against Regth - Solution/Martin: "dispositionality" "in" things.
II (d) 149
Junction/MartinVsArmstrong: certainly connectivity, but not connection - ArmstrongVsMartin: between different things a and b there is not even something like connectivity - > II 176

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Law Statements Armstrong Place IV 157
Law statement/PlaceVsArmstrong: Goodman (Goodman Facts, Fiction, Forecast, German, p 39): Law statement must make only generalizations over single time-limited individuals - these are laws on the temporal nature of an object, then you need no natural law as a truth maker - only interaction of a reciprocal dispositional property - reciprocal: only our language forces us to attribute the suitability to one side - causal laws are then universally quantified over individuals - Vsuniversals.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Laws Nozick II 144
Law/Laws of Nature/LoN/Language/Interpretation/WittgensteinVsArmstrong/Nozick: laws cannot be formulated linguistically, because they can always be interpreted differently (> Rule Following). ---
II 145
Event/Law/LoN/Relation/Hume/Nozick: Hume: the relations between events are not logical. - The connection between the event and the law cannot be causal. - Other problem: logical connections have to be interpreted in turn. ---
II 146
If the interpretation should be fixed, then the law should include something analogous to reflexive self reference. - This is mysterious itself. - Hence, we must not treat laws related with statements. - Because of Gödel there is probably not a "picture of all the facts" from which all factual statements can be derived. Determinism/Nozick: therefore should not rely on derivability from causal laws.
---
II 146
Law/fact/general/special/make true/Nozick: if a law is not treated as a quasi-statement but as a general fact, how can it make individual states true? - How can "make true" be a real relation between facts? Then it must be related to causality. Thereby, the problems would be repeated. - That laws should limit facts, only names the problem. ---
II 147
If laws are mere descriptions, they explain nothing. - If they are to be mere conjunctions of events, then there is no fundamentality and no hierarchy. - But: Fundamental orders may be variously interpreted or axiomatized again. ---
II 148
Instead fundamental order: "organic unity". - Problem: this is not a justification. - Analogous to the artwork. - Problem: Justification needs again a fundamental order. - Possible Worlds with reflexive self-subsumption could be more coherent, than those without reflexivity. - Then the question of why a particular statement applies, is repeated. - The problem of the relationship between facts and laws cannot be solved here.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Leibniz Principle Adams Millikan I 261
VsLeibniz' Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished from itself, so the two world parts of the world cannot be the same half. Leibniz' law/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): the objections do not consider the fact that this could be about a curved space instead of a doubling.
Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here one thing and the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
---
I 262
But there are still two interesting possibilities: > indistinguishability. Leibniz' Law/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s)> nonfactualism).
N.B.: this would imply that Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both!
N.B.: then Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account.
Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half had been different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only doubled.
Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, then the identity is random, but not necessary. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given if the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity.
---
I 263
Then, in the second option, identity is derived from causality. (x)(y){[NN(F)Fx equi Fy] equi x = y}
NN/Notation: nature-necessary under necessary circumstances.


Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Leibniz Principle Millikan I 259
Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Leibniz/Millikan: Thesis: I treat his principle so that it is an implicit assertion about grammatical categories. (x)(y)[(F)(Fx equi Fy) > x = y]
Problem: what is the domain of the quantifier "(F)"? ((s) >second order logic).
Here, there cannot simply elements of the domain be paired with grammatical predicates. The set of grammatical predicates may not be of ontological interest. E.g. neither "... exists" nor "... = A" nor "... means red" is paired with something which has the same meaning as "... is green" paired with a variant of a world state.
Quantification/properties/2nd level logic/Millikan: perhaps we can say that the quantifier (F) is about all properties, but we must characterize this set differently than by pairing with grammatical predicates.
False: For example, the attempt of Baruch Brody's thesis: "to be identical with x" should be understood as a property of x "in the domain of the quantifier (F)" is quite wrong! ((s) "be identical with oneself" as a property).
If so, then every thing that has all the properties of x would be identical with x. ((s) Even if it had additional properties).
Problem: under this interpretation, property is not a coherent ontological category.
How can we treat the Leibniz principle, and keep the notion of "property" so that it is ontologically coherent?
---
I 260
Leibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: the Leibniz principle is usually regarded as a claim about the identity of individual substances. Substances in which it is useful to attribute to them place and time. That is, "x" and "y" go over individuals. Quantifier: (F) is generally understood in the way that it only goes via "general properties". Or via "purely qualitative properties".
Purely qualitative properties: i.e. that they are not defined with regard to certain individuals: e.g. the property "to be higher than Mt. Washington"
N.B.: but: "the property of being higher than something that has these and these properties and which are the properties of Mt. Washington".
Individual related properties/Millikan: are normally excluded because they would allow properties like "to be identical to x". That would lead to an empty reading of the Leibniz principle.
MillikanVs: but it is not at all the case that "is identical to x" would not correspond to any reasonable property.
Leibniz principle/Millikan: however, the principle is mostly examined in the context of the domain of general properties in relation to...
---
I 261
...the domain of things that have these properties. Thus question: do we have to postulate a domain of such things beyond the domain of these general properties, or can we define the self-identity of an individual in purely qualitative expressions? Leibniz principle/Millikan: in this context, the relation to a particular individual ((s) and thus of the thing to itself) appears to be an impure or mixed ontological category.
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe could be perfectly symmetrical, whereby then a perfectly identical (indistinguishable) individual would be in another place.
((s) That is, there is something of x that is indistinguishable, which nevertheless is not identical with x, against the Leibniz principle). (See also Adams, below).
Variants: For example, a temporal repetitive universe, etc. e.g. two identical water drops, two identical billiard balls at different locations. ((s) Why then identical? Because the location (the coordinates) does not have influence on the identity!)
Property/Leibniz: Thesis: a relation to space and time leads to a property which is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one ignores such "impure" properties ((s) thus does not refer to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, is the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished (separated) from itself, so the two world halfs of the world cannot be one and the same half.
Leibniz principle/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of hacking): the objections do not consider that this could be a curved space instead of a doubling.
Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
---
I 262
But there are still two interesting possibilities: > indistinguishability. Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. Symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s) > nonfactualism).
N.B.: this would imply that the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both!
N.B.: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account.
Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half were different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only double.
Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, the identity is a random, not a necessary one. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is then given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity.
---
I 263
Then, in the second option, identity from causality applies. (x) (y) {[NN (F) Fx equi Fy] equi x = y}
Natural necessary/Notation: natural necessary under natural possible circumstances.
Millikan: this is quite an extreme view, for it asserts that if there were two sets of equivalent laws that explain all events, one of these sets, but not the other, would be true, even if there was no possibility to find out which of the two sets it is that would be true.
This would correspond to the fact that a seemingly symmetrical world was inhabited. Either the one or the other would be true, but one would never find out which one.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mathematical Entities Armstrong Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Big I 380
Numbers/Armstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: Armstrong Thesis: Numbers are causally inactive. (Field ditto). Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: some mathematical entities are even observable!
I 381
Causation/Mathematics/BigelowVsArmstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: Numbers: even they are involved in the causal processes. If objects did not instantiate the quantities they instantiate, other changes would have occurred. Thus at least proportions are causally involved. (s) FieldVsNumbers as causal agents, but not FieldVsProportions).
I 382
Counterfactual Dependence/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus we can again set up sequences of counterfactual conditionals, e.g. for the lever laws of Archimedes. This also provides why explanations.
I 383
Numbers/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows that numbers play a fundamental role in causal explanations. BigelowVsField: (a propos Field, Science without numbers): he falsely assumes that physics first starts with pure empiricism to then convert the results into completely abstract mathematics.
Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: wants to avoid this detour.
BigelowVsField: his project is superfluous if we realize that mathematics are only a different description of the physical proportions and relations and no detour.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Microstructure Armstrong Place I 29
Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker".
Place I 30
The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional.
Place I 29
Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test.
II (b) 39
Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role.
Place II 58
Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure.
Place II 60
Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties.
Place II 62
PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Nominalism Armstrong II (b) 34
Exact Similarity/Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals) - Nominalism (Place) pro: then properties (as individuals) all exactly similar properties - Representatives of universals (Armstrong): many individuals with the same property - universals realist: Assumes exactly one universal for each class.
II (c) 104
Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists, they cannot assume a nuclear higher order state that connects the universals.
II (c) 97
Property/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "the identical causes the identical"
II (c) 97
Similarity: NominalismVsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of different universals for every similarity that is not exact! Multiplication - MartinVsArmstrong: Similarity ontologically as basic concept.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Non-Existence Armstrong III 21
natural laws/ Non-existent: E.g. "nothing is faster than light": Armstrong: uninstantiated natural law - VsRegularity th.: no "empty" law (derived from paradox of implication) - LewisVsArmstrong: universal statement, which also includes the negation - natural law / Armstrong: also applies to non-existent (regularity th. Vs)
III 163ff
Non-existent: E.g. fictional grammars can be stronger / more complex: then they are relations! - Vs: better assume counterfactual conditionals - problem: what is the truth-maker? - Conceptual truth, which is more complex - problem: laws are no "conceptual truths".

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Ontology Lewis IV 40
Ontology/Lewis: for me it consists in iterative set theory with individuals - the only unorthodox strait is my view of what individuals there are - part-whole relation: for me, it relates to individuals, not sets - sets/possible worlds: therefore there is no set in a world in the sense of being part - sets: E.g. numbers, properties, propositions, events - even a sequence of possible individuals (all from the same world) is strictly speaking not itself (as a quantity) in this world - numbers: sets - they are not more localized in the logical space than in spacetime. They even exist from the perspective of all worlds - Properties: sets (of individuals) - propositions: sets - Events: sets. ---
Schwarz I 232
Ontology/Lewis/(s): all attributed to the distribution of properties instead of objects: "a priori reductionism of everything".
Schwarz I 233
Ontology/explanation/theory/Lewis/Schwarz/(s): Analysis/ href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/search.php?x=4&y=12&volltext=LewisVsArmstrong">LewisVsArmstrong: looks for definitions ArmstrongVsLewis: for true-makers - Schwarz: this is the difference between analysis and necessary implication.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Perception Armstrong Sellars I XXXVIII
Def perception/Armstrong: "Nothing more than the acquisition of knowledge of individual facts about the world with the help of the senses" (1961)(1). Here is just as little talk about a descriptive content as with Dennett. SellarsVsArmstrong: this solution is unacceptable. It is not the same, whether one thinks merely something or if you see something and at the same time think!


1. D. M. Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, London 1961, p. 112

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Properties Armstrong III 12
Properties/Armstrong: are always non-local! (>Chisholm) - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property - relational properties may not be local either! - III 14 Individuation/Individual/ED/Properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties - E.g. "being one light-second away from proton A" - is no prop - but: E.g. "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Distance).
III 83
Properties/Armstrong: strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore not all arbitrary predicates - Pseudo-property: self-identity (not universal) - Identity lends no causal or nomic force.
III 114f
Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st stage relation - if E.g. "to be a mass" isa property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight - VsRealism of Properties: risk of duplication, intermediate elements - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass".
III 141
Properties/Armstrong: "property of being a property" not desirable - at least not a second order Humean regularity - but is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws.
III 145
Rather introduce new properties than new laws.
III 163ff
Properties/Armstrong: if essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme.
II 5
Properties/Armstrong: categorically = non-dispositional - but many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible" - but dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties.
II (c) 96
Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions - it is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side - according to Martin that would be a sluggish world, because there would be no causality -
II (c) 102
MartinVsArmstrong: World does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested - (> 77 II)
II (c) 97
Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties - instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical".
Martin III 168
Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: assuming properties instead of parts - the complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Similarity Armstrong II (b) 34/35
Exact Similarity :/ Armstrong: allows formation of equivalence classes (instead of universals) - per nominalism (Place): then aptitude (as particulars) all exactly similar properties - per universals (Armstrong): many particulars with the same properties. universals-realist: takes for each class exactly one universal.

Martin I 72
Similarity / equality / property / Martin: thesis: we need to rethink the ordinary exact and inexact equality between objects (these need a way, in relation to which they may be the same) instead: similarity between properties.
II (c) 97f
Similarity: nominalism VsArmstrong: must assume the instantiation of various universlas for every sim. which is not exact ! Multiplication of entities - MartinVsArmstrong: similarity is ontologically the fundamental concept.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Structures Armstrong Place III 109
Structure / PlaceVsMartin: disp and non-disp properties always have to do with structure, but VsArmstrong: this can also be macrostructure: E.g. the blade of the knife.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Supervenience Armstrong Martin II 132
"cum" instead of supervenience - MartinVsArmstrong / VsPlace: properties are qualitative-cum-dispositional (or vice versa) - not dispositionality supervening on the categoric property and not vice versa - rather than "inert", i.e., unable to make a difference or effect to be - solution / Martin: reciprocal partners for mutual manifestation: E.g. salt dissolves in water, which both are subject to change.
Martin III 167
Supervenience/Searle: strength supervenes causally on microstructure - no epiphenomenon - causal sufficiency of the microstructure makes the concept of supervenience superfluous - ((s) even doubling) - MartinVsSearle: how can things that are identical to parts of the whole, have a causal effect on the whole which consists of them? Absurd.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Truthmakers Armstrong Place I 21
Truth Maker/Tr.M./Armstrong: Problem: counterfactual conditionals point to something that does not exist: "counterfactual state" therefore no truth maker - there are no counterfactual states - ((s) see below but there are counterfactual facts (as assumptions).
Place II 66
Truth Maker/Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./Place: special disposition, finite (like Goodman, nominalist) - ArmstrongVsPlace: tr.m.: law, infinite.
II (c) 92
Truth Maker/Armstrong: are also necessary for the true attribution of unmanifested dispositions - but non-disp properties plus laws of nature are sufficient - two non-occurring, equally likely events: no fact as truthmaker. - Same case: E.g. distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: k truth maker, k certain way, nevertheless: counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have idiosyncratic.../(s)"idiosyncratic" does not designate the manner nor does it determine it.
II (c) 99
Laws/Armstrong: Truth makers for law statements - atomic state relation high order between universals the number of instantiation is irrelevant, all identical, therefore F is deducible from a: a is G - Hume: molecular state, GF - Armstrong: here, these many cases only extend the law and do not justify deduction from the unobserved.
Place III 121
Truth Maker/Armstrong: a single law of nature G makes a universal law statement true and covers all instantiations - PlaceVsArmstrong: individual truth makers necessary.
Place IV 156
Truth Maker/Place: tempting: that the state, which makes the counterfactual conditional true is the same which makes the causal GA true from which it is epistemically derived - (Vs"counterfactual facts") - PlaceVs, Vs"general facts" - VsArmstrong , VsThought-Independent Laws of Nature as Truth Makers -> II 176
Martin III 175f
Truth Maker/MartinVsArmstrong: still unclear whether its invocation of laws is strong enough, to provide the full ontological weight as truth maker for the solvability of salt that was not put in water.
Martin III 176
Whichever he quotes, they seem to be wrong for the situation, namely solely for the situation of the compound, i.e. the actual manifestation.
II 182 f
Absence/Lack/Holes/MartinVsLewis: actually is a suitable truth maker: state - problem: state merely "general fact" (Russell) (>general term) - Lewis: "as it is", "how things are" must not simply cover everything that is fulfilled by things, otherwise trivial - Lewis: truth supervenes on what things there are and what properties and relations they instantiate -MartinVsLewis: "the way the universe" is a general term, but still 1st order! - Solution/Martin: reciprocal disposition partnes for mutual manifestation - Existence Theorem/Martin: whether positive or negative: the world is at the other end and not in vain.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Truthmakers Lewis V 269
Make true/truth-maker/Lewis: is logical, not causal. ---
Sw I 231
Truth maker-Principle/Armstrong: there must be something that makes "there are no Unicorns" true. - LewisVs - Armstrong: for properties: object (carrier) as truth-maker. - LewisVsArmstrong: it is sufficient that the object has the property. - N.B.: two worlds can then differ for the same subject matter in the distribution of properties.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Universals Armstrong III 82
Universals/Armstrong: must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world - false: to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs) - what universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined - but a posteriori: from discovery - no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones.
III 88
Stages/Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G) - 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation) - 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
III 99
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
III 118
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: his e.g. with a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uiU necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown.
III 120
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U (s) because of simple emerging properties) - Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.
Place II 57
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances - the kind of "property" has an instance - Place pro universals in this sense. (so.)
MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.

Martin I 77
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single U instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together - but it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy - solution: thesis of truth maker is the individual instantiation itself -> 96 II, II 102.
Martin II 129
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
Martin III 179
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical U is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

The author or concept searched is found in the following 29 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Kripke Vs Armstrong, D. Frank I 121
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: Does not fulfill this easiest requirement: Pain must be felt as pain, otherwise it is not a pain! Causal role: e.g. intention elicits action, pain, behavior when in pain. Identity theories/KripkeVsLewis/KripkeVsArmstrong: Usually assume that stimuli and causal roles change a particular brain state to a particular psychological state. This suggests erroneously that the representatives claim that this causation is contingent. Or that the identity of this brain state with different mental states is random.
Identity theory:
1. X is a brain condition 2. The fact is contingent that pain is being caused by a particular stimulus. (This sounds quite plausible after all) and evokes a certain behavior.
The brain state can now also exist without causing the appropriate behavior.
Thus, it seems that 1) and 2) claim that a certain pain could have existed without having been pain.
Identity/KripkeVsIdentity theory: if x = y, then x and y share all their properties. Including their modal characteristics.
E.g. if x is the pain and y is the brain state, it is an essential property of x to be a particular pain and an essential characteristic of y to be a particular brain state!
If the relationship between the two is indeed identity, then y needs to correspond to a particular pain, and x needs to correspond to a particular brain condition, namely y.
Both statements, however, seem to be wrong.


Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann
(eds.) (1972), 253-355

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Armstrong, D. Lewis Vs Armstrong, D. V 353
"New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983) Universals/Armstrong: His theory of U. is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many. >Universals/Armstrong, >universals/Lewis.
LewisVsArmstrong: But it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind.

Schwarz I 71
Combinatorialism/Armstrong: Merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours- any combination should be possible(1986,§7). LewisVs: 1986a,86, HellerVs (1998): It is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: As such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: When does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e, 150 157).
Problem: Modality is required.
VsVs: It could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b, Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11. (LewisVs: 1992a,209).

Schwarz I 118
Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: There is something missing in Lewis’ LoN: For Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: Thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a regularity, for the other, a relation of universals.
Relation of Universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the regularity theory.
SchwarzVs: This leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980, §6).
Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: If laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature?
Schwarz I 119
What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". NG/LewisVsArmstrong: Better: Regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in poss.w. in which NG is not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a LoN demands it.
Schwarz I 124
Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: Vs fundamental probability- Property. Fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability.
Schwarz I 139
Cause/Causation/Armstrong: Absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: Yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored - Problem: Numerous absences in vacuum.
Schwarz I 140
Solution/Lewis: Absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: If absence is only empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? > Solution/Lewis: "Influence", small increase of probability – I 141 counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event.
Schwarz I 231
Def Principle of truth-maker/To make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: All truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: For each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: That is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist. (1992a,204, 2001b,611f).
Truthmaker: Would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: Why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: Such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination.
SchwarzVsLewis: But this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a poss.w. without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the poss.w. with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance.
To make truth/Predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997a,205f): If object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact.
LewisVsArmstrong: Why can this object not exist, although A is not F?(1998b). If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one poss.w., but is missing in the other world: Two poss.w. are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds.
((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant).
Characteristics/Truth-maker/Lewis: A truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: The sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all. (1998b, 219).
Def Principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: Only the following will then remain: Truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate.(1992a,207,1994a,225, Bigelow 1988, §25).
Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or this objects have different fundamental characteristics.(1992a,206, 2001b,§4).
Schwarz I 232
N.B.: If there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different(which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e,224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a, 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: No other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated.((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the poss.w. are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally then set.) Schwarz: This can be amplified.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Armstrong, D. Nagel Vs Armstrong, D. Frank I 65
NagelVsArmstrong/KripkeVsArmstrong: the epistemic nature of the mental state is certain, i.e. I could have it without necessarily being aware that I have functional states. ShoemakerVsNagel/VsKripke: too idealism-friendly.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Armstrong, D. Putnam Vs Armstrong, D. I (g) 176
Materialism/PutnamVsArmstrong: fearlessly uses the medieval "causal powers" and "built-in" similarities. Even "essence"! PutnamVs. >Causal forces, >Universals/Armstrong.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Armstrong, D. Quine Vs Armstrong, D. II 221
QuineVsArmstrong: he does not provide a scale. He revives Bradley's old problem of the relation recourse. QuineVsBradley: All of Bradley's relations are real, but it does not come down to recourse, because we can define each of them, from the outermost to the innermost without referring to the one positioned further inwards.
The reason is that the use of double-digit predicate as such is not a reference to an ever so real relation which constitutes the extension of the predicate. Such a reference would rather be the task of a corresponding abstract singular term or a bound variable.
II 222
QuineVsArmstrong: A. neglects the individuation of universals. In that, we are mainly thinking about properties and attributes. I make no difference here. (..+.. "properties" abandoned in favor of "attribute"...+) I expressly accept classes and predicates as objects.
It is impossible to interpret classes as concrete sums or aggregates.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Armstrong, D. Rorty Vs Armstrong, D. Frank I 583
Incorrigibility/RortyVsArmstrong: no epistemic notion of truth: that not to say "implies its own truth". >Incorrigibility. Instead: conventional standards of the respective culture!Later: RortyVsRorty: should science produce a disagreement Ex retinal images with the reports of a person: as in hallucination the representation may then indeed be false, without rendering the report of the hallucinating subject wrong!
Rorty: "There are no recognized methods to resolve doubts about p if p fits into a pattern of sincere reports of the subject S, even if p does not fit into a general theory".
I 584
Rorty adjusts to the "ontology of the man on the street", who would have a hard time without mental entities in the foreseeable future. Rorty thesis: before we give up incorrigibility, we may one day abandon the mentalist speech.
I 589
mental state/Armstrong: This term refers to what is being caused by certain stimuli and causes certain reactions - whatever that may be.
I 590
RortyVsArmstrong: if that were true, we could never understand the contrast between a) materialism and dualism or b) the mental and the physical or c) materialism and behaviorism.
I 591
mental state/Armstrong: Ex a specific condition of the liver can cause ill-tempered behavior. Problem: What characterizes mental states compared to others? Complexity?
I 592
Problem: if the complexity of the cause to achieve complex effects is missing. Sufficiently complex processes occur only when the causal chain has reached the brain.
Solution/Armstrong: our notion of a mental state is the notion of a "cause, the complexity which reflects the complexity of the behavior that it is capable of producing".
RortyVs: confuses the degree of complexity of physical and mental states.
RortyVsArmstrong: presupposes already, it were part of our concept of the mental state that it must be identified with one or another physiological process.
I 595
Identity theory/Rorty: its significance lies in the statement that the entities of which one has always thought that they could not be physical, now turn out to be physical. If materialism is made a truth a priori this pointe is missing.
VsArmstrong: when in his "ontologically neutral" analysis the mental is a mere deputy (and nothing in itself), then one side of the distinction is missing. There is nothing that could turn out to be identical to physical particles!
RortyVsArmstrong/RortyVsRyle: mental entities that yby their nature can not be physical must be maintained, because otherwise no identity could be adopted.
Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: unlike the realist, the phenomenalist cannot explain dispositions. ((s) otherwise circular because dispositions can also only be described).
He can not explain why counterfactual conditionals are true.
I 607
The Mental/RortyVsArmstrong: whether an entity is mental does not determine whether it explains behavior, and whether a property is mental, can not determine whether it is the property of a physical entity or not. Only feature: incorrigibility.
Incorrigibility/Armstrong: A believes that p logically implies (p).
Fra I 608
RortyVsArmstrong: I want to avoid necessities. 1. because of Quine's doubts about "natural" necessities).
2. Otherwise we would conclude that the meaning of the terms "thinking" and "thought" made it impossible to have false opinions, what one believes.


Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Armstrong, D. Sellars Vs Armstrong, D. I XXXVIII
Def Perception/Armstrong. "Nothing more than the acquisition of knowledge of individual facts about the world by means of the senses" (1961). It is here not about a descriptive content just like with Dennett.
I XXXIX
Perception/thinking/SellarsVsArmstrong/SellarsVsDennett/Sellars: it is not the same, whether you merely think something or if you see something and at the same time think! Even if one accepts that the thoughts that come into play in the perception possess a particular content (Sellars pro) so it is hardly understandable how the addition of another conceptual article can compensate for the difference between seeing and mere thinking.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Armstrong, D. Wittgenstein Vs Armstrong, D. Arm III 41
WittgensteinVsArmstrong/Tractatus: laws of nature cannot be explaining principles for observed phenomena. (6.371).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Armstrong, D. Wright Vs Armstrong, D. I 153
VsBasis Equations/WrightVsLewis/WrightVsArmstrong/WrightVsCounterfactual Conditionals: counterfactual conditionals have hardly been conspicuously successful in the history of philosophy. Problem: the following sentence can always be nullified if it is possible that the realization of Q could causally interfere with a fact that actually exerts influence on the truth value of P itself:
P then and only if (would it be the case that Q), it would be the case that R
(P = statement, Q = "light on", R = reaction).
Example Johnston: a chameleon sits in the dark on a green billiard table. Then the creation of "standard" conditions can cause a change, which we can see from the skin color of the chameleon.
But if the truth conditions were correctly captured by the subjunctive conditional, then we would have to say, "The chameleon is green until the lights go on".
I 154
Conditional fallacy: here the class of judgments in which we are interested participates in the causal order. It cannot therefore apply a priori that the truth conditions for P are captured by the statement to be analysed.
Vs: when we consider a counterfactual conditional sentence, we certainly only have to consider relevant, not absurd possible situations!
VsVs: but that is so, in the case of the e.g. chameleon. The objection misses the point: the kind of equivalence we are interested in must be valid a priori.
I 155
It must be possible to know a priori that the implementation of antecedence will not materially affect those relationships that may affect the actual truth values of the analysandum. But how could one know this without collateral empirical information about the peculiarity of the world one actually finds oneself in?
Thus: a priori correct subjunctive conditional markings of the conditions of truth (in the discourse that interests us) are not to be obtained. The basic equation is to be rejected.
Instead:
"Provisional Equations"/Wright: the problem with the e.g. chameleon could not have happened if we had determined that its color is at stake under standard conditions that a standard observer has to check. Changing the truth values should not be a problem if it is the truth value of P under C conditions (no other circumstances) that S is to judge under C conditions.
Provisional Equation:
If CS, then (It would be the case that P then and only if S would judge that P).
So we do not concentrate on bi-conditionals with conditional parts to the right, but on conditionals with bi-conditional consequences.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Armstrong, D. Verschiedene Vs Armstrong, D. Arm III 90
Natural Laws/universalities/Armstrong: the state, the law N(F,G) is a two-digit U, i.e. a relation between states. Pavel TichyVsArmstrong: N(F,G) cannot be a two-digit attribute and a () digit attribute (its expression for states) at the same time.
ArmstrongVsVs: why not be a two-digit attribute and a state at the same time? Certainly not a two-digit and zero-digit attribute at the same time (same level). A zero-digit attribute would be a second order universal, a second order state.
Wright I 176
Disposition/JohnstonVsArmstrong: the simple conditional formulation of dispositional properties fails because it does not take seriously enough that essential properties are attributed here. Problem cases: Change, mimicry, masking. (So ceteris paribus condition) E.g. Masking: an angel prevents the falling object from breaking,
E.g. Strong current deflects the compass needle
I 177
Mimicry: even if an object is not subject to disposition, additional conditions may nevertheless occur: For example, although the spark plug is defective, a random gas mixture provides the ignition. WrightVs: these are nice considerations, which certainly correspond to our intuitive thinking. But can we expect them to be developed with sufficient precision? ((s) To replace the expected disposition).





Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Armstrong, D. Bigelow Vs Armstrong, D. I 39
Universals/ArmstrongVsBigelow: all universals are at least potentially multiply localized. BigelowVsArmstrong: there are some that can only be in one place at a time. Def Repetition/Recurrence//Bigelow/Pargetter: are paradigmatic universals which are actually multiply located. Individual/Existence/: instantiates a universal. The individual exists. Universal/Existence/Bigelow/Pargetter: what is instantiated by an individual also exists.
I 46
Universals/Armstrong: "a-posteriori realism". It will turn out which universals actually exist - - against: QuineVsArmstrong/GoodmanVsArmstrong/BigelowVsArmstrong.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Armstrong, D. Güzeldere Vs Armstrong, D. Metz II 413
Fehlschluß der repräsentationalen Kluft/GüzeldereVsArmstrong/Güzeldere: Versuch, Veränderungen in der Aufmerksamkeit durch nach inne gerichtete höherstufige Wahrnehmung zu erklären – Versuch, das Repräsentierte durch das Repräsentierende zu erklären – II 414 Lösung: mentale Zustände qua Gehirnzustände sind es, die beides repräsentieren – II 415 Variante des Fehlschlusses: das „geistige Auge“ – („inneres Auge“).
Metz II 408
Introspektion/Armstrong: kontrastiert introspektives Bewusstsein mit gewöhnlicher Wahrnehmung. "In der Wahrnehmung scannt das Gehirn die Umwelt im Gewahrsein der Wahrnehmung scannt ein anderer Prozeß im Gehirn dieses Scannen".
II 409
Bsp Fernfahrer , der gewissermaßen mit "Auto Pilot" fährt: völlig automatisch, bis ihm klar wird, dass er vor einer roten Ampel angehalten hat. Armstrong: obwohl er seiner Umwelt bewusst ist (er vermeidet Unfälle) ist er sich nicht seiner Wahrnehmung bewusst, er ist in einem gewichtigen Sinne "bewusstlos" gefahren, ihm fehlt introspektives Bewusstsein.
II 410
GüzeldereVsArmstrong: hier fehlt leider völlig eine philosophische Analyse welche Natur haben denn diese Eigenschaften?
II 415
Def Fehlschluß der repräsentationalen Kluft/Güzeldere: Versuch, das Repräsentierte durch das Repräsentierende zu ersetzen. VsArmstrong: als ob der Fernfahrer aufgrund seiner "inneren Wahrnehmung" seiner gewöhnlichen Wahrnehmung gewahr würde.
Das, wovon der Zustand erster Stufe handelt, scheint eine kausale Rolle für die Wahrnehmung zweiter Stufe zu beinhalten. So, als ob der Inhalt eines Zustands der ersten Stufe für sein Verhalten wichtig zu werden beginnt.
Güzeldere: gleichgültig, wieviel wir über die intrinsischen Eigenschaften repräsentationaler Zustände herausfinden, wir sind vielleicht dennoch einfach nicht in der Lage, die andere Seite der "Repräsentationalen Kluft" allein dadurch zu erreichen und zu den extrinsischen, relationalen Eigenschaften jener Zustände zu gelangen.
Falsche Voraussetzung: dass man, indem man die Eigenschaften des Repräsentierenden untersucht, um zu beantworten, wie die Repräsentierenden das repräsentieren, was sie repräsentieren.
Bsp Das ist so, als wollten wir, um herauszufinden, was ein Stopschild ist, lediglich die Farbe, Form, Gewicht und Material untersuchen.
Variante des Fehlschlusses: das Modell des "geistigen Auges".
II 416
"Inneres Auge"/"geistiges Auge"/Güzeldere: könnte tatsächlich funktionieren, wenn die Eigenschaften des Repräsentierenden (des Gehirns) ähnlich den Eigenschaften des Repräsentierten wären. ((s) So wie Locke annahm, dass schwache Abbilder im Gehirn reproduziert würden.) Selbst wenn aber solche "Ähnlichkeiten" im Gehirn vorhanden wären, (z.B. eine "Rötung" des Gehirns, wenn wir etwas Rotes sehen) müßte immer noch erklärt werden, wie solche Verfärbungen von einem "inneren Auge" wahrgenommen werden sollten.
1. gibt es dafür keine neurophysiologischen Belege,
2. führt es zum Regress.

Güzeldere I
Güven Güzeldere
"Is consciousness the perception of what passes in the mind?"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
Armstrong, D. Stalnaker Vs Armstrong, D. I 9
Def Universals/Armstrong/Lewis: repeatable entities that are fully present when a single thing instantiated them.
StalnakerVsLewis: what shall the difference between "fully present" and "partly present" be? That is too obscure.
I 10
Properties/universals/StalnakerVsArmstrong: I do not want to be nominalistic but the model of property space does not suggest things like the ones Armstrong favored. E.g. if the property red is a region in space property (prop.sp.) then it would be like to say that the c is part of the rose as to say that Texas is a complete part of George W. Bush when he is in Texas.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Armstrong, D. Meixner Vs Armstrong, D. State of Affairs/st.o.a./Meixner:
Def elementary instantiation fact: e.g. that Anna loves Fritz, e.g. that every living being is mortal (includes that every human being is mortal)
Def higher level state of affairs: example "that is greater than a transitive relation".
Def conjunctive state of affairs: example "that Anna loves Fritz and Is greater than a transitive relation".
Def negative state of affairs: e.g. that Nuremberg is not located between Regensburg and Munich
Def possibility state of affairs: e.g. that it is possible that an Iraq war will break out in March 2013.
Def necessity state of affairs: e.g. that it is inevitable that an Iraq war will break out in March 2013.
These classes are not unconnected: every state of affairs is an elementary instantiation state of affairs
negative state of affairs: every is also a negative state of affairs by being identical with the negation of its negation.
I 122/123
All conjunctive state of affairs are negations of disjunctions of state of affairs. All disjunctive negations of conjunctions of state of affairs, all necessity state of affairs are negations of possibility state of affairs and vice versa. All at least one state of affairs negations of all-state of affairs and vice versa.
Meixner: nevertheless it is surprisingly controversial among ontologists whether there are negative state of affairs.
Parallel to the discussion whether there are negative universals:
ArmstrongVsNegative Universals.
MeixnerVsArmstrong: pro negative state of affairs: one cannot deny the sentence A does not express a proposition and thus also a state of affairs. (Although state of affairs is not equal to propositions).
ArmstrongVsDisjunctive state of affairs
MeixnerVsArmstrong: much clearer is the occurrence of negative and disjunctive state of affairs in names for disjunctive and negative state of affairs:
For example, the police inspector is convinced that
1. the gardener or butler is involved in the murder
2. not both
3. no one who is different from both the gardener and the butler (so no one else).
Absurd: that the police inspector would not be convinced of any state of affairs as a consequence. He is rather convinced of three state of affairs.
I 124
The same can be said for all- and at least one- state of affairs: their names appear in descriptions of the exemplification of propositional attitudes. Here they cannot be eliminated.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Armstrong, D. Wessel Vs Armstrong, D. I 305
Def Natural Law/Wessel: here it is claimed that a true general conditional statement expresses a law when true unreal conditional statements correspond to it. (>Natural Laws/Lewis, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Lewis, >Natural Laws/Armstrong, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Armstrong). In contrast, a mere legal statement does not apply to all possible objects.
Laws like that of the coil also apply to specimens brought to earth by aliens during the Stone Age.
I 306
It is assumed that the truth of the unreal conditional sentences can be established independently of the law statement. However, this is usually difficult for unreal conditional sentences. WesselVsArmstrong/WesselVsLewis: Thesis: the unreal conditional theorem depends on the real statement.
Legal statements support and guarantee the validity of corresponding unreal conditionals and not vice versa!
Example ... "Even if": such statements are considered true, because the consequence is "true anyway".
Everyday translation:
For example "It is not like it rains when the shaman dances and he does not dance and it does not rain".

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Hume, D. Armstrong Vs Hume, D. Arm III 120
Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence.
III 121
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are to relate to their particulars (P). E.g. If a rel between Pa and Pb is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other P, would there not have to be at least one other rel to relate it with a and b?.
And if this rel itself can be uninstantiated (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum (Bradley’s regress).
This can only be avoided if universals are merely abstract factors of states (but real).

Arm II (b) 46
Causality/Causation/ArmstrongVsHume: E.g. Inhaling a quantum of cyanide leads to the death of the person who inhales it. There seems to be a causal relation here, i.e. one between types: one type produces the other type.
II (b) 47
Analytic philosophy/Armstrong: hastens to reassure that we are dealing only with the truth of a universal proposition. "Any person who inhales cyanide dies." Those who represent a singularistic theory of causation will say that each (unique event of) inhaling by a particular person causes their death. (Armstrong pro).
But that’s not the whole truth!.
Surface structure/Proposition/Armstrong: the proposition itself asserts a connection of universals on its surface, from which individual causal findings follow. Thesis: this surface structure reflects something more profound.
If the connection exists, then regularity is included at the level of universals, of course.
But this Entailment can probably not be grasped formally. Rather, it is something like Carnap’s "meaning postulate"!.

Place II 64
Causality/Hume/Armstrong: ... From this follows that we can never have an empirical proof of the truth of a counterfactual conditional. Law statement/Place: (universal counterfactual conditional): what we can have, however, is empirical proof that supports the truth of a universal Counterfactual Conditional.
Proof/Hume/Armstrong: but the proof consists in nothing more than the observation of either regular following or coinciding with Type B and Type A. (Regularity).
Place II 65
Ceteris paribus/PlaceVsHume/PlaceVsArmstrong: Such regularities are no evidence of the truth of the counterfactual conditional if it is not ensured that all circumstances remain the same. C.p. must supplement regularity in order for it to become proof. But then Armstrong does not need to refute the regularity theory.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Hume, D. Martin Vs Hume, D. Arm II 94
logische Verbindung/Hume: zwischen getrennten Entitäten wie Ursache und Wirkung kann es keine logische Verbindung geben. (Armstrong pro). II 95 Armstrong: dieses Prinzip ergibt sich umgekehrt aus der Idee, daß absolute Notwendigkeit nur aus Identität entspringt (II 95).
MartinVs: da muß man aber die Reichweite der Beispiele genau betrachten!
Martin: Analogie: die Dispositionalität und Qualitativität jeder intrinsischen Eig sind analog zu Größe und Form von ausgedehnten Gegenständen: das eine kann nicht ohne das andere existieren, aber das eine kann ohne das andere variieren! (Asymmetrie, Abhängigkeit).
MartinVsArmstrong/VsHume: sie sind verschieden, aber nicht getrennt!
Unterschiedenheit/MartinVsArmstrong: es gibt sogar Fälle von Unterschiedenheit, die nicht separierbar sind. Bsp gleichseitig/gleichwinklig.
Grenzsicht/Martin: nach ihr muß man Separabilität logisch ausschließen und die Notwendigkeit der Ko-Existenz von Dispositionalität und Qualitativität für jede Eig, aber dann ist man frei, in jedem Einzelfall zu entscheiden, ob die Kovarianz notwendig oder kontingent ist.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Leibniz, G.W. Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 261
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations.
Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half.
Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication.
Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
I 262
But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism).
Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both!
Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that.
Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double.
Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement.
I 263
Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y}
Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances.
MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong.
Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world.
I 264
Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them.
I 268
Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property.
The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle:
Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable.
complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B".
((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".)
Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B".
Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction.
I 269
Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds:
1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or
2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together.
MillikanVsLeibniz.
Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property!
Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties.
Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other.
Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz.
Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency.
Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity.
Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template.
Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology:
I 270
Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...".
ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red.
But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Lewis, C.I. Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. Schwarz I 31
Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory.
Schwarz I 60
Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a,1983b,1986e:231 233).
SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts".
Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself.
Schwarz I 100
Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (> Supervenience reduction).
Schwarz I 102
Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e:, 61,63,67 1984b:66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties.
PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there.
Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition).
Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c, 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23".
Schw I 103
Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c: 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b,§16.2,§21, 1989b: §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs.
Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a:§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is.
Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness.
2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today.
SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same.
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)> Mosaic).
Schwarz I 122
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis.
SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this.
So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them (!).
Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural.
Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they").
Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL):
a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically.
b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms.
Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL.
Schwarz I 134
Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region.
Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d,247): classes of counterpieces – versus:
LewisVsLewis: (2003) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds.
HorwichVsLewis: (1987,172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence.
Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events.
Schwarz I 139
Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished.
Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a, 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person.
Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195).
SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?.
Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind.
I 142
Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon.
Schwarz I 160
Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently.
Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above:> Quidditism).
SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information.
Schwarz I 178
Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b, 375, Fn2, 1986e, 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments.
Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it.
Schw I 179
E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture.
Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information.
Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations.
SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well.
Schwarz I 186
Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)> cognitive deficiency/Wright).
LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible.
Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b, 90 94).
Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them.
Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b, 73f).
Schwarz I 232
Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true.
Schw I 233
Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29).
Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ".

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Lewis, D. Wessel Vs Lewis, D. I 304/305
Unreal conditional sentences/Counterfactual Conditionals/Wessel: the claim to be a general condition theory is generally not fulfilled. Example
(1) If Peter had not come, Paul and Peter would not have come.
(2) If now a current would flow through the coil...
(3) Even if the shaman danced the rain dance, it wouldn't rain.
(4) If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, someone else did.
(5) If .....hadn't shot, ... would have...
(6) If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian.
(7) ...Verdi would be French.
(1) Is dependent on the system of the logical subsequent relationship (here FK).
(2) Hypothetical state of affairs: Such statements are used to explicate the term "empirical law".
Def Natural Law/Wessel: here it is claimed that a true general conditional statement expresses a law if it corresponds to true unreal conditional statements. (>Natural Laws/Lewis, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Lewis, >Natural Laws/Armstrong, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Armstrong).
In contrast, a mere legal statement does not apply to all possible objects.
Laws like that of the coil also apply to copies brought to earth from extraterrestrials during the Stone Age.
I 306
It is assumed that the truth of the unreal conditional sentences can be established independently of the law statement. However, this is usually difficult for unreal conditional sentences. WesselVsArmstrong/WesselVsLewis: Thesis: the unreal conditional sentence depends on the real statement.
Law statements support and guarantee the validity of corresponding unreal conditionals and not vice versa!
ad (3) "even if": such statements are considered true, because the consequence is "anyway true".
Everyday translation:
Example: "It is not the case that it rains when the shaman dances and he does not dance and it does not rain".
I 307
Unreal conditional sentences/Wessel: E.g. Oswald/Kennedy (4) is undoubtedly true and (5) undoubtedly false. How can this be explained? Possible worlds/many authors: one must put oneself in a context that is as close as possible to the current course of history. The similar context (next possible world) is the one in which another one shot Kennedy.
ad (5): here the most similar world is the one in which, if Oswald didn't shoot, nobody shot and Kennedy is still alive. Therefore, (5) be wrong.
WesselVsPossible World/WesselVsLewis: Disadvantage: the choice of the most similar world must be justified!
I 307
Unreal Conditional Sentences/Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Similarity Metrics/Wessel: (5) is a hidden "even if" statement: "Even if Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, Kennedy would have been shot.
The truth of such statements, which are common in political and historical contexts, is difficult to establish.
(6)/(7): Bizet/Verdi-Example/Wessel: Solution: the reason for the emergence of the paradox lies in the uncontrolled use of the predicate "compatriots", and not in conditional logic.
If both were compatriots, nothing would follow about the concrete nationality of both, except: it is the same. With the same right both could be Japanese!
Instead of the two-digit predicate "compatriots" one should use the one-digit predicates "compatriot of Verdi" and "compatriot of Bizet". ((s) Then unambiguous: Bizet as a compatriot of Verdi should be Italian.)
I 308
"Whenever someone is compatriot of Bizet, he is French." That is no longer a problem.
Unreal conditional sentences/conditional/conjunction/Wessel: every occurrence of an unreal conditional sentence can be replaced by conjunctions in which real conditionals occur.

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Martin Place Vs Martin Arm II 110
Similarity/Martin: must be "exact" if it is to exist between particulars of the same kind. PlaceVsMartin: this is too big a concession to Armstrong according to whom a universal is a kind of particular that is somehow present itself in all instantiations.
Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro, like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar so that they can be "of the same kind". And in this sense, they cannot be "inexactly" similar. But to say that it must be "exact" there is merely pleonastic.
II 111
Categorical/Dispositional/Property/PlaceVsMartin: misunderstanding: attributed to Place: in his opinion there were two different properties so that the categorical (qualitative) property is the only cause of the dispositional property as effect. PlaceVsMartin: this cannot be my view, because there can never be any causal relation, if no dispositional property connects the two (separately) interacting objects.
Place acknowledges the following principles:
1) Hume Mackie Principle causal necessity is a question of the truth of counterfactual conditionals.
2) The truth of counterfactual conditionals depends on the truth of a causal law statement.
3) Ryle Principle: dispositional statements are causal law statements, which are limited to the individual and to the time during which the disposition lasts.
4) Goodman Principle: the truth of a dispositional statement is all that is needed to support the truth of a causal counterfactual conditional.
5) Truthmaker Principle: the possession of a dispositional property consists in a state that cannot be characterized as other than that it is said that it is the state through which the dispositional statement becomes true.
Conclusion: the structure must have both dispositional and categorical properties.
VsArmstrong: So it cannot be right that all properties are ultimately categorical.
pro Martin: the dispositional is just as real and irreducible as the categorical.
II 113
Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsMartin: I accept their actual existence here and now. But everything that exists is a property of the carrier of the properties, a substantial law of nature that can only be specified by reference to potential future manifestations. That's all there is. This is not about observability, but about the linguistic fact that extends it as far as the entailments of the dispositional predicates extend. (>Truthmaker).

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Mellor, D.H. Armstrong Vs Mellor, D.H. Arm II (b) 34
Strength/Objective opportunity/ArmstrongVsMellor/ArmstrongVsLewis: I believe that the concept of a prop that can only be described as that which constitutes a chance to have a lower level prop, is incoherent. But even if that is not the case, the postulation is a piece of unwanted metaphysics. Saving the ailing regularity theory with this is a weak motif. It has also greatly veered from the original regularity theory.
II (b) 35
MellorVsArmstrong/RamseyVsArmstrong: Mellor follows Ramsey: laws of nature should not be understood as a relation of universals. ArmstrongVsVs: one should not feel too ontologically sure about the introduction of objective opportunities, they are mysterious.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979
Nominalism Armstrong Vs Nominalism Arm III 81
Nominalism/Armstrong: some allow the existence of objective relations of similarity between particulars. But they cannot analyze them in terms of common property, because that would lead them to realism. (Lit: 1978(1), ch 5: ArmstrongVsNominalism). Vs: here: In his opinion there is nothing common of F and G. F is similar to all other Fs, but one other F also resembles many other things. The same applies to the Gs. It is doubtful whether this wavering reason is sufficient to provide the necessary uniform connection between being-F and being-G.

1. D. M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 vols, Cambridge 1978

Arm II (c) 97
Similarity/ArmstrongVsNominalism: if one, on the other hand, regards the situation in a way where similarity is analyzed in terms of identity: Martin and Armstrong: agree that one thing causes the things it causes by virtue (of a subset) of its properties.
If now causally effective property can also be identical between different instantiations, then one can explain why the same property produces the same effect in the same circumstances.
Schiffer I 234
Realism/Schiffer: Realism equates these two relations: 1. between name and object
2. between predicate and property.
Then we have a relation between Mother Teresa and modesty, the first instantiates the second.
Schiffer: this can be paraphrased:
(b) Mother Teresa has the quality of being modest.
Here the second singular term ((s) "property to be modest") has the same status as the first one.
NominalismVsRealism/Schiffer: reasonable (sensitive) nominalism denies all this.
FN I 288
The unreasonable nominalist takes the reference to properties too seriously. E.g. ArmstrongVsNominalism (Armstrong 1978), besides the exchange between Armstrong 1980, Devitt 1980, Quine 1980. (SchifferVsArmstrong)
I 235
Schiffer: there is no entity "the quality of being modest" that is related to "modest", as Mother Teresa is related to "Mother Teresa". Understanding/Schiffer: example (a) only requires knowledge (awareness) of Mother Teresa, not modesty.
Property/Schiffer: Thesis: Properties do not exist, they are not to be found among the things that really exist.
Existence/"there is"/Substitutional Quantification/sQ/Schiffer: nevertheless, the rational nominalist should be careful and not say "there is no quality to be modest".
Realism/Nominalism/Referential Quantification/Substitutional Quantification/Schiffer: the dispute arises over what kind of quantification is present in (b).
I 236
Nominalism: the apparent singular term refers to nothing at all. The "logical form" of (b) is not Fab

With "F" = "x has a", "a" for Mother Teresa, "b" for modesty.
But only
Fa.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Quine, W.V.O. Martin Vs Quine, W.V.O. Arm II 73
Unterscheidung/Martin: immer auf Basis von Eig nicht Objekten. Kinder und auch Erwachsene sehen davon ab, was die Eig hat. Auch wenn wir Objekte durch Raum Zeit Segmente oder Felder ersetzen sind die Eig das entscheidende, was man dort antrifft.
Eig sind dann immer noch mehr als bloße Mathematisierungen: Die Repräsentation von RZ Punkten braucht mehr als Zahlen oder Quantitäten.
Maß: jede Quantität ist von einer Eig!
MartinVsQuine: Vs dessen "Wither physical objects" ("Obj. austrocknen").
Bsp Martin: das folgende Bsp wurde in den 50er Jahren in Adelaide entwickelt und
II 74
in den früher 60ern in Harvard und Columbia weiterentwickelt. Dispo/MartinVsQuine: (Word and Object): Vs Gleichsetzung von Dispo mit (unmanifestierten) strukt. Eig mit angenommener manifestierter Dispo.
Bsp ein Fall von komischer geographischer Tatsache, die die raumzeitliche Verteilung von Elementarteilchen (ET) betrifft, Angenommen, es gibt ET isoliert in einer Region des Universums, so daß sie verschieden sind von denen in unserer eigenen Region und sie sind so entfernt, daß sie die vielen Dispo zur Interaktion niemals mit irgend etwas anderem im Universum entfalten. Sie ähneln aber nichts anderem im Universum.
disp/kat/MartinVsArmstrong: die Unterscheidung suggeriert, daß Dispo nicht real in dem Objekt seien.
MartinVsQuine: ein ergebener Quineaner sagte in einer Diskussion: "Und wenn Schweine Flügel hätten, würden sie fliegen". Ich sagte, dass wir beide nicht wüssten, ob das wahr ist und er wiederholte den Satz einfach. Ich hätte damals sagen sollen, dass Schweine dann immer noch nicht fliegen können.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Regularity Theory Armstrong Vs Regularity Theory Arm III 13
ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) extensional problems: A) Humean Regularity: there seem to be some that are not laws of nature. (H.R. = Humean regularity). That means being an H.R. is not sufficient for being a law of nature (LoN). B) LoN: there might be some that do not universally apply in time and space. There are also laws of probability. Neither of these two would be Humean regularities (H.R.). That means being an H.R. is not necessary for being an LoN. 2) "intensional" problems: Assuming there is a H.R. to which an LoN, corresponds, and the content of this regularity is the same as that of the law. Even then, there are reasons to assume that the law and the regularity are not identical.
Arm III 25
TooleyVsArmstrong: (see below): laws of nature which essentially involve individual things must be admitted as logically possible. Then it must be allowed that laws change from one cosmic epoch to the next. TooleyVsRegularity theory: for them it is a problem that only a narrow conceptual gap separates the cosmic epochs (i.e. H.R.) from just very widely extended regularities which are not cosmic anymore. Assuming there were no cosmic regularities (reg.), but extended ones would indeed exist, then it is logically compatible with all our observations. VsRegularity theory: how can it describe the situation in a way that there are a) no laws but extensive regularities? or b) that there are laws, but they do not have cosmic reach? The latter is more in line with the spirit of reg.th. III 27 VsReg. th.: it cannot assert that every local reg. is a law. III 52 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: makes induction irrational.
Arm III 159
ArmstrongVsIdealism: being forced to assume an unspecified absolute because of the requirement of the necessity of existence. There are no principles of deduction from the absolute downwards. There has never been a serious deduction of this kind.
Explanation/Armstrong: if the explanation has to stop shortly before coming to the absolute, then idealism must accept contingency. At what point should we accept contingency?
ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: it gives up too soon.
Universals theory: can the atomic bonds of universals be explained that we have assumed to be molecular uniformities?
Necessity/Armstrong: can only ever be asserted, it cannot be demonstrated or even be made plausible.
Arm III 53
Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God).
Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro.
III 54
The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself.
Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto).
He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life.
VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979
Shoemaker, S. Armstrong Vs Shoemaker, S. Arm III 161
Properties/Shoemaker: Thesis: what makes a property a prop. is its ability to contribute to the causal powers of the things that have this prop.
III 162
ArmstrongVsShoemaker: his argument seems to be his only one. In addition, from the premise that natural laws (LoN) are necessary it cannot be concluded that invalid properties are not prop. Could there not be prop. that are ineffective with nomic necessity? Or two different prop with the same linkages? >Identity Shoemaker: can only say here that we have no reason to accept that.
Properties/Reduction: but Shoemaker could defend his argument by saying that prop. are nothing more than nomic connections with other prop. Nomically empty ones are no prop. at all, then.
This is the position that prop. are purely forces.
ArmstrongVs: regress, because it also applies to other prop.
(s)VsArmstrong: E.g. The fact that computer files have "docking sites" ("hooks") does not lead to regress, either! Or e.g. the fact that viruses have hooks and receptor sites).
ArmstrongVsVs: but that only applies to the point of view that prop. consist of nothing other than the ability to enter into these relations.
Property/ArmstrongVsShoemaker: if no prop. is anything isolated, nothing logically independent of the system (nomic network)
III 163
Can it then turn into something by entering the system? (>Swinburne, 1980, S 313 29, see above, here: Chapter 8.3). ArmstrongVsShoemaker: if an ontology of pure forces is rejected, Shoemaker only has his epistemic argument.
But that is better this way than an unacceptable ontology. I want to show that the theory that LoN are necessary is ontologically unacceptable.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Supervenience Martin Vs Supervenience Arm II 73
Eigenschaften/Dispo/MartinVsArmstrong/VsPlace: nicht bloß strukturell, diese nicht allein für Dispo verantwortlich. Terminologie: statt "kategorisch" (disp) besser "qualitativ".
Martin: These: Vorteil, über Eig auf elementarer Basis zu sprechen (Elementarteilchen?), es gibt keine Debatte über Reduktion auf noch tiefere Ebene. (Nicht makroskopisch, nicht strukturell).
Eig/MartinVsSupervenienz: die Diskussion auf struktureller oder makroskopischer Ebene wird davon verdorben, daß man sich fragt, ob es Eig auf höherer Ebene gibt, das ist ontologisch
irreführend.
II 144
Teil/Ganzes/Ontologie/Martin: es muß selbst für den ontologisch Zurückhaltenden evident sein, daß die einfacheren Teile ,Eig, oder Rel gehen, auch die komplexeren Ganze folgen,
II 145
die aus den einfacheren bestehen. MartinVsSupervenienz: diesen Ausdruck sollte man vermeiden und direkt auf die Teil Ganzes Beziehung gehen. (Martin erwähnt nicht den Ausdruck >Mereologie).
Teile: als Teil des Ganzen sind sie nicht wirklich getrennt.
Wechselbeziehung: bringt eine Masse von Dispo, die niemals realisiert sind.
Ganzes: besteht aus den Teilen in ihrer Korrelation. Und deren Stabilität und den Graden dieser Stabilität.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Tooley, M. Lewis Vs Tooley, M. Schwarz I 119
Natural Laws/Law of Nature/Reductionism/LewisVsTooley: this is the price for anti-reductionist intuitions: it sounds nice and good that laws of nature do not supervene on local events, that our concepts of counterfactual truths and causality cannot be reduced to something outside. (Tooley 1987, 2003). Problem: the most obvious features of laws of nature become incomprehensible! Lewis: (as a reductionist) can explain why one can empirically discover the laws of nature, why physics is on the way to it, why it is useful to know the laws of nature, and why all Fs are Gs, if "all Fs are Gs" is a law of nature. As an anti-reductionist, one just has to acknowledge all this with humility.
Lewis: the assumption of a primitive modal fact which ensures that in every possible world in nature (F,G) exists, also all Fs are Gs, is obscure and almost pointless: if there is no possible world in which nature (F,G) exists, but some Fs are not G, then this must have an explanation, then the idea of such worlds must be somewhat incoherent. (see above 3,2): possible worlds cannot simply be missing.
Laws of nature/LewisVsArmstrong: perhaps better: regularities that are additionally blessed by a primitive relationship between universals, a relationship that also exists in possible worlds where the law of nature does not apply. That's even more obscure, but then it's at least no wonder that all Fs are Gs if a law of nature demands it.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Wittgenstein Place Vs Wittgenstein Arm II 55
PlaceVsWittgenstein/PlaceVsArmstrong: the world should not be regarded as a "world of facts" (Tractatus). Situations/Armstrong: are localized in space and time. Spacetime itself is a "big situation". (II 33/34) Conceptualism/PlaceVsArmstrong: thus understood space and time would be abstractions. But these are only linguistic fictions. Ontology/Place: everything that exists are certain spatial relations between particulars. Also relations within particulars. And between situations. Space/Time/Place: are only abbreviations for spatial, temporal and spatio-temporal relations. Spatial Relations/Place: exist between particulars. Temporal Relations/Place: not between particulars, but between situations.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Vs Behaviorism Armstrong, D.M. Fra I 592
Armstrong: thesis: Armstrong had presented a real alternative to behaviorism. RortyVsArmstrong: the alternative Materialism / behaviorism does not make sense, as it is set up by Armstrong.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Ontology Armstrong, D.M. Meixner I 78
Ontology/Logic/Meixner: controversial question: to what extent the logical form (composition) of expressions reflects an ontological fact or distinction. Armstrong: Thesis: Ontology depends on the logical structure.
MeixnerVsArmstrong: It is much more plausible that d the mere complexity of an expression should not decide the ontological nature, i.e. not how many occurrences of negation or disjunction, and other logical operators, are there.

Mei I
U. Meixner
Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004
Ontology Meixner, U. I 78
Ontology / Logic / Meixner: controversial question: how far the logical form (composition) of expressions reflects an ontological condition or distinction.   Armstrong: ontology depends on the logical structure.
  MeixnerVsArmstrong: it is much more plausible that the mere complexity of an expression should not decide on the ontological nature. It should not decide on how many occurrences of negation or disjunction, and other logical operators are there.
Counterfactual. Condit. Reichenbach, H. Fraassen I 118
Counterfactual Conditional/Natural Law/Reichenbach/Goodman/Hempel: Thesis: Counterfactual conditionals provide an objective criterion for what a law is, or at least a law-like statement. For only laws, but not general truths, imply counterfactual conditionals.
Wessel I 306
It is assumed that the truth of the unreal conditional sentences can be established independently of the law statement. However, this is usually difficult for unreal conditional sentences. WesselVsArmstrong/WesselVsLewis: thesis: the unreal conditional theorem depends on the real statement.
Legal statements support and guarantee the validity of corresponding unreal conditionals and not vice versa!

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999
Behaviorism Rorty, R. Fra I 592
Armstrong: he had presented a real alternative to behaviorism.   RortyVsArmstrong: the alternative MaterialismVsBehaviorism does not make sense, as it is set up by Armstrong.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994