Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Author Item Summary Meta data
I 63
Thought/Nagel: one cannot escape it - that is different than making marks on paper - I 65 therefore "add two" cannot be considered a naturalistic event - it cannot be considered separately from its contents - thinking is something else than making signs on paper. A naturalistic analysis of intentionality is not possible. (NagelVsSearle).
The fallacy lies in the idea that one could escape the thought "add two" and comprehend it as naturalistically describable event.
I 93 ff
Thinking: thinking takes precedence over its description, because its description necessarily presupposes thinking.
I 101
Nagel: our thinking always inevitably leads to a view point where "I" is no longer relevant. One cannot consider any thought type to be merely personal, unless one assumes a non-personal view point.
Rorty VI 147
Language/thinking/Nagel: NagelVsWittgenstein/Rorty: the limits of language are not the limits of thought.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-22