Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 63
Thought/Nagel: one cannot escape it - that is different than making marks on paper - I 65 therefore "add two" cannot be considered a naturalistic event - it cannot be considered separately from its contents - thinking is something else than making signs on paper. A naturalistic analysis of intentionality is not possible. (NagelVsSearle).
The fallacy lies in the idea that one could escape the thought "add two" and comprehend it as naturalistically describable event.
I 93 ff
Thinking: thinking takes precedence over its description, because its description necessarily presupposes thinking.
I 101
Nagel: our thinking always inevitably leads to a view point where "I" is no longer relevant. One cannot consider any thought type to be merely personal, unless one assumes a non-personal view point.
Rorty VI 147
Language/thinking/Nagel: NagelVsWittgenstein/Rorty: the limits of language are not the limits of thought.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28