Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Denotation, naming: specify a word or phrase for an object. Related terms description designation.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 334
Denoting/Frege: Thesis: Complete sentences denote - ((s) i.e. Sentences with unicorns are always wrong according to Frege - Kripke: Non-denotating forms: e.g. xy: a form, e.g.(Sx)xys: is implied by each of its instances: f1 > y, f2 ↔ y, f2> y, f1 and y, etc. - These are not even significant units - this is something other than transparency.
---
EMD II 352
If the terms of the object language are denoting, the meta language must include referential quantification.
---
EMD II 362
Denoting/Denotation/Kripke: Problem: if some terms denote and others do not, then they are not held apart by Q(t,a): Example (26c) Q(Zeus,Zeus) is just as true - ((s) Although Zeus denotes nothing.)
(19)(Px1)(E1a)(Q(x1,a1) and term(a1)) must therefore not be construed as referential and be read as everything is denoted by a term. Wallace makes this error: Everything has a name, which he uses to show triumphantly that the substitutional quantification collapses to referential quantification. (KripkeVsWallace). Q(Cicero,Tullius) is incorrect.
---
EMD II 362
Name/Denote/KripkeVsWallace: not everything needs to have a name - not every term denotes -(>Frege each sentence is denoting: ((s) all sentences with unicorns are false or without truth value).

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Denotation



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-24