Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Behaviorism: presupposes observable and observed behavior and derives predictions of further behavior from them. As few assumptions as possible about a mental inner life are used for explanation. See also mentalism, behavior, consciousness.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 115f
Behaviorism/VsRyle/Rorty: 1) It is impossible to give a description of behavioral dispositions which does not consist in an infinitely long list.
2) "Necessity", of whatever kind, does not depend on "meaning" here, but simply reflects the fact that we usually characterize behavior in a certain way. Necessity as little a "linguistic" or "conceptual" one as the necessary link between the redness of the stove and the fire in the stove. ((s) behavior depends on description.)
3) It is merely a philosophical paradox that only comes to the mind of someone who is chased by instrumentalist or verificationist dogmas, and is constantly eager to reduce any non-observable to the observable to avoid any risk to believe in something unreal.
I 115
Rorty: all three are justified, yet you get the feeling that the behaviorism is on to something right. But you will not say one day, "Okay, no feelings, i.e. no mental states, i.e. no people"
I 116
Behaviorism: Point: he makes it clear that the question of the harder philosophers: "Are there mental states or are there no mental states?" are thus more pointless the more often they are asked.
RortyVsRyle: he should have said that incorrigibility is simply a function of the practice of justification. It was wrong to speak of a necessary and sufficient condition for the attribution of feelings.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


> Counter arguments against Rorty
> Counter arguments in relation to Behaviorism

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-23